

THE BASTIS OF KARACHI

types and dynamics

LIBRARY
International Reference Centre
for Community Water Supply

Handwritten notes:
1. 11/11/77
2. 11/11/77
3. 11/11/77



Handwritten text:
LIBRARY
IRC International Water
and Sanitation Centre
Tel: +2170 60 636 30
Fax: +2170 55 825 35

JAN VA 822 PKUA 77
18218

802
PK.KA 77

THE BASIS OF KARACHI,
TYPES AND DYNAMICS.

UNIVERSITY
International Reference Centre
for Community Water Supply

Amsterdam 1977.

© 1977, copyright by the author.

VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT TE AMSTERDAM

289

THE BASTIS OF KARACHI,
TYPES AND DYNAMICS

Academisch proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor in
de sociale wetenschappen aan de Vrije Universiteit
te Amsterdam, op gezag van de rector magnificus
mr. J. de Ruiter, hoogleeraar in de
faculteit der rechtsgeleerdheid, in het openbaar te
verdedigen op vrijdag 1 april 1977 te 15.30 uur
in het hoofgebouw der universiteit, De Boelelaan 1105

door

JOHANNES JACOBUS VAN DER LINDEN

geboren te Utrecht

LIBRARY IRC

PO Box 93190, 2509 AD THE HAGUE

Tel.: +31 70 30 689 80

Fax: +31 70 35 899 64

BARCODE:

LO:

18218

822 PKKA77

LIBRARY

International Reference Centre
for Community Water Supply

17-25

Promotor : prof. dr. J.W. Schoorl

Coreferent: prof. J.F.C. Turner

"the key battle of urbanization
will have to be fought on the
emotional and intellectual rather
than the material plane."
(Mehta, A., The future of Indian
cities: national issues and goals.
In: Roy Turner (ed.) India's urban
future, p. 419
Univ. of California Press, 1962.)

Table of contents.

Table of Contents	i
Preface	vii
CHAPTER I: <u>The context</u>	3
I.1. Pakistan and Karachi	4
I.2. Housing in Karachi	5
I.2.1. Introduction	5
I.2.2. Some components of the housing market	6
I.2.3. Conclusion	14
CHAPTER II: <u>Some remarks and suggestions towards a better definition and a better typology of slums.</u>	15
II.1. Some definitions of and remarks on slums	16
II.2. Some definitions of and remarks on squatters and/or squatter settlements	19
II.3. On a definition of slum	21
II.3.1. The definition	25
II.4. On the typology of slums	25
II.4.1. A first dichotomy	25
II.4.2. Further categorization	29
II.4.2.1. Classic slums	29
II.4.2.2. Autonomous settlements	30
II.4.2.2.1. The passively urbanized villages	33
II.4.2.3. Conclusion	34
CHAPTER III: <u>A description of the general part of the research.</u>	36
III.1. The procedure	37
III.1.1. The population	37
III.1.2. The inventory	37
III.1.3. Defining settlements	38
III.1.3.1. Nomenclature	38
III.1.3.2. Demarcation	39
III.1.3.3. Definition of the unit	39
III.1.3.4. The problem of "regularized bastis"	41
III.2. The result	42
III.2.1. Problems of scale	42
III.2.2. Problems of time	43
III.2.3. Reduction	43
III.2.4. List of bastis of Karachi, with location on Map I	44
III.2.5. Information gathered	51

III.2.5.1.	Land ownership	52
III.2.5.2.	The age of bastis	52
III.2.5.3.	The ethnic affiliation	52
CHAPTER IV: <u>Security of tenure.</u>		54
IV.1.	Starting points, development of the research	55
IV.1.1.	The "anne-hope question"	56
IV.1.2.	Basis of hope	57
IV.2.	Twofold basis for hope	60
IV.2.1.	Signals from the authorities' side	61
IV.2.2.	Items that enhance the cause for legalization	66
IV.2.3.	Conclusion, bases for hope	70
IV.3.	Establishing levels of perceived security of tenure	72
IV.3.1.	Differences in security level between subgroups	81
CHAPTER V: <u>The condition of houses in autonomous settlements</u>		84
V.1.	Introductory remarks	85
V.2.	On the typology of houses in autonomous settlements	85
V.2.1.	Some current typologies of houses and definitions of the types	85
V.2.2.	The problem	86
V.2.3.	Quality of building materials, flow of the research and results	87
V.2.3.1.	Other materials	93
V.2.3.2.	The interior of the house	94
V.2.3.3.	House- and compoundwalls	94
V.2.3.4.	Doors	95
V.2.3.5.	Storeyed houses	96
V.2.3.6.	Other, observable criteria of quality	97
V.2.3.7.	Other, non-observable criteria of quality	97
V.2.3.8.	Recapitulation, typology of houses	98
V.3.	The development of houses per basti	100
V.3.1.	Sampling	100
V.3.2.	A profile of the condition of houses per basti; construction of an index	104

CHAPTER VI: <u>On the typology of bastis, general view</u>	114
VI.1. General view	116
CHAPTER VII: <u>On the typology of bastis: pre-partition settlements.</u>	120
VII.1. Justification	121
VII.2. A complication	121
VII.3. The characteristics of the goths	121
VII.3.1. The history	121
VII.3.2. The level of security of tenure	122
VII.3.3. The condition of the houses	124
VII.3.3.1. The difference between houses in goths and colonies	126
VII.3.3.1.1. Preliminary investigations and tentative hypotheses	126
VII.3.3.1.2. The hypotheses	131
VII.3.3.1.3. Flow of the research	131
VII.3.3.1.4. The sample	134
VII.3.3.1.5. Discussion	135
VII.3.3.1.6. The result	136
VII.3.3.1.7. Conclusion	150
VII.3.4. The occupational structure	151
VII.3.5. Other characteristics	153
VII.4. Further categorization of the goths	154
VII.4.1. Other criteria of integration	157
VII.5. Ilyas Goth, an example of a Karachi goth	158
CHAPTER VIII: <u>On the typology of bastis: post partition settlements, developing.</u>	161
VIII.1. Post partition settlements	162
VIII.2. Distinguishing developing and stagnating bastis	164
VIII.3. Developing bastis	167
VIII.3.1. Developing bastis in security level group 0 items: tentative squatter settlements	167
VIII.3.1.1. Profile of a tentative squatter settlement: Pathan Colony (Scheme 24)	168
VIII.3.2. Developing bastis in security level group 1 item: provisional squatter settlements	170
VIII.3.2.1. Provisional squatter settlements with continuous development	171

VIII.3.2.1.1.	Profile of a provisional squatter settlement with continuous development: Wahid Cololy	172
VIII.3.2.2.	Provisional squatter settlements with initial partial development	174
VIII.3.2.2.1.	Profile of a provisional squatter settlement with initial partial development: Faqir Col.	178
VIII.3.3.	Developing bastis in security level group 2 items: incipient squatter settlements	181
VIII.3.3.1.	Incipient squatter settlements with continuous development	181
VIII.3.3.1.1.	Profile of an incipient squatter settlement with continuous development: Rudad Nagar	182
VIII.3.3.2.	Incipient squatter settlements with initial partial development	185
VIII.3.3.2.1.	Profile of an incipient squatter settlement with initial partial development: Mujahid Colony (Jail-Drigh Road)	185
VIII.3.4.	Developing bastis in security level group 3 items: incomplete semi squatter settlements	188
VIII.3.4.1.	Incomplete semi squatter settlements with continuous development	188
VIII.3.4.1.1.	Profile of an incomplete semi squatter settlement with continuous development: Johar Colony	189
VIII.3.4.2.	Incomplete semi squatter settlements with initial partial development	191
VIII.3.4.2.1.	Profile of an incomplete semi squatter settlement with initial partial development: Swat Colony	193
VIII.3.5.	Developing bastis in security level group 4 items: complete semi squatter settlements	195
VIII.3.5.1.	Complete semi squatter settlements with continuous development	196
VIII.3.5.1.1.	Profile of a complete semi squatter settlement with continuous development: Angara Goth	197
VIII.3.5.2.	Complete semi squatter settlements with initial partial development	199
VIII.3.5.2.1.	Profile of a complete semi squatter settlement with initial partial development: Asif Colony	200
VIII.3.6.	Three more developing bastis	203
VIII.4.	Review of the developing bastis	205
VIII.4.1.	Some more details about developing bastis	209
VIII.4.1.1.	Improvement at the individual level	209
VIII.4.1.2.	The length of stay of inhabitants of the bastis	212

VIII.4.1.3.	The occupational profile	213
CHAPTER IV:	<u>On the typology of bastis: post partition settlements, stagnating.</u>	215
IX.1.	Stagnating bastis according to the level of security and physical development	217
IX.2.	Causes of stagnation	218
IX.2.1.	Bastis on land with (potential) other destinations	218
IX.2.2.	Bastis that - for physical reasons - can stay only partly or with great difficulty	223
IX.2.2.1.	Problematical lay-out: cause or effect?	225
IX.2.3.	Other bastis	231
IX.2.4.	Causes of stagnation: inherent or changeable?	231
IX.3.	Functions of the stagnating bastis	234
IX.3.1.	Possible functions of the stagnating bastis: hypothesises	234
IX.3.2.	Testing of the "transit-station" hypothesis	236
IX.3.3.	Testing of the "human dustbin" hypothesis	238
IX.4.	Stagnating bastis: review and conclusions	248
CHAPTER X:	<u>Some case studies of legalized and improved bastis.</u>	253
X.1.	A prefatory note	254
X.2.	Introduction	254
X.2.1.	Methodology	255
X.2.2.	Presentation	256
X.3.	Khuda Dad Colony	256
X.3.1.	The history	256
X.3.2.	Recent developments and present state	262
X.3.3.	Summary	264
X.4.	Delhi Colony	265
X.4.1.	History of Delhi Colony	265
X.4.2.	Present state of Delhi Colony	273
X.4.3.	Summary	275
X.5.	Liaqat Ashraf Colony	276
X.5.1.	History of Liaqat Ashraf Colony	276
X.5.2.	Present state of Liaqat Ashraf Colony	279
X.5.3.	Summary	281
X.6.	Conclusions	282

CHAPTER XI: <u>Main conclusions and some suggestions.</u>	285
XI.1. Conclusions	286
XI.2. Suggestions	286
XI.2.1. Slum improvement versus slum clearance	286
XI.2.1.1. Positive features of spontaneous settlements	287
XI.2.1.2. Negative aspects of slum clearance	291
XI.2.1.3. The impossibility of other alternatives	294
XI.2.1.4. The positive respons to improvement in existing settlements	298
XI.2.2. Some principal conclusions and further implications	299
XI.2.3. The standards problem	302
XI.2.4. Land policy	306
XI.2.5. Problems of decision; stagnating bastis	308
XI.2.6. Problems of execution	312
XI.2.7. Problems of future settlement of more low-income people in new settlements	313
XI.3. A final remark	314
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)	315
Literature quoted	320
APPENDIX I : List of abbreviations; List of Urdu words used, with clarification.	
APPENDIX II : Instructions for taking samples of dwellings in slum muhallahs.	
APPENDIX III: Condition of houses in 250 bastis of Karachi.	
APPENDIX IV : Questionnaire on functions of the house in goths and colonies.	
APPENDIX V : Data collected from different bastis.	

<u>MAPS.</u>	opp. page
Map I : Bastis of Karachi	44
Map II : Bastis of Karachi, landownership	52
Map III: Bastis of Karachi, age	52
Map IV : Goths, according to the percentage of houses of types IV, V and VI.	157

PREFACE

"hamari koi nahin sunta"
(Nobody listens to us.)
(From dozens of interviews, all over Karachi).

This study bears the marks of the way it has come about.

It began in Autumn 1971, when I asked myself some questions about the reasons why some slum dwellings have such a poor appearance and others such a good one.

On preliminary questioning, it soon appeared that the phenomenon of poor and good dwellings often occurs according to the basti (1) and that security of tenure plays such an important role in this that it is almost impossible to trace other factors when "security" cannot be kept constant.

During the same period, my colleagues in JRP-IV (2) and I were thinking about a practicable definition and framework for a typology of slums. Also, in the Project, attempts were being made to catalogue the bastis of Karachi. When taking these points together, it should be stressed that initially work on these different points was of a very tentative nature and there was no suggestion that at some time these points would coalesce in a meaningful whole. This has been the situation for a long time: on different occasions, the study had to be interrupted for shorter or longer periods; sometimes, we studied the one aspect, sometimes another, without always realizing their interconnections.

A part of the study has the character of an inventory, of a description. This applies to Chapter II in which we review some of the literature in an attempt to find a workable definition and to Chapter III in which we describe the inventory of bastis of Karachi.

At this stage, there were no hypotheses: I attempted to let the bastis of Karachi fit into a model with dynamic aspects, a model that could possibly reveal indications of trends, developments.

In order to use the model, a typology of "hope" and a typology of dwellings were needed. The development and application of these typologies have been described in Chapters IV and V.

Only after having gained much experience, and after letting the bastis fit into the frame of a model (which indeed revealed that clearcut types could be distinguished), could I start formulating hypotheses, as in Chapter VII.

The different types of bastis are subsequently described in Chapters VII, VIII and IX. Much in these chapters again is descriptive in nature.

In some cases small side studies were undertaken to get more insight into

1) basti - settlement (Cf III.1.3.3.)

2) Joint Research Project IV for Slumimprovement and Urban Development (a joint undertaking of the Pakistan and Netherlands governments, in which the Karachi University and the Free University of Amsterdam were charged with the execution of the project).

phenomena observed. Again, it should be noted that these phenomena (e.g. the differences between pre- and post partition settlements; the differences between developing bastis with continuous and with initial partial development) were never anticipated, but rather discovered. Only upon discovery, could hypotheses be formulated regarding the causes of such phenomena.

In Chapters VII, VIII and IX, trends come to light and on their basis, ideas can be formulated regarding aspects of a policy for bastis. In this connection, some supplementary studies were carried out in a few legalized bastis to observe the results of legalization. Although the legalized bastis investigated are far from representative of the average basti, from the case studies, points could be found that were of use in Chapter XI in which I summarize the main findings and make some suggestions for policy making.

Chapters II-V had - in some much rawer shape - appeared as separate cyclostyled papers. Chapters II-IX have appeared earlier as a report called "A typology of slums of Karachi". 3).

It was after the appearance of this report that I had the opportunity to study the subject more deeply, when Dr J.W. Schoorl of the Free University of Amsterdam applied for a subsidy from WOTRO. 4). Before the subsidy was granted, the Free University kept us in its service for a bridge period.

Thanks to all this, the earlier report could be much refined, revised and extended.

Also in Chapter XI, partly, we made use of two earlier papers on the subject. 5).

Throughout this study, I have frequently quoted from the literature on the relevant subjects. Namely, when studying this literature, I soon discovered that many of the phenomena found in Karachi are far from unique. When I quote from studies in which I have found parallels with the Karachi situation - or, sometimes, exact descriptions of it, which I would be unable to better - I do so for two reasons:

Firstly, because I think these quotations give a more secure base to my own findings and secondly because by showing how common are several of the features found in Karachi I hope to highlight the need for pooling and

3) Van der Linden, J.J., 1975.

4) WOTRO - Stichting Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek in de Tropen (Netherlands Foundation for the advancement of Tropical Research).

5) Van der Linden, J.J., 1973-B, 1976.

and exchanging information and experience so that repetition of mistakes might be minimized and solutions to problems posed might be found more quickly.

If not mentioned otherwise, translations and transcriptions into Roman script of Urdu words have been taken from Feroszons dictionary. 6).

The spelling of names of bastis, however, has been copied from various maps, documents and inscriptions in the bastis themselves.

The spelling therefore, is not always consistent: "Azeem" appears alongside "Azim"; "Moosa" and "Musa" and "Raksar" and "Rexer" are other examples of alternative spellings both of which we used. Of each individual basti, however, the name has been consistently spelled one way or the other. Even very dubious spellings have been retained, as in the case of "Ultri Maidan", which name probably is a corruption of "Artillery Maidan". Only in the case of "A.B.C.-nia Lines" have we gone back to the proper name "Abyssinia Lines" for that basti.

The study has been a very interesting and sometimes exciting exercise, although - at times - it was quite embarrassing as well.

Sometimes, I felt like the journalist making his notes during a fire, a war or after a grave accident. In all these instances, there can be a moment a sane journalist will drop his pen and paper and try to do something, but usually he will keep on making his notes - with somewhat mixed feelings. The comparison is not complete: firstly, because most of the time there was nothing to do for me; as I will show, most of the basti dwellers are quite capable of and take pride in helping themselves.

Secondly because of my own position: what can a foreigner do?

This last cause of inactivity has greatly added to the "mixed feelings".

There is a story about soldiers who, during the war, found themselves in a trench with very little ammunition left when the ennemy approached.

At the last moment, when the ennemy was about to destroy the whole trench, one man jumped out of it and shouted to the ennemy: "be careful! there are people in this trench!"

Again, I cannot compare myself with the hero of this story, but thinking of myself as a somewhat frustrated journalist, I may at least borrow the words from the hero and use them as a heading in my newspaper:

Be careful! There are people in these bastis - they do not have much ammunition!

The whole study has been quite labourious. I would never have been able

6) Feroszons Urdu-English Dictionary.

Lahore-Peshawar-Rawalpindi-Hyderabad-Karachi, 1950.

to carry it out without the help of the many people who assisted and advised me.

First of all, I want to mention my "promotor", Dr J.W. Schoorl of the Free University of Amsterdam who applied for a subsidy of WOTRO and who advised me from beginning to end in carrying out the study. Most of all I thank him for giving me the freedom and opportunity to find my own ways in this complicated field. To a somewhat individualistic person such as I think I am, Dr Schoorl's confidence was a major stimulus.

I thank my reader, Mr J.F.C. Turner of the London School of Environmental Studies, whose articles and books have been a constant source of inspiration during the lengthy process of making an inventory of over 250 bastis. In the final stage of the study, Mr Turner has also advised me and several of his remarks could still be incorporated in the study. I thank my colleagues of JRP.IV for their comments, their ideas and their own studies, from which I have often borrowed.

Dr C.J.J. Vermeulen of Amsterdam University advised me on the typology of security; Drs M. Reurink of the Free University of Amsterdam gave useful comments on the typology of dwellings. Drs H. Stronkhorst, also of the Free University of Amsterdam, gave extensive comments on the pre-publication and advised me on statistical matters.

I thank all those who - for shorter or longer periods - were my assistants: Miss Nilofur Hussein and Mr R.A. Chughtai who did much of the office and field work respectively; Messrs W.R. Bakhsh and Shamin Ahmed who initially drew the maps and diagrams, and Mr J.K. Berrens who put them into their final shape.

From among my helpers, I want to make special mention - without minimizing the invaluable assistance of others - of Mr Massod Ul Hassan, whose interest in people, even more than his enormous experience, his social qualities, devotion and intelligence, has produced information of extremely high quality.

I thank the officers of KMC, KDA and MPD who have always been very cooperative in discussing matters, and who were liberal in supplying information.

I thank Mr W.B. Baird who carried out a much-needed stylistic revision of the whole study. Mr Baird is not to be blamed if the English language used is far from beautiful: at my own request, he has left the original text intact as far as possible, and has only eliminated real errors and linguistic blunders.

The final typing of the manuscript was handled by Mrs Dineke Endeman-Oosterveld. I very much appreciate her care and accuracy in doing this job.

I am grateful to the Subfaculty of Social and Cultural Sciences of the Free University for offering me the use of its machinery to have the book printed.

I thank Jantien, my wife, who in her own, very personal way both directly and indirectly has greatly stimulated me, as have our children, Heleen, Renneke and Loesje ("Have you finally convinced them they should leave the huts as they are?")

Last but not least, I want to thank the hundreds of nameless basti dwellers, the Rafiqs and Shafiqs, the Sharifs and Hanifs, who were kind and patient enough to give me the information I needed, and who in addition have been my teachers in acquiring some wisdom and patience.

They often expressed their feeling that nobody listens to them.

It is hoped that this study - which I want to dedicate to the basti dwellers of Karachi - may vocalize both the needs and the potential of these people.

Utrecht, January 1977.

CHAPTER I

THE CONTEXT

"The potential and the problems of Pakistan's urbanization are highlighted in Karachi." ')

') MPD, 1974, p. 13.

I.1. Pakistan and Karachi.

Pakistan is presently going through a period of rapid population growth and urbanization. From 1951 - 1971, the population growth was calculated in the order of 2.7 to 2.9 per cent per year, and it may be as high as 3.3 per cent now. 1).

In the same period, the percentage of the urban population increased from 17% of the total population to 28% 2).

In these processes, Karachi has a prominent place: it is the largest city and the main industrial and commercial city of Pakistan.

In 1971, the city housed 5.8% of the total population and 20.8% of the total urban population of Pakistan. 3).

Its population may be estimated at a little under five million by the end of 1976.

The population growth of Karachi was extremely high during the period 1941-1951 (10% per year), which growth can be mainly attributed to an estimated 600.000 refugees from India. 4). It is estimated at around 5% now, and it is anticipated this will remain so until 1985. Even in case an active decentralization policy should be enforced, the population growth in Karachi will not be under 4.2% until 1985. 4).

The income distribution in 1973-1974 is shown in Table I.1.

Table I.1. Income distribution of Karachi's population, 1973-'74. 5).

Income in Rs (6).	% households
under 300	44.5
300 - 499	35.3
500 - 999	14.4
1000 - 1999	3.43
2000 -	2.28

We will call groups having a monthly household income under Rs 500. "low-income groups". Similarly, we will call those having monthly household

- 1) MPD, 1974, p. 1.
- 2) Segaar, T.J., 1975, p. 21.
- 3) id. p. 24.
- 4) id. p. 30.
- 5) MPD, 1974, p. 51.
- 6) Abbreviations and Urdu words will be clarified in footnotes only at their first appearance in the text; all abbreviations and Urdu words are also clarified in Appendix I.
Rs - Rupee (equivalent to 10 U.S. dollars approximately).

incomes of Rs 500 - Rs 999 and of Rs 1000 and above "middle-income groups" and "high-income groups" respectively.

It is forecasted that in the coming years a partial shift in this distribution will take place from lower to higher incomes. However, it is estimated that by 1985 still 64.5% of the incomes will still be below Rs 500. 7).

I.2. Housing in Karachi.

I.2.1. Introduction.

The ability and willingness of low-income groups to pay for housing and related services cannot easily be estimated as they do not depend on mere income. Other factors, like the security of income, the situation and the composition of the household and its priorities are at least as important as determinants of what the household can and will spend on housing.

Still, one figure may give some impression.

CSO national data indicate that income groups below Rs 500 per month spend approximately 15% of their incomes on housing, lighting and fuel, but should spend less, as they were also found to consume an insufficient diet of calories and nutritional value by minimum international standards. 8).

Although it cannot be sufficiently stressed that in certain situations low-income households can, and indeed do, spend a much higher percentage of their incomes on housing plus related services, the figure of 15% appears to indicate a sort of average ceiling of what is spent on housing. In other words, this figure - with all its shortcomings - gives some rough idea of what 75 to 50% of the Karachi population can afford to spend on housing.

At least, from this figure, it should be clear that the low-income groups have no access to the official private house market, and hardly to the government "low-cost" house market, as the following figures may show.

Table I.2.1. Unsubsidized prices and rents of "low-cost" house types in Karachi in 1973. (Cost of land not included). 9).

	Price	Monthly rent
2 room flat	Rs 10,000	± Rs 100.
2 room house	Rs 7,000	± Rs 70.

7) MPD, 1974, p. 51.; due to inflation, the actual figure may be different during time; its meaning will not.

8) MPD, 1974, p. 178; CSO - Central Statistical Office.

9) Segear, T.J., 1975, p. 46.

In conclusion, there is, in Karachi, a "housing problem" for low-income groups.

I.2.2. Some components of the housing market.

Land.

Karachi is a desert city. The greater part of its surroundings is populated extremely sparsely. This fact undoubtedly facilitates horizontal expansion of the city. The built-up area of Karachi in 1968 was comparable to that of cities like Tokyo and Moscow that housed more than twice as many inhabitants at the same time.

Most of the land in the urban area is in public ownership.

Only for defence purposes and under the control of the CB (10) are 29,000 acres of land within the built-up area of Karachi (approximately 27% of the built-up acreage in the Metropolitan Area). This land is being utilized at very low densities. 11).

Much of the remaining land is in ownership of national, provincial or local public agencies.

The system.

The KDA (12), as the major land development agency, allocates plots to individuals or areas to cooperative housing societies.

Commonly, 99 year leases are granted.

Individual plots and areas leased to housing societies tend to be large. 13).

The lessees often either do not have the means or do not want to develop their plots fully, so that the infrastructure provided is being under-utilized.

Regarding the housing societies, the MPD (14) report of 1974 mentions

"their history of bad management, incompetence and speculation." 15)

As a result, in 1969, there existed some 12,300 acres of developed vacant land in all schemes. Meanwhile, "public utilities and roads (are)

still being extended expensively into outlying areas in response to pressures that are primarily speculative." 16).

No doubt, all this also is a major reason for the enormous horizontal expansion of Karachi.

10) CB - Cantonment Board.

11) MPD - 1974, p. 21

12) KDA - Karachi Development Authority

13) MPD, 1974, p. 179

14) MPD - Master Plan Department (of KDA)

15) MPD, 1974, p. 200.

16) id. p. 21.

The geographical distribution of income groups and housing types. 17).

The geographical distribution of the different income groups over the city can be read from Map I.

The rich - i.e. those with incomes over Rs 1000. per month in 1970 - live mainly in three areas: Clifton, Defense Housing Society and PECHS with adjacent KDA-scheme I. 18).

The basic house type in these areas is the bungalow on a relatively large plot, measuring from a minimum of 200 to well over 2000 square yards.

The middle-income groups (i.e. those with monthly incomes between Rs 500 and Rs 999 in 1970) live in Saddar, Liaqatabad and Nazimabad.

Nazimabad and North Nazimabad house upper low-income groups as well.

Probably, the presence of several illegal low-income settlements and much sub-letting make for a low average monthly income in these areas which are typically middle income areas.

Saddar is the main shopping centre of the city. Housing in this area is found in rooms and apartments on top of shops and also in three- or four storied, relatively old houses.

Liaqatabad, Nazimabad and North Nazimabad are - in a way - copies of the area where the rich live. A large part of this area is occupied by small bungalows on plots measuring from 200 - 400 square yards. Closer to the city's centre, plots tend to be smaller (80 - 120 square yards) and often houses have been built in rows. Most of the houses have storeys that are often let for rent.

Also in Nazimabad, multistoreyed flat buildings have gone up recently.

Scattered over the city, the so called "quarters" can be found, in which employees of different public agencies - and sometimes private institutions - are housed. The police force, the army, the PWD (19), the PWR (20), the KMC (21) and many other agencies have housed some of

17) For information on the geographical distribution of income groups, use is made of data contained in a survey of MPD in 1970, which Segaar uses (Segaar, T.J., 1975, p. 36). On the basis of these data, the MPD has defined 53 zones with a defined median income.

By implication, when using these data, if we call an area "low income area", this does not exclude the occurrence of representatives of other income groups in such an area. With this rough description, we cannot aim at giving more than some impression of the geographical distribution of income groups and housing.

18) PECHS - Pakistan Employees Cooperative Housing Society.

19) PWD - Public Works Department.

20) PWR - Pakistan Western Railway, now: PR - Pakistan Railway.

21) KMC - Karachi Municipal Corporation.

their personnel in such quarters. The quarters are of different standards, mostly rows of houses having from 1 to 4 rooms; in some cases the quarters have the shape of (4-storeyed) flat buildings.

In these quarters, mainly low- and lower middle income groups are housed. Mostly, rents are calculated according to salaries and wages, as a fixed percentage.

"The Planning Commission, in their publication dating back to 1965, has been pointing out the unfairness and heavy cost of these programmes. The current programmes are unfair in that the people selected for available housing are greatly subsidized and the majority who do not have the housing supplied are therefore penalized." 22).

Likewise, in the years immediately after partition, similar (row-house) quarters were built for refugees under the programmes "Emergency Refugee Houses" and "Displaced Persons Colonies" (with a total of some 45,000 units) 23).

The rents of all this accommodation are relatively low. Reportedly, many of the allottees have let these quarters to third parties, whilst they have themselves moved to unauthorized colonies.

All the rest of Karachi is low-income area, the housing conditions of which we will describe in detail in the following chapters.

Besides the many unauthorized settlements, this area also includes Korangi, North Karachi and Orangi Township, which areas are planned low-income areas.

It is of interest to note that these planned low-income areas are situated far from the city's centre.

Finance.

Low-income people hardly have any possibility to settle legally.

This is one more reason for them to be excluded from formal ways of obtaining loans for house building.

The HBFC (24), a state-sponsored institution that provides loans for house building, does not give loans for building on unauthorized plots.

It is of interest to note that the average loan per unit, given by the HBFC in the period 1/VII/'74 - 31/XII/'75 amounted Rs 27,000. 25).

"The fact however remains that the (HBF) Corporation as well as commercial banks have only been able to help middle and lower middle income families and rules and recovery difficulties have not allowed any assistance to the very low income group for low cost housing." 26).

22) MPD, 1974, p. 182.

23) Segaar, T.J., p. 42.

24) HBCF - House Building Finance Corporation.

25) HBFC, 1975.

26) Kazmi, S.A., 1975, p. 19.

Moreover, in view of the importance of the house as an asset of security, it is to be doubted whether many low-income people would be interested in obtaining loans from institutionalized sources (Cf VII.3.3.1.7.).

Van der Harst found that almost 50% of the low-income houses had come about with the help of (small) loans (over 60% of these loans amounted to less than Rs 1000.).

Sources from which loans were obtained, were mainly friends and relatives (69%), employers (39%) and suppliers of building materials (18%). 27).

On the whole, the low-income groups have been confined to informal ways of financing their house building, as they found informal ways to settle. It is of interest to note that these informal ways are apparently being found on a large scale.

The role of the Government.

It is difficult to describe "the" role of "the" Government regarding the housing situation in Karachi. Beside National and Provincial authorities, at the local level, there are over 60 Government- and semi-Government organizations involved in planning and execution in the fields of public works, house building, services and economic development. 28).

This brief review is not the place to describe their interrelations and structure in detail.

Generally speaking, the coordination of all these organizations is poor. As a result, many of the tendencies one might discover are not completely consistent. In almost every instance, a counter-tendency can also be found. What remains as a main characteristic is that there has been no consistent overall policy. Thus, for instance, the attitudes and policies regarding unauthorized settlements vary greatly (Cf III.2.5.1.; IV.3.1. and IX.2.1.).

A typical, present-day example is the Jacob Lines Redevelopment Scheme which envisages rehousing of inhabitants of "illegal colonies" in flats, whilst both the Subcommittee to the Housing Committee of the (Federal) Ministry of Production and Presidential Affairs implicitly, and the MPD explicitly disapprove of this scheme. 29).

Under an ordinance of 1972, a Karachi Metropolitan Corporation should be established, in which several main institutions that presently deal with planning and execution, would be merged.

This Corporation has not come into existence yet.

27) Van der Harst, J., 1974-8, pp. 57-61.

28) Segaar, T.J., 1975, p. 27.

29) MPD, 1974, pp 179-180 and p. 191 resp.

When, in the following pages, we attempt to describe some important aspects of "the" policy and its execution, these facts should be remembered.

For a long time, the Government has not recognized the informal system of low-income housing and has attempted to remove the illegal settlements. As main reasons for this attitude, Segaar mentions:

- a) the danger to public health these settlements pose.
- b) their (perceivedly) unaesthetic appearance which sometimes affects the quality of the immediate surroundings.
- c) their occupying economically valuable land that can be more profitably used.
- d) their occupying land that is needed for other more urgent purposes.
- e) their illegal status: the dwellers have no (formal) right to occupy the land they live on. 30).

It is difficult to estimate the effect of the Government's attempts to remove the "illegal settlements". One may argue that these attempts have absolutely failed to attain the purpose as the number of illegal dwellers has only further increased.

"The Government has tried for many years to resettle population from jhuggi areas. Over 10.000 jhuggi huts have been removed, but still their number is increasing." 31).

However, we do not know how much more it would have increased, had there been no such attempts from the Government's side.

Whatever be the case, the Government's attempts have not been convincingly successful, as may appear from a brief review of the different attempts made.

- a) Simple bulldozing.

This method was applied in many "illegal settlements" of Karachi. In most cases, the inhabitants, having little choice, settled again on the same spot, or in another, close by colony. Quite often, the inhabitants managed to stop the bulldozer by legal or illegal actions. Examples can be found from our case studies (Cf Chapters VIII and X).

- b) Bulldozing plus offering an alternative house.

For this purpose plans were made and partly executed to build satellite townships: Korangi and North Karachi, with a planned population of 400,000 and 200,000 respectively.

When, in 1964, 45,000 dwelling units had been built (i.e. somewhat

30) Segaar, T.J., 1975, p. 47.

31) MPD, 1974, p. 183, jhuggi - hut.

less than 50% of the total planned), this programme was discontinued because it could no longer be financed.

"In Korangi and North Karachi only 7 crores (32) have been realized and Rs 11.62 crores are in default in spite of the fact that both these projects were heavily subsidized." 33).

One of the reasons for this lies in the location of both projects far from the city. This entails high expenditure on transport.

In fact, many of the resettled people came back to the city to settle again in an illegal colony.

c) Bulldozing plus offering an alternative plot.

After the "Resettlement Programme" (Korangi and North Karachi) had been stopped, a much more realistic attempt was made to resettle inhabitants of demolished unauthorized structures in "plot townships", viz. Baldia, Orangi and Qasba.

Here, the planned service level was much more modest: instead of house-to house water connections (as in Korangi and North Karachi), community standpipes were planned.

Also the plot area in these townships is smaller than in Korangi (80 square yards instead of 120 square yards).

To some extent these plot townships have been a success. However, they could by no means cater for all the needs: in the 4-year period 1965-1969, only 16,000 plots were distributed. 34).

Although the relatively low service level is often quoted as a main reason for the limited success of the plot townships (35), there is reason to believe that other factors have at least been as influential.

For example, it is worth noting that adjacent to all the three townships illegal settlements have come up and developed quite successfully, although having a still lower service level.

The legal nature of the plot townships made them enter into the official market mechanism. For this reason, the sites became interesting for middle income groups who generally are not attracted by the prospect of buying illegal plots. As a result, prices of these legal plots rose and the plots became attractive objects of speculation.

For a long period, there was a quite elevated number of not built-on plots in the "legal" parts of Baldia and Orangi, which fact may be explained as an indication that speculation took place.

32) crore - 10,000,000.

33) MPD, 1974, p. 178

34) KDA, 1969.

35) Segaar, T.J., 1975, p. 45; MPD, 1974, p. 184.

An additional reason may be the relatively small numbers of plots distributed (average 4,000 per year).

Alternative plots were also offered in the not built-upon parts of North Karachi and Korangi, where - again - the high transport costs made the site unattractive to many of the allottees.

To some extent, this same reason may also apply to involuntary allottees of plots in Baldia, Orangi and Qasba.

Although the location of these townships (closer to the central city and close to the main industrial area) is much more favorable than that of Korangi and North Karachi, it may not be attractive to those who were forcibly shifted from places in the centre of the city, where in fact most of the demolition of illegal houses took place.

As a result of all this: "KDA notes that about 50% of the households leave the open plot site after resettlement." 36).

Sometimes, when inhabitants of illegal colonies are removed, the authorities indicate that occupying a plot in a specific "illegal" colony will not meet objections from their side. (For examples, cf. Chapters VIII, especially VIII.3.2.2., and X).

As the location of such colonies is often convenient and as prices of land in such colonies tend to be much lower than in the plot townships, this solution appears to work reasonably well.

It should be noted that this system is quite unofficial, which may well be the very reason for its relative success.

d) On the spot rehousing in flats.

This proposed solution is presently being (partly) executed in the Jacob Lines area. Weijs has sufficiently demonstrated that this project will not fulfill the purpose as the proposed flats will be much too expensive for the target group. 37).

As in other similar cases (flats in Lyari for rehousing flood affected people; 1700 KDA flats for industrial workers, built in 1971/'72), the flats are too expensive without heavy subsidies and procedures of allocation, realizing of rents, etc. are lacking, so that for a long time the flats remain vacant. 38).

Besides, once inhabited, it is expected (also by the prospective dwellers) that several of the allottees will sell or let their flats and go squatting somewhere else, fetching the difference between the

36) MPD, 1974, p. 184.

37) Weijs, M.H., 1975.

38) Segaar, T.J., 1975, p. 46; MPD, 1974, p. 182.

subsidized rent and the market value, i.e. the subsidy. 39).

e) Legalizing of existing illegal settlements.

Until now, this has been done in very exceptional cases only.

In Chapter X, we will describe some of these cases which are not very typical of the average unauthorized settlement in Karachi.

Presently, both from the side of the Federal Government (40) and the MPD (41) this solution is emphasized and KMC is in the process of adopting a new approach to the solution of problems of unauthorized settlements (42) and has even started to experiment with this approach in Lyari. 43).

Some of the important details in this approach have yet to be defined. A main problem in the adoption of this approach is that the land of the settlements, once legalized, enters into a much wider market than illegally occupied land would do. As a result, prices of land rise sharply and there is a danger that the right of dwelling for the most needy sections of the population cannot be sufficiently protected.

f) Site and service project.

Presently, KDA is executing a "Site- and service project", called "Metroville". The location of this first Metroville is convenient, as it is located next to the main industrial area of Karachi. 5000 plots - for the greater part measuring 80 square yards - are provided with a "wet wall". Every plot has connections to water-supply, electricity, gas and sewerage.

The prices of the plots with "wet walls" will be close to Rs 40. per square yard. Again, the high service level and the implied high price will exclude the real low-income groups from making use of this offered alternative.

For some reason, the proposed (cheaper) component of Open Plot Development (44) has not been included in the first Metroville.

Besides, until now, the number of plots delivered is very limited. Instead of the target scale of 40,000. plots per year (44),

39) Weijs, M.H., 1975, p. 42.

40) MPD, 1974, pp. 179-180.

41) idem, pp. 183-184.

42) KMC, 1976.

43) KMC, 1975.

44) MPD, 1974, p. 338

in the last two and a half years, approximately 5,000 plots have been developed, but are not yet dwelt upon.

Typically, none of the 200 interviewees in Weijs' study had ever heard of, and hardly any of them showed any interest in the Metroville. It should be noted that these interviewees live in the Jacob Lines Area, the houses of which are proposed to be demolished and replaced by flats which the majority of the inhabitants are unable to pay for. Thus, these people could constitute a potential target group for a site- and service project.

"Those classes of people most in need of it seem to be much less familiar with the program than is supposed by the authorities.

