

The Venezuelan Experience: Successful Tariff Structure in Caracas 1993-1999

Special GWP Seminar in Water Pricing Stockholm August 1999

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
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
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Caracas' Water Utility



Water Rate



Analysis of Results



Hidrocapital - Characteristics of the water utility

Hidrocapital is the water utility serving 3.5 million people in Caracas and 1.0 million people the metropolitan area.

Venezuela










Population Serve
Total Dwelling U
In 10 K Building
In Residential U
In Social Units
In Illegal & Info





Population Served	3.5 Million in Caracas
Total Dwelling Units	685 Thousand
In 10 K Buildings	260 K
In Residential Units	132 K
In Social Units	43 K
In Illegal & Informal	250 K
	;

Number of connections	206 Thousand Registered 250 Thousand Illegal
Nater Production	505 Hm³/Yr in 1998
Capacity	25.000 liters per second
Nater Delivery	415 liters per capita per
	day

232 Hm³/ Yr in 1998 Water Sales Billing/Production 46% Collection/Billing 85%

Hidrocapital - Characteristics of the water utility

Hidrocapital's system is large, complex and expensive to operate

and maintain

Production



Treatment



Distribution



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6 Reservoirs

13 Major Pumping

Stations

50 Wells in the city

1.000 meters of elevation

180 Km of pipes up to 3m in diameter

1490 Hm³

500 MW

3 LargeTreatment plants

2 Small Treatment plants


25m³/sec

86 pumping stations in Caracas


2.500 Km of water pipes > 4"

2.000 Km of sewer and runoff pipes

The System is Complex



The System is Complex




Hidrocapital - Characteristics of the water utility

		Number		Billing		Collection	
	Type of Users	# of clients x 1000	%	10 ⁶ m/yr Billed		10 ⁶ m/yr Collected	% Collected /Billed
	Social	43	21%	16	7%	5	31%
	Residential	142	69%	140	60%	136	97%
	Industrial	3	1%	13	6%	13	100%
	Commercial	16	8%	46	20%	41	89%
	Governmental	2	1%	17	7%	2	12%
Š	Sub Total	206	100%	232	100%	197	85%
	Illegal & informal	250					


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
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Caracas' Water Utility





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Water Rate

- Key features
- Tariff Structure
- Tariff Increases
- Variations
- Rate Setting Procedure

Analysis of Results

Current Tariff Structure - Background

Motivation

- No More Goverment Fund Transfers
- Aborted Privatization Process

Objective \$ \$

- Cost Coverage
- Cost Coverage
- Cost Coverage

Context

- Lack of regulation
- Legal
- Institucional
- HighlyDiscretional

Methodologies Explored

Average Incremental Cost

Marginal Cost

Price Cap Benchamark ... or "Empresa Modelo" Average Referential Price


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Current Tariff Structure - Key Features

Venezuela's current water tariff structure was put in place April 14th, 1993 (Gaceta Oficial N° 35.190)

Key Features



- 1) Two parameters set the rate
 - ARP = Average Referential Price ARPs = Average Referential Price for social users
- 2) Cross Subsidies between users
- 3) Automatically indexed over time

ARP can change as a function of minimun wage, electric rate, cost of chemicals and the consumer price index




Current Tariff Structure - Coefficients

The coefficients provide discounts for social and residential sanitary uses (<15m³/month), penalize excess consumption and charge more for non

(13111 /111011till), penalize excess consumption and charge more for fion					
residenti	al usage Type of Users	Minimum 15 m³/mo	į l	1 st Excess 41-100 m³/mo	2nd Excess >100m/mo
	Social	0.5 ARPs	0.75 ARPs	1.5 ARP	2.0 ARP
	Residential	0.75 ARP	ARP	1.5 ARP	2.0 ARP
		Fixed Charge	Up to contracted "Dotación"	> Contracted "Dotación"	Dotación
	Ind A	1/6 dotación or 50m³/mo	2.05 ARP	3.25 ARP	m3 /month contracted
	Ind B	1/6 dotación or 40m³/mo	1.7 ARP	2.7 ARP	by the non residential
	Commercial	1/6 dotación or 30m³/mo	1.5 ARP	2.5 ARP	user


Current Tariff Structure - Increases in ARP

Rate increases are built into the Tariff resolution



Where a + b + c + d = 1.0 and reflect the cost structure of the water utility

Current Tariff Structure - Increases in ARP



Current Tariff Structure - Variations

Different Acqueducts can use different ARP

- f (cost of providing water service)
- f (population's ability to pay)
- f (population's willingness to pay Management)
- f (composition of residential Vs non residential users)

$ARP = \frac{Cost}{M^3}$


When you don't read the meter... You estimate!