..... only 24.5% of our informants would be willing to go (to the Metroville, JL) if necessary. Some of them only because they would obey the Government through lack of alternatives." 45).

I.2.3. Conclusion.

In its development plan, the MPD concludes:

"The low-income groups are denied access to housing credit, cannot obtain plots in locations of their need and are subjected to resettlement and harassment when they live in unauthorized areas." 46).

From the above review, it appears that this conclusion holds true as far as officially recognized and legal ways and means are concerned. However, the low-income groups often manage to deal with the situation quite successfully in informal and sometimes illegal ways. For this reason the picture is not as bleak as the above quotation would suggest.

In later chapters, we will describe in some detail how the low-income groups deal with the situation.

45) Weijs, M.H. 1975, p. 44.

46) MPD, 1974, p. 196.

CHAPTER II

SOME REMARKS AND SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS A BETTER DEFINITION
AND A BETTER TYPOLOGY OF SLUMS.

"Indeed, the failure to distinguish different kinds of areas of poor housing from one another is a major source of difficulty in clarifying the problem of poverty and of housing among low-status people." ')

') Fried, M. and J. Levin, 1968, p. 60

II.1. Some definitions of and remarks on slums

In this and the next paragraph, we will review a number of definitions of and remarks on slums, squatter settlements and squatters.

After this review, we will try to analyse the definitions and to formulate a definition, practicable for the purpose of our study.

When we use the word slum, we do so for want of an other expression that is equally universally understandable.

The disadvantage of using the word, however, is, that to many, the word "slum" is strongly (negative-) value loaded.

As we will show in this study, often this is not justified. The reader is therefore invited to forget all the connotations of the term until a definition is formulated. A slum does not necessarily constitute a problem; under circumstances, it may well be an - even good - solution to problems, as we will explain in the relevant chapters (for instance, cf. Ch. VIII)

SLUM:

- Residential areas that are physically and socially deteriorated and in which satisfactory family life is impossible. Bad housing is a major index of slum conditions. 1).
- A street, alley, court, etc. situated in a crowded district of a town or city and inhabited by people of a low class or by the very poor; a number of these streets or courts forming a thickly populated neighborhood or district of a squalid and wretched character. 2).
- A thickly populated, squalid part of a city, inhabited by the poorest people. 3)
- A building, group of buildings or area characterized by overcrowding, deterioration, unsanitary conditions or absence of facilities which, because of these conditions or any of them, endanger the health, safety or morals of its inhabitants or the community. 4).
- An urban settlement, generally unplanned, legally or illegally inhabited by underprivileged or low socio-economic class of people, and characterized by unsanitary conditions, overcrowding, makeshift, deteriorated or deteriorating dwellings, either completely lacking or with facilities and amenities far below the minimum acceptable standards of the city; thus predisposing the area as hazardous to the physical and social well-being for its inhabitants. 5).
- Houses that are so dilapidated and congested that the condition poses a health, fire, vice and crime hazard not only to those who live in the slums, but to the whole urban community as well. 6).
- Areas with poor housing. (.....) poor housing may but need not be associated with social pathology. 7).
- The slum is a building that is old, decrepit, and lacks essential amenities. 8).
-that the condition of the land, huts or other structures in an area is such that the continued existence of such conditions would be injurious to public health or safety, or to the health, hygiene or morals of the inhabitants of such an area, it may declare such an area to be a slum. 9).

- 1) Encyclopaedia Britannica.
- 2) Oxford English Dictionary.
- 3) American College Dictionary.
- 4) Anderson, N., 1960, p. 191, quoting a U.N. report.
- 5) Sandani, G.M., 1971.
- 6) Special Committee of the National Housing Council (Philippines), 1969, p.29.
- 7) Fried, M. and J. Levin, 1968, p. 79
- 8) Abrams, C., 1969, p. 35
- 9) The West Bengal Slum Areas Act, 1971, p. 396c.

- Residential structures and districts should be defined as slums only if they have been proven to be physically, socially or emotionally harmful to their residents or to the larger community. 10).
- Broadly we may define "slum" as an area where general housing and living conditions are so dilapidated, unhealthy and dangerous that the conduct and growth of safe healthy and normal life becomes difficult. 11).
- A slum can be defined as chaotically occupied, unsystematically developed and generally neglected, overpopulated and overcrowded with ill repaired and neglected structures, insufficiently equipped with proper communications and physical comforts and inadequately being supplied with social services and welfare agencies to deal with the economic and social problems of families who are victims of biological, psychological and social consequences of the physical and social environment. 12).
- A residential area which provides housing possibilities at a very low cost for those persons who take the initiative to construct their own house or for those persons who are only able to pay a low rent for a substandard house in an environment with insufficient public facilities. 13).
- A residential area of which the majority of dwellings are juggis, kucha or semipucca, built close together in an unplanned way with insufficient public facilities or amenities, sometimes located in danger spots, such as riverbeds, often overcrowded and congested with a population of which the majority belongs to the lowest social economic class of the society. 14).
- The slum is the house of the poor and the stranger. The distinctive feature of slums, is not appearance as such, then, but the relation between the slum and its inhabitants and that neighborhood and its inhabitants which the city regards as having met minimum livability standards. 15).
- Although a slum is generally characterized by inadequate housing, deficient facilities, overcrowding and congestion, it involves much more than these elements; sociologically it is a way of life, a subculture, with a set of norms and values which is reflected in poor sanitation and health practices, deviant behavior and characteristic attributes of apathy and social isolation. 16).
- Normally it is used to denote an area of very inferior housing in which there is a high incidence of social pathology. I am using the word slum here to denote an area that serves to receive unacculturated immigrants of low income, and in which they remain during the period of acculturation to urban life; that is the reference is to the function of the area in the urban system, rather than to its quality. 17).

10) Gans, H.J., 1962, p. 309.

11) Shibli, K, Ch. Salimullah, and others, 1965.

12) Report of the seminar on slumclearance, Bombay, 1957, cit. in J.H. de Goede, 1971, p. 2.

13) de Goede, J.H., 1971, p. 5.

14) Definition adopted by JRP-IV for its General Survey of slums of Karachi, 197

15) Stokes, C.J., 1962, p.187.

16) Clinard, M.B., 1962, p. 3

17) Alonso, W., 1964, p. 168.

- Too often the slums of the world are all regarded as housing the same kind of people, whether the slum is a newly made barriada or an ancient bazar or basti..... A slum that is a ghetto is not the same kind of nursery as, for instance, a newly built squatter town. 18).
- Any area (where) the buildings in that area
 - a) are in any respect unfit for human habitation; or
 - b) are by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangement and design of such buildings, narrowness or faulty arrangement of streets, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities, or any combination of these factors detrimental to safety, health or morals. 19).
- Groszstädtische Substandard-Wohngebiete, die von rassisch, ethnisch, religiös, wirtschaftlich, sozial und/oder juristisch stark unterprivilegierten Gruppen bewohnt werden. 20).

II.2. Some definitions of and remarks on squatters and/or squatter settlements.

- Squatter settlements are seldom one-class communities, 21).
- A squatter is a person who settles on new, especially public land without title, a person who takes unauthorized possession of unoccupied premises. 22).
- Squatter was used in rustic England and in America as a term of contempt for persons with small claim to a fixed place of living.... In Australia it signified: one who had gone out to the unoccupied territories and had there without official sanction built a hut..... 23).
- 1. (U.S.) A settler having no normal or legal title to the land occupied by him.
2. (Austr.) One occupying a tract of pastoral land as a tenant of the crown. 24).
- Squatting is primarily a legal concept and involves the occupancy of a piece of land or building without the permission of the owner. As a violation of property rights it is punishable under our laws. 25).
- That class of shelterless people who moved during day, but slept at night in open spaces or on street pavements. 26).
-is used to describe people occupying land or premises belonging to somebody else without his authorization. 27).

18) Ekistics, report by a consultant, 1965, p. 326.

19) Working Group on slums, undated, p. 1.

20) Blenck, J., 1974, p. 311.

21) Mangin, W., 1967 A, p. 65.

22) Concise Oxford Dictionary.

23) Australia Encyclopaedia.

24) Oxford English Dictionary.

25) Special Committee of the National Housing Council (Philippines) 1969, p. 29.

26) KDA, 1965, p. 59

27) Jedraszko, A.B., 1966, p. 76.

- By uncontrolled urban settlement we mean urban settlement, whatever its duration or expectations may be, that takes place independently of the authorities charged with the control of local building and planning. 28).
- The urban squatters.....are illegal occupants of urban land, whether government or private property. 29).
- (the term "squatter settlement" refers to) predominantly residential areas whose only uniform identifying characteristics are their illegal and unordered origins by accretive or organized invasion and because of their origin, their continued juridically ambiguous status as settlements. 30)
- Squatters are illegal land occupants. 31).
- A squatter shall be defined here as a person who settles on land without a legal title or right to it. 32).
- The squatter - when his tenure is secure enough to risk investment in permanent structures - builds..... 33).
- Some of these squatters are in fact only semi-squatters, since they do have some claim to the land they occupy or they genuinely tend to move on and are at least tacitly approved by the authorities who realize these intentions. 34).
- Les habitants sont des squatters, n'ayant aucun droit sur le terrain où ils ont élevé leurs baraques. l'Occupant peut payer un loyer peu élevé au propriétaire du terrain, ou obtenir de l'état la reconnaissance de son droit d'occupation. 35).
-some were squatters who tried to live rent free in vacant buildings. 36).
- A "barriada" (37). is a community of residents which has sufficient organization and leadership to have requested and received formal recognition by the Peruvian government. 38).
- Organized squatters-housing: the principle consists in laying out an area..39).
- The result of this new approach has been the implementation of what, in fact, are government squatter settlements. 40).
- Most people regard them as violators of property rights, since they have taken possession of land that is not theirs. 41).

28) Turner, J.F.C., 1967, p. 11.

29) Juppenlatz, M., 1970, p. 12.

30) Leeds, A., 1969, p. 44.

31) Angel, S. and S. Benjamin, 1976, p. 24

32) Enche Ali Ben Esa, 1971, p. 98.

33) Turner, J.F.C., 1969A, p. 43.

34) U.N., 1971, p. 76.

35) Raymaeckers, P., 1964, p. 179.

36) Gans, H.J., 1962, p. 9.

37) "barriada" is equivalent to a type of squattersettlement, cf Turner, 1965, p.

38) Dietz, A.G.H., M.N. Koth and J.A. Silva, 1965, p. 23.

39) Emery, P.A., 1963, p. 271.

40) Portes, A., 1972, p. 180.

41) Poethig, R.P., 1972, p. 388.

- The erection of fresh jhuggis will be dealt with as a serious criminal offence, punishable by at least one year rigorous imprisonment. 42).

II.3. On a definition of slums.

If one studies the list of definitions of slums and in addition one keeps in mind that many authors have formulated no definition at all, one cannot but conclude that it is extremely difficult to give a good definition of a slum. It seems that the difficulties in formulating a good definition mainly arise from three causes.

1. There are two broad type-groups of slums which will be treated below in further detail, but which, for the time being, can be referred to as:

- a) the old central city slums, characterized by physical deterioration, which we may call "old slums", or "classic slums".
- b) younger slums, mostly situated towards the periphery of towns or cities, where physical deterioration certainly is no constant characteristic. For the time being, we may call these slums "squatter settlements" or "autonomous settlements".

Some of the definitions quoted in the above list evidently refer only to the first type group (e.g. Anderson, Special Committee Housing Council, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Abrams) and are for this reason not very convincing, for very often, in the literature, both types are referred to as slums (Clinard, Casasco (43). Gans, and many others).

It is clear that a definition should comprise both types, in order to match colloquial speech as well as a main part of the existing literature on the subject. This problem has been recognized before by Samdani who, accordingly, mentions in his definition: "Makeshift, deteriorating or deteriorated dwellings".

2. Many of the definitions try to go further and mention characteristics of the slum dwellers besides the mere indication of negative aspects in the physical conditions - about which all authors agree. The clearest example of this is perhaps M.B. Clinard's description of a slum:

Although a slum is generally characterized by inadequate housing, deficient facilities, overcrowding and congestion, it involves much more than these elements: sociologically, it is a "way of life", a "subculture", with a set of norms and values which is reflected in poor sanitation and health practices, deviant behaviour and characteristic attributes of apathy and social isolation". 44).

42) Ali, A., A, Mahmood, A.K. Barwa, and Z.A. Nezami, 1969, p. 5.

43) Casasco, J.A., 1969.

44) Clinard, M.B., 1962, p. 3.

In descriptions like this one, it seems as though no reckoning is kept with the above mentioned broad type-groups, each of which may have its own specific sociological characteristics that may well take polar positions. Various authors make this clear in their typologies. De Maëonseul distinguishes between "the slum" (meaning the classic slum) that "houses the urban failure", and "shanty towns: ... an attempt made by bold and gallant men attracted by the best and the worst in the big city". 45). Stokes distinguishes between "slums of hope" and "slums of despair". 46). Gans mentions "urban villages" versus "urban jungle". 47).

An U.N.-report says about this: "

A distinction should be made between the dead-end slums, those with a minimum of economic potential where old and socially unadapted people live, and the open-end slums composed of relatively young families with potential for economic growth". 48).

Moreover, the type-groups in themselves are so broad that it seems questionable whether anything relevant about the inhabitants could be said before a more detailed subdivision has been made.

Thus, for instance, Stokes (46) subdivides both his groups ("hope" - "despair") into two categories each, according to the concept-pair "escalator - nonescalator". Seeley distinguishes twelve types of slum dwellers, starting from the two dichotomies "permanent - temporary" (probably partly matching the two above indicated broad type-groups) and "necessity - opportunity". Amongst other groups of slum dwellers, Seeley mentions "the indolent", "the entrepreneurs", "the fugitives" and "the trapped". 49).

One may wonder what sociological, psychological or even economic characteristics these groups would have in common. It would be as complicated to attempt a sociological, or socio-psychological meaning to a simple but broad concept like "wood". The frequent occurrence, in the definitions, of terms like "generally", "sometimes", "often" and "or" is indicative of attempts of this kind.

As a result, many of the definitions that mention characteristics of the slum dwellers are vague and unspecific where these slum dwellers are concerned.

45) Quoted by P.A. Emery, 1963, p. 269.

46) Stokes, C.J., 1962.

47) Gans, H.J., 1962.

48) U.N., Ec. & Soc. Affairs, 1971, p. 10.

49) Seeley, J.R., 1966, pp 409 and onwards.

If, on the other hand, the definition is confined to the physical factors - namely what is considered to be the bad state of housing, then the conditions necessary and sufficient for a definition have been met: although we may agree that "it involves more than these elements", still there are no residential areas with substandard housing but they are called slums, and there is no slum but where there is substandard housing.

What, however, should be understood by the word "housing"?

It should be noted in this connection that "the housing problem should no longer be seen in terms of the housing unit, but in terms of the total environment in which the individual lives"..... "the real problem is not the housing unit.....but the uncollected human wastes, the polluted stagnant water which does not drain away, the inadequate water supply, the dark unlit lanes, the litter and the filth, the non-existence of community services..." 50).

We may conclude that slums should be exclusively defined in terms of housing inadequacy, where housing should be understood - as quoted above - in its broadest sense.

3. A third difficulty is, that - if a definition is to have practical application-standards have to be indicated so as to decide what should be considered as "inadequate". In this connection, many authors - among them Turner (51) and Gans (52) - reject the use of standards derived from upper and middle class values, a bias often attributed to the fact that a main part of the staff of government institutions has been recruited from classes where such values prevail.

In addition, because of the differences in climate and in the level of development, the meaning of "adequate" and "inadequate" may vary widely. Stokes tries to solve this problem by using the expression:

"which the city regards as (not) having met minimum livability standards". 53).

Thus, Stokes relates standards to local circumstances. Here also, there is a danger that local authorities may act as a pars pro toto for the city. In theory one could imagine a hypothetical city consisting entirely of the worst type of hovels. Here standards would tend to become very low. The problem then is to decide whether comparisons should dominate to such an extent that slums can be defined only in the perspective of

50) van Huyck, A.P., 1968, pp. 65 and 87.

51) Turner, J.F.C., 1967 A, p. 66., 1967 B, passim, 1972.

52) Gans, H.J., 1962, pp. 308, 309.

53) Stokes, C.J., 1962, p. 187.

better-off sections of a given city; or whether a generally applicable standard can be found. Many definitions quoted in II.1. try to find such a standard in the danger for the inhabitants created by bad housing conditions.

(We may recall expressions, quoted in II.1.: "victims of biological, psychological and social consequences of the physical and social environment", "poses a health, fire, vice and crime hazard", "satisfactory family life is impossible" "injurious..... to the health, hygiene or morals of the inhabitants", "conduct and growth of safe, healthy and normal life becomes difficult", etc.)

In fact, in these definitions the problem is only postponed, since it has then to be decided what should be considered e.g. "satisfactory family life".

Here again, the danger arises that standards of what should be considered a "safe, healthy and normal life" may be fixed according to middle class values.

Gans especially warns against this attitude and emphasizes that residential areas should be defined as slums only "if they have been proven to be physically, socially or emotionally harmful to their residents or to the larger community". 54).

In this connection it should be noted that Gans himself strongly doubts the causal relationship between slum conditions and "social or emotional harm". Support for these doubts can be found from R.K. Merton amongst others, who - with the aid of a number of references - denies the causal relationship between slum problems and delinquency. 55).

Also Fried and Levin state that criminality and other socio-pathological phenomena on the one hand and poor housing on the other are not so much cause and effect, but rather both the effects of other basic causes underlying our society as a whole. 56).

The proof which Gans wants to be given of social and emotional harm, could hardly ever be shown in practice. Moreover, according to this definition, even bungalow-quarters, situated near an airport, would have to be called slums, if evidence could be given that the inhabitants suffer emotional harm because of the noise inconvenience.

Even so, with a few modifications it seems that Gans' definition can be put to good use because a) it is generally applicable and b) it avoids the danger of arbitrary judgements.

54) Gans, H.J., 1962, p. 309.

55) Merton, R.K., 1966, p. 21

56) Fried, M. and J. Levin, 1968, p. 79.

It seems to be safer, however, and - in the light of the above-quoted literature also justified - to relate the physical conditions that define the slum only to "physical harm", without a priori excluding possibilities of other kinds of harm.

Moreover, in order to make the definition more practicable, the required proof could perhaps be left out. As a principle, for this proof the help of physicians and bacteriological laboratories would be needed, whereas in a residential area, where human excreta lie about in the streets, where there is a shortage of water, where roofs leak, where there is no arrangement for the disposal of waste, where houses are in danger of collapse, etc. etc., it is clear enough that the health of the residents is endangered.

II.3.1. The definition.

After all these considerations, the following definition is put forward as being more practicable at this moment:

A slum is a residential area, where housing conditions in the broader sense are substandard to such an extent that it is clear that for one or more explicit reasons the physical health of the inhabitants is endangered by those conditions.

It should be stressed that this definition aims at being an objective statement on what a slum is. It does not reveal anything about what a (particular) slum does and means to the people who live in it.

As Turner has explained, a shack may be supportive to the family that dwells in it and a house that meets all standards may be oppressive. 57). Comparison of several government-sponsored housing schemes - as briefly described in Chapter I - with the settlements described in Chapters VIII-X will confirm this view.

II.4. On the typology of slums.

II.4.1. A first dichotomy.

From whatever point of view we want to categorize slums, a first subdivision into the already above mentioned broad type-groups will always be needed because of the fundamental differences that exist between these two type groups.

It seems reasonable again to define both groups in terms of physical conditions. Otherwise, in the above-cited characterizations of the

57) Turner, J.F.C., 1976, pp. 51-72.

type-groups ("hope - despair", "urban village - urban jungle", etc.) there is a danger of confusion, since these characterizations do not precisely complement each other, whereas on the other hand terms and characteristics are sometimes confused.

Let us compare the descriptions from Gans, Stokes and De Maisonneul:

Gans: Urban village: "the area of first or second settlement where migrants try to adapt their non-urban institutions and cultures to the urban milieu".

Urban jungle: "tends to be populated by single men and individuals who provide the more disreputable or illegal-but-demanded services to the rest of the community". 58).

Stokes: Slums of hope: "house the rural migrant and other newcomers to the city".

Slums of despair: "are often devoid of opportunity for employmenthuman dustbins.....not wanted.....unaggressive.....". 59).

De Maisonneul:

The slum: (meaning the classic slum) "houses the urban failure, the men overcome and rejected by the big city".

Shantytowns: "are an attempt made by bold and gallant men attracted by the best and the worst in the big city". 60).

While Stokes, and certainly also Gans in their "slums of hope", and "urban village" respectively also include the classic slums, mostly centrally located and sometimes referred to as "vertical slums", De Maisonneul explicitly excludes them; yet apart from this, their descriptions almost coincide. De Maisonneul clearly has combined two groups of factors too early by fixing certain characteristics of the inhabitants to the type of slum. Stokes and Gans avoid this, but their types will in practice need a further subdivision, according to physical criteria, because both types provoke completely different reactions from their residents. "Slums of hope are selfeliminating" (61), but in the case of the classic slums, this selfelimination will almost always take the form of the moving out of the inhabitants. In the case of autonomous settlements on the other hand selfelimination involves improvement of the slum to such an extent that it cannot be called a slum anymore.

Therefore, it will seem simpler to distinguish first between the classic slum and the autonomous settlement, and this with the help of physical criteria only, as the other criteria do not completely coincide with these

58) Gans, H.J., 1962, p. 4.

59) Stokes, C.J., 1962, p.121.

60) Quoted by P.A. Emery, 1963, p. 26J.

61) Stokes, C.J., 1962, p. 124.

physical criteria. A very practical distinction between classic slums and autonomous settlements has been formulated by P.A. Emery, when he states that "A slum (meaning the "classic slum") was never built for the men who are now living in it". 62).

Here, very clearly, the case is deterioration of buildings that had been constructed originally for a purpose other than housing the people who live in them. Although, very often, these slums are centrally located, and - in many cases - consist of multi-storied houses, neither the term "central slum", nor "vertical slum" describe this type very specifically: on the one hand slums of the other type may sometimes be centrally located, and on the other hand multi-storied houses do not constitute a constant condition of the former type. We prefer to call this type the "classic slum", borrowing the term from R. Roberts, who in his turn was inspired by F. Engels' "The condition of the working class in England". 63).

Engels states that "proletarian conditions exist in their classical form, in their perfection, only in the British Empire, particularly in England proper". 64).

Thus, the slums he describes are "classic slums". It should be noted, however, that Engels in his description includes houses that were built for lowly-paid laborers, built therefore as slumhouses. For this reason Emery's above-quoted description does not fit this type. In our own time, however, building regulations preclude official building of these slumhouses (e.g. back-to-back row houses). Furthermore it is worth mentioning with regard to these houses, that Engels mentions "deterioration" and "going bad", as constant characterizing attributes, however new the house may be.

In conclusion we may say that the classic slum is characterized by deterioration and that it is - in our times - seldom, if ever, inhabited by the people it was built for.

The other type is generally referred to as a "squatter settlement", unless a local term ("barriada", "gecekondu", "gourbiville", "callamna", "villa miseria", "shantytown", "bidonville", "basti", etc. etc.) is used. In the list of definitions and descriptions of the concept "squatter" and "squatter settlement", there appears to be great emphasis on

62) Emery, P.A., 1963, p. 269.

63) Roberts, R., 1971.

64) Engels, F., 1969, p. 18.

illegality, although some of the authors (Turner, Emery, Raymaekers, Dietz) include a possibility of (semi-)legal status. Emery even goes so far as to speak about "organized squatters housing" meaning organised by the authorities, and Portes refers to "government squatter settlements", expressions that according to the narrower definition would be a contradiction in terms (Cf. II.2).

Turner has introduced the concepts of "uncontrolled urban settlements" or "autonomous urban settlements", terms that may be still applicable when squatters obtain some kind of sanction to their settlement.

Turner's circumscription of these concepts:

"Urban settlement (65) that takes place independently of the authorities charged with the control of local building and planning." 66).

does not completely fit in with Karachi's situation. As will be seen later (Cf. VIII.3.2.2. & VIII.3.2.2.1.)

some of the settlements, although strictly speaking illegal, come about in unofficial collaboration with the authorities charged with the control of local building and planning.

The epithet "autonomous" deserves preference over "uncontrolled" for this reason, and besides: "to call a settlement "uncontrolled" implies official control, but ignores the important organizational controls exerted within many squatter communities. Distribution of available services, employment, rents, and - in some cases - planning and building, are all examples of unofficial but meaningful autonomous controls." 67).

For the purpose of this study, we will describe "autonomous settlements" as settlements in which people construct their houses or have them constructed according to their own ideas (e.g. regarding design, pace and phases of building, etc.). It should be noted that the expression "autonomous settlement" in this sense can only be used within the whole of a typology of slums, for otherwise - as de Goede rightly remarks (68) - various non-slum areas could also fit within this definition.

Beside the advantage of escaping from a strict notion of legality, another advantage of the use of this expression is that it also includes passively urbanized villages that often bear the characteristics of a slum, but

65) Note that Turner's emphasis is on the process "settlement", rather than on "settlement" as a quarter, a neighborhood. The word is used as a verb rather than as a noun.

66) Turner, 1967-A, p. 11.

67) U.N., 1973, p. 28.

68) de Goede, J.H., 1971, p. 4.

do not fit into our circumscription of classic slums (deterioration; "never built for the men who are now living in it").

II.4.2. Further categorization.

After this first, rough categorization of slums, factors other than purely physical, may be brought to light in order to enable us to make sharper and more detailed subdivisions. This, of course, can be done in innumerable ways, according to one's own standpoint. (69). The anthropologist - for instance - will find ethnic composition or the level of ethnic homogeneity a very important variable; the economist may prefer to use data on income and employment; the geographer might be more interested in the localization or the function of the slum in relationship with the city it is part of and so on.

If one is primarily interested in slum-improvement, the most important criteria with the help of which a further subdivision could be made, would seem to be:

- a) possibilities of improvement, and
- b) if these are present, to what degree these possibilities have been made use of.

Throughout this study we will concentrate the attention on the concept of improvement, by which we mean in this context: a development towards elimination of the factors that characterize a settlement as a slum-

II.4.2.1. Classic slums.

Regarding the classic slums, it appears that they do not lend themselves to improvement - given the prevailing system - , as these slums, by definition, consist of deteriorated buildings that originally had been destined for other purposes than housing the present dwellers. If within the free-market system there had been economically sound possibilities for upkeep or improvement, these slums would not have reached the stage in which they find themselves now.

There are a few instances of revitalizing of classic slums (70). However, the common characteristic of these seems to be that management of this form of housing has radically changed hands, and is - in a way - withdrawn

69) Cf - for instance - Santos, M., 1970, who proposes classifications of squatter settlements according to origin, lay-out, location, occupational structure and other criteria.

70) Cf Andersen, S.A.N., 1972, Keyes, W., 1976, p. 314., Kalk, E., 1975, p. 29.

from the free market mechanism: in terms of money, revitalizing of classic slums does not give an optimum profit. Improvement of classic slums is - economically - an unattractive affair. Besides, in Karachi, the classic slums constitute a minor proportion of the slums.

Probably for these reasons, in Karachi, as far as we know, improvement of classic slums is out of the question. Thus, from the viewpoint of improvement, this category can be seen as at best a stationary, transit settlement and at worst a "human dustbin". 71).

The scale of possibilities between these extremes could be very well measured in terms of the mobility of the residents: what percentage of them leaves the slum within a given period of time? We will describe the reasoning in more detail in IX.3.1., where other stagnating settlements are dealt with.

II.4.2.2. Autonomous settlements.

Regarding the autonomous settlements, from the viewpoint of improvement, they can be categorized along a continuum that starts from the stage where the newly arrived settler erects his first, temporary, easily removable hovel, and ends at a point where the settlement cannot be called a slum anymore.

For passively urbanized villages, mostly the starting point will be somewhat beyond that of the migrant settlement, but basically - and especially in the situation of Karachi (Cf VII.4.) - the process is the same.

This is what Turner has described as the situation in Latin America, and more specifically in Peru. As criteria for his subdivision, he used five levels of physical development on the one hand and five degrees of security of tenure on the other hand. Out of the twenty five theoretically possible combinations, he found 14 actually in existence. 72)

71) Stokes, C.J., 1962, p. 121.

72) Turner, J.F.C., 1969-8, p. 512.

Table II.4.2.2. Turner's categorization of autonomous settlements. 72).

					<u>Levels of physical Development</u>
			Complete Semi-Squatter	Complete Legal	Complete structure & utilities to modern standards.
		Incomplete Squatter	Incomplete Semi-Squatter	Incomplete Legal	Incomplete structure or utilities but built to modern standards.
	Incipient Tentative Squatter	Incipient Squatter	Incipient Semi-Squatter		Incipient construction of potentially modern standard.
	Provisional Tentative Squatter	Provisional Squatter	Provisional Semi-Squatter		Provisional construction of low standard or impermanent materials.
Nomad	Transient Tentative Squatter	Transient Squatter			Transient temporary and easily removed shelter.
<u>Itinerant</u> <u>Transient</u> occupancy with no intention of permanent tenure.	<u>Tentative squatter</u> occupancy without any legal status or guarantee of continued tenure.	<u>Established squatter</u> de facto and secure possession but without legal status.	<u>Semi-squatter</u> semi legal without full recognition but with some rights	<u>Legal occupancy</u> Institutionally recognized forms of tenure.	<u>Degrees of Security of Tenure.</u>

In the above diagram, it can be shown in which of the 25 theoretically possible cells a certain settlement fits. Besides, a possible relationship between the two variables can be demonstrated. The (absence of) dynamics of the development, however, can be easily obscured in this diagram, as it does not include the age of the settlements. If, in Turner's diagram a majority of the autonomous settlements can be fitted on, or close to a diagonal, then no more than a relationship between security of tenure and

level of physical development has been established. If old settlements find themselves at the left lower side of the diagram, we have to conclude that such settlements are stagnating in their development and therefore in fact do not fit into the more or less smooth flow of development which the diagram strongly suggests.

Thus, the shortcoming of Turner's subdivision is that it depends too much on the principle of an unhampered evolutionary process, whereas in practice - certainly in the Subcontinental situation - in the transition from each stage to the next one, certain hindrances can occur which may lead to either a prolonged lagging behind in development, or to the skipping of one or more stages and a premature transition to an advanced stage.

The same kind of objection applies to more of Turner's descriptions wherein - amongst other things - he enunciates a theory of the stages that a migrant passes through before he becomes a squatter. 73).

These problems have been elaborated by C. Benninger (74) who, using Turner's models, demonstrates some deviations that frequently occur in the Subcontinent. The so-called "prolongued reception" - i.e. migrants getting stuck in their first stage of provisional settlement in the city - , and "premature consolidation" - i.e. premature shifting to autonomous settlements - are such deviations. This last deviation leads - according to Benninger - to too much improvization so that often - for example - plots are too small, or the general lay-out of the settlement is too irregular, which facts in their turn are obstacles to all kinds of improvements at a later stage. In due course, we will pay more attention to Benninger's findings. What is important now, is that Benninger shows a few side tracks from Turner's rather too smooth flowchart of stages through which the migrant to the city passes. In exactly the same way, some modifications can be envisaged in the flowchart of improving autonomous settlements, modifications, moreover, on which Benninger explicitly touches when studying the stages in the migration process.

In view of this, we propose to categorize the autonomous settlements initially according to both of Turner's criteria: level of physical development and degree of security of tenure. For this purpose, it seems that further investigations into the local situation are called for, in order to establish clearcut indicators to these levels and degrees.

73) Turner, J.F.C., 1968

Turner, J.F.C., 1965

Caminos, H., J.F.C. Turner and J.A. Steffian, 1969.

74) C. Benninger, 1970.

In Chapters IV and V we will try to establish these levels and degrees. When, thereupon, we introduce the age of the settlements as a third variable, we can further distinguish the settlements according to their development, i.e. between "improving" and "not improving".

The category of improving autonomous settlements can be categorized further according to stages of the kind suggested by the diagonal in table II.4.2.2.

Also, regarding the settlements which are not improving when fitting into Turner's diagram it can be seen at what stage of development these settlements stagnate. Moreover, for the particular settlements, once identified, it can be seen what causes there are for these settlements not to develop like other settlements do and on that basis it can be decided whether the cause of stagnation is inherent or whether it can be manipulated.

A subdivision of those settlements which are not improving into those with and those without potential for improvement is extremely relevant, when improvement is the main focus of the study.

When looking into the causes of stagnation, it can be seen whether any parallel to Benninger's model can be found. (cf. IX.2.2.1.)

Finally, regarding all the stagnating settlements, and especially those without potential, it seems of relevance to deal with them in the same way as we have proposed for the classic slums. They can as a principle be categorized along a continuum in between "transit station" and "human dustbin", with the mobility of the inhabitants as the criterion.

II.4.2.2.1. The passively urbanized villages.

We propose to deal with the passively urbanized villages in the same way on principle that we have proposed for the other autonomous settlements. This group of settlements deserves some special attention, however, as in this group "age" is not a variable and - with a few exceptions - "security" is hardly a variable.

By definition, the passively urbanized villages were established before they were encircled by the city - in most cases established several generations ago. Regarding security, it should be noted that the inhabitants of these old and long-established villages have very often genuine claims to the land they dwell on. Thus, a further subdivision of this group of settlements can only be made by concentrating on the third variable: level of physical development, with the help of which variable alone no decisions can be taken on the question whether the settlement is

developing or stagnating. For this decision, insight into the history of the passively urbanized villages will be required.

II.4.2.3. Conclusion

In conclusion, we propose to categorize all autonomous settlements first according to the two variables "level of physical development" and "degree of security of tenure".

When introducing the age of the settlement as a third variable, we will be able to:


- a) sift out the passively urbanized villages and categorize them according to the level of physical development.
- b) distinguish the subgroup of improving autonomous settlements and subdivide them further according to the particular stages of development they find themselves in.
- c) distinguish the subgroup of not-further-improving autonomous settlements and subdivide them according to the same above indicated stages.

Further study of this group of settlements, once identified, will reveal the causes of stagnation, so that decisions can be taken on the question whether these causes are inherent or manipulable. In other words: whether there is a potential for improvement or not.

Finally, further study will also enable us to understand the functions which this kind of settlement performs.

In graph II.4.2.3. we have tried to represent proposals for categorization of the slums.

Graph II.4.2.3. Proposed categorization of slums.




Before starting to develop measurable levels of physical development and degrees of security of tenure we will, in the next chapter, begin by defining some concepts and describing the way in which the research was carried out, thereby sometimes anticipating later developments in the study.

CHAPTER III

A DESCRIPTION OF THE GENERAL PART OF THE RESEARCH.

"People in general and poor people in particular become invisible to officialdom; their needs are reduced to the barren and abstract specifications of codes and standards, however well-intentioned." ')

') Grenell, P., 1972, p. 97.



"Minislum" (in PECHS)



"Rooftop slum" (in Saddar)

III.1. The procedure.

III.1.1. The population.

A first step towards the construction of the typology is an inventory, as complete as possible, of the existing population. The population in this context consists of autonomous settlements of Karachi.

A problem was how to define the area in which the population is situated: Karachi. We excluded localities outside Karachi proper, as Landhi, Korangi, Malir, Mauripur and Mango Pir.

We also excluded localities situated at more than half a mile from the built up area of Karachi and - of necessity- we excluded a few settlements situated in "restricted" (i.e. some of the military) areas.

Regarding the autonomous settlements themselves, we excluded small squatter settlements and passively urbanized villages of an estimated 200 huts or less. 1).

By implication, also no attention was paid to "roof-top slums".

III.1.2. The inventory.

In order to inventorize the city, we visited all parts of it systematically. We crossed all these parts in different directions so as to see whether there were any autonomous settlements. Use was made of the 1:4.000. Karachi City Map (ed. Survey of Pakistan) and some additional maps that were given to us by KDA and MPD. Fundamentally, however, observation and replies from residents to our questions form the basis of the decision whether an area was to be included or not. Checking was done later with the help of some lists of unauthorized colonies, and with the help of maps, provided by KDA, MPD and KMC.

Still, it is quite probable that we have missed a few areas that should have been included. Yet, as the number of areas surveyed amounts to 254, we may suppose the coverage is sufficient to base a typology upon.

The areas surveyed were marked on a map, sometimes with the help of the existing 1:4.000. maps, but in many cases these maps were found to be outdated as far as the settlements are concerned. Therefore, mostly, we had to measure the settlements roughly (by counting steps), so that at least we could mark the localities on the map as accurately as possible within the given means.

Even so the result cannot be more than a sketch.

1). For information on these small settlements in Karachi, see:
T.E.L. van Pinxteren, 1974-A.

III.1.3. Defining settlements.

III.1.3.1. Nomenclature.

A serious problem was, and still is, how to define and demarcate settlements that were to be included in the inventory, as units.

Firstly, there is much confusion about the nomenclature.

- Sometimes, the inhabitants use different names for their basti. 2).

A classic example of this is a basti in Golimar I, which is called "Ali basti" by the Shia community and "Farooqabad" by the Sunna community.

Another example is Mohammadi Colony on Mauripur Road, which nobody in the neighbourhood is able to show the location of, as the basti is popularly known as "Machar Colony" (i.e. "Fly-colony").

- Sometimes, even in official files the same colonies appear under different names.

In KDA files we found both the names "P.I.I.F. Colony" and "Essa Nagri" used for the same basti. 3).4). Later, we heard an officer referring to the same basti as "Liaqat Basti".

- Sometimes, the bastis change their names (especially when they are called after political leaders).

The combination of colonies known as "Angara Goth - Jangian Goth" one day in 1972 was suddenly called "Iqbal Shaheed Colony", which name had been painted on every house.

- During the B.D.-system period 5), sometimes several areas were taken together to form one administrative unit, called "Union Committee".

The inhabitants of such an area, when asked about the name of the locality, may refer to these larger units or to the smaller neighbourhood, they live in.

Many examples hereof were found in Lyari, where - for instance - the Union Committee Daryabad consists of the following sub-units: Hingorabad, Zikri Para, Niazi Chauk, Patni Para, Liaqat Colony, Anjam Colony and Turk Mahalla. 6).

- Sometimes, bastis are subdivided into smaller units having their own names. Here the former problem reappears, on a different level.

Sometimes, also, bastis are subdivided into (smaller) bastis, for very trivial reasons.

2) See for clarification of the word "basti": III.1.3.3.

3) KDA, undated, A.

4) KDA, undated, B.

5) B.D. - Basic Democracies.

6) Hashmi, S.H., 1972, p. 1.

In the North Eastern Part of Baldia, when people complained about water shortage, they were told that no more than one tank wagon of water could be supplied per basti per day. Consequently, the inhabitants subdivided their basti into several parts to which different names were given. The names were in fact used and even explicitly painted on every individual house, so as to underline the right to more shares of water.

III.1.3.2. Demarcation.

Secondly, very often, the exact boundaries of bastis are not clearly defined.

Even in some of the in-depth studies of JRP-IV, in which much time could be devoted to this problem in one single area, it was not always possible to find out which are the exact boundaries of that area: ".....and an arbitrarily chosen line from the West side of the play ground along the public latrine with water tap and garbage dump and the cul de sac West of the Abdul Rahim Lassi Compound, to the Mirza Adam Khan Road." 7).

III.1.3.3. Definition of the unit.

Thirdly, and perhaps most important, there is a problem of how to decide what settlement should be considered a unit for the purpose of this study. Generally speaking, we can say that Karachi can be subdivided into large areas (like Lyari, Old Golimar, Lalukhet, Baldia, etc.). These areas can be subdivided again into societies, colonies, goths, etc. In the case of Lyari - for instance- it can be subdivided into Bihar Colony, Agra Taj Colony, Daryabad, etc.

The colonies in their turn can sometimes be subdivided into muhallahs, although, quite often, they coincide with muhallahs. 8). In the case of Bihar Colony, a subdivision in the above example, it can be subdivided into a Panjabi Muhallah, a Pathan Muhallah, etc.

Again, sometimes, the muhallahs are subdivided into chauks. 9).

The question is on which of these levels we should fix our unit of research, and an additional problem is that not always clearcut distinctions exist between the above described levels. It is interesting in this connection, to note how in the above given example of the subdivision of Daryabad Union Committee all the three levels "colony", "muhallah" and "chauk" appear. We have chosen to take the "basti" as our unit of research and we may give it the following working definition, for the purpose of the study:

- 7) Chughtai, R.A., T.E.L. van Pinxteren, H. Kiestra and M.H. Weijs, 1975, p. 13.
- 8) Muhallah - a district, division, quarter (of a city or town), ward, parish (J.T. Platts, a dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi and English, Oxford, 1961).
- 9) Chauk - quadrangle, square (ibid.). The concepts of "muhallah" and "chauk" have no administrative meaning.

A basti is the largest residential area which the inhabitants understand to be one unit, but which is more or less uniform as far as the elements of the research are concerned (viz. the house conditions and the public facilities).

This implies that - if the inhabitants perceive subunits within a certain area - we only consider these subunits as separate bastis if they differ from other sub-units regarding those items that are relevant to our study. Although it might be as much justified to use the muhallah as our unit, we prefer the basti, because sometimes bastis are subdivided into muhallahs which differ from each other only in (e.g.) the ethnic composition of the inhabitants, as - for instance - in the above example of Bihar Colony. The word "basti" is often part of the name of bastis, as is the suffix "-abad", which stems from the same root. 10).

With the help of the above working definition of a basti we have been able to define and delineate most of the settlements. Only in very special cases, the definition was not completely applicable (Cf VII.2. and IX.2.1.).

We will also use the terms "colony" and "goth" as specifications of the concept of basti, firstly, because both expressions are frequently used in Karachi and secondly, because there are differences in emphasis upon the quality, and the age, respectively of settlements indicated by these terms. In the term "basti", there is an implication of substandardness:

"The word is applied in Calcutta to the separate groups of huts in humbler native quarters, the sanitary state of which has often been held up to reprobation." 11).

"Bustee litterally means "settlement" but has become almost synonymous with "slums" for many government officials and the Westernized upper classes." 12).

In the term "colony", on the other hand, there is a more positive connotation, as the word is derived from Latin "colo" = to cultivate, to take care of a field, to abide, to dwell, to stay, to inhabit, to bestow care upon a thing, to care for, to devote oneself to, to live. 13). 14). 15).

10) From Sanskrit: vas = dwell.

11) Hobson & Jobson, a glossary of colloquial Anglo-Indian words and phrases, London, 1969 (4th ed.).

12) Grenell, P., 1972, p. 95.

13) Lewis, & Short, Latin dictionary, Oxford 1969.

14) It is tempting to draw also a few parallels with a more modern meaning of the word "colony", viz. conquered and /or exploited country. As clearly this connotation is not (yet) meant by the basti dwellers when they call their settlements "colonies", we will here leave this connotation for what it is. We may, however, refer to U.N., 1971, pp. 127-132, C.A. Frankenhoff, 1967, pp. 27-36 and A. Leeds, 1969, pp. 57-63, where parallels between slums and countries with a colonial economy have been elaborated.

15) We do not know how and when the word "colony" was introduced into Urdu language. Somehow, the positive connotation of the word seems to have been retained: at least, the word is used also for areas that have no slum characteristics.

We paid so much detailed attention to the etymology and context of these words "basti" and "colony" - which we will use interchangeably for autonomous settlements inhabited by migrants - because we think both words reflect two main characteristics of these autonomous settlements: on the one hand, the word "basti" has the connotation of substandardness; on the other hand, the word "colony" reflects the attention paid to and the care taken of the habitat by its inhabitants.

The term "goth" - which is the local word for "village" - we will use interchangeably with "basti" only for passively urbanized villages.

III.1.3.4. The problem of "regularized bastis".

If bastis develop well, there is a point in their development, when the settlement cannot be called a slum anymore. Several of the bastis from our inventory have housing conditions that are no longer a threat to the health of the inhabitants. These bastis constitute the "upper" end of the continuum of developing bastis, beyond which stage we are - for the purpose of this study - no more interested in their further development. If these bastis also obtain a completely legal status, there would be reason to exclude them from the inventory.

In this way, a decision problem came up in connection with bastis of which it was officially stated that they were "regularized".

When we sought information on this subject (mainly from the basti dwellers and from the MPD), we found that regularization in this context means that the right of occupancy is recognized as a principle, but subject to certain conditions (standards of plot size, street width, etc.) which implies that allotting or leasing of the land may eventually be carried out in future. In fact, its meaning is that a de facto situation is being given official sanction, but subject to a number of conditions, of which some have yet to be defined.

Typically, in the official terminology, reference is made to "IAP", meaning Improvement and Regularization Programme (16). As clearly the word "improvement" refers to physical - and perhaps also other kinds of - improvement, the word "regularization" is reserved for the legal side of the case. But, again, this regularization is subject to certain conditions on the improvement side, so that in fact the position of the individual basti dweller or his house is not being changed by the mere act of "regularization" of a basti.

Also, observation taught us that nothing visible changed when a basti

was "regularized", and this is understandable in view of the sometimes very ambitious improvement plans launched - but not always executed - in which a very high proportion of the population and of the dwellings is affected. (Cf IV.2.1.).

Therefore, we decided to include the regularized bastis in our inventory. More difficult is the case of those colonies where the land is already partly being leased to the occupants (e.g. Liaqat Ashraf Colony, Mahmoodabad, Saeedabad (Baldia), several parts of Lyari, Delhi Colony (Gizri Road), Madina Colony (id.)).

In these cases the decision to include or not to include a certain colony was based only on information from inhabitants of those bastis: wherever reportedly at least 50% of the plots had been leased out, we excluded the colony from the inventory.

III.2. The result.

From the above, it may be clear that the nomenclature, the demarcation, the definition of the unit of research and the decision to include or to exclude partly leased-out bastis, are all somewhat arbitrary. 17).

As there was no standard demarcation, no standard nomenclature and no standard definition of the unit at any level, and as finally, it is not possible to determine to what extent certain bastis have been leased out, the only way was to demarcate, name, include or exclude bastis according to the above given rules, as strictly as possible.

All the bastis included have been indicated on Map I, in which the numbers refer to the alphabetic list of bastis, so that matching with any other nomenclature or demarcation is always possible.

III.2.1. Problems of scale.

It should be noted that the unit of research is the basti, whatever its size - except for "mini-slums" (Cf III.1.1.).

This important fact should be kept in mind when we start comparing different bastis, of which the area may vary from just under one acre (Gharibabad, Lyari) to an estimated 300 acres (Bismillah Colony), and the number of inhabitants from an estimated 800 (Gharibabad, Lyari) to an ample 70.000 (estimated in Shutta Village).

17) It is - for instance - interesting to note that the so called "Jacob Lines area" which for the purpose of this study, we subdivided into 6 "bastis" was divided into no less than 54 units by M.H. Weijs for his in-depth study of the same area. The criteria he used for subdivision were physical in nature and applied very strictly. Thus, parts which the inhabitants understand to be one unit, were subdivided in many parts, sometimes consisting of less than 200 dwelling units. Cf. Weijs, M.H., 1975.

III.2.2. Problems of time.

The study took a great deal of time, not only because it was very extensive, but also because it had to be combined with other activities and sometimes even to be completely interrupted for a considerable span of time.

As a result, neither the maps, nor the data we are presenting give a synopsis of a situation that was existing at a certain moment. Rather, it is an accumulation of snapshots, taken over a period of more than four years.

As we try to develop a typology and to discover trends, we do not think this fact is much harm, but the reader should be warned that - for instance - some of the bastis indicated on the map do not even exist anymore (e.g. Islamia Jamhurya Colony), others may have changed substantially since the data were collected.

III.2.3. Reduction.

From the 254 colonies surveyed, two were afterwards excluded. One because it turned out to be too small to fall within the set rules (Merajabad), and one because it turned out to be 100% leased (Memon Society, Lyari). Besides, one colony (Khyber Colony, off Mango Pir Road) showed no relevant differences from the basti next to it (Mastan Colony), so that it was included in this last colony.

As a result, data on 251 bastis will be presented.

III.2.4. List of bastis of Karachi, with location on map I. 13).

Sr Nr	Name of basti	Location	Age	Security	Index house- cond.
1.	Abdul Jabbar Compound	4-E	28	1	- 50
2.	Abyssinia Lines	5-F	23	1	- 43
3.	Afridi Colony	2-C	7	1	+ 8
4.	Agra Taj Colony	2-F	26	4	+140
5.	Ajab Khan Colony	4-C	13	1	+ 15
6.	Akhlaq Mohammad Colony	2-A	4	1	- 73
7.	Akhtar Colony	6-G	3	3	+126
8.	Akramabad	6-D	17	2	+ 4
9.	Angara Goth	5-E	23	4	+ 37
10.	Anjam Colony	2-D	18	3	+ 47
	Aqab Jail Colony: see P.I.B. Colony				
11.	Asif Colony	4-E	20	4	+ 94
12.	Azam Basti	6-G	11	4	+ 36
13.	Azam Nagar	6-D	17	2	+ 21
14.	Azeemabad	9-F	28	0	- 84
15.	Azim Khan Goth	8-B	p.o.(19).	2	+ 6
16.	Aziz Colony	3-AB	3	1	- 23
17.	Baghdadi	3-F	p.p.	4	+157
18.	Baghicha Hashim Khan	4-F	23	4	+ 24
19.	Bakhshan Village	5-H	p.p.	2	+ 33
20.	Bakra Piri	3-E	p.p.	4	+ 35
21.	Baluch Colony	6-G	11	0	-136
22.	Baluch Goth	4-B	p.p.	0	-138
23.	Baluch Para	5-E	p.p.	3	- 12
24.	Banguria Goth	6-D	p.p.	0	- 53
25.	Bath Island	4-H	19	1	-137
26.	Bawapat	3.4-F	p.p.	4	+ 37
27.	Behind Jacob Lines	5-F	27	2	- 74
28.	Bengali Area (Orangi)	3-B	15	1	-205

18) Age, an indication of the degree of security of tenure and an index of the houseconditions have also been given in this list (Cf. III.2.5.2., Chapters IV and V).

19) p.p. - pre partition.

Sr Nr	Name of basti	Location	Age	Security	Index house-cond.
29.	Bh. Para (Pahar Ganj) (20).	5-B	11	1	- 16
30.	Bhutta Village	2-H	p.p.	4	- 34
31.	Bhutto Colony	2-F	3	0	-182
32.	Bihar Colony	3-F	26	4	+270
33.	Bilalabad	5-AB	9	1	+ 40
34.	Bilal Colony	3-A	1	0	-193
35.	Bismilla Colony	3-C	3	1	- 55
36.	Bizerta Lines	5-G	23	1	- 81
37.	Bowani Chali	3-C	22	2	- 21
38.	Bukhari Colony	4-B	21	1	-108
39.	Central Jacob Lines	5-F	27	2	-130
40-	Central Muslimabad	4-E	23	4	- 27
41.	Chakiwara I and II	3-F	p.o.	4	+152
42.	Chanesar Goth	6-G	p.p.	4	+ 20
43.	Chhota Maldan	4-D	24	2	- 7
44.	Chittagong Colony	4-D	28	3	+ 40
45.	Choona Bhatti	4-F	28	1	- 74
46.	Chorwarh Colony	2-C	18	3	+ 15
47.	City Station Colony	3,4-G	21	0	-100
48.	Darbar Colony	5-B	11	2	+ 2
49.	Daryabad	3-F	p.p.	4	+173
50.	Data Nagar	4-B	10	1	-114
51.	Daulat Ram Mil Colony	6-E	p.p.	2	- 64
52.	Delhi Colony	2-D	23	3	+127
53.	Dharamsiwara	4-F	p.p.	4	+144
54.	Dhobighat	4-E	p.o.	4	+103
55.	Dodha Goth	4-D	p.o.	4	- 2
56.	Dosmand ka Goth	7-C	p.p.	0	-193
57.	Eid Gah Line	3-F	p.p.	4	+220
58.	Faqir Colony	2-C	5	1	- 55
59.	Farooqabad	4-E	27	4	+ 60
60.	Farooq Colony	3-B	5	1	-170

20) "Bh." stands for "Bhangi". Once we had made the mistake of using the word, it was difficult to change it, because a change would entail a different order of sequence in the serial numbers, changes of maps, etc. The word, meaning "sweeper", is as discriminating as "panah qir" for refugees, and should therefore be avoided.

Sr Nr	Name of Basti	Location	Age	Security	Index house-cond.
61.	Federal C. Area (Panjabi Para)	5-C	3	1	- 79
62.	Firdos Colony	5-E	25	3	+ 2
63.	Frontier Colony	4-C	15	1	+ 11
64.	Gabol Colony	4-B	2	1	-195
65.	Gandhi Nagar	4-F	p.p.	4	+ 96
66.	Garden Area	4-F	28	1	-190
67.	Gauharabad (Sabzi Mandi)	6-D	15	2	+ 38
68.	Gauharabad (Dastgir)	7-C	13	1	- 10
69.	Gharibabad (Lyari)	3-F	17	2	-119
70.	Gharibabad (Nea)	6-D	15	1	- 30
71.	Gharibabad (Furana)	6-D	22	2	- 17
72.	Gharibabad (Pologround)	4-G	23	1	- 40
73.	Gharib Nawaz Colony	4-E	25	3	- 35
74.	Ghas Ganji	3-F	p.p.	4	+113
75.	Ghaus Nagar	2-C	5	3	+ 72
76.	Ghausia Colony	5-D	26	3	+ 25
77.	Ghaziabad	3-A	1	1	-151
78.	Giddomal	5-F	23	3	+ 85
79.	Gizdarabad	5-E	23	2	+ 27
80.	Golimar I	4-E	25	4	+ 53
81.	Gujro Nala	5-D	22	1	- 54
82.	Gul Bhai Colony	2-E	p.p.	3	- 39
83.	Gule Rana Colony	5-E	23	1	- 73
84.	Gul Mohammad Lane	3-F	p.p.	4	+139
85.	Hafizabad	3-B	6	1	- 70
86.	Haji Camp	3-F	28	0	- 33
87.	Haji Murid Goth	5-E	p.p.	4	+ 11
88.	Haji Qasim Colony	2-D	10	3	+ 15
89.	Hanifi Colony	2-F	17	0	- 173
90.	Haroonabad	3-D	15	3	+ 12
91.	Hassan Colony	5-D	25	4	+ 87
92.	Hassan Lashkari Village	4-E	p.p.	4	+118
93.	Hazara Colony	5-G	25	0	- 53
94.	Hazrat Mohani Colony	4-U	21	4	+ 70
95.	Hijrat Colony	4-B	12	2	- 77

Sr Nr	Name of Basti	Location	Age	Security	Index house- cond.
96.	Hill Area	6-G	21	2	+ 27
97.	Husseiniat Colony	5-B	16	1	-110
98.	Ibrahim Goth	6-D	p.p.	2	- 64
99.	Idu Lines	3-F	p.p.	4	+ 10
100.	Ilyas Goth	5-E	p.p.	4	+ 12
101.	Iqbalabad	9-E	27	0	- 37
102.	Iqbal Baluch Colony	3-B	3	1	- 85
103.	Iqbal Goth	8-C	p.p.	0	-190
104.	Isa Nagri	6.7-D	13	1	-102
105.	Islamia Jamhurya Colony	7-C	14	0	- -
106.	Islam Nagar	3-B	4	1	-137
107.	Ismail Goth	4-I	p.p.	1	-175
108.	Ismail Village	4-H	17	0	-143
109.	Jamhurya Colony (Race Course)	5-G	28	0	- 67
110.	Jamhurya Colony II	4-C	21	2	+ 4
111.	Jam Nagar	2-D	18	3	- 14
112.	Jamshed Road II	5-E	26	2	- 12
113.	Jan Mohammad Goth	5-E	p.p.	2	- 14
114.	Jehangirabad - N.	4-D	25	1	+ 4
115.	Jehangirabad - S.	4-D	25	2	+ 1
116.	Jilalabad	4-D	17	2	- 13
117.	Jinnahabad	3.4-F	23	4	+200
118.	Jinnah Hospital I	5-G	6	1	-129
119.	Jinnah Hospital II	5-G	25	1	-100
120.	Johar Colony	4-D	25	3	+ 42
121.	Jumman Shah Plot	3-F	p.p.	4	+141
122.	Junaghar Muhallah	2-D	18	3	- 2
123.	Juna Kalri	3-F	p.p.	4	- 11
124.	Juna Kumbharwara	3-F	p.p.	4	+143
125.	Kakoos Colony	2-H	5	0	-133
126.	Kalakot	3-F	p.p.	4	+102
127.	Karim Bakhsh Para	8-E	p.p.	1	- 60
128.	Karnali Basti	6-D	21	1	-182
129.	Kashmir Colony	6-H	9	0	+ 45
130.	Kashmiri Town	3-C	5	2	+ 6

Sr Nr	Name of Basti	Location	Age	Security	Index house- cond.
131.	Kausar Niazi Colony	6-C	15	1	- 91
132.	Khadda	3-F	p.p.	4	+156
133.	Khalilabad	5-B	8	1	+ 4
134.	Khamosh Colony II	3-E	20	2	+ 40
135.	Khoja Muhallah	5-E	27	4	+ 30
136.	Khowaja Gharib Nawaz Colony	3-B	5	1	- 73
137.	Khowaja Moinuddin Colony	2-A	1	1	-217
138.	Koila Godown	3-E	20	4	+ 49
139.	Kokan Colony	2-C	10	3	+ 31
140.	Kumbharwara (Baldia)	2-D	21	4	+ 12
141.	Lalukhet Pockets	5-D	28	4	+ 21
142.	Lassi Para (Baldia)	1-D	p.p.	3	- 33
143.	Leprosy Colony	4-G	28	2	+ 18
144.	Liaqat Ashraf Colony	6-G	23	3	+ 78
145.	Liaqat Colony	3-F	26	4	+169
146.	Limu Goth	8-C	p.p.	2	-149
147.	Lotus Road	4-F	28	2	-127
148.	Lower Gizri	5-H	28	2	+ 14
149.	Lyari Naddi	4-E	15	0	- 98
150.	Machar Colony	2-F	9	1	- 68
151.	Madina Colony (Love Lane)	4-E	25	3	0
152.	Madina Colony (Baldia)	2-D	10	3	+ 17
153.	Mahmoodabad	7-G	21	4	+113
154.	Mama Road	4-F	28	4	-155
155.	Manzoor Colony	7-G	7	2	+ 52
156.	Maghdum Shah Colony	3-B	5	1	- 34
157.	Mastan Colony	4-C	5	1	- 33
158.	Masum Shah Colony	6-G	12	1	- 46
159.	Maulwi Musafir Khana	4-F	28	2	- 76
160.	Miran Naka	3-E	p.p.	4	- 62
161.	Miran Pir	3-F	p.p.	4	+191
162.	Mohammadabad	4-E	13	4	+ 66
163.	Mohammadi Line	4-E	25	1	- 3
164.	Mohammad Nagar	3-B	4	1	- 8

Sr Nr	Name of Basti	Location	Age	Security	Index house- cond.
165.	Mominabad	3-C	2	1	-194
166.	Moosa Colony	5.6-C	12	1	-123
167.	Moosa Lane	3-F	p.p.	4	+160
168.	Moosa Nagar	5-C	14	1	- 98
169.	Mujahid Colony (Jail-Drigh Road)	8-E	8	2	+ 53
170.	Mujahid Colony (Barsati Nala)	5-C	13	1	- 40
171.	Mujahid Colony (Gujro Nala)	5-C	13	1	- 1
172.	Musa Goth	5-C	p.p.	1	- 47
173.	Muslimabad	3-F	p.p.	4	+ 80
174.	Naddiabad	5-E	15	1	- 59
175.	Nafisabad	5-E	24	4	+ 33
176.	Narain Pura	4-F	28	1	-121
177.	Natha Khan Goth	9-F	28	2	- 21
178.	National Tyre Colony	3-G	28	1	- 53
179.	Nawabad	3-F	p.p.	4	+221
180.	Nawa Line	3-F	p.p.	4	+ 33
181.	New Kalri	3-F	28	4	+205
182.	New Karachi - N.	11-A	13	1	- 49
183.	New Karachi - E.	11-A.B.	10	1	-152
184.	New Kumbharwara	3-F	p.p.	4	+ 99
185.	Niazi Colony	4-E	15	4	+ 53
186.	Nishtar Basti	6-E	11	2	- 65
187.	Nishtar Colony	4-E	27	4	+101
188.	Nusrat Bhutto Colony	6-A	4	1	- 85
189.	Old Golimar	4-E	p.p.	4	+ 11
190.	Pak Ghausia Colony	4-C	22	1	- 51
191.	Pak Jamhurya Colony I	4-C	20	1	- 3
192.	Pak Sarhad Colony	5-D	9	0	-137
193.	Panjabi Para (Dastgir)	7-C	11	0	-100
194.	Panjabi Para (Golimar)	4-E	15	1	+ 12
195.	Paposh Nagar	4-C	13	1	- 18
196.	Patel Para	5-E	p.p.	4	+ 10
197.	Pathan Colony	4-C	18	1	- 7
198.	Pathan Colony (Scheme 24)	8-B	3	0	- 91

Sr Nr	Name of Basti	Location	Age	Security	Index house-cond.
199.	Pirabad	4-C	6	1	- 25
200.	P.I.B. Colony 21).	6-E	24	1	- 50
201.	Piru Goth	3-B	p.p.	0	-179
202.	Police Risala Line	3.4-F	28	3	- 65
203.	Qadafi Colony	5-G	24	1	-117
204.	Railway Camp	4-G	28	1	-173
205.	Railway Colony	3-G	23	0	-148
206.	Raksar I	4-E	24	2	-102
207.	Raksar II	4-E	p.p.	4	- 99
208.	Rangiwara	3-F	p.p.	4	+ 19
209.	Rashidabad	2-D	10	3	+ 6
210.	Rattan Talab	4-F	27	2	- 41
211.	Reis Amrohi	2-A	1	1	-198
212.	Reta Plot	10-F	11	0	-134
213.	Reti Lines	5-G	15	1	-105
214.	Rexer (Lyari)	3-F	p.p.	4	+186
215.	Rudad Nagar	4-C	14	2	+ 14
216.	Saeedabad (Baldia)	2-C	5	3	+ 63
217.	Saeedabad (Lyari)	3-E	24	4	+ 7
218.	Salimabad	2-B	1	1	- 74
219.	Shah Beg Line	3-F	p.p.	4	+123
220.	Shah Jehanabad	4-E	24	4	+ 43
221.	Shah Nawaz Bhutto Colony	5-F	28	2	+ 9
222.	Shah Rasul Colony	5-I	29	1	-133
223.	Shanti Nagar	8-E	27	1	- 92
224.	Sheds	4-E	25	3	+ 58
225.	Shershah Colony	2-F	23	4	+147
226.	Shershah Goth	3-E	p.p.	4	-107
227.	Shiddy Village	3-F	p.p.	4	+186
228.	Shohada-e-Mashriq Nagar	3-A	1	1	-220
229.	Sikandarabad	6-D	23	2	+ 7
230.	Singo Lines	3-F	p.p.	4	+ 80
231.	Sir Agha Khan Road	4-E	27	4	+ 25
232.	Slaughter House	3-F	p.p.	4	+ 91

21) P.I.B. - Pir Ilahi Bakhsh.

Sr Nr	Name of Basti	Location	Age	Security	Index house- cond.
233.	Sultanabad	4-G	10	2	- 52
234.	Suraj Colony	4-D	20	1	+ 11
235.	Swat Colony	1-D	10	3	+ 13
236.	Taru Line	4-E	p.p.	4	+ 40
237.	Tauhid Colony	2-B	1	1	-175
238.	T. and T. Colony 22).	5-H	14	2	- 54
239.	Tunesia and Jutland Lines	5-F	27	1	- 63
240.	Ultri Maidan	4-G	27	2	- 18
241.	Umr Colony	7-F	17	1	-145
242.	Umr Farooq Colony	4-C	8	1	+ 40
243.	Usmanabad	4-F	p.p.	4	+113
244.	Usmania Mahajir Colony	5-E	27	1	- 24
245.	Wahid Colony	5-C	9	1	- 27
246.	Wahidabad	4-D	24	4	+ 52
247.	Wilayatabad	4-D	20	4	+ 81
248.	Yahya Nagar	6-D	6	0	-242
249.	Zaidabad	6-D	25	2	+ 32
250.	Zarin Khan Colony	4-E	22	4	+ 3
251.	Zikri Para	4-E	p.p.	4	+ 24

III.2.5. Information gathered.

As will be explained and elaborated in chapters IV and V, information was sought, during the cataloguing mainly on the presence or absence of certain public facilities and official actions in bastis on the one hand, and on the condition of the houses on the other hand.

In addition, some other information was collected which might be of use in a later stage of the study.

This information concerns:

- a) the ownership of land of the bastis
- b) the age of the bastis
- c) the ethnic affiliation of the basti dwellers.

22). T. and T. - Telegraph and Telephone.

III.2.5.1. Land ownership.

The ownership of land is an important factor influencing the development of bastis, as we will show in the relevant chapters.

Data on landownership is shown in Map II.

III.2.5.2. The age of bastis.

As will be shown in Chapter VI, the age is an important datum, partly influencing the level of security of tenure and, besides, needed for assessment of the development of a basti.

The age of bastis is given in III.2.4. and also shown in map III.

It is already of interest here to note how squatter settlements - that always tend to be located in the periphery of cities, amongst some other places - developed during the post partition period in belts around the city as it was at the moment of birth of these bastis.

Roughly, one can easily distinguish three of these "belts" on map III:

- a) settlements that came into existence between 28 and 20 years ago, and which find themselves almost in the centre of the city now. Bastis in the Northern part of Lyari, Sher Shah Colony, bastis on Mango Pir Road and in Golimar, Jacob Lines and Kala Pul area belong to this category.
- b) settlements that came up between 20 and 10 years ago can be distinguished in a wider circle: parts of Baldia, the areas along the Northern end of Gujro and Orangi Nala, the Eastern end of Lyari River and - to the South side of the city - some bastis that are "encroaching" on the sea.
- c) a third belt which took shape during the last ten years comprises bastis such as Machar Colony, the outskirts of Baldia, Orangi, Pahar Ganj, Manzoor Colony and Akhtar Colony.

Finally, we draw attention to the fact that pre-partition settlements, in great majority passively urbanized villages, find themselves scattered all over the city, although there is some concentration in places close to rivers and the sea.

III.2.5.3. The ethnic affiliation.

It may be supposed that the ethnic affiliation of basti dwellers is of influence on the development of a basti. Partly, we will deal with this problem in Chapter VII. It is, however, of little use to give data on the ethnic affiliation here, either in the shape of a map or a table; firstly because we could not discover any particular pattern in the distribution of ethnic groups over the city and secondly because many bastis have

an ethnically mixed population so that representation in a map or table is confusing.

CHAPTER IV

SECURITY OF TENURE.

"In Karachi..... the worst types of hovel persisted because tenure was viewed as temporary." ')

') Abrams, C., 1964, p. 236.

IV.1. Starting points, development of the research.

Although officially only two possibilities can exist regarding the security of tenure: legal or illegal occupation of land, the basti dwellers themselves distinguish a whole scale of possibilities in between. This became obvious in the very first interviews we took on the subject. In this chapter we will mainly deal with the perception of security of tenure. Firstly, because there are no officially recognized levels of security of tenure except for the zero- and hundred percent level. Yet, there are indications that government officials themselves recognize levels of security in between these extremes, levels which - of course - can never be legally established. We will elaborate somewhat further on this subject in IV.2.3.

Secondly, we think the perceived level of security of tenure is an important datum, because we assume that this perception - whether right or wrong - could be a main factor influencing decisions about the improvement of the housing conditions, rather than the official legal/illegal status of a basti, which status leaves no room for nuances.

One might argue that at least the previously mentioned "regularized bastis" (Cf III.1.3.4.) have some sort of semi-legal status. It should be noted, however, that even in these bastis all the inhabitants live there illegally and still do not know what is going to happen to them as the terms of the "Improvement and Regularization Program" still have to be defined. We will come back to this point in IV.2.1.

As the subject is very much of an unofficial nature, we had to find out first the terminology and the dimensions of the concept of security of tenure. In the first free interviews, we used a number of terms, in order to find out how "security" could be best translated in this context.


Thus, in the beginning, we asked people in different localities whether they had "fikr" - anxiety, fear - "shakk" - uncertainty, doubt - "ummid" - hope -, or "yaqin" - confidence - that the land of their basti would (not) be allotted to them. It appeared that from the worst basti in this respect (1), up to the best one, hope - "ummid" - was the term common to all.

Even in bastis where people reported they had only fear to be shifted and considered legalization as an impossibility, they would still say: "ham ummid par baithe hain" - we live on hope -, or "kuchh ummid to hameshah hi hai" - there is always some hope.

1). Except for one, viz. Yahya Nagar, where some respondents reported they hoped they would be shifted away from their basti and given alternative plots.

BASTIS OF KARACHI
LAND OWNERSHIP


MAP 91




SCALE 0.75" = 1 MILE

 K.M.C.

 K.D.A.

 G.O.S.

 C.B., K.P.T., P.W.D., P.W.R.

 PRIVATE

AGE OF BASTIES OF KARACHI

map 3



PRE-PARTITION

28-20 YEARS OLD

19-15 YEARS OLD

14-10 YEARS OLD

9-5 YEARS OLD

4-0 YEARS OLD

IV.1. Starting points, development of the research.

Although officially only two possibilities can exist regarding the security of tenure: legal or illegal occupation of land, the basti dwellers themselves distinguish a whole scale of possibilities in between. This became obvious in the very first interviews we took on the subject. In this chapter we will mainly deal with the perception of security of tenure. Firstly, because there are no officially recognized levels of security of tenure except for the zero- and hundred percent level. Yet, there are indications that government officials themselves recognize levels of security in between these extremes, levels which - of course - can never be legally established. We will elaborate somewhat further on this subject in IV.2.3.

Secondly, we think the perceived level of security of tenure is an important datum, because we assume that this perception - whether right or wrong - could be a main factor influencing decisions about the improvement of the housing conditions, rather than the official legal/illegal status of a basti, which status leaves no room for nuances.

One might argue that at least the previously mentioned "regularized bastis" (Cf III.1.3.4.) have some sort of semi-legal status. It should be noted, however, that even in these bastis all the inhabitants live there illegally and still do not know what is going to happen to them as the terms of the "Improvement and Regularization Program" still have to be defined. We will come back to this point in IV.2.1.

As the subject is very much of an unofficial nature, we had to find out first the terminology and the dimensions of the concept of security of tenure. In the first free interviews, we used a number of terms, in order to find out how "security" could be best translated in this context.

Thus, in the beginning, we asked people in different localities whether they had "fikr" - anxiety, fear - "shakk" - uncertainty, doubt - "ummid" - hope -, or "yaqin" - confidence - that the land of their basti would (not) be allotted to them. It appeared that from the worst basti in this respect (1), up to the best one, hope - "ummid" - was the term common to all.

Even in bastis where people reported they had only fear to be shifted and considered legalization as an impossibility, they would still say: "ham ummid par baithe hain" - we live on hope -, or "kuchh ummid to hameshah hi hai" - there is always some hope.

1). Except for one, viz. Yahya Nagar, where some respondents reported they hoped they would be shifted away from their basti and given alternative plots.

In bastis where the inhabitants were confident their land would be eventually allotted to them, people would - amongst other things - say: "hamko puri ummid hai" - we have complete hope. Thus, "hope" turned out to be the best usable term to find out the basti dwellers' perception of security.

IV.1.1..The "anne-hope question".

Trying to establish levels of hope, we asked how much hope the basti dwellers had that their occupation of land would be legalized, to be expressed in "anne" from within a rupee (Rs 1.-- = 16 anne).

Still, as this is a difficult question, and many respondents said that only God knows such things, we had to introduce the question with a phrase which made this escape impossible to the informant.

After much probing, the question was framed as follows:

"different happenings are such that their occurring or not occurring is not in our power. But still they can be estimated when keeping reckoning with time and circumstances. For instance, when many clouds spread, then only God knows whether there will be rain or not.

But even so, when looking at the clouds, it can be estimated how much hope there is that it will rain.

Could you tell us exactly in the same way how many anne in a rupee hope you have that the land of this basti will be allotted to the inhabitants?"

Although the answers to this question mostly give a fair impression of how the informants view the security of tenure, still, there is much fluctuation in the replies, which - of course - are influenced by the temperament of the respondent and perhaps also by his speculation about the effect of his reply.

When trying to assess the perceived level of security of tenure, individual differences in the replies, caused by the temperament or the mood of the respondent, can have their legitimate place. If, however, the replies are influenced by speculation, the replies are no good yardstick of the actually perceived level of security of tenure.

We may here illustrate our point with the help of a table taken from the report Usmania Mahajir Colony, where this question in a somewhat modified form was also asked.

Table IV.1.1. Number of anne hope of inhabitants of Usmania Mahajir Colony. 2).

Amount of hope	F	%
0 - 2 anne (hardly any or no hope)	57	24
4 - 8 anne (some hope)	49	21
10 - 12 anne (good hope)	38	17
14 - 17 anne (very much hope)	90	38
Total	234	100

A few observations regarding this table may be made which illustrate the value and weaknesses of the approach of the "anne-hope question".

- a) Answers tend to cluster around round figures. Not a single respondent mentioned 3, 9 or 13 anne hope.
- b) There is a great variation in the replies, so that probably only averages taken from large numbers of interviews could give a good measure of the perceived level of security. In this example, the average is approximately 9 anne, a figure that might be translated into: "people have a very moderately optimistic view, just over the fifty-fifty level".
- c) The large number of respondents who showed themselves to be very optimistic, should in our view be explained by wild speculation, probably boosted by the fact that an extensive research was being carried out in the area. The fact that some respondents said they had "17 anne hope" (i.e. 106% ! !) reflects this exaggeration.

Our conclusion is that the "anne-hope question" is only useful either to obtain a first impression of the perceived level of security, or when used on a large scale. When it is not possible to take many interviews from every basti, an other way of measuring is necessary.

IV.1.2. Basis for hope.

Our next step was to find out what people base their (lack of) hope upon, and thus see whether measurable indicators can be found.

Initially, the question what causes there are for people to hope or not to hope for secure tenure was asked from a total of 211 respondents, spread over 81 bastis.

All the replies collected are represented in table IV.1.2.

2). Figures taken from JRP.IV, 1975-A, p. 80.

Table IV.1.2. Reasons why 211 informants from 31 bastis of Karachi have (no) hope they will get secure rights of tenure.

Reasons: 3)).	F
1. This basti is old, we have settled here long ago, etc.	66
2. The government has announced so	39
3. We have got watertaps in the area	33
4. Idem, and the number of taps increases	9
5. We can have a connection to the electricity supply system	37
6. Some roads or streets have been metalled by the authorities	23
7. There is ((part of)) a sewerage system in the area	20
8. A politician visited the area and announced future legalization	19
9. There is some arrangement for cleaning the area ((sweepers, dustbins, garbage collection vans)) from the side of the authorities	15
10. Taxes are being collected	15
11. Active local organizations try their best	15
12. Many houses are ((semi-)) pakka 4)).	13
13. ((Some)) People have certain claims to the land	11
14. The land is in private ownership// is nobody's property	9
15. The lay-out of the area is such that the authorities can have no objection//will object against legalizing the area	8
16. The area has been surveyed//mapped by the authorities	7
17. There are no facilities at all	5
18. A neighboring basti holds good prospects for being legalized	2
19. Street lights have been provided	1
20. There are public latrines in the area	1
21. There is a KMC-school in the area	1
22. There is a KMC-hospital//dispensary in the area	1
23. Mail is being delivered in the area	1
24. Connections to the gas distribution system are given	1
Total replies	363

3)) Some of the items were mentioned either as providing hope because of their presence or as destroying hope because of their absence.

4) pakka -- ((literally:)) solid. In this context: a house with walls of bricks or concrete blocks and with a concrete roof; semi-pakka: a similar house with a somewhat inferior roof, e.g. of asbestos sheets or corrugated iron sheets.

For more elaborate definitions, see V.2.41.

Besides the items mentioned in table IV.1.2., a few more items were mentioned by our respondents. These items do not give hope for legalization, but make the inhabitants of bastis confident that they will not be shifted forcibly.

As such, we mention (with frequencies in brackets):

1. This is surplus land (faltu), nobody can want or claim it (16).
2. We are Pathans, nobody will dare to shift us (2).
3. We work in KMC; we can make trouble if KMC tries to shift us (1).
4. We are too many people: in case we make trouble, nobody can fight us (1) 5).
5. Several mosques protect the area from bulldozers (2).
6. Previous attempts to shift us, resp. announcements regarding shifting from the side of the authorities have not succeeded, resp. materialized (2).

Later, the same question was asked in 173 more bastis, and the only additions to the list given in table IV.1.2. were:

1. inhabitants of this basti have rationcards/there is a ration shop in the area (2)
2. the general census of Pakistan included this colony (1)

Thus, the list of table IV.1.2. seems to be rather exhaustive.