- based on historic consumption
- based on regional studies
- •based on given table e.g. For residential users

Range	Single dwelling m³/mo	Multi dwelling m³mo
1	20	20
2	35	30
3	25	20
4	30	25
5	40	35
6	70	50




Rate setting Procedure



Rate setting Procedure

After 1993




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
Rate setting Procedure


After 1993




Tariff Evolution

Price of water increased x13 in Bs/m³ and x 3.5 in \$/m³








Impact On Cost Coverage

The impact on cost coverage has been significant...


Unit Operation and Maintenance Costs and Average Referential Price in Bs/m3





Impact On cost Coverage

There is still a long way to go... Comparing the break even rate with current rate






Impact on Consumption

Tariff increases have not changed total water billed






Notes

- Decrease in 1997 is due to severe drought conditions
- Over 80% of the water billed is estimated, no metered

Impact on Consumption - Sample Study

The sample consists of 316 clients with a reasonable record of metered consumption from 1993 to 1999


The distribution by type of use is:




Total Clients = 316




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Water Rate




Analysis of Results

- •Tariff evolution x 13 in Bs/m³ x 3.5 in \$/m³
- •Impact on cost coverage □□
- •Impact on consumption -=
- Regulatory vacuum



Impact on Consumption - Sample Results

Tariff increases have changed water consumption mainly in Multi-family dwellings and Industrial A




Advantages of a Regulatory Vacuum

The water sector in Venezuela has been enjoying a regulatory vacuum

Not Because of lack of laws and regulations

- Ley Orgánica de Administración
 Central
- Ley Orgánica de Régimen Municipal
- Ley de Protección al Consumidor
- •Decreto 2.186
- •Resolución tarifaria G.O 35.190



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Not Because of lack of **Actors**

- Central Government MARNR,MF,MSAS, CONGRESO.
- State Government Alcaldías, Cámaras, Mancomunidades
- Inos (R.I.P)
- Hidroven
- Hidro´s
- Private Operators
- Clients
 Jacobo Rubinstein

The vacuum is due to

- Long transition
- Lack of clear direction and leadership
- Conflict of competencies
- Responsibilities are fragmented and dispersed
- Inefficiencies in price and subsidies
- Lack of penalties for non compliance
- •Few incentives for private participation


Advantages of a Regulatory Vacuum

The advantages of the regulatory vacuum enjoyed from 1993 to

1999 include, among others, the following



Ability to increase tariff x 13 in Bs/m³ x 3.5 in \$/m³





Ability to explore diferent avenues of private participation

- Concession (R.I.P)
- Technical Assistance
- Outsourcing
- Strategic Alliances(?)



Low political interference

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
- Prevalence of sound technical criteria
- •Flexibility and speedy decision making process

Disadvantages of a Regulatory Vacuum

There are important disadvantages associated with the regulatory vacuum

Unclear rules of the game





 Unclear responsibilities and accountability

- Difficult to predict
- Highly discretional
- Highly unstable
- Too risky to invest

- Lack of concern for efficiency, quality and cost of service
- No penalties for non compliance



Conclusion

Tariff increases in Caracas

ΠHave improved the utility's financial condition ΠHave not reduced consumption significatively

 The regulatory vacuum made this tariff increase easier to accomplish

ΠLack of Regulation was far better than inappropriate Regulation

Lessons Learned






Develop abilities to manage customer's willingness to pay






Incentives to improve efficiency must be forced in place to balance pure price increases





Automatic and clearly agreed upon rules are much more transparent and efficient than discretionary negociation





Thank You!