It is also of interest to note that elsewhere several of the same items were found to be operating:

"the de facto legality of uncontrolled settlements is often recognized by government through its reaction to the area; willingness to grant settlers reasonable security of tenure is often implied through the normalization of city services in an area. Even taxes are welcome in this respect, as a sign of governmental recognition of the permanence of the settlement. Tenure can also be derived from de facto legalization, for example government inactivity or refusal to take steps to evict squatters." 6).

"Eventually, a majority of these gecekondu houses, though lacking any form of legal title to the land they occupied, were assessed for municipal and state taxes. Such taxes or imposts were usually readily paid by the squatter owners, since by doing so proof of effective occupancy was established by the squatters." 7).

- 5) It is interesting to note W. Mangin's description of squatters who had been forcibly shifted for four times and then: "they soon learned that there was greater safety in numbers...." (Mangin, W., 1967-8, p. 23) Again, about Karachi, we noted: "Yet another aspect was that the encroachment was attempted in groups rather than on individual basis so that it becomes difficult to tackle with the crowd" (Dawn, 2/VII/'75).
- 6) U.N., 1971, p. 107.
- 7) Drakakis-Smith, D.W., and W.B. Fisher, 1976, p. 94.

"Given any recognition or encouragement by the Government, such as the paving of a street or even the collection of taxes from them, the people respond with a burst of activity on improvement of their houses." 8).

"Interestingly enough, the Municipal Corporation charges house tax on unauthorized houses also and the owners of unauthorized houses are more than eager to pay the house tax and produce the receipt as evidence of their bona fides." 9).

"In spite of a blind eye being turned to squatters by local authorities and open disapproval being frequently voiced by the Government, a sort of secret diplomatic recognition has been given in various forms (wells, pre-schools, trading licences, standpipes)." 10).

Still, the items listed are different in nature and not all of them give a good base for comparison as to what is the perceived legal status. Moreover, on practical grounds, a reduction of the number of items would be justified. We will therefore further scrutinize and select the items.

IV.2. Twofold basis for hope.

The twenty-four items mentioned can be broadly divided into two categories:

- a) signals from the side of the authorities that thinking of eventual legalization of the particular basti may not be unrealistic. The fact that e.g. watertaps are provided in a certain area is interpreted as a sign that the authorities at least are aware of the existence of that area and its inhabitants, and this awareness is manifested by means of visible signs, which fact implies a certain recognition. (items 2 - 10 and 16 - 24).
- b) items which (the basti dwellers think) - if present - would enhance the cause for authorization if the basti dwellers are to defend it (items 1 and 11 - 15).

The fact that all the items mentioned reflect as it were both sides of the lawsuit, may be regarded as an indication that the question was well understood, and the fact that the list of items turned out to be almost exhaustive when applied in 173 other bastis, may be seen as an indication that these items are indeed reasonable indicators to the perceived level of security of tenure.

8) Mangin, W., 1967-B, p. 28.

9) Bose, A., 1973, p. 175.

10) Andrews, P., M. Christie, and R. Martin, 1973, p. 19.

IV.2.1. Signals from the authorities' side.

Item no. 2: Announcements.

Announcements from the government's side are very diverse in nature. Some are specific, others general; some were made recently, others long ago (e.g. Liaqat Ali Khan's famous "Golimar abad karo" (i.e. "settle in Golimar"), the statements were made by different officials under different regimes; some have, others have no documentary evidence. Often, the statements contradict each other.

To give an example: it is difficult to judge and weigh the value of the following cuttings from newspapers:

"All unauthorized colonies in Karachi to be regularized" 11).

"City slums to be removed" 12).

"Unauthorized colonies to be regularized" 13).

"The second category.....where it is not feasible to ameliorate the living conditions..... Therefore, the recourse is the wholesale removal of the settlers to new accommodations or areas..... There are now 200 chunks.....with a population of half a million, which fall under the second category. For the resettlement of the people in these areas, a gigantic plan is being implemented under the Master Plan..... The plan envisages the construction of 75,000 nucleus houses and 50,000 flats...." 14).

The first three statements quoted were reportedly made by different high officials, the third quotation suggests authenticity by giving details of the Master Plan. The tenor of the different quotations is so different, that one is at a loss to attach any value to this kind of statements. It is also difficult to judge information on this subject from the side of the basti dwellers who may strongly colour the information, firstly because of their own involvement, and secondly because they may suppose this to serve their interest.

The next difficulty - which we already referred to in the former chapter - is the polyinterpretability of the nomenclature. Very often, the boundaries of areas about which announcements are made, are poorly or not at all defined.

We found - for instance - references to "regularization of Lyari" in newspapers dated 1971, but it was not before October 1974 that the boundaries of the area to be included in the "Lyari-scheme" were defined. Moreover, these boundaries were revised again in 1976.

11) Dawn, 19/III/'73.

12) Morning News, 16/I/'74.

13) Dawn, 26/VI/'75.

14) Morning News, 6/IV/'75.

There is, however, one complication of a more serious nature. In some cases the announcement that a basti is going to be regularized works hope-destroying at the individual level, i.e. regarding security of tenure to the individual.

It seems as though a completely different mechanism starts working as soon as the final stage on the way to legalization is within sight. One reason for this is that in the traditional regularization plans all kinds of changes in the lay-out of the area are provided for. Especially the widening of roads and lanes according to traditional town planners' standards plays an important role. As a result, a high percentage of the dwellings in a particular basti is going to be affected by these plans.

"It is unfortunately necessary to reduce the existing population from 340.000 to 150.000 persons." 15).

A later proposal for the same area (Lyari) still implied that 30% of the plots would be affected. Another proposal, for Chanesar Goth, envisages shifting a percentage of no less than 25%. 16)., 17).

What really happens if plans of this kind are being attempted, is that a smaller percentage of the population is actually shifted and that others remain living where they are, but do not get an official title and run more risk of being forcibly shifted one day.

For this reason, it appears that the perceived security at the individual level decreases when the legal status of a basti as a whole has reached a certain, high, level. At least for a proportion of the basti dwellers, this is the case.

A second reason is that the official land market starts operating as soon as the basti dwellers obtain a proprietary right or a right to a long-term lease of the land they dwell upon. As long as there is no land policy that actively protects the low income groups from the influences of land speculation, it may be expected that "what really will happen is that the squatters will sell this eventually". 18).

Besides a - probably low - percentage of "professional squatters", there may be many bona fide squatters who cannot withstand the temptation created by their scarce resources on the one hand and the offer of a relatively high sum for the land they dwell upon, on the other hand.

15) KDA, 1961, p. 6.

16) KMC, 1969-1971.

17) Associated surveyors, 1972-A.

18) Havlik, L., 1974, p. 3.

"For every professional squatter, there are hundreds who are there because they cannot afford the high rent that living in a comfortable house entails. They are not evil people, unless being poor is evil".

"The promise of quick money.....often proves too much for the original lessees who are always hard up for cash. They sell their "rights" and then squat somewhere else again." 19).

In the allotted part of Khuda Dad Colony, it was found that an estimated 30% of the original squatters had sold their allotted plots and left. 20). Thus, allotment or leasing out of plots may work against the security of tenure - when "tenure" is taken in its strict meaning which has a component of continuity. It should be stressed again, that this by-effect occurs when there is no landpolicy to control such effects. 21).

Thus, however announcements from the governments' side seem to be a legitimate source of hope, it cannot be used as a single interpretable indicator of hope. Moreover, we found that probable announcements (i.e. when the announcements have an official status in one of the executing agencies) mostly coincided with a high number of the indicators we will use for establishing the perceived levels of security, so that the use of these announcements as an indicator, is redundant to a certain extent.

Table IV.2.1. Number of hope providing items present in bastis that reportedly will be regularized.

No of hope providing items present	0	1	2	3	4	Tot.
No of bastis for which announcement was made	1	7	12	13	70	103

Item no. 3: water.

This item will be included. In case there are no taps, but the authorities have made some alternative provision for water supply (e.g. by means of vans), it will be considered as equal to the presence of taps, because it can be regarded as an indication of care from the governments's side. Only the technical expression of this care may take different shapes.

19) Laquian, A.A., 1969, pp. 33 and 22 resp.

20) Frank, E., 1975, Cf also Chapter X.

21) See for more details about land policy: Vander Harst, J., 1974-A, and MPD, 1974, pp. 173 and 200.

Item no. 4: increase of number of watertaps.

The increase in the number of taps is difficult to find out and to judge. Besides, increase seems to be much less important than the question whether water is or is not provided.

This item will be ignored.

Item no. 5: electricity.

This item will be included if it regards officially sanctioned connections.

Items no. 6 and no. 7: paved roads and sewerage.

These items will be included.

Item no. 8: promises by politicians.

Again the value of this item is extremely difficult to judge. Questions arise about the period in which the politician made his promise, his party affiliation, power balances, etc. More importantly, it should be noted that many of our informants on the subject - basti dwellers themselves - expressed their scepticism regarding this item.

"After Mr. X had come and made his promises, a few stupid ("be-samajh") people started to build their houses pakka, believing that these promises would come true." (from an interview in Gule Rana Colony).

It should also be noted that over a period of time, innumerable promises of legalization have been made all over Karachi, by all kinds of politicians, but that hardly any of these promises has materialized until now.

This item will be ignored.

Items no. 9 and no. 10: cleaning and taxes.

These items will be included.

Item no. 16: map/survey.

Information on this subject from the side of the basti dwellers was not very reliable in many cases. Sometimes, the general census, a survey of KESC (22) - e.g. for the provision of electricity to a mosque - or mapping by a local welfare organization, or university students, were mistakenly assumed to be related with the plans of the authorities for the area. It should be noted that when the basti dwellers mistakenly attach value to map making or surveying for purposes that are trivial in our context, this fact will probably influence their perception of security.

In other words, the basti dwellers' reaction to trivial events may be very relevant in the context of our research.

However, we are unable to measure the effects of what in fact is an

22) KESC - Karachi Electric Supply Company

interpretation of false rumours.

Therefore, only those cases will be considered reliable where there is proof of such activities (e.g. marks put by KDA-officials on walls to be demolished, or documents lying with local leaders or in the offices of KMC, KDA, etc.)

In these cases the evidence of official plans can be equated with the existence of the item(s) concerned. It should be remembered that we are not interested in the item as such, but in its value as an **indicator of official recognition**, and -as such - as an indicator of hope for secure tenure. Thus, it can be argued, an approved plan for - e.g. - a sewer implies as much official recognition as the sewer laid.

We will retain the item and reckon it under one or more relevant, other items (e.g. electricity, sewerage, water, paved roads, etc.).

Item no. 17: no facilities.

This item is covered - in its positive form - under the different facilities that provide hope. As such it can be ignored.

Item no. 18: situation neighboring basti.

Comparison with neighboring areas is not possible on a large scale, as all kinds of other factors may also play their role in this respect.

It is impossible to keep these other factors constant, and therefore the influence of developments in neighboring areas cannot be measured in isolation.

This item will be ignored.

Item no. 19: Street lights.

We have found no bastis where street lights are provided but no private connections to the electricity supply exist. Accordingly we consider this item to be covered by item no. 5.

Item no. 20: public latrines.

The presence of public latrines does not seem to be a useful item in this context. Firstly, we have the impression that the installation of these useful institutions is very much connected with the central location of bastis with a Sindhi, Baluchi or Pathan population.

Secondly - and more important - several instances were found, where latrines had been demolished - at the request of the inhabitants of the basti - when the basti developed. Thus, this item is not always retained during the process of development of a basti and therefore its presence

or absence is no good indicator of the level of security.

This item will be ignored.

Items 21 and 22: KMC school and hospital/dispensary.

In the provision of these items the population number and the location of the bastis play important roles. If these institutions or any of them exist in certain areas, they may not be provided in the neighbouring areas, especially when these last are relatively small bastis. Yet, these last bastis that do not have or get these institutions within their boundaries, may have a legal status equal to, or even higher than the adjacent basti where the institution happens to be located.

A good example of this is the Mahmoodabad KMC hospital, which is situated in Chanesar Goth, but which is supposed to cater also to the needs of Mahmoodabad proper, Liaqat Ashraf Colony and other localities in the neighborhood. Liaqat Ashraf Colony does not have a KMC-hospital within its boundaries, but its legal status is higher than that of Chanesar Goth: in Liaqat Ashraf Colony leasing of plots was started much earlier than in Chanesar Goth.

Thus, these items do not lend themselves to be used as a basis for comparison, and consequently these will be ignored.

Item no. 23: mail delivery.

The delivery of mail turned out to be too difficult to determine. In practically all bastis of Karachi people can receive mail somehow or other. On the scale of the whole city of Karachi it is not possible to attach a certain weight to the different ways mail is being delivered. The item will be ignored.

Item no.24: Gas.

Gas connections were observed in a very few bastis only. The location of the basti might also play a major role, even more probably than is already the case with water, electricity and sewerage.

This item will be ignored.

IV.2.2. Items that enhance the cause for legalization.

Item no. 1: the age.

The age of a basti certainly plays an important role and can in most cases be easily determined. It is, however, difficult to compare data on the age of bastis with the previously mentioned items which are of a completely different nature.

Besides, it is questionable whether the age, as such, is of great importance as an indicator to security of tenure.

We know of relatively old colonies where still "hope" is at the 0-level (e.g. City Station Colony, 1954; Hazara Colony, 1950) and very young settlements where hope is high (e.g. settlements in Orangi). It may be supposed that where age works as a hope-increasing factor, this should also be reflected in the presence of other, aforementioned items. Where this is not the case, a high age may well have hope-destroying effects:

"Even after 25 years there is almost no water in the area; that is why there cannot be any trust ("bharosa") in the future of this basti". (interview Usmania Mahajir Colony)

A third complication is that age may partly coincide with item 13: claims to the land.

We may suppose that in pre-partition settlements the age really supports the cause of a claim to the land. Here, the level of security may be enormously influenced by the fact that the inhabitants have good reasons to assume that the land belongs to them, although this may not have been officially recognized.

"We have been born here, and so have our fathers and grandfathers; they are buried in the graveyard of this goth. Who dares say that the land is not ours?" (interv. Ibrahim Goth).

For all these reasons, we will deal with age in a manner somewhat different from the other items.

Accordingly the age-factor will be dealt with at a later stage, as on the one hand it is a non-constant factor like the previous items (it may be hope-increasing or hope-destroying) but on the other hand it seems too important to be ignored.

Item no. 11: Local organizations.

Although in some instances local organizations (political parties, "anjumans" (23)) may be instrumental in the legalization of bastis, the quality of these organizations varies greatly. 24).

As often as not our informants stated they had absolutely no confidence in the activities of anjumans or local leaders, as these - reportedly - are only after "eating our money".

Even when things are not all that bad: "typical of all these associations is that they are associations having a board that consists of those who have decided to create the association, and that there are no or hardly any members. In this sense, and also because the results of their activities are scanty, these organizations are paper organizations". 25).

23) Anjuman - association, mostly used for: voluntary welfare organization.

24) Cf Bos, A., 1970, Segaar, T.J., 1975, p. 111.

25) Segaar, T.J., 1975, p. 132 (translation mine, JL).

Moreover, we may suppose that where these organizations are effective, again this should be reflected in the presence of other items, which have been mentioned earlier. In the few cases where we found effective local organizations, this indeed is the case (Cf Chapter VIII and X). On the scale of Karachi, it is impossible to measure the quality of local organizations. Accordingly this item will be ignored.

Item no. 12: Pakka and Semi-pakka houses.

The two criteria proposed for framing a typology of autonomous settlements are:

- a) the level of security of tenure, and
- b) the level of physical development.

It would be incorrect to measure the level of security in terms of the level of physical development, as this would entail contamination when the two variables are combined.

This item should therefore be ignored in this context.

Item no. 13: claims to the land.

Claims to the land are difficult to weigh. Even in very strong cases, namely in old, passively urbanized villages, the claims seem to be not always recognized.

"The commissioner.....recently tried to explain the persons occupying the land that they had to ultimately vacate the area under the law. He failed to make them see the point.

.....The illegal occupants argue that they have been living there for generations..... 26).

Moreover, for most of the pre-partition settlements, the claim to the land is supported by the presence of a relatively high number of hope-providing items. Again anticipating the final list of hope-providing items, the following table may illustrate our point.

Table IV.2.2. Hope-providing items present in pre-partition settlements.

No of hope providing items present	0	1	2	3	4	Total
No of settlements	2	6	7	3	42	60
No settlements (cumulative fig.)	2	58	52	45	42	60

26) Regards some goths in KDA-scheme 24. Quotation from Dawn, 8/III/'75, (underlining mine, JL.)

A comparison with table IV.3.1. shows that the pre-partition settlements are relatively much better provided with hope providing items. (Cf also table IV.3.1.1.)

Claims to the land in younger settlements are relatively rare and again, genuine claims are supported by the presence of the other hope-giving items.

A good example hereof can be found in Azam Basti, where "a number of dwellers.....hold documentary evidence which indicates that the movement of the families was made under official orders and patronage," 27).

Regarding this basti, there was also an official statement announcing its regularization (28) and all the hope-providing items are present in this basti.

This item will not be further investigated.

Item no. 14: Ownership of land.

The ownership of land cannot be used as an overall indicator, as it sometimes works as a hope-enhancing and sometimes as a hope-destroying factor, dependent upon the attitude or policy of the particular owner (examples of both extremes are respectively Sikandarabad and Hazara Colony).

It will be of relevance though, to distinguish between bastis on the land of different owners in the public sector. We will come back to this point later, but omit the item as an indicator.

Item no. 15: The lay-out.

The lay-out cannot be used either as a constant criterion providing or destroying hope, as it depends on the standards one wants to adopt. At present, in Karachi, there is much discussion on the standards problem. Thus, a large group of bastis are in a doubtful position as regards the lay-out: they may be just acceptable or just below the accepted level. Only in very obvious cases (both positively in parts of Orangi and negatively in parts of Jacob Lines, for example) one may safely assume that the lay-out is of influence in the perception of the level of security of tenure, but as such it is not a constant influencing factor.

This item will be ignored for the time being, but we will come back to the point in a number of obvious cases. (Cf VIII.3.2.2. and IX.2.2.).

27) Associated surveyors, 1972-B, p. 1.

28) Dawn, 9/XII/'74.

IV.2.3. Conclusion, bases for hope.

In conclusion, from the first group of items ("signals from the side of the authorities"), the following will be retained and will be used as indicators to the perceived level of security of tenure:

1. water supply
2. arrangements for keeping the area clean
3. electricity supply
4. collection of taxes
5. presence of paved roads
6. presence of a sewerage system

From the second group of items ("points in defence of the cause of legalization"), attention will be paid to:

1. the age of the basti
2. the ownership of the land
3. the lay-out

As these last three items are not constant in their effects- like the items of the first group are - we will be able to deal with these factors at a later stage only.

The items mentioned from the first group of items seem to be good indicators to the perceived level of security of tenure - to be called "security" in the following-.

When van der Harst used these items and compared the level of security as expressed in terms of anna from a rupee with the level of security as indicated by the presence of one or more of these six items, he found that there was an outspoken relation between the two.

Table IV.2.3. Perceived security of tenure in anna and estimated security by presence of hope providing items, in 13 colonies of Karachi. 2)

Anne hope in a rupee	settlements with		
	no item or water only	water, mostly cleaning, and electricity	all six items
0	36%	18%	-
1 - 8	32%	22%	4%
9 - 14	13%	28%	19%
15 - 16	19%	32%	77%
Total	100%	100%	100%

29) van der Harst, J., 1974-B p. 5.

The fact that the relation - although evidently present - is not very strong, can be viewed in the light of our previous remarks on the shortcomings of the "anne-hope question". 30). There is reason to assume that the items give a better indication than the replies to the "anne-hope question" do, as the personal bias which affects the answers to the last question is avoided when a simple inventory is made in every basti showing which of the hope-giving items is present.

It is also important in this connection to note that the authorities themselves recognize the hope-giving power of these items, which fact again underlines the probable validity of this operationalization.

"KESC-authorities inform that in terms of their policy electricity is provided only to the areas which hold prospects of obtaining lease from the government." 31).

One of the criteria for "authorization, regularization and improvements" in unauthorized colonies is "the existing level of utility services." 32).

".....KMC has provided about 50 community water taps. Besides, two metalled roads have been constructed by KMC. KESC has also provided street lights and house to house connections.....it may be considered for regularization....." 33).

In conclusion: "water and electricity are our clouds" (an informant in Kokan Colony, referring to the introduction to the "anne-hope question"). (Cf. IV.1.1.)

It should be noted that the items mentioned only serve as indicators to the perceived level of security of tenure. There may, or there may not be a causal relationship between the presence of these items and future allotment.

The items in this context merely function as signs (the word "nishan" - sign - was often used by our informants) on the road to legalization. They can - for instance - be interpreted as signs that an anjuman is effectively exerting pressure on the authorities, so that the hope increases the anjuman may eventually also succeed in its efforts to get the settlement legalized.

30) The strength of the relation expressed as the "gamma of Goodman & Krushal" is 0.66. (Cf. W.M. de Pijper, 1974, pp. 52-54).

31) Rauf, M.A., 1970/71.

32) KDA, 1973.

33) KDA, undated -8, p. 15.

IV.3. Establishing levels of perceived security of tenure.

The next problem was how to arrange or weigh the items, so that levels of security could be established.

In an attempt to weigh the items, we first asked respondents to indicate how much hope each of the items gives.

"Electricity gives 12 anne hope, but a sewerage system 16 anne".
(interview Aqab Jail Colony).

Later, we asked our respondents to indicate what order of sequence the items have, when viewed as providing different quantities of hope.

"A paved road is a much better sign than electricity is, because there are more expenses to the government in the construction of a road." (interview Sikandarabad).

A problem in using both these methods was that often the presence of a certain item already implied the presence of another item, so that the **items cannot be weighed in isolation. There are no bastis with a sewerage system but not having provision for water,** to give one extremely obvious example.

When we had discovered that there is a certain logical order of sequence in the appearance of the different items, we tried to let the bastis fit in a Guttman scalogram.

The principle of this technique is very simple. The basic hypothesis is that there is a certain fixed order of sequence in the appearance of the different items. When the items are arranged according to their total frequencies, then item no. 1 is the most "easy" to achieve, and the last item is the most "difficult". As a principle, the presence of a certain item automatically implies the presence of the previous ("more easy") items. The levels of security, in our case, can then be easily defined by the presence of 0, 1, 2, etc. items.

For the 251 colonies in total, about which we gathered information, the frequencies scored by the different items are shown in table IV.3.1.

It should be noted that an item was considered to be present only when it was provided for the particular basti. In the case of bastis that are encroachments in planned parts of the city, the presence of e.g. a paved road evidently has nothing to do with the basti and - as a consequence - was not considered to be an item present. When, however, in the encroachment a public tap had been provided, it was clearly destined to serve the population of the encroachment as the regular dwellings in the street have their private house to house connections. Thus, the public tap was reckoned as an item present, in such a case.

Table IV.3.1. Total frequencies of hope giving items in 251 bastis of Karachi.

	No item (O)	Water (W)	Clean- ing (C)	Elec- tricity (E)	Taxes (T)	Paved Road(s) (R)	Sewer- age (S)	Total
F	26	225	145	142	97	90	74	251

In order to obtain reasonable numbers of bastis in each security-level group, again, from the 6 items used, we eliminated two.

The items (C) and (E) and the items (T) and (R) have frequencies that are very close to each other, so that security-level groups of 3 and 7 bastis respectively would come into **existence**. Establishing of such small groups does not seem to be very relevant. Accordingly we excluded the items (C) and (R), and thus arrived at the Guttman scalogram, shown in IV.3.2. (34).

34) For a full explanation of the technique of the Guttman scalogram, see Guttman, L., 1944, Guttman, L., 1950, Carneiro, R.L., 1962 and Gadourek, I., 1967, pp. 287-304.

Table IV.3.2. Guttman scalogram, showing the presence of 4 home-giving items in 251 bastis of Karachi.

Name basti	W	E	T	S
Azeemabad	-	-	-	-
Baluch Colony	-	-	-	-
Baluch Goth	-	-	-	-
Banguria Goth	-	-	-	-
Bhutto Colony	-	-	-	-
Bilal Colony	-	-	-	-
City Station Colony	-	-	-	-
Dosmand ka Goth	-	-	-	-
Haji Camp	-	-	-	-
Hanifi Colony	-	-	-	-
Hazara Colony	-	-	-	-
Iqbalabad	-	-	-	-
Iqbal Goth	-	-	-	-
Islamia Jamhurya Colony	-	-	-	-
Ismail Village	-	-	-	-
Jamhurya Colony (Race Course)	-	-	-	-
Kakoos Colony	-	-	-	-
Kashmir Colony	-	-	-	-
Lyari Naddi	-	-	-	-
Pak Sarhad Colony	-	-	-	-
Panjabi Para (Dastgir)	-	-	-	-
Pathan Colony (Scheme 24)	-	-	-	-
Piru Goth	-	-	-	-
Railway Colony	-	-	-	-
Reta Plot	-	-	-	-
Yahya Nagar	-	-	-	-
Abyssinia Lines	+	-	-	-
Abdul Jabbar Compound	+	-	-	-
Afridi Colony	+	-	-	-
Ajab Khan Colony	+	-	-	-
Akhlaq Mohammad Colony	+	-	-	-
Aqab Jail Colony	+	-	-	-
Aziz Colony	+	-	-	-
Bath Island	+	-	-	-

Name basti	W	E	T	S
Bengali Area (Orangi)	+	-	-	-
Bh. Para (Pahar Ganj)	+	-	-	-
Bilalabad	+	-	-	-
Bismillah Colony	+	-	-	-
Bizerta Lines	+	-	-	-
Bukhari Colony	+	-	-	-
Choona Bhatti	+	-	-	-
Data Nagar	+	-	-	-
Faqir Colony	+	-	-	-
Farooq Colony	+	-	-	-
Federal C. Area (Panjabi Para)	+	-	-	-
Frontier Colony	+	-	-	-
Gabol Colony	+	-	-	-
Garden Area	+	-	-	-
Gauharabad (Dastgir)	+	-	-	-
Gharibabad (Pologround)	+	-	-	-
Gharibabad (Nea)	+	-	-	-
Ghaziabad	+	-	-	-
Gujro Nala	+	-	-	-
Gule Rana Colony	+	-	-	-
Hafizabad	+	-	-	-
Husseiniat Colony	+	-	-	-
Iqbal Baluch Colony	+	-	-	-
Isa Nagri	+	-	-	-
Islam Nagar	+	-	-	-
Ismail Goth	+	-	-	-
Jehangirabad North	+	-	-	-
Jinnah Hospital I	+	-	-	-
Jinnah Hospital II	+	-	-	-
Karim Bakhsh Para	+	-	-	-
Karnali Basti	+	-	-	-
Kausar Niazi Colony	+	-	-	-
Khalilabad	+	-	-	-
Khowaja Gharib Nawaz Colony	+	-	-	-
Khowaja Moinuddin Colony	+	-	-	-
Machar Colony	+	-	-	-
Maghdum Shah Colony	+	-	-	-

Name basti	W	E	T	S
Mastan Colony	+	-	-	-
Masum Shah Colony	+	-	-	-
Mohammadi Line	+	-	-	-
Mohammad Nagar	+	-	-	-
Mominabad	+	-	-	-
Moosa Colony	+	-	-	-
Moosa Nagar	+	-	-	-
Mujahid Colony (Barsati Nala)	+	-	-	-
Mujahid Colony (Gujro Nala)	+	-	-	-
Musa Goth	+	-	-	-
Naddiabad	+	-	-	-
Narain Pura	+	-	-	-
National Tyre Colony	+	-	-	-
New Karachi East	+	-	-	-
Nusrat Bhutto Colony	+	-	-	-
Pak Ghausia Colony	+	-	-	-
Pak Jamhurya Colony I	+	-	-	-
Panjabi Para (Golimar)	+	-	-	-
Paposh Nagar	+	-	-	-
Pathan Colony	+	-	-	-
Pirabad	+	-	-	-
Qadafi Colony	+	-	-	-
Railway Camp	+	-	-	-
Reis Amrohi	+	-	-	-
Reti Lines	+	-	-	-
Salimabad	+	-	-	-
Shah Rasul Colony	+	-	-	-
Shanti Nagar	+	-	-	-
Shohada-e-Mashriq Nagar	+	-	-	-
Suraj Colony	+	-	-	-
Tauhid Colony	+	-	-	-
Tunesia and Jutland Lines	+	-	-	-
Umr Colony	+	-	-	-
Usmania Mahajir Colony	+	-	-	-
Wahid Colony	+	-	-	-

Name basti	W	E	T	S
Akramabad	+	+	-	-
Azam Nagar	+	+	-	-
Azim Khan Goth	+	+	-	-
Bakhshan Village	+	+	-	-
Behind Jacob Lines	+	+	-	-
Bowani Chali	+	+	-	-
Central Jacob Lines	+	+	-	-
Chhota Maidan	+	+	-	-
Darbar Colony	+	+	-	-
Daulat Ram Mil Colony	+	+	-	-
Gauharabad (Sabzi Mandi)	+	+	-	-
Gharibabad (Lyari)	+	+	-	-
Gharibabad (Purana)	+	+	-	-
Gizdarabad	+	+	-	-
Hijrat Colony	+	+	-	-
Hill Area	+	+	-	-
Ibrahim Goth	+	+	-	-
Jamhurya Colony II	+	+	-	-
Jamshed Road II	+	+	-	-
Jan Mohammad Goth	+	+	-	-
Jehangirabad South	+	+	-	-
Jilalabad	+	+	-	-
Kashmiri Town	+	+	-	-
Khamosh Colony II	+	+	-	-
Leprosy Colony	+	+	-	-
Limu Goth	+	+	-	-
Lotus Road	+	+	-	-
Lower Gizri	+	+	-	-
Manzoor Colony	+	+	-	-
Maulwi Musafir Khana	+	+	-	-
Mujahid Colony (Jail-Drigh Road)	+	+	-	-
Natha Khan Goth	+	+	-	-
Nishtar Basti	+	+	-	-
Raksar I	+	+	-	-
Rattan Talab	+	+	-	-
Rudad Nagar	+	+	-	-

Name basti	W	E	T	S
Shah Nawaz Bhutto Colony	+	+	-	-
Sikandarabad	+	+	-	-
Sultenabad	+	+	-	-
T. and T. Colony	+	+	-	-
Ultri Maidan	+	+	-	-
Zaidabad	+	+	-	-
Akhtar Colony	+	+	+	-
Anjam Colony	+	+	+	-
Baluch Para	+	+	+	-
Chittagong Colony	+	+	+	-
Chorwarh Colony	+	+	+	-
Delhi Colony (Baldia)	+	+	+	-
Firdos Colony	+	+	+	-
Gharib Nawaz Colony	+	+	+	-
Ghaus Nagar	+	+	+	-
Ghausia Colony	+	+	+	-
Giddomal	+	+	+	-
Gul Bhai Colony	+	+	+	-
Haji Qasim Colony	+	+	+	-
Jam Nagar	+	+	+	-
Johar Colony	+	+	+	-
Junaghar Muhallah	+	+	+	-
Kokan Colony	+	+	+	-
Lassi Para (Baldia)	+	+	+	-
Liaqat Ashraf Colony	+	+	+	-
Madina Colony (Baldia)	+	+	+	-
Madina Colony (Love Lane)	+	+	+	-
Police Risala Line	+	+	+	-
Rashidabad	+	+	+	-
Saeedabad (Baldia)	+	+	+	-
Sheds	+	+	+	-
Swat Colony	+	+	+	-
Heroonabad	+	- (!)	+	-
Agra Taj Colony	+	+	+	+
Angara Goth	+	+	+	+
Asif Colony	+	+	+	+

Name basti	W	E	T	S
Azem Basti	+	+	+	+
Baghdadi	+	+	+	+
Baghicha Hashim Khan	+	+	+	+
Bakra Piri	+	+	+	+
Bawapat	+	+	+	+
Bhutta Village	+	+	+	+
Bihar Colony	+	+	+	+
Chakiwara	+	+	+	+
Chanesar Goth	+	+	+	+
Central Muslimabad	+	+	+	+
Daryabad	+	+	+	+
Dharamsiwara	+	+	+	+
Dodha Goth	+	+	+	+
Dhobighat	+	+	+	+
Eid Gah Line	+	+	+	+
Farooqabad	+	+	+	+
Gandhi Nagar	+	+	+	+
Ghas Ganji	+	+	+	+
Golimar I	+	+	+	+
Gul Mohammad Lane	+	+	+	+
Haji Murid Goth	+	+	+	+
Hassan Lashkari Village	+	+	+	+
Hazrat Mohani Colony	+	+	+	+
Idu Lines	+	+	+	+
Ilyas Goth	+	+	+	+
Jinnahabad	+	+	+	+
Jumman Shah Plot	+	+	+	+
Juna Kalri	+	+	+	+
Juna Kumbharwara	+	+	+	+
Kalakot	+	+	+	+
Khadda	+	+	+	+
Khoja Muhallah	+	+	+	+
Koila Godown	+	+	+	+
Kumbharwara (Baldia)	+	+	+	+
Lalukhet Pockets	+	+	+	+
Liaqat Colony	+	+	+	+

Name basti	W	E	T	S	
Mahmoodabad	+	+	+	+	
Miran Naka	+	+	+	+	
Miran Pir	+	+	+	+	
Mohammadabad	+	+	+	+	
Moosa Lane	+	+	+	+	
Muslimabad	+	+	+	+	
Nawabad	+	+	+	+	
Nawa Line	+	+	+	+	
New Kalri	+	+	+	+	
New Kumbharwara	+	+	+	+	
Niazi Colony	+	+	+	+	
Nishtar Colony	+	+	+	+	
Old Golimar	+	+	+	+	
Patel Para	+	+	+	+	
Raksar II	+	+	+	+	
Rangiwara	+	+	+	+	
Rexer (Lyari)	+	+	+	+	
Saeedabad (Lyari)	+	+	+	+	
Shah Beg Line	+	+	+	+	
Shah Jehanabad	+	+	+	+	
Sher Shah Colony	+	+	+	+	
Shiddy Village	+	+	+	+	
Singo Lines	+	+	+	+	
Sir Agha Khan Road	+	+	+	+	
Slaughterhouse	+	+	+	+	
Taru Line	+	+	+	+	
Usmanabad	+	+	+	+	
Wahidabad	+	+	+	+	
Wilayatabad	+	+	+	+	
Zarin Khan Colony	+	+	+	+	
Zikri Para	+	+	+	+	
Hassan Colony	+	+	- (!)	+	
Mama Road	+	+	- (!)	+	
Nafisabad	+	+	- (!)	+	
Sher Shah Goth	+	+	- (!)	+	
Total		251	142	97	74

From this table, it can be seen which bastis fall within each of the five established security-level groups. The spaces in between the parts of the table (0 items, 1 item, etc.) mark the division into these level groups. 35).

The sizes of the different security level groups can be easily read from the scalogram and established as follows:

Table IV.3.3. Sizes of security level groups of bastis.

No of items	No of bastis
0	26
1	82
2	42
3	31
4	70
Total	251

IV.3.1. Differences in security level between subgroups.

The scalogram method was also applied to subgroups of bastis, according to age and land-ownership. It is worth noting that - although relevant differences in security between these groups of bastis can be observed, - the different subscales also show a fairly good approximation to the perfect scale.

In table IV.3.1.1. we have summarized the data here referred to.

35) The scalogram is almost perfect. Reproducibility coefficient is 0.99. Note the exceptions to the perfect scale, marked with (!) in the scalogram. The Reproducibility coefficient is calculated as follows:

$$R = 1 - \frac{\text{No of exceptions}}{\text{No of items} \times \text{No of observations.}} \quad (\text{Cf. R.L. Carneiro, 1962})$$

Table IV.3.1.1. Total frequencies of hope-giving items in different groups of bastis.

Basti group	Total N	W	E	T	S	% of total
<u>On KMC-land</u>						
Pre-partition	45	45	45	43	40	33
Post-partition	89	84	62	47	23	31
Total KMC land	134	129	107	90	58	51
<u>On KDA and GOS land 36)</u>						
Pre-partition	10	6	4	1	0	0
Post-partition	47	41	6	0	0	0
Total KDA + GOS land	57	47	10	1	0	0
<u>On C.B., PWR, PWD and KPT land 37)</u>	33	23	9	0	0	0
<u>On privately owned land</u>	27	26	16	6	6	22
<u>Total pre-partition</u>	60	53	52	45	42	70
<u>Total post-partition</u>	191	168	91	53	33	17
Total	251	226	143	98	75	37

A few striking facts from this table may be noticed:

- a) Relatively more pre partition bastis fall in the highest security group (Cf also table IV.2.2.)
- b) Regarding the level of security, batis on KMC land are far better off than those on either KDA/GOS land or on land of one of the agencies C.B., PWR, PWD and KPT. The bastis on privately owned land take a medium position in this respect.

As far as KDA and GOS land is concerned, the lower frequencies scored may be partly explicable by the distances to the centre of the city, that tend to be higher in these groups than in the other groups.

- 36) GOS - Government of Sindh. A breakdown of KDA and GOS land dit not show any differences worth mentioning.
- 37) KPT - Karachi Port Trust. A further breakdown according to pre - and post-partition settlements makes little sense because of the small numbers involved.

These distances in their turn may render the provision of some facilities difficult. (CF also map II). In the case of land belonging to CB, PWA, PWD and KPT, it seems to be the definite policy of these institutions to keep the facilities level low and eventually to evict the "illegal residents".

CHAPTER V

THE CONDITION OF HOUSES IN ANTONOVSKIE SETTLEMENTS.

"Squatters build houses in which nobody else is interested and which nobody is prepared to invest money in!"¹⁾

¹⁾ Mengin, M., 1959, n. 37.




1.



2.



4.



3.

According to most of the traditional typologies, the houses on photos 1, 2 and 4 would be called jhuggis. The house on photo 3 would not fit in most typologies; otherwise, it would be considered "semi-pakka".

V.1. Introductory remark.

The proposed criteria for framing a typology of autonomous settlements were: the level of security of tenure and the physical development of the bastis (Cf Chapter II).

As we have measured the level of security mainly in terms of public facilities, (Cf Chapter IV) we cannot use these again as indicators to the physical development, although of course these facilities are very much a component of the physical development of an area.

Therefore, to find out the level of physical development, we will concentrate on one main component of it exclusively, viz. the condition of the houses.

V.2. On the typology of houses in autonomous settlements.

V.2.1. Some current typologies of houses and definitions of types. 1).

We will first review and analyse a few current house typologies.

a) Pucca house: made of bricks or cement blocks with reinforced concrete cement roof.

Semi-pucca house: walls made of cement blocks, brick or stone, with roof of asbestos cement, galvanized iron sheets, wood or mud.

Kucha house: construction with mud as its principal component.

Juggi: shanty made of reed, bamboo, matting, jute sacks, tin or wood. 2).

b) Pucca: a dwelling unit with all its walls and roof made entirely of cement concrete, stone or firebricks.

Semi-pucca: a dwelling unit made partly of pucca material and partly of mud.

Kutchra: a dwelling unit whose walls and roof is made of mud, thatch, bamboo, etc. 3).

c) Pucca: a dwelling with all its walls and roof made entirely of bricks, stone and concrete.

Semi-pucca: a dwelling made partly of pucca material and partly of mud.

Jhuggie: a dwelling made of straw, bamboo, canvas, sacks or mats and some mud plaster. 4).

1) A completely different and much more refined housing typology was suggested by Grünwald, 1972, pp. 27 - 30. It is, however, far too sophisticated for the purpose of this study.

2) Islamuddin Siddiqi, 1971, p. 47.

3) WPD, 1972-A.

4) Hashmi, S.S., 1966.

d) Pucca: house with roof of either R.C.C. or R.C.C. slabs (5).

Semi-pucca: house of which at least one wall (of the room) has been made of cement blocks, but not having a roof as described above.

Kucha: house of which the walls (room) have been made either of mud or of stones.

Juggi: house of which the walls have not been made of any of the above mentioned materials. 6).

V.2.2. The problem.

The typologies of slumhouses, as they are currently being used in Pakistan, (Pakka, semi-pakka, kachcha, jhuggi) (7), have certain disadvantages.

a) There are no generally accepted definitions of the different types mentioned; in fact definitions given by different authors partly contradict each other. Compare e.g. the definitions of "kachcha" (kucha or kutcha).

b) certain housetypes cannot be fitted into any of the types of some typologies. E.g. a wooden house does not fit in any of the types under V.2.1.c).

c) Finally, and most important, it is not clear from what criteria the typologies start. Although the suggestion implicitly is there that the typologies reflect a certain order in terms of quality, the ethnic factor has not been completely eliminated.

E.g. in typology V.2.1.a) - which probably is the most commonly used one - a (Baluchi) house built of wooden planks with a tile (kapral-type (3)) roof would have to be called "jhuggi", i.e. the last (= worst??) category, coming after "kachcha". This last category could be well represented by - for instance - a (Panjabi) mud house with a mud roof. The same jhuggi described above would be judged - in the traditional typology - as equal to a hovel made of rags or rusted canisters.

The problem we want to solve now, is to find a typology in which ethnic differences play no part. Therefore the typology should be fixed to one single criterion.

This criterion should preferably also have a dynamic component, so that certain trends could be discovered, if they exist.

5) R.C.C. - Reinforced concrete cement.

6) JRP-IV, for its study in Usmania Mahajir Colony.

7) kachcha - unbaked, clay-built, below a fixed standard, half done.
jhuggi - hut.

3) kapral - roofing tile.

From interviews and from the literature the existence of a trend to development of the houses towards higher quality seems a reasonable proposition.

"Look, here you see the improvements from the traditional village house - such as we all have been born in - up to exactly the same house, but made of pakka materials. But there is still something beyond that: you see this house. Here, you would not be able to judge whether a Baluchi or a Panjabi lives in it: this is a normal city-house." (Interv. in Ilyas Goth).

"Another interesting feature is the gradual form in which the final slumdwelling evolves. At the beginning the dwellings are built with perishable materials.....Later on they will be replaced by adobe or bricks or in some cases, concrete." 9).

"A very noticeable aspect of these slums is this process of continuous self-improvement". 10).

"The squatter, when his tenure is secure enough to risk investment in permanent structures, build by stages." 11).

"But when you look at any Caracas barrio which has been long established, the process is manifest through a stratigraphy, which, as in archeology, expresses evolutionary change through time, by sequence of levels and forms. At the bottom of the hill the dwellings are plastered and painted masonry; just above come rough block walls; at the top are the board and tin shacks. To climb the hill is to run a developmental history backwards." 12).

"Deterioration, physical and social, is the hall mark of the Western slum; improvement is more typical of the barrio." 13).

V.2.3. Quality of building materials, flow of the research and results.

The best criterion that can be used consistently, that discards ethnic influences and has dynamic components, is the quality of the building materials used.

Our first step has been to find out how the basti dwellers themselves view the different building materials. To this end we asked 30 respondents to arrange set lists of building materials, both for roofs and walls, in order of sequence according to preference.

In an attempt to reflect the ethnic composition of the Karachiites, we interviewed 20 Muhajirs (14), 20 Panjabis, 20 Pathans, 10 Sindhis and 10 Baluchis.

- 9) Matos Mar, J., 1963, pp. 256 - 257.
- 10) U.N., 1971, p. 23.
- 11) Turner, J.F.C., 1969-A, p. 43.
- 12) Peattie, L.R., 1966, p. 17.
- 13) Jones, E., 1954, p. 424.
- 14) Muhajir - refugee (from India)

The respondents were selected at random from over 20 different bastis, where people have settled at least 10 years ago, so that a certain experience with different building materials may be assumed.

The list of building materials offered is far from complete but includes all the most commonly used materials. No mention was made, however, of a great number of inventions which people make sometimes use of, like mud walls, plastered with cement, earthen pots (15), jute, etc. etc. Besides, no indication was given regarding the quality of each particular item. E.g. in the case of stones, one might think either of well cut stones with cement masonry, or of roughly hewn stones with or without mud as a binding agent. (15).

Also in the case of planks, there is a wide variety in quality.

In the case of mud roofs, it was not made explicit whether the mud is supported by tiles, wooden planks or by "sarkanda" (16), nor was any indication given about the thickness of the layers of mud.

Not even did we mention whether the roof asked about was supposed to be made of "Panjabi mud" or "Karachi mud", although reportedly there is a great difference in quality between the two.

These and similar considerations would have led us too far.

The results of these interviews are shown in table V.2.3.1.

Although some ethnic differences are reflected in the ratings (Pathans for stones, Panjabi's for mud- curiously enough, Sindhis not for "kaprel"), there is a remarkable similarity in the ratings by different ethnic groups. When we compare the sequence found from the lowest rankings for the different items with the order found from the highest rankings, we may conclude a difference only in two cases, viz. mud and planks, under roofing materials.

We may now assume that the averages reasonably well reflect the average person's opinion of the quality of different building materials.

When we represent the same findings in a diagram - as has been done in diagram V.2.3.2. - we can distinguish different groups of building materials, of which the ratings more or less cluster together.

We have, in the diagram, indicated these clusters with the letters a, b, c and d. The setting of the clusters is done on the basis of differences between the average rankings found. The largest differences found between averages within clusters amount to 0.9 (between stone and mud (walls) and between canister and chatai (walls)). The smallest difference between

15) Cf KDA-JRP-IV, 1974.

16) sarkanda - reed; the word is also used for simple, unwoven mats of parallel bound reeds.

clusters is found between kaprel and mud (roofs), viz. 1.2. It should be noted that the figures are of an ordinal nature and that comparing differences as we have done here, is not really justified. Yet, we assume that it may serve as a basis for setting the clusters.


Table V.2.3.1. Average ranking of building materials by different ethnic groups.

I. a-Walls.

Materials	e t h n i c g r o u p s					Total Average rankings	Largest difference rankings	Order of sequence materials acc. to		
	Muha-jir	Pan-jabi	Pathan	Sin-dhi	Balu-chi			Low-est rankings	High-est rankings	Average
Plastered cement blocks	1.	1.1	1.1	1.	1.	1.	.1	1	1	1
Single cement blocks	2.	2.3	2.7	2.	2.	2.2	.7	2	2	2
Stones	4.	3.9	2.8	3.6	3.4	3.5	1.2	3	3	3
Mud	4.6	3.8	4.7	4.6	4.7	4.4	.9	4	4	4
Planks	4.7	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	.3	5	5	5
Canister	5.2	5.7	5.6	5.7	6.3	5.6	1.1	6	6	6
Chatai (17)	6.5	6.8	6.6	6.6	6.1	6.5	.7	7	7	7
<u>I-b. Roofs.</u>										
Materials										
R.C.C.	1.	1.	1.	1.	1.	1.	.0	1	1	1
Tiles (bricktype)	3.6	2.5	4.4	3.5	2.5	3.3	1.9	2	2	2
Asbestos	3.8	4.7	3.2	3.	4.1	3.8	1.7	3	3	3
Tiles ("kaprel")	3.1	5.	3.8	5.2	3.4	4.	2.1	4	4	4
Mud	6.7	4.3	4.5	5.1	5.7	5.2	2.4	5	7	5
Corr. Iron	4.8	6.3	5.8	6.1	6.6	5.8	1.8	6	6	6
Planks	6.	5.	6.2	6.6	5.9	5.9	1.6	7	5	7
Canister	7.6	7.4	8.2	7.	8.3	7.7	.9	8	8	8
Chatai	8.4	8.8	7.9	7.5	7.5	8.1	1.3	9	9	9

17) Chatai - (reed) matting.

Diagram V.2.3.2.: Ranking of building materials



Note: The bars represent the space between the highest and lowest average ranking for each item; the horizontal line in each bar represents the average ranking. (Cf Table V.2.3.1.) The letters a,b,c,d, refer to the above mentioned "groups of building materials".

- Abbreviations:
- R.C.C. = reinforced concrete
 - Bl.Pl. = plastered cement blocks
 - Kb. = unplastered cement blocks
 - Til. = tiles (brick-type)
 - Asb. = asbestos sheets
 - Kap. = tiles ("kaprel"-type)
 - St. = stones
 - Mud = mud
 - Pl. = wooden planks
 - Can. = canister
 - Chat. = chatai (incl. "sarkanda")
 - C.I. = corrugated iron sheets

Thus, we find four groups of building materials, both for roofs and walls. Theoretically, 16 combinations of these are possible, out of which we may consider 2 as technically impossible.

The combinations are represented in diagram V.2.3.3.

Diagram V.2.3.3.: Combinations of groups of building materials.

		Walls		a		b		c		d	
VI	a	(R)	R.C.C.	R.C.C.	Impossible	Impossible					
		(W)	Bl.Pl.	Kb.							
	b	(R)	Til/Asb/Kap.	Til/Asb/Kap.	Til/Asb/Kap.	Til/Asb/Kap.	Til/Asb/Kap.				
		(W)	Bl.Pl.	Kb.	St./Mud/Pl.	Can/Chat					
V	c	(R)	Mud/C.I./Pl.	Mud/C.I./Pl.	Mud/C.I./Pl.	Mud/C.I./Pl.	Mud/C.I./Pl.				
		(W)	Bl.Pl.	Kb.	St./Mud/Pl.	Can/Chat.					
	d	(R)	Can/Chat.	Can/Chat.	Can/Chat.	Can/Chat.	Can/Chat.				
		(W)	Bl.Pl.	Kb.	St./Mud/Pl.	Can/Chat.					
		IV	III	II	I						

- Abbreviations:
- (R) = Roof
 - (W) = Wall
 - R.C.C. = reinforced concrete
 - Bl.Pl. = plastered cement blocks
 - Kb. = unplastered cement blocks
 - Til. = tiles (brick-type)
 - Asb. = asbestos sheets
 - Kap = tiles ("kaprel"-type)
 - St. = stones
 - Mud = mud
 - Pl. = wooden planks
 - Can. = canister
 - Chat. = chatai (incl. "sirkanda")
 - C.I. = corrugated iron sheets

Again, these combinations can be grouped together into categories which then could represent the different types of our typology of basti houses. The six categories, thus formed - which we have numbered in the diagram I - VI - could be named as follows:

- I Very temporary
- II Temporary
- III Prolongued temporary
- IV Semi permanent
- V Provisional permanent
- VI Permanent

Although the subdivision into types is somewhat arbitrary, it certainly represents the actual situation much better than any of the traditional typologies had done.

When we compare the traditional typology of Islamuddin Siddiqi - probably the most commonly used typology (Cf V.2.1.a) - with the one proposed here, we may note the following points:

- a) The traditional category "pakka" remains as it was.
- b) The traditional category "semi-pakka" is now subdivided into three types, one of which coincides with the traditional category "kachcha".
- c) The traditional category "kachcha" is now subdivided into two types. One type coincides with the worst type of the traditional "semi-pakka"; the other coincides with the best type of the traditional "jhuggi".
- d) The traditional category "jhuggi", finally, is subdivided into two types, one of which we have implicitly dealt with in the above. The other type we consider as a category in itself.

We will, in the end of this chapter, recapitulate the different types and exactly describe which housetype falls in each particular category. There are, however, a number of complications we have to deal with first.

V.2.3.1. Other materials.

As already mentioned above, some less frequently used building materials have not been represented in this typology. In most cases, these "other materials" are slight improvements on other, more common building materials. Even painted cement blocks might be mentioned in this connection. We propose that these materials- or combinations of materials- be placed in the respective categories in which the not improved upon material would fall. Some examples of this are:

<u>Material(s) found:</u>	<u>to be categorized as:</u>
Painted cement blocks	cement blocks
Mud + cement plaster	mud
Chatai + cement plaster or mud	chatai
Earthen pots (filled and laid with mud)	mud
Jute in any combination	the other material in question.

It is further proposed that where mere jute is used, it be equated with chatai.

V.2.3.2. The interior of the house.

A second complication is more serious and has a much higher frequency. Any typology of houses should be easily manageable, if it is to be used on a large scale, and therefore the characteristics of houses on which the typology is to be based, should be visible from the streets. This implies a certain simplification: however sophisticated a house may be from the inside - and quite often this is the case to an amazing extent - it is not practically possible to keep reckoning with that. This is certainly a limitation to this typology, which cannot be avoided.

V.2.3.3. House- and compound walls.

It is necessary to deal with both the compound wall and the house wall which may be made of different materials. In the above we have dealt with the mere materials themselves. Now the question arises how to deal with houses of which the compound- and house-wall consist of different materials.

In free interviewing, we have found that there are very different reasons for improving the wall either of the compound or the house.


In some cases, it is a step forward in the direction of achieving a "city-house" (type VI).

In other cases the improvement was only brought about - or a particular material was used - because of external circumstances (fire, rain, pardah (18), without there being any intention to improve the house as such. We may in this connection quote an interviewee from Usmania

Mahajir Colony:

"I have made my house such, that we can decently live in it, but I am not going to spend more - though I could - as long as there is no security."

18) pardah - curtain, veil, cover, privacy.



The quality of doors may vary widely.

The interviewee in question had rebuilt his chatai house after fire had destroyed it. Now, the house walls are made of cement blocks, the compound wall of canister.

In cases like this one, we can hardly perceive the improvement as a step on the way since it will not be followed automatically by a further step. Another factor is again complicating this problem: there is no fixed sequence in the improving of house or compound wall. Sometimes, the compound wall is taken up first - e.g. for reasons of pardah or because the compound wall is more prone to weather hazards, the house wall being better protected by the roof.

Sometimes, priority is given to the house wall, e.g. when it is supposed to have a more direct effect on the quality of living, or because of fire danger. 19).

Coming back to the typology of houses, our reasoning is that if a compound wall is made of material inferior to that of the house wall, then the dwelling as a whole does not qualify for the category in which the house itself would have been placed. Conversely if the compound wall is made of any material superior to that of the house wall, the dwelling as a whole qualifies for a "higher" category than the house would by itself. Keeping the above in mind as a guiding principle, we have proposed solutions for each individual combination possible. These can be found in table V.2.3.8.

V.2.3.4. Doors.

As doors are an item visible from the streets, initially we thought it good to include this item as one of the variables in the categorization. In practice, however, it proved to be extremely difficult to categorize doors. Further more, we may assume that a door is not "immovable property", since it can be easily removed when a person shifts to another place.

As a consequence, it is questionable whether the quality of a door is as strong an indicator to the quality of the dwelling as e.g. the quality of the house wall.

Finally, we decided to exclude this item.

19) In the accumulated figures of the 250 house-samples that were taken for this study, we found that out of 20.310 houses, 2.296 had a compound wall inferior to the house wall, and 720 had a house wall that was inferior to the compound wall. Thus, there seems to be a tendency towards a higher priority attached to improving the house wall than the compound wall. Reasons for this, however, are so trivial that we cannot attach much value to this finding.

V.2.3.5. Storeyed houses.

A further complication concerns those houses that have a storey. As in an earlier case, the presence of a storey can be explained in a positive way in some cases and in a negative way in some other cases.

There are three possibilities:

- a) an "inferior" house (Cat. II or III) with a storey made of the same kind of material as the rest of the house.
- b) a "superior" house (Cat. IV, V, VI) with a storey made of inferior material.
- c) a "superior" house (Cat. IV, V, VI) with a storey made of approximately the same material as the ground floor is made of.

Possibility a) must be regarded as very negative: an investment has been made in the house but it has not resulted in an improvement of quality. This case reflects a situation where - for one reason or another - the way to improvement seems to have been blocked.

We suggest that these cases be arranged into a separate category S: Stagnating temporary.

Possibility b) is neutral from the viewpoint of possible improvement. The storey may have been built purposely of temporary materials if it is required for a short period only. It may have to serve as a shed or verandah only. But even in cases where this storey is intended as a more or less permanent part of the house, technically speaking, there is still a potential for improvement: the storey can -e.g. - be improved stepwise. In case a), this is impossible without rebuilding the whole house. We propose that in case b) the presence of a storey should not be reflected in the categorization.


Possibility c) can be seen as a step forward in the direction of achieving the "city-house". A pakka house with a pakka storey has certainly more permanency than the same house without a storey.

It is proposed that two-storied houses - provided the storey is pakka - of category IV be placed in Cat. V and those of Cat. V be placed in Cat. VI. Two-storied houses of Cat. VI should be kept in the same category, as there is nothing beyond it in the framework of this typology.

It is further proposed that where the presence of a storey influences the placing of a house in any category, the quality of the compound wall can be neglected.



The height of a house and decorations may be indicators to intended permanency.



V.2.3.6. Other visible criteria of quality.

We have to point to another limitation of this typology. "Quality", or "permanency" has throughout this chapter been a main variable in the decisions whether to place different dwelling types in any category. 20). From our observations and from a number of interviews we have a strong impression that at least two further observable phenomena are indicative of some degree of permanency. Firstly, the height of a house is a measure of its permanency.

We have often noticed that people appreciate high house walls, especially if it enables them to have a few "raushan dans" installed. 21).

The height of the room enhances its coolness, especially when raushan dans allow for extra ventilation. The investment made for raising the roof reflects the permanency, at least as viewed by the inhabitant.

Similarly, when the outside of the house has been decorated, we may assume some permanency is intended.

Neither item however, seems to be as strong or important an indicator as the quality of the material used. Moreover, measuring such indicators would be extremely difficult in the case of decorations and extremely labourious in the case of house height especially on the scale of a city like Karachi.

Accordingly we have ignored both these criteria.

V.2.3.7. Other, non-visible criteria of quality.

As pointed out already in V.2.3., no reckoning was kept of the possible differences in quality within a given category of building material, as this would lead to a degree of refinement which is not attainable in practice. Thus, for instance, no distinction was made between new and second hand cement blocks.

Apart from this, there are other factors influencing the quality of a house; factors that are not or not easily observable.

To illustrate this problem, for which we have no solution, we may quote:

20) Meant is "permanency" as a quality of the material as it is. To a great extent permanency of the dwelling is a function of maintenance. In the province of Sind, there are ages-old multistoried mudhouses in a good state of upkeep, whilst some post partition quarters, built of concrete blocks, are in a poor shape already. (cf also Turner, J.F.C., 1976, p. 122). In the autonomous settlements of Karachi, by definition, maintenance is in good hands (viz. the hands of the owner-dwellers) and as such is a constant factor. To these people then, permanency coincides with the qualities of the material itself.

21) raushan dan - skylight, ventilator.


"You ask how I dared to build my house pakka after it was bulldozed twice. Well, you see, this house has got no foundation and the masonry is such that the blocks remain intact when we break the wall. They can be taken apart with one little push. The roof is easily removable and so is the door. I am living almost in the middle of this colony, so by the time the bulldozer reaches my house, I will have loaded all the materials safely on a donkey-cart. After all, man wants to live in a decent house." (interv. in Kausar Niazi Colony).

V.2.3.8. Recapitulation, typology of houses.

In table V.2.3.8. we have shown in which particular categories the different housetypes have to be placed. We must warn the reader that the table looks somewhat complicated. In practice, however, it does not take more than a few seconds to find the right place for any house with the help of this table.

Table V.2.3.8. Placing of houses in different categories.


1. The (groundfloor of the) house has an R.C.C. roof		Cat VI.
Other	see: 2.	
2. House single storied	see: 3.	
House multistoried	see: 10.	
3. House without compound wall	see: 4.	
House with compound wall	see: 5.	
4. (<u>house without compound wall</u>)		
a) House wall of Bl.Pl.	see: 6 e).	
b) House wall of Kb.	see: 7 e).	
c) House wall of St/Mud/Pl.	see: 8 d).	
d) House wall of Can/Chat.	see: 9 g).	
5. (<u>house with compound wall</u>)		
a) Compound wall of Bl.Pl.	see: 6.	
b) Compound wall of Kb.	see: 7.	
c) Compound wall of St/Mud/Pl.	see: 8.	
d) Compound Wall of Can/Chat.	see: 9.	
6. (<u>compound wall of Bl.Pl.</u>)		
a) House wall of Bl.Pl.	see: 6 e).	
b) House wall of Kb.	see: 6 e).	
c) House wall of St/Mud/Pl.		Cat IV.
d) House wall of Can/Chat.		Cat III.
e) Roof of Til/Asb/Kap/Mud/C.I./Pl.		Cat V.
f) Roof of Can/Chat.		Cat IV.




House type I




House type II





House type III






House type IV



House type V



House type VI



House type S

7. (compound wall of Kb.)
- a) House wall of Bl.Pl. see: 7 d).
 - b) House wall of Kb. see: 7 e).
 - c) House wall of St/Mud/Pl/Can/Chat. see: 7 f).
 - d) Roof of Til/Asb/Kap/Mud/C.I./Pl. Cat V.
Roof of Can/Chat. Cat IV.
 - e) Roof of Til/Asb/Kap/Mud/C.I./Pl. Cat IV.
Roof of Can/Chat. Cat III.
 - f) Roof of Til/Asb/Kap/Mud/C.I./Pl. Cat III.
Roof of Can/Chat. Cat II.
8. (compound wall of St/Mud/Pl.)
- a) House wall of Bl.Pl. Cat IV.
 - b) House wall of Kb/St/Mud/Pl. see: 8 d).
 - c) House wall of Can/Chat. Cat II.
 - d) Roof of Til/Asb/Kap/Mud/C.I./Pl. Cat III.
Roof of Can/Chat. Cat II.
9. (compound wall of Can/Chat.)
- a) House wall of Bl.Pl. see: 9 e).
 - b) House wall of Kb. see: 9 f).
 - c) House wall of St/Mud/Pl. Cat II.
 - d) House wall of Can/Chat. see: 9 g).
 - e) Roof of Til/Asb/Kap/Mud/C.I./Pl. Cat IV.
Roof of Can/Chat. Cat III.
 - f) Roof of Til/Asb/Kap/Mud/C.I./Pl. Cat III.
Roof of Can/Chat. Cat II.
 - g) Roof of Til/Asb/Kap/Mud/C.I./Pl. Cat II.
Roof of Can/Chat. Cat I.
10. (multi-storied houses)
- a) Storey wall of St/Mud/Pl/Can/Chat. see: 10 c).
 - b) Storey wall of Bl.Pl./Kb. see: 10 d).
 - c) House wall of Bl.Pl. or Kb: treat as if no storey see: 3.
House wall of St/Mud/Pl/Can/Chat. Cat S
 - d) House wall of Bl.Pl. Cat VI.
House wall of Kb. see: 10 e).
 - e) Ground floor roof of Til. Cat VI.
Ground floor roof of Pl. Cat V.

V.3. The development of houses per basti.

V.3.1. Sampling.

In order to obtain some idea of the physical development of bastis - which in this case is measured only in terms of houses (Cf. V.1.) - samples were taken of houses in all the bastis surveyed.

The way in which samples were taken can be seen from the "Instructions for taking samples of dwellings in bastis", which is attached as Appendix II. Broadly speaking, the method applied consists of walking at regular intervals in two mutually rectangular directions through the bastis and taking all the houses found at one side of the parcours in the sample.

This method has certain weaknesses and some advantages:

- a) because of the large number of bastis from which samples had to be taken, it was imperative to have a simple system, so that different assistants could work with a minimum probability of error, and taking a minimum amount of time.

A system had to be found therefore that could be used in all kinds of bastis, whatever their shape and lay-out, and mostly without the help of maps.

Even so, decisions sometimes had to be left to the one who took the sample. A certain safeguard in this case was that the route taken had to be described. Regular checks were possible and were indeed carried out.

- b) a disadvantage is that the sample fraction is not constant. This disadvantage could not be avoided, as to do so the houses would have to be counted. For a house count maps are needed and mapping of all the bastis concerned was out of question.

The actual sample fractions were calculated in 17 colonies from which we catalogued the condition of 100% of the houses for checking purposes.

Table V.3.1.1. gives an impression of the sample sizes.

The overall average sample size is 81. The smallest sample is 25 (by definition in the instruction), and the largest 803 (Bhutta Village).

Table V.3.1.1. Sample sizes in 17 colonies of Karachi.

Name basti	Total houses N	Sample N	Sample %
Abyssinia Lines	788	215	27
Anjam Colony	553	32	15
Baluch Para	500	107	22
Bhutto Colony	267	50	18
Darbar Colony	733	97	13
Haroonabadi	407	82	20
Khamoshi Colony II	601	114	19
Lassi Para	279	43	15
Leprosy Colony	233	31	13
Lyari Naddi	277	42	14
Miran Naka	617	139	22
Mohammad Nagar	362	74	20
Nafisabad	612	54	9
Pak Sarhad Colony	214	32	15
Rakser I	586	148	25
Shiddy Village	192	25	13
Shah Jehanabad	320	99	31

c) another disadvantage is that in this system relatively more attention is paid to the inner part of a basti than to the outskirts, especially the border streets. In a way, one may argue, this is good, because often the outskirts of a basti are not very representative of the basti as a whole (e.g. when it is situated along a main road on which commercial -cum- living structures have grown up, or when it is situated alongside a nala (22), where the lower parts of a basti are more prone to flood hazards, so that only very temporary structures are built in that lower belt). Even so, the sample is not completely representative and this is especially noticeable in bastis developed around old goths where, as a consequence, there may be substantial differences in the house conditions between the centre and the outer parts. 23).

22) nala - watercourse.

23) Cf, for instance, Chughtai, R.A., c.s., 1975, p. 29.

d. to obtain an idea as to the reliability of the sample taken we have taken 100% inventories from 17 bastis. Samples were also taken, along with the 100% inventories. The results of this exercise are shown in table V.3.1.2.

Table V.3.1.2. Reliability checks of house samples in 17 bastis of Karachi.

Name basti	H o u s e c a t e g o r i e s (%)							X ²
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	S	
Abyssinia Lines Total Sample	11 13	8 11	21 17	57 56	2 3	1 -	- -	9.8
Anjam Colony Total Sample	1 1	1 -	6 4	54 62	18 23	20 12	- -	5.78
Baluch Para Total Sample	2 3	27 25	15 20	22 29	24 16	10 7	- -	7.97
Bhutto Colony Total Sample	3 12	84 78	13 10	- -	- -	- -	- -	14.05
Darbar Colony Total Sample	- -	3 6	12 19	66 50	18 15	8 10	- -	10.24
Haronabad Total Sample	- -	- -	11 2	77 83	20 13	2 1	- -	3.98
Khamosh Colony Total Sample	3 8	8 7	17 19	54 53	6 4	12 9	- -	11.08
Lassi Para Total Sample	1 -	49 58	10 5	28 21	7 14	5 2	- -	6.65
Leprosy Colony Total Sample	5 10	1 -	6 8	70 58	10 13	8 11	- -	3.43

Table V.3.1.2., cont'd.

Name basti	H o u s e c a t o r g i e s (%)							X ²
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	S	
Lyari Naddi.								
Total	6	19	26	42	5	1	1	4.63
Sample	5	14	38	35	7	-	-	
Miran Naka								
Total	1	18	15	43	8	15	-	34.99
Sample	1	24	1	54	12	7	-	
Mohammad Nagar								
Total	11	10	12	58	8	1	-	1.57
Sample	14	9	9	59	8	-	-	
Nafisabad								
Total	4	3	6	60	20	7	-	5.1
Sample	-	4	6	53	30	7	-	
Pak Sarhad Colony								
Total	5	25	35	25	8	2	-	5.71
Sample	6	22	31	22	18	-	-	
Raksar I								
Total	2	15	33	43	3	-	4	26.1
Sample	3	22	31	49	6	1	7	
Shiddy Village								
Total	2	3	6	18	16	55	-	9.12
Sample	-	8	16	28	8	40	-	
Shah Jehanabad								
Total	-	1	5	66	21	7	-	1.13
Sample	-	3	5	51	24	6	-	

At a reliability level of 0.95, X² is 11.070 with 5 degrees of freedom (and 12.592 with 6 degrees of freedom, i.e. in the cases where category S is represented).

In only three of the 17 cases (Bhutto Col, Miran Naka, and Raksar I),

the χ^2 found exceeds the permissible figure.

In conclusion, we may say that the sampling method seems to be reasonably reliable and the figures found give a reasonably true profile of the condition of the houses in the bastis surveyed.

Again, we may stress here that hardly any other method can be used on this scale, because orientation in the field is extremely difficult, so that sampling a fixed percentage of the dwellings - for which counting and localizing each dwelling is necessary - is extremely laborious, when no maps are available.

A problem arose when samples had to be taken from bastis that have grown within properly planned "legal" areas, such as e.g. Jacob Lines Area. In these cases, a sample was taken from the "illegal" part of the area only. When an encroachment was an extension of a regular house (e.g. in the quarter-area of Bhutta Village and often in Jacob Lines Area), it was not considered as part of a basti.

Exceptions to this rule are:

a) Haji Camp, where we took a complete sample of barracks and jhuggis.

These barracks were never intended for permanent habitation and can be considered classic slum dwellings.

b) Slaughterhouse, where the inhabitants live partly in flats which we included in the sample. Due to overcrowding, living in these flats resembles living in a slum. 24).

Each of these locations is in Lyari, a part of the city generally considered as a conglomerate of slums.

The figures found for each basti can be seen in Appendix III, except for one basti, viz. Islamia Jamhurya Colony which was bulldozed before we could take the sample.

The figures have been presented as percentages in order to make comparisons possible.

V.3.2. A profile of the condition of houses per basti; construction of an index.


As we want to combine the level of security with the condition of the houses found in each basti, the best thing to do would be to construct an index that indicates the condition of the houses.

24) Cf Streefland, P.H., 1975, pp. 41-52.

As can be seen from the figures and diagrams in Appendix III, there are two factors involved in the assessment of the condition of the houses in a basti. One is the average condition and the other is the distribution of the houses over the different categories.

We may illustrate this problem with help of the figures and diagrams found for two bastis: Juna Kalri and Madina Colony (Love Lane):

Diagram V.3.2.1. House conditions in Juna Kalri and Madina Colony (Love Lane).



We have not been able to combine both factors in one index, nor are we able to decide in which of the bastis of the above example the houses are "better".

For the construction of an index we have taken the total averages found from all the samples as a starting point of our thinking.

Table V.3.2.2. Total of house samples from 250 bastis of Karachi.

House Cat.	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	S	Total
N	1093	2354	3514	8340	2829	2071	109	20310
%	5.4	11.6	17.3	41.1	13.9	10.2	0.5	100

It appears that houses of category IV are by far the most common. Category IV consists of the type of house which is the optimum attainable for most low income people. The relationship between hope and investment in housing, as established by van der Harst (25) diminishes as a result of the effect of the income, after a certain stage in the investment has been reached. There is, of course, a ceiling to the investment in a house,

25) Van der Harst, J., 1974-8, *passim*.

which ceiling is mainly dictated by the household income.

This ceiling is represented by the category IV type of house, approximately. Plastering of walls- which is the characteristic that distinguishes house type V from house type IV is a relatively inexpensive affair, amounting to about 7.5 % of the total investment costs in a semi-pakka house. 26).

It is therefore, remarkable that relatively few people make this investment in further improvement of house type IV.

Partly, this fact can be explained by relatively low security levels. Another factor, probably of influence, is the fact that to many of the low-income people, a house of type IV is already difficult to achieve. Figures on household incomes found in Usmania Mahajir Colony may make one wonder how these people can invest in housing at all. (27).

At the same time, house type IV is a very much desired type as it can be much less affected by outside influences - e.g. heavy rains, floods or fire - than the inferior types. Therefore, the security value of the investments made in house type IV is high (Cf VII.3.3.1.). This fact explains the sacrifices people bring in order to achieve house type IV. Once achieved, both the capacity and the desire to invest still more will be reduced.


Only higher low-income groups or lower middle-income groups may invest in further improvements in their houses; for the great majority house type IV is the best attainable. And, indeed, it is a type in which a family can live very decently.

Diagram V.3.2.3. may illustrate this point.

26) Van der Harst, J., 1974-C, p. 106.

27) JRP-IV, 1975-A, p. 38.

Diagram V.3.2.3. Relation between hope, investment and income (28.29)



28) Figures taken from J. van der Harst, 1974-8, p. 10.

29) The diagram is taken from M. Reurink, 1975.

In view of current projections of household income distribution for the Karachi region (30), we may assume that for a considerable time to come, house type IV will continue to be the best attainable house for a majority of the low-income population. 31).

Our reasoning for the construction of the index is that for each basti the houses inferior to category IV be subtracted from, and those superior to category IV be added to the figure that constitutes the index. Further, when calculating the index, we considered the presence of houses in category I "more negative" than the presence of houses in category II. The same way, houses of category II are considered "more negative" than those of category III. Conversely the presence of category VI dwellings is considered "more positive" than those of category V. It should be noted, however, that the house types form a scale of ordinal nature. Distances between the categories are not constant, nor even calculable.

Weighing of the categories, therefore, is an arbitrary decision.

In this case, our calculations have been based on the assumption that distances between the categories are equal, except for the distance between category V and category VI, which is evidently greater than any of the other distances (Cat. VI represents houses mainly characterized by an R.C.C. roof).

As stated, this assumption is not completely justified and accordingly too much importance should not be attached to these figures.

The indices calculated are meant to be a tool to arrange bastis into an order of sequence according to the average condition of houses.

We are of the opinion that this order of sequence gives a fair representation of the truth, although slightly different representations might be equally justified.

The reader should, however, remember that the figures as such have no meaning: bastis having a negative index are bastis in which the houses

30) MPD, 1974, p. 51.

31) It may be recalled here that type IV - roughly speaking - is an unplastered house with walls of cement blocks and a roof of tiles (bricktype or roof-tile type), asbestos sheets, mud, corrugated iron sheets or wooden planks. It is also of interest to note here that over 80% of the houses in the sample have an open space enclosed as a compound. In conclusion, we may say that the unplastered concrete block house with no R.C.C. roof, and with a compound is by far the most popular.

inferior to type IV outweigh those superior to type IV, but nothing is revealed about the distribution of the house types, nor even about the incidence of any of the types. Bastis having a negative index may well contain a number of high quality houses. Most significantly too, the index does not reveal anything about the potential for development in any basti.

Again, it should be stressed that the zero-level should not be mistaken for a kind of border line between "up to standard" and "substandard". The calculations have been done according to the following scheme.

Category:	S	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Weighing factor:	x4	x3	x2	x1	-	x1	x3
Pos./Neg.	negative			neutral		positive	

We may now use the examples given in diagram IV.3.2.1. to illustrate the way in which the indices were calculated.

Juna Kalri

Category	pos/neg	% found	weighing factor	result
S	-	0	4	0
I	-	2	3	- 6
II	-	31	2	-62
III	-	14	1	-14
IV	0	21	0	0
V	+	11	1	+11
VI	+	20	3	+60
				+ -11
index found:				-11

Madina Colony (Love Lane)

Category	pos/neg	% found	weighing factor	result
S	-	0	4	0
I	-	0	3	0
II	-	4	2	- 8
III	-	2	1	- 2
IV	0	87	0	0
V	+	4	1	+ 4
VI	+	2	3	+ 6
				+ 0
index found:				0

A complete list follows of all the indices found, in descending order.

Table V.3.2.4. List of bastis in order of sequence of the index of the condition of the houses.

1. Bihar Colony	270	35. Asif Colony	94
Nawabad	221	Slaughterhouse	91
Eid Gah Line	220	Hassan Colony	87
New Kalri	206	Giddomal	86
5. Jinnahabad	200	Wilayat abad	81
Miran Pir	191	40. Singo Lines	80
Gul Mohammad Lane	189	Muslimabad	80
Shiddy Village	186	Liaqat Ashraf Colony	78
Rexer (Lyari)	186	Ghaus Nagar	72
10. Daryabad	179	Hazrat Mohani Colony	70
Liaqat Colony	169	45. Golimar I	68
Moosa Lane	160	Mohammadabad	66
Baghdadi	157	Mujahid Col. (Jail-Drigh Rd.)	63
Khadda	156	Saeedabad (Baldia)	63
15. Chakiwara	152	Farooqabad	60
Shershah Colony	147	50. Sheds	58
Dharamsiwara	144	Niazi Colony	53
Juna Kumbharwara	143	Manzoor Colony	52
Jumman Shah Plot	141	Wahidabad	52
20. Agra Taj Colony	140	Koila Godown	49
Delhi Colony	127	55. Anjam Colony	47
Akhtar Colony	125	Kashmir Colony	45
Shah Beg Line	123	Shah Jehanabad	43
Hassan Lashkari Village	118	Johar Colony	42
25. Mahmoodabad	113	Bilalabad	40
Ghas Ganji	113	60. Khamosh Colony II	40
Usmanabad	113	Chittagong Colony	40
Dhobi Ghat	109	Taru Line	40
Kalakot	102	Umr Farooq Colony	40
30. Nishtar Colony	101	Bakhshan Village	38
New Kumbharwara	99	65. Gauharabad (Sabzi mandi)	38
Bakra Piri	96	Nafisabad	38
Azam Basti	96	Angara Goth	37
Gandhi Nagar	96	Bawapat	37

Nawa Line	33	105. Kashmiri Town	6
70. Zaidabad	32	Azim Khan Goth	6
Kokan Colony	31	Jehangirabad-N.	4
Khoja Muhallah	30	Akramabad	4
Hill Area	27	Jamhurya Colony	4
Ghausia Colony	26	110. Khalilabad	4
75. Sir Agha Khan Road	25	Zarin Khan Colony	3
Zikri Para	24	Firdos Colony	2
Baghicha Hashim Khan	24	Darbar Colony	1
Azam Nagar	21	Jehangirabad-S.	1
Lalukhet Pockets	21	115. Madina Colony (Love Lane)	0
80. Gizdarabad	20	Mujahid Colony (Gujro Nala)	- 1
Chanesar Goth	20	Junaghar Muhalla	- 2
Rangiwara	19	Dodha Goth	- 2
Swat Colony	18	Mohammadi Line	- 3
Leprosy Colony	18	120. Pathan Colony	- 7
85. Madina Colony (Baldia)	17	Pak Jamhurya Colony I	- 8
Ajab Khan Colony	15	Mohammad Nagar	- 8
Chorwarh Colony	15	Chhota Maidan	- 9
Lower Gizri	14	Gauharabad (Dastgir)	-10
Rudad Nagar	14	125. Juna Kalri	-11
90. Ilyas Goth	12	Baluch Para	-12
Panjabi Para (Golimar)	12	Jamshed Road II	-12
Kumbharwara (Baldia)	12	Jan Mohammad Goth	-14
Haroonabad	12	Jam Nagar	-14
Haji Murid Goth	11	130. Bh. Para, Pahar Ganj.	-16
95. Old Golimar	11	Haji Qasim Colony	-16
Frontier Colony	11	Gharibabad (Purana)	-17
Suraj Colony	11	Jilalabad	-18
Idu Lines	10	Paposh Nagar	-18
Patel Para	10	135. Ultri Maidan	-18
100. Shah Nawaz Bhutto Col.	9	Bowani Chali	-21
Afridi Colony	8	Natha Khan Goth	-21
Saeedabad (Lyari)	7	Usmania Mahajir Colony	-24
Sikandarabad	7	Pirabad	-25
Rashidabad	6	140. Central Muslimabad	-27

141. Wahid Colony	- 27	Gule Rana Colony	- 73
Aziz Colony	- 28	Akhlaq Mohammad Colony	- 73
Mastan Colony	- 33	Choonna Bhatti	- 74
Maghdum Shah Colony	- 34	180. Salimabad	- 74
145. Bhutta Village	- 34	Behind Jacob Lines	- 74
Gharib Nawaz Colony	- 36	Maulwi Musafir Khana	- 76
Gul Bhai Colony	- 39	Hijrat Colony	- 77
Gharibabad (Pologround)	- 40	Federal C. Area (Panj. Para)	- 79
Mujahid Col. (Bars. Nala)	- 40	185. Khowaja Gharib Nawaz Colony	- 79
150. Rattan Talab	- 41	Bizerta Lines	- 81
Masum Shah Colony	- 46	Azeemabad	- 84
Musa Goth	- 47	Iqbal Baluch Colony	- 85
New Karachi N.	- 49	Nusrat Bhutto Colony	- 85
Abyssinia Lines	- 49	190. Gharibabad (Nea)	- 90
155. Abdul Jabbar Compound	- 50	Pathan Colony (Scheme 24)	- 91
Aqab Jail Colony (PIB col)	- 50	Kausar Niazi Colony	- 91
Pak Ghausia Colony	- 51	Shanti Nagar	- 92
Sultanabad	- 52	Lassi Para (Baldia)	- 93
T. & T. Colony	- 54	195. Haji Camp	- 93
160. Bismillah Colony	- 55	Iqbalabad	- 97
National Tyre Colony	- 56	Moosa Nagar	- 98
Daulat Ram Mil Colony	- 56	Lyari Naddi	- 98
Naddiabad	- 59	Raksar II	- 99
Banguria Goth	- 59	200. City Station Colony	-100
165. Karim Bakhsh Para	- 60	Jinnah Hospital II	-100
Miran Naka	- 62	Panjabi Para (Dastgir)	-100
Ibrahim Goth	- 64	Isa Nagri	-102
Gujro Nala	- 64	Raksar I	-102
Nishtar Basti	- 65	205. Reti Lines	-105
170. Faqir Colony	- 65	Shershah Goth	-107
Police Risala Line	- 65	Bukhari Colony	-108
Jamhurya Colony (Race C.)	- 67	Husseiniat Colony	-110
Hazara Colony	- 68	Data Nagar	-114
Machar Colony	- 68	210. Qadafi Colony	-117
175. Tunesia & Jutland Lines	- 69	Gharibabad (Lyari)	-119
Hafizabad	- 70	Narain Pura	-121

Moosa Colony	-123
Lotus Road	-127
215. Jinnah Hospital I	-129
Central Jacob Lines	-130
Shah Rasul Colony	-133
Pak Sarhad Colony	-137
Bath Island	-137
220. Islam Nagar	-137
Baluch Goth	-138
Ismail Village	-143
Umr Colony	-146
Railway Colony	-146
225. Limu Goth	-149
Ghaziabad	-151
Mama Road	-155
New Karachi E.	-162
Baluch Colony	-169
230. Farooq Colony	-170
Railway Camp	-173
Ismail Goth	-175
Tauhid Colony	-176
Hanifi Colony	-178
235. Piru Goth	-179
Bhutto Colony	-182
Karnali Basti	-182
Reta Plot	-184
Kakoos Colony	-186
240. Iqbal Goth	-190
Garden Area	-190
Mominabad	-194
Gabol Colony	-196
Reis Amrohi	-198
245. Dosmand ka Goth	-198
Bilal Colony	-198
Bengali Area Orangi	-205
Khowaja Moinuddin Col.	-217
Shohada-e-Mashriq Nagar	-220
250. Yahya Nagar	-242

CHAPTER VI

ON THE TYPOLOGY OF BASTIS, GENERAL VIEW.


"For, of course, a man has a mind of his own, and a pair of hands that do what his mind tells them. A man is an active creature, a source of action and initiative, and you no more have to build him a house than you have to build nests for the birds in the air.

Give him half a chance and a man will solve his part of the housing problem - without the help of architects, contractors or planners - far better than any government authority ever can. Instead of one architect in an office sitting up all night to find out how many houses of each size will best fit the masses to be housed, each family will build its own house to its own requirements, and will inevitably make it into a lively work of art.

Here, in each private person's longing for a house, in his eagerness to make one himself, is the alternative to the disastrous mass housing schemes of so many governments." ')

') Fathy, H., 1973, p. 33.

GRAPH VI.1. BASTIS ACCORDING TO SECURITY AND CONDITION OF HOUSES



numbers refer to the alphabetic list of bastis in Σ.2.4

VI.1. General view.

In Graph VI.1., we have combined the data on security of tenure (Chapter IV) and on the condition of the houses (Chapter V).

The graph is strongly suggestive of a correlation between both criteria - security and physical development -. No bastis fill the spaces of the upper right and lower left corners of the graph.

Stating that there is a correlation between security of tenure and the spontaneous physical development of a basti, is almost a truism.

Support for this proposition can be found from all kinds of sources.

Nevertheless the point has to be emphasized, firstly because in our view it is here that one of the main keys to the slum problem in Pakistan can be found; and secondly, because not every one seems to be convinced of these facts. Several attempted approaches to solve the problems of slums in Karachi, in the past and in the present reveal this.

This point will be taken up again in the last chapter.

In many interviews, we found evidence that the basti dwellers invest in improvements on their houses only after a careful assessment of the level of their security of tenure.

"They (i.e. the government, J.L.) can give us the land: it is of no use anyway ("faltu"). Let them see after a year the improvements we can bring about ourselves. They will see that at least 80% of the houses will be pakka. We will have gutters and whatever we can provide for ourselves....." (interview in Ajab Khan Colony).

"I made my house fire - and rainproof, but at the lowest cost and with an easily removable roof. As long as there is no more security, I donot want to do more than this." (interview Usmania Mahajir Colony).

In the litterature, we find support for the same proposition in abundance.

"The guarantee of land, either in the city or in the close proximity gives him (the squatter, J.L.) the initiative for improvement." 1).

"Some of their features derive from insecurity: families who know their shacks may be torn down at any time have no incentive to improve them." 2).

"Experimental projects have regularly demonstrated that where the government can provide secure land tenure and some basic community services, individual families will gradually improve their houses. Authorities would do better to concentrate on removing obstacles to such popular action." 3).

1) Poethig, R.P., 1971, p. 125.

2) U.N., 1961, p. 321

3) U.N., 1971, p. 123.

"World wide experience has shown that when the fear of relocation is lifted from the jhuggi-area, it becomes possible to encourage self help programs and it becomes acceptable to the jhuggi residents themselves to start investing in their area." 4).

"Development and improvement is a function of security of tenure." 5).6).

Van der Harst, when studying low income housing in Karachi, came to the same conclusion. 7).

From the figures he presents, we may conclude that the effect of security explains approximately 50% of the variation in investments in housing in autonomous settlements of Karachi. The combination of security and income explains 85% of the variation. 8).

In Usmania Mahajir Colony, it was found that there is hardly a correlation between income and the condition of the house. On the other hand the correlation between "hope" and the condition of the house was found to be quite strong. 9).

The data found in 250 bastis of Karachi which we presented in graph VI.1., again support the same conclusion: when the basti dwellers have reasonable security of tenure, they show themselves able to solve the housing problem themselves, albeit within the limits of their economic potential.

The relationship between security of tenure and physical conditions in a basti having been established in so many places as well as in Karachi, we will not scrutinize graph V.1. further. By itself the graph does not show any historic perspective. Therefore, the next question to be answered is whether or not bastis develop- more or less smoothly - from one stage to the next.

For this, we will now introduce the next variable: the age of the bastis. With this variable introduced into graph V.1., the dynamics of improvement whether present or absent in bastis will become apparent. In order to study the dynamics of development, ideally, one should follow all developments in a number of bastis during an extended period

4) Van Huyck, A.P., 1972

5) Turner, J.F.C., 1967-A, p. 19

6) We may also refer to various quotations in V.2.2.

7) Van der Harst, J., 1974-B, p. 10.

8) Cf Diagram V.3.2.3.

9) JRP-IV, 1975-A, pp. 50-51.

of time. As, in the present study, this was not possible we have assumed that data on different bastis of different ages represent the equivalent of data obtained in longitudinal studies from some of the same bastis.

We can find support for this assumption in the descriptions of the histories of different bastis of Karachi. As examples we may mention the reports on Chanesar Goth, Usmania Mahajir Colony, Miran Naka and Jacob Lines. 10).

In all these descriptions we find evidence that house conditions did indeed improve during time, albeit with different speed and with different results.

When the present study was still in a tentative stage, we collected and recorded the histories of 177 houses in 75 bastis. Table VI.1.2. gives a summary of the findings.

Table VI.1.2. Histories of 177 houses in 75 bastis of Karachi.

House of types I, II, III, not improved	32
House of type IV, V or VI, built at once and not improved further	14
Total unchanged houses	46
Improved to type IV or beyond in stages	29
Improved to type II or III in stages	35
Total houses improved in stages	64
Improved to type IV or beyond at once	52
Total instantly improved	52
Bought as type IV or beyond, history unknown	7
Rented as type IV or beyond, history unknown	8
Total history unknown	15
Total	177

10). Ahsan, A., 1972-A; JRP-IV, 1975 A, pp. 7 and 49; Chughtai, R.A., c.s., 1975, p. 38; Weijs, M.H., 1975, p. 26. Also Van der Harst (1974-B, p. 16) comes to the same conclusion.

From table VI.1.2., we can see that over 70% of the houses of which the history was known, were improved over time.

The assumption that data on different bastis of different ages can be used as a substitute for data gained from longitudinal studies in some of the same bastis, is again supported by this table.

On the basis of the same table, we may wonder at the reasons why houses do or do not develop over time, and - in those cases where they develop - why they do so instantly or in stages.

Starting from van der Harst's thesis that in Karachi security of tenure is a main agent influencing the investment in houses, we may now formulate some specifications:

- a) Improvements on houses that take place at once (e.g. a change from type I directly to type IV or beyond), and houses of type IV or beyond, built instantly, coincide with bastis having a relatively high level of security of tenure from the beginning.
- b) Staged improvements on houses up to type IV or beyond coincide with bastis where the level of security increases by stage.
- c) Staged improvements below type IV and houses remaining unimproved in types I, II and III coincide with bastis with a continuing low level of security of tenure.

In the following chapters, we will try to point to specific types of basti that can be classified in one of the above forms.

First, however, we may introduce age as the third variable, so that bastis can be categorized according to the combination of

- a) level of security
- b) condition of the houses
- c) age

This, we will do in the following chapters.

CHAPTER VII

ON THE TYPOLOGY OF BASTIS:
PRE-PARTITION SETTLEMENTS.

"They were a pastoral race, and moved about in vast caravans....., searching for good pasturage.....
...Sir Bartle Frere mentions that during the time he was Commissioner in Sind the first of the tribe came down to Kurrachee, and told they would soon all come that way....." ')

') Baillie, A.F., 1890 (1975, p. 93).

VII.1. Justification.

We will take the pre-partition settlements as a group apart.

Most of these settlements are some generations old, and differences in age play no role here - as far as can be seen.

Therefore, the age of bastis of this group will not be further specified and will be treated as a constant factor for the whole group.

VII.2. A complication.

As we will try to show below, the pre-partition settlements, passively urbanized villages - to be called "goths" in the following pages - have certain characteristics of their own. When taking these settlements as a separate group however, it should be borne in mind that such goths are rarely inhabited exclusively by the descendants of the original goth dwellers. In many cases, squatters from outside have settled in the goths. Chanesar Goth and Miran Naka are good examples of the mixed nature of the population in many of the goths. 1).

Still, even these settlements of mixed nature mostly show traits characteristic of the "pure" goths, so that there is justification for treating them as one group. It should be noted in this connection that wherever outsiders have settled in a goth, the older part of it has retained its character while the newcomers live more or less separated beside, or around, the old centre.

There would therefore have been some justification for distinguishing two bastis in the case of goths of mixed population. (Cf III.1.3.3.). Wherever this was technically possible, we have done so, but in two types of case this was difficult and - as a consequence - we have considered these "goths of mixed nature" as one basti:

- a) Where the newcomers have squatted around the old centre, so that the new part of the basti is circular (e.g. Miran Naka)
- b) Where the old goth consists of a number of small clusters, among which the squatters from outside have settled, so that the new part assumes the shape of a net or a number of spots (e.g. Haji Murid Goth)

VII.3. The characteristics of the goths.

VII.3.1. The history.

The goths of Karachi should not be viewed as villages that have been

1) Ahsan, A., 1972-8.
Chughtai, R.A., c.s., 1975.

there since time immemorial. Most of them have come into existence during the past 150 years, a few even quite recently (e.g. Hassan Lashkari Village, 1943).

In a way, most of the goths owe their birth and existence to the presence of the nearby city, although the way the goths came to be inhabited is markedly different from what is common in squatter settlements. Unlike the "colonies", the goths were not intended to be or to become parts of the city. They were meant to be villages, separated from the city. In this connection, it is worth noting that all the goth dwellers interviewed agree that previously the place was "dehat", i.e. countryside. 2). In some cases our informants still consider their basti as such, even when it is located in the central parts of the city.

"consider this place as countryside" (from an interview in Taru Line).

"Our forefathers roamed about in Sindh and Baluchistan or Kuch. They lived in a certain place for a couple of years and then they would again move. They went to places where there was rain, and stayed until there was drought again. When Karachi started growing, there were jobs - that is also a kind of rain - and in periods of drought people used to come here. They did not want to live here permanently: the same way as they always do, they put up their villages. (from an interview in Karim Bakhsh Para, confirmed in other places.)


When Karachi expanded, it became a market for agricultural products. Fishermen's villages came into existence or expanded, and around the city - wherever sweet water could be obtained - vegetable farming and dairy farming gained importance. Especially jobs in farming and fishing attracted the semi-nomads with a farmer's or fisherman's background to these villages rather than to the city itself, although there is no doubt that these villages were very much dependent on the city.

VII.3.2. The level of security of tenure.

Graph VII.3.2. shows the position of the goths as regards the level of security and the condition of the houses.

Regarding the level of security, it is immediately clear that the great majority of the goths find themselves in a relatively favourable position (Cf also tables IV.2.2. and IV.3.1.1.). In fact, numbers of goths in the groups "0 items" to "3 items" are so small, that is questionable whether much value can be attached to tendencies found. Indeed, graph VII.3.2. shows the same tendency as graph VI.1. does, but in the case of goths, the concept of "security" has to be handled carefully. Here, the age of the settlement 2) dehat - plural of deh: village, mostly used to signify "countryside".

GRAPH VII.3.2. SECURITY LEVEL AND CONDITION OF HOUSES IN PRE PARTITION SETTLEMENTS



numbers refer to the alphabetic list of bastis in III.2.4

also plays an important role as a security-providing item (Cf IV.2.2.). It is true that the few goths of which we know the legal position is being challenged, are placed in the groups " 0 items" and "1 item" (some goths in KDA scheme 24, one adjacent to Orangi-scheme and one in KDA's Clifton scheme). This fact again supports the validity of the selected items that provide hope. However, because of the small numbers of bastis involved, it does not make much sense to go very deeply into the matter here. With some reservation for the exceptions, we may say that in all the goths the level of security of tenure is high, if not because of the high number of hope-providing items present, then because of their age, old claims to the land, etc.

VII.3.3. The condition of the houses.


Regarding the condition of the houses - especially in the case of the goths - it is worth noting the distribution of the different types of house beside the "index". The index representing a kind of "average condition", tends to obscure the distribution among the different categories, as shown by the graphs in Appendix III.

In this respect, the goths show a particular pattern: whereas the autonomous settlements of more recent date in the graphs show a clustering of house types around one peak and a distribution over relatively few categories, (3) the goths often show two or even three peaks in the graphs and have a relatively wider dispersion of houses among the different categories.

A few examples may illustrate this.

3) Except for one, easily indentifiable category, Cf VIII.3.2.2.

Graph VII.3.3. Condition of houses in Limu Goth, Ibrahim Goth, Baluch Para, Azim Khan Goth, Zikri Para, and Hassan Lashkari Village.



Contrary to what is common in the younger autonomous settlements, these graphs are not suggestive of a steady, continuous process of development. We find in most of the goths a certain percentage of houses in category VI, which is indicative of a high level of security: the investment in an R.C.C. roof is usually not made unless the inhabitants feel very sure their structures will not be demolished.

In bastis of a more recent date, such high security levels would result in a high percentage of houses in categories IV, V and VI, and one does not find many houses below category IV in colonies where there is also a percentage of houses in category VI. In the goths, we find fairly high percentages in the lower categories (I, II and III).

Thus, on the one hand, there seems to be scope for improvement in houses, but - on the other hand - it seems as though this opportunity is being only partly utilized.

Moreover, the graphs suggest that there is no smooth transition from

one stage to the next, but rather, that improvements take place by jumps. 4). For example it is interesting to note that in Limu Goth category IV, which is the most common and popular basti-house type all over Karachi, is completely absent, but - at the same time - 18% of the houses appear in categories V and VI which are superior to type IV, and percentages scored by the "inferior" types are high, so that the average condition of the houses is rather poor (index - 149).

We have done some research into the background of this phenomenon. Although a description of it will lead us somewhat beyond the scope of a mere typology, and although it will implicitly anticipate some characteristics of more recent settlements to be described later, we will now first describe our investigations into the background of the difference in house conditions between goths and colonies.

This difference seems to be particularly revealing about the characteristics of goths and colonies. So, for a good understanding of the goths, it is essential to make this detour from the line of argument.

VII.3.3.1. The differences between houses in goths and colonies.

VII.3.3.1.1. Preliminary investigations and tentative hypotheses.

Mostly, when we asked the goth dwellers about the reasons why the house conditions partly lag behind those in adjacent colonies, economic reasons were given.

This, however, is not very convincing if understood in the sense that jhuggi dwellers in goths do not have sufficient money to build a better house. For checking purposes we took a few interviews from jhuggi dwellers in goths. We restricted ourselves to those people who had been born in those goths. The results of these interviews are shown in table VII.3.3.1.1.1.

- 4) From without 60 goths, 31 diagrams show 2 peaks, and 10 show 3 peaks. The majority of the remaining 19 diagrams - that have one peak only - still shows the peculiar wide dispersion over the different categories.

Table VII.3.3.1.1.1. Average income of head of household living in a jhuggi in a goth of Karachi. (figures May/June 1975)

Name goth	Number of interviews	Average income of head of household
Dhobighat	7	Rs 271/--
Ilyas Goth	7	Rs 270/--
Ibrahim Goth	5	Rs 200/--
Taru Line	7	Rs 241/--
Sher Shah Goth	6	Rs 267/--
Total	32	Rs 252/--

In Usmania Mahajir Colony, the average income of the heads of households was found to be Rs 170/-- per month in 1973. 5). Here, the level of security is much lower than in any of the above goths, but 77% of the houses fall in categories IV and V, while categories I, II and III score 0%, 6% and 18% respectively. Moreover, in Usmania Mahajir Colony, the relation between the individual income and housetype was found not to be very strong. 6).

At the same time, there may be some truth in stating that mainly economic reasons lie behind the condition of the houses. From each of the five above mentioned goths, we also took two interviews from people living in houses of type VI. Although the number of interviews is very limited, it is striking that here the average income of the head of the household was found to be no less than Rs 770/--. monthly. The explanation could be that for the goth dwellers priorities are different from those of the migrant squatters. Apparently, the goth dwellers start building a house of type IV - VI only when they are comparatively rich. This proposition may also explain the fact indicated above that improvements when they take place seem to be very large. One can imagine that once a goth dweller decides to improve his house, he is "rich" enough to make a great leap forward.

5) JRP-IV, 1975-A, p. 40.

6) *ibid.* p. 51.

In order to get some ideas about the priorities of goth dwellers, we also asked in the 32 interviews quoted above what the respondent would do in case he suddenly has Rs 1000/-- in his hands.

The replies to this question, however, do not significantly differ from van der Harst's findings, when he asked the same question from migrant squatters (7), namely, approximately one third said they would invest it in their house, another third of the interviewees would invest it in business, while the rest mentioned any of the different items: marriage, clearing of debts, education, food, clothing, medicines.

Still, we are inclined to believe that for the migrant squatter the shock of moving from his own village or town and having to live in the "foreign" metropolis, spurs him on constantly to try and improve his house, once he has more or less definitively settled. The absence of this shock would - following this line of thought - imply the absence of an incentive to improve. The goth dweller remains in his goth and the goth remains what it was, whatever changes take place all around.

In the literature, there are indications that the migrant squatter does indeed attach a high priority to his house, as compared with the villager. To the goth dweller, a house is a status-symbol or achievement-symbol to a lesser extent than to the migrant squatter, because the place of the goth dweller in his community is already fixed by a number of other criteria, such as his caste and ancestry. This place is also relatively safe: the goth dweller does not need the house as "a substitute for the loss of the traditional security of the local kinship network and the inaccessibility of institutionalized insurance, enjoyed only by the relatively wealthy." 8).

Conversely, to the squatter, all these functions of the house are extremely important: by migrating to the city, the migrant squatter runs the risk of failure. Will he be able to find a job? Will he manage to make some money to send home? Will he be able to find accommodation for his relatives? When he goes back to the village, can he be proud or will he be ridiculed? These are the common questions which we noted regularly from interviews.

"For the family that has no other form of security, no social insurance, no convertible capital, or no skills in assured and constant demand, the inalienable tenure of their home is essential for their peace of mind and often for their very existence." 9).

7) Van der Harst, J., 1974-8, pp. 48-51.

8) Caminos, H., J.F.C. Turner and I.A. Steffian, 1969, p.vii.

9) Turner, J.F.C., 1966, p. 42.

"House-ownership is, then, a way in which people at the bottom acquire capital and a social base. House-ownership probably has both economic and psychological functions in the social mobility and social consolidation processes which go into urbanization and industrialization." 10).

"In urban areas, the house is invariably a status symbol, whilst in rural areas the possession of farm animals, carts and irrigation equipment may be considered to give higher status than the possession of a house." 11).

"In the present study, a majority of the respondents in both barrios listed home ownership or desire for property as the major reason for moving to the area." 12).

"One of the most interesting features of squatter settlements is that though they are inhabited by the very poor, there is a very strong sense of saving among the residents. Out of their minuscule earnings, they save every cent they can. Their great ambition is to have a better home for their families." 13).

"In the Lima *barriadas*, many of my informants were quite conscious of the insurance value of their squatters' houses in the event of emergency." 14).

All this could well explain the high value the migrant squatter attaches to his house, one of the few or perhaps the only visible sign of his successful migration.

The goth dweller lacks these incentives.

Besides this explanation, one might propose ethnic reasons.

For obvious reasons, the goth dwellers - i.e. the original inhabitants of the region - belong to narrowly defined ethnic groups that are hardly represented in the other settlements. When emphasizing - as we have done - the age of the settlement, the ethnic factor may have been obscured. We have, however, observed that in the rare cases where Baluchi people squat in completely new settlements (mainly in Orangi), they tend to build their houses in the same way as the other squatters do. This is one more reason for believing that rather than the ethnic factor, it is the position of the fresh migrant-settler to the city which influences his investments in improving his house.

This is also in accordance with what van Pinxteren infers regarding Chanesar Goth. On the basis of house-occupying ratios according to ethnic origin and length of stay, he concludes:

10) Peattie, L.R., 1966, p. 26.

11) Alcock, A.E., K.N. Misra, J.L. McGairl and C.B. Patel, 1962, p. 85.

12) Flinn, W.L., 1971, p. 88.

13) Mc Namara, R.S., 1975, p. 32.

14) Mangin, W., 1967-A, p. 88

"It may be expected that with the influx in the next decade of new migrants whether they are Sindhis or non-Sindhis, only semi pucca and pucca houses will be built by them." 15).

On the other hand, a sample study in Lyari (16) reveals no different patterns for newcomers and older inhabitants of Sindhi and Baluchi origin. The figures found are shown in the following table.

Table VII.3.3.1.1.2. Sample of Sindhi and Baluchi house owners/inhabitants of Lyari, according to length of stay and type of house.

Length of stay	House type (%)						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	S
0 - 25 years (N = 473)	0.5	14	11	19	30	25	-
over 25 years (N = 1286)	0.5	11	9	22	34	24	-

It is worth noting that the peaks are not very outstanding, neither in the case of the recent settlers, nor in the case of older residents. We may attribute this to the fact that the two peaks for different bastis occur at different places (house types). Thus, when the figures are combined, they may cancel each other out to some extent.

In the same way, tendencies which we expected to trace might be obscured in the figures presented. The figures of the sample study presented here unfortunately cannot be used on a muhallah-basis for this particular purpose, since the number of newcomers (0-25 years) per muhallah is too small.

We think that simultaneously one more factor could be influencing the house conditions in some of the goths. As we have already pointed out in IV.2.1., a high level of security may cause the market mechanism to begin operating almost in the formalized ways of the officially recognized land market. Land prices rise quickly. It is, therefore, plausible to assume that some goth dwellers continue to live in their jhuggis until such time as an outsider makes a profitable bid for the

15) Van Pinxteren, 1972, p. 19.

16) JRP.IV, 1975-8. For the purpose of this study, a secondary analysis of the data collected was made, thanks to the cooperation of the Administrator KMC and the staff of the computer section.

land. Thus, the quality of the house may be sacrificed partly for speculative purposes.

But, again, this can be done only when the quality of the house has no high priority.

VII.3.3.1.2. The hypotheses.

In the previous paragraph we have explained what could be reasons for goth dwellers building their houses differently - both in terms of speed and of quality - from migrant squatters.

We may now briefly summarize our hypotheses:

Migrant squatters in the city attach a high priority to their houses, as these - apart from providing shelter - enhance the security of the dweller, enhance the status of the dweller and are an important symbol of the dwellers' achievement. There is no doubt that to a certain extent the same hypotheses would hold good for goth dwellers as well, but as the migrant squatters in the city are in a relatively insecure position - both economically and socially - we hypothesize that our assumptions hold to a higher degree for migrant squatters than for goth dwellers.

VII.3.3.1.3. Flow of the research.

In the initial stages of the study, when we took free interviews, one of the regular questions was what advantages there are in having a house of one's own. It was noted that - roughly speaking - most of the replies could be categorized under the headings "security" and "status" or "achievement-status". We have retained this question in the final version of our short questionnaire on the subject (17). It reads:

"What are in your opinion the advantages of having an own house?"

Besides, we tried and selected a number of questions pertaining to one of the three concepts "security", "status" and "achievement-status".

a) Security.

Our reasoning is that if providing of security is a function of the house, this can best be found out by asking the interviewees what they would do in case of emergency, crisis, etc., e.g. in case of illness, joblessness or death.

During free interviews, it appeared that death was not a good thing to invoke the interviewee's imagination on. After some probing, the

17) The full text of the questionnaire is attached as Appendix IV.

question was framed as follows:

"If - God forbid!! - you should fall seriously ill, then it is clear there will be much trouble for your family. What will they do?"

In addition, two more questions were framed in connection with the concept of security: one about investing money safely and one about obtaining loans. These questions read as follows:

"If a poor man saves a sum (18), what is the best way to keep it? Should he - in your opinion - keep it in a bank
build a house
invest it in business
buy animals
anything else.

"If, for some special need, you have to take a loan, then can you - in your opinion - get a loan easily?"

If our hypothesis is valid, we may formulate the following expectations:

- regarding the first question: relatively more migrant squatters than goth dwellers will find security from their house.
- regarding the second question: relatively more migrant squatters than goth dwellers will prefer the house as a safe means to invest money in.
- regarding the third question: goth dwellers can get loans more easily from traditional sources (e.g. relatives); migrant squatters can get loans less easily, and if they can get loans, more often their houses will serve as a security, because they borrow from more formal sources.

b) Status.

It was very difficult to find the right expression in Urdu for asking about status. "'Izzat" - respect - was tried in a number of versions of the questions, but it appeared to be too much connected with religious and ethical norms - at least in official opinion. 19).

Although one informant stated that:

"'Izzat is a matter of money alone; all the rest is nonsense", many other informants were more inclined to agree with an interviewee who stated that:

"'Izzat cannot be seen: it is in your heart".

We tried to get round this problem first by mentioning the religious/ethical meaning of 'Izzat in an introduction to the question what other components 'Izzat consists of. We also tried to circumvent the problem by asking what in the interviewee's opinion would be the opinion about 'Izzat of the man in the street. Neither attempt was very successful.

18) Translations have been kept as literal as possible.

19) 'Izzat - grandeur, glory, dignity, honour, respect, esteem, reputation, fame.

Finally, we found that "martabah" (20) might be a better expression to translate "status", although, already in free interviews, a few respondents also held that this is a matter of the heart.

In order to exclude as much as possible of the religious/ethical components of "martabah", we framed the question in such a way that the respondent was almost forced to restrict himself to the outward symbols.

The question, in its final version, reads:

"If somebody from outside walks about in some colony or area, how then will it be known to him that in this area this man is of great martabah or of little martabah?"

If our hypothesis is valid, we may expect that the results of this question would show that

- the house as an outward sign of status has relatively more importance to migrant squatters than to goth dwellers.

c) Achievement.

In this connection, two questions could arise. Firstly, we wanted to investigate which are the particular symbols of achievement. Secondly, we wanted to know whether there are different opinions regarding the symbols one may and one should not use to show off his achievements.

The two questions framed for this purpose are:

"If , for example - a poor man improves his position by endeavor and effort, then how will it become known that this man has improved his position?"

"Imagine that a poor man receives a very great sum from a lottery or as a present, and the next day he demolishes his hut and calls a contractor to build a pakka house. Then some people say that this is very wise. Some people say that he should save the sum for the difficult times.

And again some people say that this is not proper if a poor man suddenly becomes equal to a rich man: he should take more care and be less proud.

What do you think about this?"

If our hypothesis is valid, we may formulate the following expectations regarding these two questions:

- regarding the first question: relatively more migrant squatters will view the house as a primary sign of achievement than goth dwellers.
- regarding the second question: relatively more squatters will think the new rich did a wise thing; goth dwellers will show a higher preference for the alternatives.

20) martabah - degree, dignity, class, order.

d) A general question.

One, more general question was added to assess the level of priority attached to the house as compared with other items. The question reads:

"Some people live in a kachcha house or hut although they can (afford to) build a pakka house. They find other things more important. Are there in your opinion such people in this area? If yes, what then is the more important thing in their opinion?"

Regarding this question, we formulate the following expectations:

- The frequency of "colonies" in which relatively wealthy people live in jhuggis or kachcha houses is lower than of goths with the same phenomenon.
- regarding the alternative ways of spending money, to be indicated by the informants, alternative spending is more accepted as normal amongst goth dwellers than amongst migrant squatters. Therefore the goth dwellers will make mention of real alternatives more often than migrant squatters, who more often will frown upon alternative ways of spending.

VII.3.3.1.4. The sample.

In order to obtain a profile of the opinions of both migrant squatters and goth dwellers, we have tried to disperse the sample in terms of ethnic groups and localities. 25 interviews were taken in each group, with the following distribution:

Goth dwellers: 5 interviews were taken in each of the following goths:

Ibrahim Goth
Chanesar Goth
Baluch Para
Ilyas Goth
Juna Kalri

The sample interviewed comprised 10 Sindhis and 15 Baluchis.

Migrant squatters: 8 Pathans, 8 Panjabis and 9 Muhajirs were interviewed in the following colonies:

Angara Goth
Gauharabad (Sabzi Mandi)
Jehangirabad N.
Mahmoodabad
Pahar Ganj (i.e. the collective name of bastis 33, 133 and 48)
Rudad Nagar

Representatives of each ethnic group were found in two different bastis. Care was taken to select bastis with a reasonable security level (at least three items present), so as to exclude insecurity as a main reason for not building pakka houses.

Regarding the respondents, a possible bias introduced by the difference

of generations (e.g. affecting opinions about the behaviour of the "new rich") was excluded by selecting only male respondents of middle age (35 - 55 years), who are married and have children. From the goths, only those people who had been born in the goth were selected as respondents.

VII.3.3.1.5. Discussion.

If our hypotheses turn out to be valid, it will still not be clear whether the differences - if found - should be attributed to ethnic factors or to the way certain areas become inhabited.

The ethnic factor can only be excluded if it can be proved that migrant squatters with a Baluchi or Sindhi ethnic background react in the same way as other migrant squatters do. It is, however, very difficult to locate real squatters from one of these ethnic groups in Karachi. Migrants from these groups mostly settle in the traditional goths which still serve as receptional areas. In the goths, the migrants settling can hardly be considered as squatters, as they settle on land belonging to relatives or to members of their tribe. Besides, we may expect that in the goths newcomers easily adopt the opinions of the majority especially so because the newcomers belong to the same traditional group: the very fact that they settle in a particular goth proves that they identify themselves with the inhabitants of such a goth.

The only place where we found many Baluchis squatting is Orangi. 21). It should however be remembered that most of these Baluchis came from different goths in Karachi (especially from Lyari) before settling in Orangi.

Thus, this group is not strictly comparable with other squatters (e.g. Pathans), firstly because they may constitute a selection (socially and economically) of the goth dwellers; secondly - and more important - because these people have been living in Karachi for a long time. Accordingly their socio-economic security might be more comparable with that of the goth dwellers themselves than with that of migrant squatters who have left their relatives somewhere far away from Karachi.

The Baluchi squatter in Orangi does still have his relatives and his whole traditional context close by, in the city itself. So, his position is not very different from that of the goth dweller.

21) Many Baluchi squatters live in Kausar Niazi Colony, but they originate from the Quetta region and therefore differ from the Baluchis who reside in the goths of Karachi, these last originate from the region adjacent to Karachi: Makran.

Still, as there is no other basis for comparison, we have taken also 25 interviews from Baluchis in Orangi and we expect that if the way of settling is the causal factor behind the difference in houses of goth dwellers and migrant squatters, the Baluchis of Orangi will hold opinions resembling the opinions of other squatters (Pathans, Panjabis, Muhajirs) more than the opinions of goth dwellers.

It cannot be denied that the Baluchi squatters of Orangi may well constitute a selection from the Baluchi goth dwellers, and for that reason have different opinions from those who remained in the goth. However, a number of factors make it probable that such a selection - if such it be - does not greatly differ from the other goth dwellers in many respects:

- a) many of them remained living in their goths of origin for years after they had purchased a plot in Orangi, so probably they were not pushed out of their goths by strong social pressures.
- b) most of them visit, or are visited by, relatives and friends who have remained in the goths.
- c) many of them have been living, or still live in jhuggis which they improve bit by bit, so they do not seem to be extremely rich.
- d) almost all build their houses in Baluchi style and manifest themselves as "pakka" Baluchis, so we cannot assume that their moving to Orangi was intended partly as breaking a tradition.
- e) when asked about their reasons for settling in Orangi, all informants agree they would have preferred to stay in their goths, had there been room enough to accommodate them.

Further, a number of them were removed forcibly because of widening of roads and for similar reasons.

Thus, those who were evicted from their goths by lack of space, can be considered in a way as a random selection.

In conclusion, although we cannot prove that the Baluchi squatters of Orangi are not a selection from the goth dwellers of Karachi, their socio-economic circumstances do not seem to be very different from those of the goth dwellers.

VII.3.3.1.6. The result.

The general question.

Table VII.3.3.1.6.1. shows the frequencies of different replies given to the question what in respondent's opinion are the advantages of owning

a house. We have attempted to categorize the replies according to the headings "security", "status" and "achievement status" as far as possible. It should be noted that several of the replies do not directly refer to any of the headings. We have grouped them under the headings whenever there is a potential indication that the heading may be relevant. Thus, when a respondent told us he likes his own house, because he can expand it at will, he may have many reasons for wanting to do so. The fact that one of these reasons could be to use the house as an achievement status symbol, has made us decide to group the reply under this heading.

In order to best approximate the somewhat vague distinction between "status" and "achievement status", we have retained the replies of a static nature ("easy life", "respect", etc.) under "status", and the replies of a more dynamic nature ("future children", "can expand", etc.) under "achievement status".

Table VII.3.3.1.6.1. Opinions about advantages of owning a house.

Category	Reply	Frequency of the reply 22).		
		Goth dwellers	Squatters	Baluchi squatters
Security	No problem when jobless	4	4	3
	No forced shifting	2	4	5
	Can get mortgage/loan	4	-	1
	Can sell/rent out	7	3	2
	Good way of saving	1	1	-
	Total	18	12	11
Status	Own property	8	11	13
	'Izzat	1	-	2
	Easy life	1	4	1
	More freedom	-	2	3
	Place for guests/relatives	-	1	1
	Better upkeep	-	1	-
Total	10	19	20	
Achievement-status	Can improve	-	1	-
	Can expand	-	2	2
	Facilities obtainable	3	2	1
	Better for future children	-	-	4
Total	3	5	7	
Other	No rent	23	23	25
	Attachment	-	-	1
	No quarrels	1	-	-
Grand total		55	59	64

22) Total frequencies are higher than 25 (nr of interviews per group), as often more than one reply was given.

It is remarkable that goth dwellers score higher in the "security"- items and lower in the both "status"-items than the other two groups. As will be shown below, it is exactly regarding the "security"-items that squatters have an opinion significantly different from the goth dwellers, who appear to need the house less as an asset of security than the squatters. It should be remembered however, that the question was put in very general terms: the Urdu expression "kya faidah hota hai?" (23) emphasizes the general meaning of the question, so that replies could be - and in fact were - given that had no relation to the situation of the particular respondent, or even to the basti he lives in.

"in this goth nobody sells or rents out his house", stated one respondent, who had indicated the possibility of selling/renting out as one of the advantages of having his own house.

Another explanation can be that almost all goth dwellers own their house, so that status differences are less relevant to them in this respect, especially so when the quality of the house is not further specified. Automatically, the attention of the goth dweller would almost have to restrict itself to other items.

To the squatters who are quite familiar with renting of houses, "status" is more relevant.

It is striking that the Baluchi squatters hold very much the same opinions as the squatters.

a) Security.

Table VII.3.3.1.6.2. shows the frequencies scored by different replies to the question what the family of the respondent would do in case the respondent fell seriously ill.

23) kya faidah hota hai - what is - in general - the advantage.

Table VII.3.3.1.6.2. Frequencies of replies to the question what respondents' families would do if respondents fell seriously ill.

Category 24).	Reply	Frequency of the reply 25).		
		Goth dwellers	Squatters	Baluchi Squatters
Self help	Sell house	1	17	4
	Rent out house	-	-	1
	Mortgage house	1	-	1
	Total relying on house	2	17	5
	Sell savings	3	4	1
	Wife will work	-	3	4
	Total self help	5	24	11
Help from others	Loan/help relatives	19	4	3
	Loan/help neighbors	3	1	-
	Loan/help friends	1	1	-
	Total loan/help from informal sources	23	6	3
	Loan/help employer	1	2	-
	Loan (not specified)	-	2	2
Total help from other sources	24	10	11	
Grand Total		29	34	22

It can be easily seen from this table that much more than the goth dwellers the squatters rely on self help in an emergency situation. The Baluchi squatters take an intermediate position. Apparently, the goth dwellers can get help more often from informal sources than the squatters; again

24) One squatter who reported he would go back to his village is not recorded: in a way, it can be argued, he gets help from other sources; at the same time one can justifiably hold he can find absolutely no way of either self help or help from other sources in his present situation. In case of crises, he would be helpless.

25) Sometimes more than one answer to the question, sometimes no answer.

the Baluchi squatters take an intermediate position.

Very clearly, in the great majority of the cases, self help of squatters takes place by relying on the house as an asset.

In conclusion, we may say that our expectation is fulfilled, and that indeed the house is an asset of security to the squatters to a far greater extent than to the goth dwellers. The Baluchi squatters take a position in between, which fact also is in accordance with our expectations. 26).

Our second question regarding the house as a source of security was about the safest way to keep money for low income people.

The following table gives a review of the replies to this question.

26) For the purpose of establishing the statistical value of relations found, this, and each of the following tables has been reduced to three 2 x 2 tables, for which Yule's Q could be calculated (Cf W.M. de Pijper, 1974, pp. 44-46).

In the case of this table, the calculations of Q were found as follows:

	G(oth dwellers)	S(quatters)
Total self help	5	24
Total help from other sources	24	10

$$Q_{GS} = - 0.84$$

	G(oth dwellers)	B(aluchi squatters)
Total self help	5	11
Total help from other sources	24	11

$$Q_{GB} = - 0.65$$

	B(aluchi squatters)	S(quatters)
Total self help	11	24
Total help from other sources	11	10

$$Q_{BS} = - 0.41$$

For the following tables, we will only indicate which reduction was applied and what values were found for Q_{GS} , Q_{GB} , and Q_{BS} .

Table VII 3.3.1.6.3. Opinions on safest way to keep money.

First choice	Second choice	Frequency of the reply		
		Goth dwellers	Squatters	Baluchi squatters
House	Bank	6	5	8
	Business	5	12	9
	Animals	2	-	-
	Land	-	1	-
	Jewelry	-	1	-
Total house		13	19	17
Business	House	7	2	7
	Bank	1	-	-
	Animals	1	-	-
	Marriage	-	-	1
	No second choice	-	1	-
Total Business		9	3	8
Bank	Business	2	1	-
	No second choice	-	2	-
Total Bank		2	3	-
Animals	no second choice	1	-	-
Total animals		1	-	-
Total replies		25	25	25

Although not as outspoken as in the previous case, it can be seen that squatters have a higher preference for investing money in their house than goth dwellers. These last show a greater preference for investing in business.

Again, the Baluchi squatters take an intermediate position.

Our expectation that relatively more squatters prefer the house as a safe means of investing money, turns out to be valid. Also the fact that Baluchi squatters take an intermediate position is in accordance

with our expectations. 27).

Our next question related to security, regards loans. The following table summarizes the replies to the question whether the informant would be able to obtain a loan when he should need one, and, if yes, from what source.

Table VII.3.3.1.6.4. Possibilities of obtaining loans, and sources of loans.

Possibility	Source	Frequency of the reply		
		Goth dwellers	Squatters	Baluchi squatters
No	-	8	8	11
Yes	Relatives	5	5	7
Yes	Baraderi (28)	8	1	-
Yes	Qaum (29)	2	-	-
	Total Rel./Barad./Qaum	15	6	7
Yes	Neighbors/friends	1	4	1
Yes	Employer	-	3	2
Yes	On basis of house	1	4	3
Yes	Not specified	-	-	1
Total Yes		17	17	14

Our expectation that squatters can get loans only with greater difficulty than goth dwellers does not hold true: both groups score equal numbers of positive and negative replies to the question whether the informant can get a loan. Our expectation that goth dwellers can get loans more often from traditional sources (relatives, baraderi, qaum) has proved true: the goth dwellers score $2\frac{1}{2}$ times higher than the squatters.

27) Reduction of the number of variables was found by concentrating on the first choice only. The variables in the reduced tables are: "first choice house" and "first choice other items".
 $Q_{GS} = -0.49$ $Q_{GB} = -0.32$ and $Q_{BS} = -0.20$

28) Baraderi - brotherhood, small community, group. Segaar defines baraderi as: patrilinear group of relatives, sometimes including in-laws (Segaar, T.J., 1975, p. 278).

29) Qaum - a people, a tribe.

Squatters appear to rely more frequently on formal sources which we may assume to require some kind of security more often than the traditional sources.

"Everybody around knows that I have spent Rs 3000/-- on this house. So my neighbours know I would not run away, and when my wife had to be admitted to the hospital, I could borrow from my neighbours." (interview Pathan Colony, Sch. 24).

The figures scored by the Baluchi squatters very much resemble those scored by other squatters, so also in this respect, our expectations are supported. 30).

b) Status.

The replies to the question what are the visible signs of martabah are given in the next table.

Table VII.3.3.1.6.5. Outward signs of martabah.

Item	Frequency of mention by:		
	Goth dwellers	Squatters	Baluchi squatters
House	11	8	10
Behaviour	6	7	7
Dress	10	8	8
Econ. items (scooter, T.V., brand of cigaret smoked)	3	2	5
Food/fat belly/shiny face	-	1	3
Education/cleanliness	-	2	-
Job/Business	1	2	-
Having of "chamchahs" (31)	2	2	1
No visible items	11	13	10
Total replies	44	45	44

The picture this table gives does not lend itself to any conclusions regarding any of the groups. When broken down according to items mentioned in the first, second and third place, the picture is no clearer.

It certainly does not support our hypothesis that the house serves as a

30) The variables in the reduced tables are: "loan from members of kin" and "loan from other sources or unspecified sources."

$$Q_{GS} = 0.86 \quad Q_{GB} = 0.76 \quad \text{and} \quad Q_{BS} = 0.29$$

31) chamchah - follower of an important man (Segaar, T.J., 1975, p. 278).

status symbol to squatters more often or in higher degree than to goth dwellers. 32).

The high frequency scored by the reply that martabah is not visible gives rise to the thought that - although during pre-testing of the questionnaire martabah seemed to have a more secular meaning than 'izzat - again this expression has the same disadvantages we encountered when using the word 'izzat. It might have been better to use the simple equivalent of "rich" and "poor", although - during free interviewing - we found that quite often the basti dwellers tend to suggest that there are no "rich" people in the area.

"We are all of poor class", was a common remark when we used the words for "rich" and "poor", and often it was difficult to make the respondent admit that there are - after all - differences, even within a certain basti.

c) Achievement.

Again, to our question how would it be visible when somebody improves the position, a wide variety of replies was given. Here, only two respondents (both goth dwellers) held that there would be no visible signs of the improved position of the poor man whom we had introduced in our question. The following table shows the frequencies of the different replies given.

Table VII.3.3.1.6.6. Frequencies of main items mentioned as signs of achievement.

Item 33).	Mentioned	Frequency of mention by		
		Goth dwellers	Squatters	Saluchi squatters
House	first	9	14	3
	second	9	4	7
	third	3	4	2
Dress	first	6	8	9
	second	3	8	8
	third	6	3	6
Job/business	first	8	2	1
	second	3	3	2
	third	0	3	0

32) The variables in the reduced tables are: "house" and "other items".
 $Q_{GS} = 0.21$ $Q_{GB} = 0.11$ and $Q_{BS} = 0.15$

33) Other items, scoring a very low frequency only, are food (f.2), happy face (f.2), marriage (f.1), equipment (f.1), language (f.1).

From this table, we can see that there is a slight tendency for squatters to attach more priority to the house as a sign of achievement than is the case with goth dwellers. These last appear to attach more value than the squatters do to a job or business as a sign of achievement. 34).

It is worth noting also that the two respondents who said that achievement is not being shown in any manner, are goth dwellers.

In the question as it was formulated, there is no possibility left - as was the case with the expressions 'izzat and maratabah - to say that "it is in your heart", as it regards purely material things. Thus, when it is said that an improvement of the position is not shown, we may conclude that it is - in the community under consideration - no use to show it, e.g. because that is being frowned upon, or because somebody's place in the community is so fixed that it does not change

by an improvement of the material position, or because other values are rated much higher.

The Baluchi squatters react like the goth dwellers where the house is concerned, and more like the squatters where the other two items are concerned.

We may conclude that - in accordance with our expectation - indeed more squatters view the house as a primary sign of achievement than the goth dwellers do. The difference between the two groups, however, is not very marked.

Our expectation that Baluchi squatters would hold opinions resembling those of the other squatters, does not hold true.

Our second question related to the achievement status was what would be the respondents' opinion about the poor man who suddenly becomes rich and immediately demolishes his jhuggi and has another, pakka, house built instead.

The following table shows the frequencies scored by the three possible alternative reactions given. In the case of the first alternative ("very wise") we had to break down the answer into two categories as several respondents selected this alternative under certain conditions:

34) In the reduced tables, we concentrated the attention to the first choice only. The variables in the reduced tables are "house" and "other items".

$Q_{GS} = - 0.39$

$Q_{GB} = 0$

and $Q_{BS} = - 0.39$

"It was very wise, but he should also save money for his business."

"It was very wise, but he should keep some money for the difficult times."

Table VII.3.3.1.6.7. Opinions about the new rich who builds a pakka house.

Opinion	Frequency of reply		
	Goth dwellers	Squatters	Baluchi squatters
Wise	14	17	13
Wise, under conditions	4	3	7
Not careful	6	5	4
Not modest	1	-	1
Total replies	25	25	25

Although there seems to be a slight tendency for squatters more often than goth dwellers to agree with the behaviour of the new rich whom we introduced in our question, the difference is very small. Our expectation has come out, but so slightly, that it is questionable whether value can be attached to the difference found.

The Baluchi squatters again take a position in between the other squatters and the goth dwellers: for them, the total frequency scored by "wise" is equal to that of the squatters, but more frequently, they add a condition. 35).

d) The general question.

Our final, general question was whether according to the interviewee's opinion there were any people in the basti he lives in who could afford to build a pakka house, but still lived in a jhuggi or kachcha house. If so, it was also asked what alternative items these people prefer to spend their money on.

The following table shows the results of the first part of the question.

35) The variables in the reduced tables are "total wise" and "other opinions".

$$Q_{GS} = - 0.22$$

$$Q_{GB} = 0$$

$$\text{and } Q_{BS} = - 0.22$$

Table VII.3.3.1.6.8. Frequency of opinion that people of the basti who can afford a pakka house (36), still live in an inferior one.

Opinion	Frequency of reply by		
	Goth dwellers	Squatters	Baluchi squatters
Yes	20	22	17
No	5	3	3

Our expectation that there would be fewer squatter settlements than goths in which people reside who could afford to but do not live in a (semi-) pakka house, has not proved true. 37).

It should be noted however that squatters and goth dwellers probably have very different opinions about the meaning of "can afford to": this is exactly what we want to show.

Besides, the above table does not reveal anything about the frequency of the phenomenon per basti.

The following table, showing the replies to the second half of the question (regarding alternative ways of spending money) will throw new light on this matter.

36) The basti dwellers do not differentiate between "pakka" and "semi pakka". To them, mostly, "pakka" means: built of concrete blocks.

37) No reduction in the table was needed in this case.

$$Q_{GS} = - 0.29$$

$$Q_{GB} = 0.31$$

$$Q_{BS} = - 0.55$$

Table VII.3.3.1.6.9. Frequency of alternative ways of spending money of "rich" people living in "inferior" houses.

Category	Reply	Frequency of reply by		
		Goth dwellers	Squatters	Baluchi squatters
Negative + Not able to imagine	Miserliness	1	5	5
	Spends on women	-	1	-
	Is a fool	-	-	1
	Is illiterate	1	-	-
	No idea	-	7	8
Total		2	13	14
Neutral	Matter of custom	-	2	-
	No lease	7	2	4
	Not planning to live permanently	-	5	2
	Total	7	9	6
Real alternative spending	Save for hard time	5	1	3
	Business	4	-	1
	Wedding	4	-	-
	Education children	1	-	1
	Cattle	1	-	-
	Gold	1	-	-
	Send home	-	2	-
Total		16	3	5
Total replies		25	25	25

The figures of this table convincingly support our expectation that squatters tend to frown upon those who can afford to but do not live in a (semi-) pakka house. In many cases, it seems as though they admit that the phenomenon occurs, but they cannot imagine why anyone should behave in that way. In the goths, the phenomenon is regarded as normal, with very few exceptions only.

Regarding the Baluchi squatters, it appears that again they take a

position somewhat in between the goth dwellers and the squatters. 33). In view of their provenance from goths of Karachi - which fact makes them intra-city migrants, who can maintain strong ties with their goths of origin, - the fact that their opinions tend to resemble those of the squatters from outside can be interpreted as evidence that their way of settling rather than the ethnic background determines their attitudes regarding the house.

VII.3.3.1.7. Conclusion.

The purpose of this side-study has not been to collect information on a representative sample, although we have tried to reflect as far as possible the goth- and squatter population in our small samples.

Regarding the Baluchi squatters, we have already explained that the 25 of them whom we interviewed cannot be considered to fulfil completely the requirements of a control group.

The only aim of this part of the study is to give a profile and to show some tendencies.

From the replies to questions regarding security, it has become sufficiently clear that indeed the squatters are in a less secure position than the goth dwellers. These last can rely to a much larger extent upon help from outside sources, in many cases from within the context of their village life; the squatters have to rely upon self help much more often, and in most cases they view and would actually use the house as an asset of security in emergency situations.

The question regarding status has not given an unambiguous result. In view of the replies given, we doubt whether the question was put in the right way. It should be recalled also that in the first, general, question the squatters scored twice as high as goth dwellers on potential status items.

On the other hand, in this general question, the quality of the house was left out of consideration. As we explained above, most of the goth dwellers own their house, so that ownership of a house not further described may not be relevant to them as a status item. Therefore, we cannot attach too much value to the results of this first general question.

The replies to both questions regarding achievement status show a slight

38) The variables in the reduced table are "total negative statements + not able to imagine" and "total real alternative spending".

$$Q_{GS} = - 0.94$$

$$Q_{GB} = - 0.91$$

$$Q_{BS} = - 0.21$$

tendency for squatters to view the house more as an achievement symbol than the goth dwellers do.

The Baluchi squatters take an intermediate position in both questions. The results of the final, general, question are perhaps the most convincing. Our expectation that goths would house people living in houses of a quality below their economic potential more often than colonies, did not prove true. However, nothing was revealed about the frequency of this phenomenon.

Regarding the second half of the question, from the squatters, hardly any indicated a real alternative way of spending money, and, from the goth dwellers, hardly any gave a negative reason for relatively rich people living in houses below their economic potential.

From the replies to this question alone, we may conclude that squatters do tend to attach a higher priority to their house than goth dwellers do. To goth dwellers it seems more natural to spend money on a number of alternative items; for squatters most of the alternatives are real - as has become clear from the replies to other question (e.g. "hard time", "business") - but apparently, they have no priority over the house. From the replies to this question it can again be seen that Baluchi squatters take an intermediate position.

VII.3.4. The occupational structure.

The occupational structure of the goths reflects their history of relatively young villages that came into existence due to the expansion of the city.

Certainly - even in the past - the occupational structure has not been what one might expect of small hamlets in a desert country.

At the same time, it was markedly different - and in some cases it still is - from what is common in settlements inhabited by migrant squatters. Many of the Sindhis and Baluchis who settled in the goths around Karachi found employment in agricultural or semi-agricultural jobs. There were, however, very few real farmers amongst them. Hardly any of them owned land, as this was mostly the property of city dwellers.

The newly arrived goth dwellers started working as fishermen, dairy farmers, or as laborers in vegetable gardens.

Many of them also took up semi-agricultural jobs, like the cutting and selling of grass, the profession of merchants in animals, milkseller, donkey- or cameldriver, fish- or shell processor and -seller.

Others took jobs in road construction, transport of sand, wood cutting,

and digging.

Finally, there were some of the traditional occupations like the maulawi's (39), the petty shopkeepers, the shoemakers, etc., and some people started working in the city as servants.

When many of the vegetable gardens were turned into residential areas and some gardens were no more irrigable because of the deteriorated quality of water in rivers and under ground, more and more goth dwellers took up other jobs, so that nowadays the occupational structure often does not differ much from that in many of the colonies. (Cf Appendix V). For obvious reasons, gardening is most affected by the expansion of the city. Dairy farming is less affected, as fodder can be had from farther distances; fishing is probably the least affected by the influence of the city.

The high proportion of drivers found in our samples probably is a reflection of the high frequency in which donkey drivers and sand loaders were found in the previous generation.

In a few goths we have taken samples (40) and collected some information about the inhabitants. (41). Some data collected on the occupational structure may now illustrate the above point.

Table VII.3.4. Some data on the occupational structure in 6 goths of Karachi, present and past.

Name goth	Total Sample N 43)	In (semi-)agricultural profession 42)		Drivers	
		Present %	Previous generation %	Present %	Prev. gener. %
Ismail Goth	25	52	64	4	4
Sher Shah Goth	60	38	57	18	15
Baluch Para	58	14	50	33	16
Taru Line	36	6	52	14	22
Zikri Para	33	9	36	12	-
Dhobi Ghat	32	3	3	3	-

39) maulawi - learned man, religious instructor.

40) Samples were taken the same way as we took the house samples, cf. App. II.

41) Full data in Appendix V.

42) "(semi-) agricultural professions" include: fishers, farmers, gardeners, farm labourers, fish- and shell processors, grass cutters, animal merchants, milk sellers, donkey- and camel drivers.

43) Attention is paid only to people belonging to ethnic groups, native to the goth.

The figures shown indicate that the goths tend to loose their agricultural traits, and adopt traits more typical of the city.

One more agricultural trait we investigated is the number of domestic animals kept. In five of the six goths above, their number is very limited: we found a total average of 0.8 animal per household in the six goths, but in Sher Shah Goth alone, the average is 3.5 animals per household; in the other goths, it is negligible.

Reportedly, in some of the goths, there have been many more animals in the past (e.g. in Baluch Para); but the keeping of animals has not been a constant factor in all the goths, but rather was - and up to a point still is - a specialization of some goths (e.g. Chanesar Goth, Musa Goth, Sher Shah Goth), just as other goths specialized in vegetable farming (e.g. Raksar II, Baluch Para) or Fishing (e.g. Juna Kalri, Khadda, Ismail Goth).

VII.3.5. Other characteristics.

Due probably to the way the goths were occupied and to their history, there is another characteristic that distinguishes the goths from most of the colonies. In the goths we find a level of ethnic homogeneity and a sense of continuity seldom found in the colonies.

Table VII.3.5. may illustrate our point.

Table VII.3.5. Ethnic composition and length of stay in 6 goths of Karachi.

Name Goth	Sample N 44)	% population belonging to main ethnic group, native to the goth.	% population belonging to second main ethnic group native to goth.	% heads of households born in goth.
Ismail Goth	25	88	12	100
Sher Shah Goth	60	55	37	72
Baluch Para	58	84	9	91
Taru Line	36	64	36	97
Zikri Para	44	75	-	70
Dhobighat	32	94	-	94

Often, the inhabitants of the goths form very close communities:

"we all belong to the same tribe" (interview Limu Goth).

Typically, the three bastis where we were not allowed to take a sample -

44) In this case samples include non-autochthoneous settlers in the goths.

or even access in two cases, although we had a very good introduction - were goths.

VII.4. Further categorization of the goths.

When we want to categorize goths further, it seems to be good to again take "development" as the basic criterion, as we try to do throughout this study. As suggested in Chapter II, "development" can be measured with the help of two criteria, viz. the level of security of tenure and the condition of the houses.

In VII.3.2. we have explained that for the goths the level of security can be considered almost as a constant factor, exception being made in a few cases.

In VII.3.3. we have explained that the condition of the houses in goths is such that the index (as found per instructions in V.3.2.) tends to obscure the dispersal of houses over the different categories, and that - in case of the goths - attention to this dispersal is essential.

Stated in popular words, one might say that the main characteristic of the condition of houses in goths is that we may find the worst type of jhuggis next to the best type of pakka houses, bungalows or flats; the index representing a sort of "average", obscures this fact when the peaks for low and high quality houses more or less outweigh each other. Therefore, we suggest to measure the level of development of the houses in terms of the percentages scored by high quality types (IV, V and VI), rather than in terms of the "index of house conditions."

The result of this categorization is shown in table VII.4.1.

Table VII.4.1. Pre partition settlements according to the percentage of houses in categories IV, V and VI. 45).


a) 100-90% houses in categories IV, V and VI.

Eid Gah Line (57)	Patel Para (196)
Nawabad (179)	Miran Pir (161)
Shiddy Village (227)	Gul Mohammad Lane (84)
Khadda (132)	Rexer (Lyari) (214)
Hassan Lashkari Village (92)	Daryabad (49)
Dhobighat (54)	Dharamsiwara (53)
Gandhi Nagar (65)	Juna Kambharwara (124)
Usmanabad (243)	

45) In this, and following lists of bastis, the sequence numbers (Cf III.2.4.) are given in brackets.



"The worst types of jhuggis next to the best types of jhuggis houses".



b) 89 - 80% houses in categories IV, V and VI.

Moosa Lane (167)	Shah Beg Line (219)
Chakiwara (41)	Baghdadi (17)
Jumman Shah Plot (121)	Bakhshan Village (19)
Ghas Ganji (74)	Ilyas Goth (100)
Haji Murid Goth (87)	Zikri Para (251)
	New Kumbharwara (184)

c) 79 - 70% houses in categories IV, V and VI.

Chanesar Goth (42)	Jan Mohammad Goth (113)
Kalakot (126)	Singo Lines (230)
Slaughterhouse (232)	Taru Line (236)
Bawapat (26)	Rangiwara (208)
Musa Goth (172)	Dodha Goth (55)

d) 69 - 50% house in categories IV, V and VI.

Muslimabad (173)	Bakra Piri (20)
Old Golimar (183)	Nawa Line (130)
Banguria Goth (24)	Bhutta Village (30)
Baluch Para (23)	Juna Kalri (123)
Idu Lines (99)	Gul Bhai Colony (82)
Azim Khan Goth (15)	Miran Naka (160)
Ibrahim Goth (98)	Daulat Ram Mil Colony (51)

e) 49 - 25% houses in categories IV, V and VI.

Karim Bakhsh Para (127)	Lassi Para (Baldia) (142)
Baluch Goth (22)	Raksar II (207)
Sher Shah Goth (226)	Iqbal Goth (103)

f) 24 - 0% houses in categories IV, V and VI.

Limu Goth (146)	Piru Goth (201)
Dosmand ka Goth (56)	Ismail Goth (107)

If we pay attention to the location of these goths, we may make the following observations:

Group a): all the settlements are located in the heart of the city (mainly the Lyari area).

Group b): most bastis are located in the heart of the city (Lyari area); a few of the bastis are located just outside the heart (Haji Murid Goth, Ilyas Goth, Bakhshan Village).

Group c): Half of the bastis are located in the centre of the city; about half of the bastis are outside, but close to the centre

(Chanesar Goth, Taru Line, Jan Mohammad Goth, Dodha Goth).

One is located farther from the centre (Musa Goth).

Group d): Less than half of the bastis are located in the centre of the city; the other bastis are equally divided into a group that finds itself close to the centre (Old Golimar, Baluch Para, Bhutta Village, Gul Bhai Colony) and a group that is situated farther from the centre (Azim Khan Goth, Ibrahim Goth, Banguria Goth, Daulat Ram Mil Colony).

Group e): No centrally located basti is represented. Some of them are close to the centre (Sher Shah Goth, Raksar II); the rest are located far from the centre.

Group f): Three of the four bastis lie far from the centre of the city; one is more close to it.

Before we draw any conclusion from the above, we have to make some more remarks, in order to keep things in the right perspective.

- In Karachi, it is difficult to define what should be considered "the centre of the city". In the above, by "centre" we mean the area that was a built-up urban area before partition. Its boundaries can be roughly imagined with the help of the following landmarks: Seaport/Keamari, Lyari River Upstream until it meets Nishtar Road, Jacob Lines, Cantonment Station, Clifton.

- It should also be remembered that a number of the goths is of the "mixed" type, i.e. goths where outsiders have also settled. In some cases, the condition of the houses is improved by that fact (Haji Murid Goth, Ilyas Goth, Dodha Goth, several bastis of Lyari).


This last consideration especially implies a limitation to the clarity of the overall picture.

Even within this limitation, we may conclude that - generally speaking - there is a tendency for goths located closer to the centre of the city to contain higher percentages of houses in the "higher" categories. We may conclude that goths tend to get integrated into the city, as far as the condition of the houses is concerned.

As an illustration, we may present three diagrams, representing the condition of houses in bastis from Group a), Group c) and Group e) respectively.

PASTIS OF KARACHI
 PLOTS, ACCORDING TO % OF HOUSES OF TYPES IV, V AND VI

MAP IV



70% - 75% IV, V & VI

71% - 50% IV, V & VI


49% - 25% IV, V & VI

24% - 0% IV, V & VI

SCALE 0.75" = 1 MILE

PASTIS OF KARACHI
 PLOTS, ACCORDING TO % OF HOUSES OF TYPES IV, V AND VI

MAP IV




100% - 75% IV, V & VI

75% - 50% IV, V & VI

49% - 25% IV, V & VI

24% - 0% IV, V & VI

Graph VII.4.2. Condition of houses in goths at an increasing distance from the centre of the city.



Still, the picture is somewhat confused. For this reason, in map IV, representing the house conditions in goths, we have grouped the goths into larger groups (viz. of 100 - 75%, 74 - 50%, 49 - 25% and 25 - 0% houses in types IV, V and VI) so that the pattern may be optimally visible.

VII.4.1. Other criteria of integration.

In order to find more evidence about the degree of integration of the goths into the city, also in other respects, we have collected some data about one goth from each of the categories distinguished.

We assumed that the degree of integration might also show itself with the help of the following criteria: - % of inhabitants employed in (semi-) agricultural occupations.
- number of animals per head of households.

Table VII.4.1.1. shows the result of these attempts.

Table VII.4.1.1. Some possible indicators to the degree of integration into the city, of 6 goths in Karachi.

Name Goth	Group	Distance to CBD (bird's fl.) (miles)	Heads of household in (semi-) agr. occupations %	Animals per head of household n
Ismail Goth	f	3.2	52	0.04
Sher Shah Goth	e	2.4	38	3.5
Baluch Para	d	1.8	14	0.5
Taru Line	c	1.6	6	0.6
Zikri Para	b	1.6	9	0.06
Dhobi Ghat	a	1.4	3	0.3

From this table, we may see that indeed the percentages of heads of households engaged in (semi-) agricultural occupations roughly correlate with the distance from the central business district - as the percentages of houses (as expressed in group f) - a)) do -.

The other indicator does not show a very regular pattern, but seems to be dependent on circumstances characteristic of the particular goth.

Thus - for instance - Sher Shah Goth is quite specialized in cattle keeping; in Ismail Goth cattle can hardly be kept due to the condition of the soil.

It should be noted that the figures presented are meant as illustrations and partly support our finding that the goths tend to get integrated into the city the closer they find themselves to the centre.

As the figures regard a few goths selected as illustrative cases, not too much weight should be attached to any particular figures found.

Another indicator which we supposed might correlate with the degree of integration into the city is the time from which the inhabitants no longer perceive their goth as "countryside" - "dehat" - , but as part of the city. When interviewed on the subject, however, different informants from the same localities gave such different statements on the subject, that it was not possible to pinpoint even an approximate date for each of the goths. We tried one further approximation, namely the span of time since different facilities were introduced in the different goths. The data found on this subject, however, gives absolutely no support to our finding that goths in the subgroups a), b), etc. show an increasing degree of integration into the city. Some of the relatively peripheral goths had already received certain facilities long before partition; other, more centrally located goths got these facilities relatively late.

VII.5. Ilyas Goth, an example of a Karachi goth.

The history.

"I do not know the exact date when this area was inhabited, but the oldest stone on the graveyard is of 1801. That means it became inhabited little earlier. We (sic! JL) came here due to drought."

"Three persons from Makran (of whom the names are still known, JL) settled with their families. They put up around 25 jhuggis..... They selected the place because water was available from the river and jobs were available in the gardens."



views of Ilyas Goth.



"For water they dug out a well close to the river."

"Up to 1919, a majority of the people were working as mali (45) in the gardens. Then, the Ismaeli's, who were the owners of the gardens converted them into residential places slowly. Five years before partition there were only two gardens left."

"In early 1900 already, one of the original settlers built a oakka house for himself - he was the grandfather of Ilyas, after whom the village was called later on. He was also the one who invited many more Baluchis to settle here."

"As the gardens were converted into residential places, the malis engaged there, became jobless. Therefore, they started working as laborers in the market. Also, many of them started working in construction: they dug sand out of the riverbed and transported it to the places it was ordered."

"After partition, the then commissioner made a plan to settle Muhajirs here and the goth was included in his plan. They issued notices to us for the vacation of the land. Then, Ilyas filed a case and within two or three months, the High Court accepted (the principle of, J.L.) our right of ownership of the land."

Ilyas also arranged with KMC for a watertap, and after he was elected as KMC-counsellor, due to his efforts, KMC also sanctioned a sweeper for the area.

The first metalled road was built in 1967. Electricity came in 1969. The first beginning of a sewerage system was constructed along with the road in 1967. It is not yet complete. The number of watertape has greatly increased during recent years.

The inhabitants.

In the goth part of the locality, 100% of the inhabitants are Baluchis. Pathans and Panjabis have also settled, but live separately.

Still, from the 70 heads of households interviewed, 4 mali's were found and a remarkably high percentage of drivers (24%) which fact was attributed to sandloading and --carrying, to which professions many of the inhabitants belonged - and sometimes still are - after they lost their jobs in gardening.

In the 70 households interviewed, the total number of animals found is 29 only - all goats.

37% of the heads of households had been born in the goth. 33% live in their own, self-built or inherited, house.

46) mali - gardener.

Although the occupational structure hardly shows indications of rusticity, the atmosphere is very rustic indeed. Not only do the inhabitants know each other, but they also know who is whose son and grandson and they tell detailed stories about these - long dead - people.

The lay-out of the basti is completely unplanned, with huts and houses clustered so as to house groups of relatives. Everywhere there are trees in between houses and on compounds. Off the main road, no compound walls have been built. Many of the houses, when rebuilt or improved, have retained their traditional shape, with the pointed roof. 47).

- 47) In this and other short descriptions of individual bastis, we use data collected during our survey for the typology. Besides, from each of the bastis, we took a few (2 - 5) interviews to supplement our data. In addition, we collected some information by asking a few questions from a sample of the population. The samples were found in the same way as in the case of the house samples (cf. Appendix II). Quotations are from the interviews.
- It should be noted that in a number of cases some of the conditions in the basti had changed since we first visited the basti for the sake of the mere typology. Thus, sometimes, the basti we used as an illustration of a particular stage in development, has reached the next stage meanwhile.

CHAPTER VIII

ON THE TYPOLOGY OF BASTIS:
POST-PARTITION SETTLEMENTS, DEVELOPING.


"I may be arrested
I may be hit
I may not even
Have something to eat
But I won't change my opinion
I won't ever move from this hill.

If there is no water
I'll dig myself a well
If there is no meat
I'll buy a bone
And put it in the soup -
I'll get on, I'll get on.

They can say what they like
Here, I don't have to pay rent
If I die tomorrow morning
I'm very near the sky! ')

') A favela song from Brazil, by Zé Keti.
Quoted by A.A. Laquian, 1971.

GRAPH VIII.1.1. SECURITY LEVEL AND CONDITION OF HOUSES IN POST PARTITION SETTLEMENTS



numbers refer to the alphabetic list of basins in III.2.4

VIII.1. Post partition settlements.

In Graph VIII.1.1. the level of security and the index of the condition of the houses in post-partition settlements have been represented. The correlation between the two variables is again clearly visible and can be seen also when we pay attention to the average "index of the condition of the houses" in different security level categories, as represented in Table VIII.1.2.

Table VIII.1.2. Average index of house conditions, related to security level.

Number of hope providing items present	(N)	Average index of house conditions
4	28	+ 71
3	27	+ 27
2	36	- 19
1	79	- 78
0	20	-132

The figures presented in table VIII.1.2. are suggestive of a regular development of bastis from "transient tentative squatter settlements" to "complete semi-squatter settlements", as Turner has called them. 1). The term "semi" in "semi-squatter" here refers to the fact that the squatter, having obtained some recognition from the authorities' side, can hardly be called "squatter" any more. 2).

As we will show below, this regular development does take place on a large scale in Karachi. However, some bastis stagnate in their development. We suggest that the age of bastis can be a good criterion to see whether bastis are on the way towards (further) development or not. Stated in popular terms, one might say that nothing is wrong with a basti having an extremely low security level and very poor house conditions, as long as this basti is very young. However, when we find bastis with these characteristics (lower right corner of Graph VIII.1.1.) and which are -

1) Turner, J.F.C., 1969 - B.

2) C. Abrams gives a much narrower definition of the concept "semi-squatter", although the principle is the same: "A semi-squatter has surreptitiously built his hut on private land and subsequently come to terms with the owner. The semi-squatter - strictly speaking - has ceased to be a squatter and has become a tenant. In constructing his house, he usually flouts the building codes." (Abrams, C., 1964, p. 21).

say - 20 years old, we may conclude that for some reason or other, something is "wrong" with those bastis: there seems to be no development. Let us therefore subdivide the post-partition settlements into those bastis which follow the "regular" pattern of development, and those which do not.

VIII.2. Distinguishing developing and stagnating bastis.

As a principle, certain age limits should be set for each group of bastis, so as to see whether a particular basti fits into the broad category of bastis that follow the regular development pattern. In Graph VIII.2., the age of the different post-partition bastis is shown. At glance, one can see from this graph that although there is a correlation between age and level of security, there is a number of rather aged bastis that have not seen the level of security increasing during their existence (Bastis in the right upper corner). These are the bastis that evidently deviate from the regular development pattern. We suggest the following age limits - which we have chosen arbitrarily, on empirical grounds - to decide whether a basti fits in the type group with a regular development or not.

category 0 items: maximum age 5 years

category 1 item : maximum age 13 years

category 2 items: maximum age 19 years

category 3 items: no age limit

category 4 items: no age limit.

We have indicated these age limits as horizontal lines in Graph VIII.2. Thus, bastis older than these limits do not fit in the group of regularly developing bastis.

However, the standards of age have to be handled with some imagination: in fact, it is the combination of three variables (security, condition of houses and age) that decides whether a basti fits within this type-group. A good example to illustrate our point is Kashmir Colony (nr 129). This basti is 9 years old and still finds itself in the 0-item category. As such it does not fit in the typegroup we describe here. The index of the house conditions however, indicates that this basti progressing very well. In fact, because of the location of the basti, there are difficulties in obtaining water, but the residents are convinced they will eventually be provided with this facility. In this and similar cases, the index of the condition of the houses is decisive in the conclusion that the basti still

GRAPH VII.2. AGE OF BASTIS IN DIFFERENT SECURITY LEVEL CATEGORIES (POST PARTITION ONLY)

	4 ITEMS	3 ITEMS	2 ITEMS	1 ITEM	0 ITEMS
28	18 141 181	44 78 154 202	79 143 147 148 159 177 221	1 45 66 72 83 176 178 204 222	14 86 109 147 205
27	59 135 231		27 39 210 240	223 239 244	101
26	4 32 145 187	62 75	112		
25	80	73 91 120 151 224	115 249	114 119 163	93
24	217 220 246	175	43 206	200 203	
23	9 40 117 225	52 62 144	229	2 33	
22	250		37 71	81 190	
21	94 140 153		96 110	38 128	
20	11 138 247		134	191	
19				25	
18		10 46 111 122		170 171 197 234	
17			8 13 69 116	241	89 108
16				70 97	
15	185		67	28 63 131 174 213	
14			215 238	168	
13	162			5 68 104 182 195	
12			95	158 166 194	
11	12		48 186	29	21 193 212
10		88 139 152 209 235	233	50 183	
9		7		53 150 245	129 192
8			169	61 133	
7			155	3	
6				85 118 199 242	248
5		75 216	130	60 136 156 157	125
4				6 106 164 188	
3				16 35 102	31 198
2				58 64 165	
1				77 137 211 218 228 237	34

numbers refer to the alphabetic list of bastis in III.2.4

fits in the group of regularly developing bastis, although the age is "too high". Accordingly, we propose to keep colonies beyond the set age limits within the category of regularly developing bastis, provided the index of the condition of the houses exceeds the following minima:

category 0 items: - 60

category 1 item : - 10

category 2 items: - 10

(categories 3 and 4 items have no age limits)

The proposed limits have been indicated as interrupted horizontal lines in Graph VIII.1.1.

On the other hand, we will call bastis "developing" only, if the condition of the houses meets certain minimum criteria, which we have set as follows:

category 0 items: no minimum

category 1 item : no minimum

category 2 items: minimum index - 80

category 3 items: minimum index - 40

category 4 items: minimum index 0

These limits have been indicated in Graph VIII.1.1. as horizontal lines. The meaning of these lines is that bastis which find themselves below those lines, apparently have not developed physically to the extent that might be expected in regularly developing bastis.

It should be noted that all the proposed limits have been found on the basis of an arbitrary judgement of the position of bastis.

One might challenge a number of cases that occur close to the set limits on either side. Our purpose, however, is to point to certain tendencies, and as such, the type-group of developing bastis is readily identifiable, although a few marginal cases may be open to discussion, according to the standards one wishes to adopt.

A few examples may clarify how the decision is taken to include a basti in any particular group.

We have taken all the examples in the group of bastis with a security level "2 items", as in this group all the possible combinations of factors occur.

Example 1) Gharibabad (Lyari), age 17 years, house index - 119.

In Graph VIII.1.1., no 69 is under the index - 40 limit.

This means that the houses in the basti have not developed sufficiently to consider the basti as developing. The basti is stagnating.

Example 2) Sultanabad, age, 10 years, house index - 52.

In Graph VIII.1.1. no 233 is above the set minimum index of house conditions required.

In Graph VIII.2., it can be seen that no 233 is below the maximum age limit required to consider the basti as developing. The basti is developing.

Example 3) Jamhurya Colony II, age 21 years, house index + 4.
In Graph VIII.2., it appears that the basti (no 110) is too old to be considered as developing.
Yet, the index of the house conditions (viz. above the interrupted line in Graph VIII.1.1.) is high enough to consider this basti as developing.

Example 4) Rattan Talab, age 27 years, house index - 41.
From Graph VIII.2., it can be seen that the basti is too old to consider it as developing (no 210). The index of the house conditions is not high enough (below the interrupted line in Graph VIII.2.) to consider the basti still as developing. As a consequence, the basti will be typified as stagnating.

VIII.3. Developing bastis.

We will now see which of the bastis fall within the type-group of developing bastis, and what are their characteristics.

VIII.3.1. Developing bastis in security level group "0 items": tentative squatter settlements. 3).

The following bastis fit into this category:

Bhutto Colony (31)

Kakoos Colony (125)


Pathan Colony (Scheme 24) (198).

The diagram showing the condition of the houses in this group show one peak that is located at a house type inferior to type IV.

Two diagrams may illustrate this.

3) We have partly adopted Turner's terminology for naming the different types of developing bastis, Cf II.4.2.2.

Graph VIII.3.1. House conditions in Bhutto Colony and in Pathan Colony (Scheme 24). 4).



This is what very young bastis, without much security, look like: only a few inhabitants dare to build pakka. People are waiting - and fighting - for a sign from the authorities' side before improving further on their houses. As time passes, this fact by itself will be taken as a "sign", and the peak will tend to move from type I towards type IV.

VIII.3.1.1. Profile of a tentative squatter settlement: Pathan Colony (Scheme 24).

The history.

The basti is now four years old, although it appears that two or three Pathans have been living here for the last fifteen years.

People settled here because the location is close to a number of places of work: the University Campus, the Suigas transmission plant and a few factories (cement, textile) are close by.


Only one of our informants reaches his place of work by bus; no less than 23 reach it on foot, two work in the basti itself and one (a rickshaw driver) has his own rickshaw.

As the position of the land is somewhat uncertain, the inhabitants thought and still think that there is a fair chance the land may eventually be allotted to them: the place where the basti is built is just outside

4) One of the graphs shown as an illustration of the type of basti in this and the following paragraphs is of the basti we describe in more detail as an illustrative case.

The other graph (or graphs) we selected because we consider it represents its type well, just as we selected bastis for our case studies.

From Graph VIII.1.1., it can be seen that development of houses in a randomly chosen basti of a certain type does not necessarily represent an improvement compared with a randomly chosen basti of the preceding type. The averages calculated per type, however, clearly show an improvement from type to type (Cf table VIII.4.).



Pathan Colony (Sch.24).
Most houses are of mud
or stones.
There are no provisions
for water and sewerage.



the planned part of KDA scheme no 24.

Most of the inhabitants began by building houses of mud and/or stones, both materials being abundantly available near the colony.

Some have meanwhile converted (parts of) their kachcha houses into pakka ones. Most of them however are waiting for more security of tenure before daring to do so: "My employer offered me a loan to build my house, but I do not feel like doing so, because who knows whether tomorrow a bulldozer comes?"

Hope for security of tenure is somewhat enhanced since Mr X, a member of the National Assembly, who is living nearby, made efforts to get a watertap installed within a short distance of Pathan Colony, in which he succeeded.

Reportedly, the same Mr X. is also doing his best to obtain permission for the inhabitants to live here permanently. In this connection, Mr X also managed to get a minister of the Federal Government to visit the area.

The inhabitants.

The majority of the inhabitants are from N.W.F.P. (5); in addition there are a few Panjabis and Baluchis.

Most of the inhabitants were living in Karachi already before settling in this colony: only 5 out of our 27 respondents moved directly to this basti.

On average, the inhabitants have lived for fully 10 years in Karachi, including just over two and a half years in Pathan Colony.

It appears that all those who came from other parts of Karachi, had been bridgeheaders (i.e. the pioneers who try to establish an economic base in the city and who, at first, do not attach much priority to their abode or its environment, but rather to its location) in those other places and moved to Pathan Colony to find a potentially permanent place to live.

From the 22 respondents who came via other parts of Karachi, 13 had been living in rented dwellings, 1 in a dera (6), and 8 in their own house. Of these 8, five were evicted forcibly from a very illegal colony that no longer exists while two lived in mini-slums, which by their very nature "have little chance of having the land allotted" (7). Only one lived in

5) N.W.F.P. - North Western Frontier Province

6) dera - (litt.) dwelling, tent. Here used for a dwelling where single living men reside. For a more detailed description see van Pinxteren, 174-B.

7) van Pinxteren, T.E.L., 1974-A, p. 15.

his own house in a basti with good prospects for development, but his plot in Gauharabad (Dastgir) was very small ("tang") 8).

All the informants have (mostly regular) work. They see Pathan Colony as their final place of settlement in Karachi.

The difference with their previous situation is highlighted by the fact that here 23 out of the 27 informants live in their own houses.

24 of the respondents live here with their families, one lives alone and two interviewees live in small "dera" (2-and 3-person deras respectively), with relatives.

21 respondents built their houses themselves; 4 live in a rented house and 2 purchased theirs. The two houses bought belonged to people who went back to their home country - one because he lost his job in Karachi and one for family reasons. Regarding the rented houses, it is interesting to note that two of the "landlords" previously lived in their own house, but were offered quarters along with their job. Reportedly, both of them plan to live in their own house again once they finish the job which meanwhile entitles them to live in quarters. In one case, the landlord has built two houses on his plot, one of which he has rented out. In the fourth case a landlord who has never lived in the colony occupied a plot in order to earn income from it.

In general, the picture is one of a first step towards definitive settlement of migrants who have gone through the bridgeheader's stage. They have fixed jobs, they built their own houses, they have their families with them and they live conveniently close to their place of work. On the other hand, facilities are extremely poor and the security is still very low, so that most of the inhabitants hesitate to improve their houses. Still, as one informant put it: "This is a place of hope for the future."

VIII.3.2. Developing bastis in security level group "1 item": Provisional squatter settlements.

A large number of bastis fall within this category.

It is of relevance to distinguish here between two sub-groups.

As a matter of fact, in this category we find - as could be expected from a viewpoint of continuous development - a group of bastis that have developed to this type after having passed through the previous stage.

In addition to this group, we also find very young bastis that have missed

8) tang - contracted, narrow, tight, scanty.

the previous stage. The reason is that most young bastis of necessity are located at the periphery of the city. The farther the city extends, the more difficult it becomes to obtain water at the periphery. That is to say, going far beyond the officially recognized, planned parts of the city, it becomes impossible to obtain water in those parts. New bastis therefore tend to grow up nowadays only in those places where there is some provision for water.

Thus, a type comes into existence which at its very start has 1 item indicative of security, namely water. This type of basti does not begin from nothing, but starts one stage farther on.

We will therefore - within the group of developing bastis in security level group "1 item" - distinguish between those bastis that have developed from the previous stage towards this one and those bastis which began in this type.

VIII.3.2.1. Provisional squatter settlements with continuous development.

The following bastis belong in this type:

New Karachi E. (183)	Jinnah Hospital I (118)
Isa Negri (104)	Federal C. Area (Panjabi Para) (61)
Masum Shah Colony (158)	Mastan Colony (157)
Pirabad (199)	Bh. Para (Pahar Ganj) (29)
Pak Jamhurya Colony I (191)	Pathan Colony (197)
Mohammadi Line (163)	Mujahid Colony (Gujro Nala) (171)
Khalilabad (133)	Jehangirabad N. (114)
Afridi Colony (3)	Ajab Khan Colony (5)
Bilalabad (33)	Panjabi Para (Golimar) (194)
Suraj Colony (234)	Moosa Colony (166)
Machar Colony (150)	New Karachi N. (182)
Wahid Colony (245)	Paposh Nagar (195)
Gauharabad (Dastgir) (68)	Frontier Colony (63)
Umr Farooq Colony (242)	

Also these colonies show one peak in the diagrams indicating the condition of the houses. In 22 of the 27 cases, this peak is found at house-type IV, in three cases at type III and in two cases at type II.

The great majority of these colonies are reasonably well established settlements having much better housing conditions than in the previous type, viz. the tentative squatter settlements.

The level of facilities is still very low.


From the graphs which we will present below as illustrations, it can be readily seen that this type represents a succeeding stage, following from the earlier one whenever development is not hindered.

Even so, the security level is rather low and this may explain the fact that house type VI is hardly represented at all. In 17 out of the 27 cases, there is not a single house of type VI. In the 10 cases where type VI is found, it is represented very sparsely: 3% or less in 6 cases. Only in 4 cases did we find percentages of houses of type VI worth mentioning, varying from 5 - 13%.

Unlike the previous type, in this group house types I, II and III are present in smaller proportions.

Two graphs may illustrate our point.

Graph VIII.3.2.1. House conditions in Pirabad and Wahid Colony.



VIII.3.2.1.1. Profile of a provisional squatters settlement with continuous development: Wahid Colony.

The history.

The basti is now eleven years old, although according to some informants there had been a few jhuggis even before that time.

The inhabitants settled here because the place is conveniently located, regarding job opportunities and transport facilities: 36% of the informants in our sample reach their place of work on foot or by bicycle, and 35% by bus.

Moreover, the land was considered "faltu" ("spare"), as it is a long, narrow strip of sloping land alongside Gujro Nala, a watercourse.

However, one of the alternative plans for extension of the circular railway affects a part of the colony. This is probably one of the reasons KDA demolished the houses three times after people had just started living here. But every time the inhabitants rebuilt their houses again.



Wahid Colony.

Still many mudhouses can be found.
On photo 1, mark the house on the left, with a raised roof.
On photo 2, mark the simple open drain.

1.

2.



When again the population received orders from the Railway Department to move, they managed to get a stay order through the services of Mr X, a Labour Union President, who contacted the Governor on the issue. 9). Initially, water had to be obtained from private bungalows. Later, a contractor who built a nearby road, was paid to arrange a tap alongside that road, but KMC immediately disconnected this tap. The then commissioner was approached, but showed himself unable to do anything in the matter. Finally, a number of representatives from the Colony managed to convince KMC that the connection should be restored.

For a long time, the position of the colony has been very insecure and according to our informants, that is why hardly any house was built pakka before 1971. Even today, there is a feeling of insecurity: in 1973, KDA again requested that the land should be vacated, but again, Mr X intervened. Again through his influence, three more water taps were installed in 1973 and in 1975 permission was obtained for electricity connections.

Although the colony has to be considered still as temporary ("arizi" (10)), there is much more hope than previously that it may be regularized: through the services of the P.P.P.-office (11) of the area and of Mr X, two different provincial ministers, the chairman of P.P.P. Karachi, and a member of the Provincial Assembly took an interest in and visited the basti. This holds out better prospects for influencing decisions should the existence of the colony ever be threatened again.

The inhabitants.

The majority of the inhabitants are of Panjabi origin, but Pathans and Muhajirs also settled here.

Although many people settled in the colony straight after migration, the majority had been living in Karachi before (61%).

Of these, a majority had been paying rent (52%) and 38% had been living in a stagnating basti before moving to Wahid Colony.

At present, only 4% of the sample was found to live in a rented house and the majority live in owned, selfbuilt houses.

Almost all the informants live here with their families and have regular work. The turnover of population is low, as can be concluded from the fact that only 4% of the informants live in a rented house and only 3% purchased their houses. Moreover, in more than half of these cases, the previous owner or landlord still lives in Wahid Colony.

9) "Mr X." introduced may be different persons where different bastis are concerned.

10) 'arizi - temporary

11) P.P.P. - People's Party of Pakistan.

It seems that tenants and buyers mostly live on subdivided plots or in subdivided houses.

Generally speaking, this colony shows a picture of a basti that has made the first steps towards establishing itself: the first difficulties (attempts to evict and problems in obtaining some basic facilities) have been overcome and contacts with the authorities have been established to safeguard the basti against demolition, although there is no guarantee of permanency. Many of the inhabitants improved their condition by moving to Wahid Colony, having lived previously either as tenants or in a stagnating basti.

Here, they live in their own, selfbuilt houses, their families with them. They live in a convenient location and they have regular work.

They look forward to further improvements which they expect to come about in stages - as has been the case in the past - as a result of their own efforts (the expression "jidd-o-jahd" (12) was often used in this connection). Also in this connection, it is important to note that the inhabitants of Wahid Colony were, and are, well organized, previously in a "rabitah-committee", currently in the P.P.P. 13).

VIII.3.2.2. Provisional squatter settlements with initial partial development.

The following bastis belong in this category:

Mominabad (165)	Akhlaq Mohammad Colony (6)
Faqir Colony (58)	Farooq Colony (60)
Tauhid Colony (237)	Gabol Colony (64)
Reis Amrohi (211)	Shohada-e-Mashriq Nagar (228)
Khowaja Moinuddin Colony (137)	Ghaziabad (77)
Data Nagar (50)	Islam Nagar (106)
Iqbal Baluch Colony (102)	Nusrat Bhutto Colony (188)
Khowaja Gharib Nawaz Colony (136)	Salimabad (218)
Hafizabad (85)	Bismillah Colony (35)
Aziz Colony (16)	Maghdum Shah Colony (156)
Mohammad Nagar (164)	

The average age of these colonies is 3.2 years. 14). All of them are found at the periphery of the city, mainly in Orangi, Baldia, Pahar Ganj.

The diagrams of the condition of the houses show a very peculiar pattern,

12) jidd-o-jahd - effort, hard labour, struggle

13) rabitah - connection, liaison

14) as compared to an average of 12.6 years in the previous group.

having two peaks, just as we found in the case of pre-partition settlements. Also the distribution of houses over the different types is much wider than in the former category and resembles the distribution in the pre-partition settlements. Remarkably, in 10 out of 21 cases, house type VI is represented, and although it is found mostly in low percentages only, it is a fact worth noting in view of the very young age of these bastis. Other colonies of the same security level which are much older show houses in type VI much less frequently (cf. previous paragraph). The occurrence of house type VI is indicative of a level of security higher than one might expect on the basis of the age and the one item present. Probably, it is the location, far from the city which enhances its security. Also the fact that great masses of people move to these colonies may give them a feeling of security.

"Everybody knows that no one is going to touch the lakhs (15) of inhabitants of Orangi" (interview in Shohada-e-Mashriq Nagar).

The most important fact however is that these colonies come about with a kind of unofficial recognition. The fact that from the very beginning, there is provision for water, is only one aspect of this.

All the colonies of this type have a remarkably sophisticated lay-out: lanes are wide and straight, plots are of equal size and in several cases there are even provisional roundabouts at road-crossings situated far away in the desert.

The way in which this unofficial recognition comes about may differ from case to case, but a common trait is that the colonization is organized and that the organizers obtain indications from the official side that they will not be disturbed.

"So long as they are able to approve the choice of a site, and thus prevent valuable industrial or middle class residential land from being spoiled, the authorities believe that a well executed invasion relieves them of many of the burdens they would have to assume were they to take direct responsibility for the housing problem.

Except for the actual value of the land itself, an invasion costs the government nothing. It is not called upon to develop and administer the settlement, and it is not required to supply architects, contractors, or social workers.

Moreover, the government does not become involved in the delicate controversies that develop regarding the distribution of land, the quality of the terrain and the prices charged by speculators. In addition, since it assumes no responsibility for the barrio's existence, it is not committed to providing community improvements immediately." 16).

15) lakh - 100.000

16) Ray, T.F., 1969, pp 42-43.

"Let them organize the job; I cannot compete with the Pathans."
(from an interview with an officer of KDA, regarding Orangi)

For their part, the organizers see to it that the colonies are laid out properly. Mostly they also manage to arrange for water and transport, the two factors indispensable for living somewhere in the desert, far from the city. The system, in whatever shape, seems to be universal: it resembles the "barriada" of Lima which Turner describes (17) and in Algeria, the "bidonville suburbain" exhibits the same traits. 18). These colonies attract many people from other bastis, who have established themselves in the city and can afford to live at greater distances from their jobs than the newcomer to the city.

"If I had a fixed job ("pakki naukari"), I would not mind, out as I have no fixed job, therefore I want to live in the centre of the city" (interview in Naddiabad).19).

"A man comes alone and plans to go back to his village after some time. But slowly he gets used to Karachi. It becomes his own country ("mulk" 20)). If he finds a fixed job and he has no more fear (i.e. when he feels well established, J.L.), he calls his family and looks for a decent place to live." (interview in Frontier Colony).

"In the beginning, there is need for work; later, there is need for a place" (interview in Nusrat Shutto Colony).

"Once we settle here, then we stay here" (interview in Bilalabad).

"Here even live people who previously lived much closer to their jobs." (interview in Bh. Para, Pahar Ganj).

This is in accordance with Turner's theory about the shifting of priorities from location, via tenure to amenity along with the degree of being established in the city and along with the income of the migrant. 21). In the Karachi situation, van Pinxteren established a pattern of intra-city migration which he described as follows:

"Karachi... (has).... the shape of an open hand. To describe migration movements with the help of this image, we can say that most of the movement takes place from the palm of the hand to the tips of the fingers." 22).

Except for the one case which we will describe below, we have no figures on this migration, but it is known from many interviews and observation that many people from Lyari have migrated to Baldia, Orangi and the places in between. Many former residents of Haji Murid Goth now live in Pahar Ganj.

17) Turner, J.F.C., 1968.


18) Descloitres, R., J.C. Reverdy and C. Descloitres, 1961, p. 71.

19) naukari - service, employment, post.


20) mulk - country, region.

21) Turner, J.F.C., 1968.

22) van Pinxteren, T.E.L., 1974-C, p. 32.



"....families living in a reed jhuggi in a corner of the plot. In the other corner, a start is made to build a pakka house."







All this can explain the peculiar pattern of the condition of houses in the colonies we deal with in this paragraph. The colonies have a relatively high level of security. They attract people who have established their position in the city and who attach some priority to a good place to live. They plan to stay in that place for the foreseeable future, and to build a permanent house there. For the most part they can also afford to build such a house, although many make use of the opportunity to temporize the building of their house. This temporizing, however, is effected by building parts of the house in the required shape, rather than by staged improvements in the materials the house is built of. Instead of a development from a reed jhuggi to a mud house thence to a house of concrete blocks, here we see a development where (e.g.) first the reed jhuggi is being surrounded by a compound-wall of concrete blocks, secondly the walls of the house are rebuilt with concrete blocks, and finally, the reed roof is replaced by an asbestos sheet roof. In these circumstances, in view of the high security level, there is no need to adjust the house all the time and keep it at an assumed optimal level (a balance between the requirements of the family and the security level), therefore either straight away the inhabitants build pakka houses, or they start living in a provisional jhuggi and build pakka when they have the opportunity (time, money). The stages in between house type I (or II) and IV are mostly avoided.

Quite often we noticed in these colonies that families were living in reed jhuggis in a corner of their plot. In the other corner, a start had been made on building a pakka house. In some of such cases, we even noticed R.C.C. pillars being constructed to support eventually a second storey for such a house. (Nusrat Bhutto Colony, Parts of Orangi).

We may suppose that large parts of (e.g.) Baldia - which now is hardly represented in this group of bastis - have borne these characteristics a number of years back. In due time, the houses of types I - III disappear and superior houses take their places, so that the remarkable profile of the diagrams disappears with time.

Graph VIII.3.2.2. gives some illustrations of typical profiles of house conditions in provisional squatter settlements with a start in their development.

Graph VIII.3.2.2. House conditions in Khowaja Moinuddin Colony, Data Nagar, Akhlaq Mohammad Colony and Faqir Colony.



VIII.3.2.2.1. Profile of a provisional squatter settlement with initial partial development: Faqir Colony.

The history.

Some 7 or 8 years ago, a dervish lived in this part of the desert between Baldia and Orangi. He probably had good contacts with the authorities:


"Being a dervish, it was easy for him to call on the minister and high officials."

After some years, he started laying out roads and plots and sold the plots, for Rs 25/-- each. The money was used for leveling the land and for building a mosque. According to one informant, the dervish only acted as a middleman between the squatters and the authorities at different levels. He had to pay them their share for obtaining their silent consent to the areas being settled. The same system was reported several times in different bastis of Orangi and other bastis of the same type and on some occasions, even details were given regarding the way the money was divided among interested parties. There is thus some reason to believe that this is what actually happened. Moreover this does not exclude the probability that the dervish also kept money to



Faqir Colony.

The lay-out is planned.
Mark the mix of huts and
pakka houses, and the un-
inhabited plots on the two
upper photos.



build a mosque.

Many Baluchis from Lyari came to settle, either voluntarily, or when their houses had to be demolished for widening of roads. It is said that they were advised from official sources to settle here.

Pathans and Panjabis also started to settle. Most of the settlers (approximately 70%) came from "average" - i.e. not stagnating, - bastis. In addition a number of basti dwellers bought plots without settling on them, either for speculative reasons or to keep the plot as safety in case they should be forcibly evicted.

In this context, it is interesting to note that in Usmania Mahajir Colony some inhabitants were reported to be owners of plots in Orangi or New Karachi, but as long as they are allowed, they prefer to stay where they live at present. 23).

Quite soon, the dervish managed to arrange for water tankers from KDA. According to the one informant referred to above, obtaining an arrangement for water is part of the deal the middleman makes. Again this system was confirmed in interviews elsewhere.

"Nobody can attract settlers when there is no provision for water and transport; thus the Pathans organize all this before a new basti is created." (interview Akhlaq Mohammad Colony).

An anjuman was created shortly after the first settlers had come. The anjuman started spreading rumors and even issuing notices against absent plot-owners. As a result many more people actually came to live in the colony.

Soon afterwards, the president of the anjuman approached a friend of his, who is the chairman of a transport association and he also approached the then minister of transport personally. As a result, bus and minibus services were extended to Faqir Colony.

The Anjuman which meanwhile had transformed itself into a local branch of the P.P.P. had also approached KDA for construction of roads and for allotment. Although initially, KDA refused, saying that the area was outside the boundaries of its planned schemes, on the orders of the provincial Prime Minister, KDA made a survey for legalization in 1974. Thanks to the recommendation of a provincial minister, KESC has agreed to electrify the area. Application forms to that end have already been distributed.

23). van der Linden, J.J., 1973-A, p. XIX.

The inhabitants.

Although on the outskirts of the city, Faqir Colony is favourably located as it is not far from the main industrial area SITE. 24).

A quarter of the population reach their places of work on foot or by bicycle. The residents can be divided into three ethnic groups of approximately equal size: Baluchis, Pathans and Panjabis. A few Mahajirs have also settled amongst them.

The great majority of them live in their own, self-built houses (70%). Yet, it is surprising to note that in this very young colony, 10% of the population live in bought houses. This fact may be interpreted as an indication that speculation is taking place in the colony.

Also the fact that 12% of the houses in the sample were not occupied at the time of the research can be partly explained in this way.

Of the owners of houses let and of the previous owners of houses sold, only 14% live in Faqir Colony. Many more of them moved to other, mostly more centrally located bastis of Karachi (36%). Some returned to their places of origin.

Very few settlers came straight to this basti after migration, still fewer came from stagnating bastis. A majority (\pm 70%) came from "normal" bastis, mostly located towards the centre of the city.

Previously, 53% of them had been tenants. Now, only 5% of the inhabitants of Faqir Colony live in rented houses.

Fully 95% of the residents live here with their families.

The occupational profile indicates that most residents must be relatively well off financially: 34% belong to the groups "skilled labourers", "professionals and technicians", "administrators and managers" and "clerical workers", only 3% salesworkers were found. Of course, the location of the basti does not invite many salesworkers. But the same can be said about Pathan Colony (Scheme 24), where 15% were salesworkers, mostly hawkers. 25).

This was also confirmed in interviews:

"People come to this place via the city. Those who have employment (naukari) and livelihood (rozi), come here."
(interv.) 26).

In conclusion, Faqir Colony exemplifies a basti that started with a sort of unofficial, but quite reliable sanction from the authorities' side. Here, attempts were never made to evict the inhabitants, nor is

24) SITE - Sindh Industrial Trade Estate

25) For more explanation on the position of salesworkers, cf. IX.3.3.

26) rozi - daily sustenance, livelihood.

this expected to happen in the future. Facilities are being supplied surprizingly quickly.

The lay-out of the basti is extremely good: the whole area is divided into rectangular blocks with wide streets in between. Everywhere cars, and even lorries can easily pass. In all probability, this was achieved in unofficial consultation with the authorities concerned. Again this was confirmed in other bastis of the same type.

It is no wonder, that the colony attracts settlers of the upper low-income group, who have become integrated in the city with contacts and a fixed job and who want to improve their living conditions, either by moving to a more spacious site than the inner city can offer, or by changing from a rented house to owner-occupation. Not surprizingly too, prices of land and of houses go up very quickly in this colony, especially as the provision of water, transport and electricity improves. This is also why some speculators are attracted to invest in this kind of basti. However, the great majority of the plot owners apparently are not speculators.

In connection with speculation, it is of interest to note the development of prices of 80-square-yard plots in one comparable basti of Orangi:

January 1974 : Rs 10.--

July 1974 : Rs 55.--

November 1974 : Rs 160.--

July 1975 : Rs 400.-- to Rs 500.-- (including a reed jhuggi, worth an estimated Rs 125.--)

VIII.3.3. Developing bastis in security level group: "2 items": Incipient squatter settlements.

Here again, it is relevant to distinguish between those bastis with continuous development and those that had a "start" from the beginning.

VIII.3.3.1. Incipient squatter settlement with continuous development.

The following bastis belong in this category:

Hijrat Colony (95)	Nishtar Basti (186)
T. & T. Colony (238)	Sultanabad (233)
Jilalabad (116)	Jehangirabad S. (115)
Chhota Maidan (43)	Akramabad (8)
Jamhurya Colony II (110)	Sikandarabad (229)
Shah Nawaz Bhutto Colony (221)	Rudad Nagar (215)
Lower Gizri (148)	Leprosy Colony (143)

Azam Nagar (13)

Gizdarabad (79)

Hill Area (96)

Zaidabad (249)


Gauharabad (Sabzi Mandi) (67)

Khamosh Colony II (134)

Darbar Colony (48)

This group of bastis is the logical successor to the former stage which we described in VIII.3.2.1., viz. the provisional squatter settlements with continuous development. All the bastis show one peak in the diagram of house conditions, and the peaks are found at house-type IV in all cases. House types I, II and III are less represented; types V and VI are slightly better represented here than in the previous stage. Two diagrams may illustrate this point.

Graph VIII.3.3.1. House conditions in Akramabad and Rudad Nagar.



The picture is one of well established bastis, where the poor house-types have almost disappeared. Even so, house-type VI is poorly represented.

VIII.3.3.1.1. Profile of an incipient squatter settlement with continuous development: Rudad Nagar.

The history.

The basti is now 15 years old. The first few settlers occupied the land and sold out plots. The newly arrived inhabitants built reed huts which were bulldozed and rebuilt two or three times. Again, in 1966, KDA ordered the residents to vacate the area and started demolition of the jhuggis. Then the leaders of the colony approached Mr X., who obtained a Stay Order from the court. The case was finalized in favour of the residents after three years.

Mr X. is also reported to have contacted the magistrate who used his influence to get two water taps installed in Rudad Nagar, in 1966. On different occasions, in 1966, 1967 and 1968, fire broke out in the basti. This attracted the attention of the authorities: after the first fire and the then Commissioner of Karachi arranged for a sum of Rs 100/--



Rudad Nagar. No more mudhouses are left.



for each of the 55 families affected. Reportedly, most of the money was misappropriated by one of the leaders. After a second fire, different political parties distributed food, beds and cash among the affected people.

After the third fire, in 1968, the then commissioner came to see what had happened. He advised the residents to build pakka houses in order to avoid further fire damage in the future.

The commissioner also promised the residents that they would be allotted the land and sanctioned four more watertaps for the colony.

For the rest, things remained as they were, although in 1969, an attempt was made to promote the welfare of the colony through a political leader who addressed a public meeting in Rudad Nagar.

In 1972, KDA again issued notices to vacate the land within 15 days.

Then, Mr Y, a close friend of one of the provincial ministers, took an interest in it and contacted the minister concerned with the case through his friend. The minister concerned was not at that time aware of the notices issued. He immediately procured a Stay Order.

Afterwards, a press conference was organized and a meeting held in which the provincial minister, a labour leader, representatives of the local anjuman and KDA officers participated.

This meeting was concerned with the lay-out and the rates to be charged for land when the colony should be authorized, but no compromise could be reached. Therefore, a memorandum was submitted to the then prime minister of Sindh, who promised to solve the problems.

In 1973, the Sindh Cabinet Subcommittee decided in a meeting that Rudad Nagar should be regularized, and the minister concerned ordered KDA to survey the area.

Meanwhile, a plan has been prepared in which there are provisions for the widening of some of the streets. The inhabitants, however, argue that the area is small and that they are not interested in the widening of streets. Moreover, they do not know which streets are to be widened, nor which and how many houses would be affected.

Electricity connections were provided from 1972 onwards.

The level of security of tenure has gradually increased to quite a high level. Although it is not yet known what will happen to individual houses, there is hardly any fear that the basti itself will be destroyed.

In spite of this: "Previously, we had won a case, and still after that we received notices from KDA. I do not believe anything until

the lease paper is in my own hands." (interview).

The basti is well located regarding job opportunities and transport: 22% of the informants reach their place of work walking or by bicycle; 43% go by bus.

The inhabitants.

The inhabitants of Rudad Nagar show a wide variety of ethnic origins. In our sample, the Panjabis score 42%, Muhajirs 30% and Pathans 21%; Bengalis and Baluchis were found in small numbers.

About one third of the residents settled in Rudad Nagar immediately on moving to Karachi, the others had already lived in Karachi before - about half of them in a stagnating basti, and over 60% of them in rented houses. In Rudad Nagar, now only 21% of the population lives in rented accommodation.

Although a few deras are found in the colony, the great majority of the population lives there in families.

A surprisingly low percentage of the inhabitants live in own, self-built houses (30%), and many of them have bought the houses they presently live in (39%). The turnover of population, however, has not been extremely large: over 40% of the landlords of rented houses and of previous owners who sold houses still live in the colony.

Apparently, many plots were subdivided by the original occupants.

Another 30% or more of landlords/previous owners migrated back to their own region ("mulk"). Only a few of them moved to other parts of Karachi. We may conclude that Rudad Nagar to most of its inhabitants is a place for permanent settlement. 27).

This colony illustrates the well established basti, where there is good hope for legalization. All initial problems have been overcome.


The basic facilities are amply available and the residents expect that further facilities will be provided. Our informants expressed their need to obtain connections to a sewerage system and to the suigas network. Representatives of the area try to keep in contact with KDA and other authorities in order to get the land allotted, to modify plans which are not in line with the population's requirements and to obtain facilities. Typically, discussions are no longer about moving or staying, but now concern details of the execution of regularization.

Many of the residents have improved their situation by moving to Rudad Nagar, having lived previously in rented houses or in stagnating bastis.

27) From this and other bastis, no information could be obtained about those who possibly owned the house before the "previous owners".



Mujahid Colony (Jail-Drigh Rd.). Mark the much improved houses and an open drain.



Here, they live with their families, in a conveniently located place that has prospects for further development without much threat of being disturbed by attempts at forced eviction.

VIII.3.3.2. Incipient squatter settlements with initial partial development.

There are only three bastis in this category, viz.

Manzoor Colony (155)


Kashimiri Town (130)

Mujahid Colony (Jail Drigh Road) (163)

The diagram of the house conditions in these colonies no longer show the peculiar pattern typical of the previous stage, viz. the provisional squatter settlements with initial partial development: houses of types I - III have almost disappeared. These bastis can be categorised only by knowing their history. The fair lay-out, typical of all bastis with initial partial development, suggests that there is something special about these bastis.

Houses of types V and VI show a relatively high frequency, especially in view of the young age of these bastis (average age 6.6 years, as compared to an average of 19.5 years in the comparable group of bastis with continuous development). A few diagrams may again illustrate this.

Graph VIII.3.3.2. House conditions in Manzoor Colony and in Mujahid Colony (Jail-Drigh Road).



VIII.3.3.2.1. Profile of an incipient squatter settlement with initial partial development: Mujahid Colony (Jail-Drigh Road).

The history.

During the floods of 1967, the areas around Tin Hatti, Sabzi Mandi and the Central Jail were badly affected. The then commissioner of Karachi came to inspect the situation and was very much impressed. He dictated orders on the spot, including an application for allotment of land to the people affected. Next day he came again and told the people that

there was a place for them to dwell: the place on which Mujahid Colony is now built. About 600 families moved into this newly created colony. Initially, objections were raised by the cement factory close by which claimed the land. A court case on the matter was decided against the cement factory. From that moment onwards the inhabitants had no more fear of being evicted and started building pakka houses.

Water was brought in by trucks, and no other facilities were given to the residents, who - in the beginning - lived in reed jhuggis. Nor were any steps actually taken to allot the plots to their occupants.

Although public meetings were organized in honour of different leaders and ministers, for a long time no approval was given for a water connection. 28).

In 1974, again such a meeting was held in honour of a minister of the Central Government. This minister finally sanctioned water connections and in the same year he performed the opening ceremony of the first public tap. Also in 1974, electricity connections were installed.

Different provincial ministers have - on different occasions - made speeches in the basti, in which they promised full regularization. Also the Cabinet Sub-Committee decided that this colony should be regularized. However, in this respect, no further action has been taken as yet.

From the beginning, the lay-out of the basti has been kept in good order: streets are straight and wide.

Although on the outskirts of the city, the location of the colony is acceptable. Close by is a cement factory and several institutions of the Cantonment Board, both places of work to a number of inhabitants of Mujahid Colony.

Of the sample population 27% reach their places of work on foot or by bicycle.

The inhabitants.

The bulk of the population consists of Panjabis (44%), followed by Muhajirs (20%), Pathans (15%), Sindhis (5%) and Baluchis (2%).

29) In several cases, in the history of bastis, meetings and official ceremonies play an important role.

Their function is at least threefold:

- a) The popularity of the guest of honour is often enhanced.
- b) The lengthy procedures in the administration can sometimes be cut short by "orders on the spot".
- c) The legal status of the basti and its chance of obtaining certain rights or facilities is often enhanced.

In X.4.1., such a meeting is partly described.

Previously, there were also many Bengalis, but most of them have meanwhile migrated to Bangla Desh.

In this basti, quite a large number of people settled straight after migration to Karachi (27%), but they - in general - do not live in their own houses but in rented ones. The proportion of tenants in our sample reaches 34%.

Reportedly, many people managed to get hold of more than one plot at the time of settling. One person is known to have occupied no less than 15 plots. Also, when many Bengalis left, others took possession of their plots.

Most of these plots are let out on rent or are kept vacant for speculative purposes: 15% of the plots and houses in the sample were found to be unoccupied. Therefore, there is opportunity for newcomers to Karachi to rent a house.

From observation and interviews, we know that only very few plots were subdivided. Even so, fully 50% of the previous owners of plots sold and of landlords of rented plots live in the Colony.

As many of the inhabitants are in the army (the name Mujahid Colony is derived from this (29)), some of them also have the opportunity of living in Army quarters and have let their houses on rent. Hardly any of the previous owners/landlords left the colony for another basti.

Little over one third of the population came to Mujahid Colony after having lived in a stagnating basti; about one fifth came from "normal" bastis. In conclusion, Mujahid Colony again is an example of a basti that started with a kind of official sanction. Although this sanction was initially challenged by a private firm, it was supported and confirmed by the authorities.

The lay-out of the basti is good: in most of the streets motor vehicles can easily pass.

Never at any time had the authorities tried to evict the inhabitants. Except for water, facilities were provided only slowly.

As the whole basti came about as an instant development in an emergency situation, it did not attract people from all over the city, but a group of flood-affected people from stagnating bastis formed the core of the first settlers.

Many of these settlers saw a chance for speculation by occupying more than one plot, so that letting and selling of plots occurred frequently, even though few of the original inhabitants have left the colony.

Due to the influx of tenants, the basti as a whole does not show so
29) Mujahid - warrior (in the defence of true faith), crusader.

markedly the pattern typical of "improvers", people of higher low income groups, who have started living in their own house.

When the newcomer-renters are excluded from our sample, this pattern again emerges.

VIII.3.4. Developing bastis in security level group "3 items": incomplete semi-squatter settlements.

Again, in this group, a distinction can be made between the bastis that took off with a start and those which developed continuously.

VIII.3.4.1. Incomplete semi squatter settlements with continuous development.

The following bastis belong to this category:

Madina Colony (Love Lane) (151)	Nafisabad (175)
Gharib Nawaz Colony (73)	Johar Colony (91)
Hassan Colony (25)	Firdos Colony (52)
Haroonabad (90)	Ghāusia Colony (75)
Chittagong Colony (44)	Sheds (224)
Siddomal (28)	


These bastis also show one peak in the graph of house conditions; in two cases, this peak is found at house type V, for the rest it is found at type IV.

Again, compared with the previous stage, viz. the incipient squatter settlements with continuous development, this category is a step forward in development. Although the percentages scored are not very high, house-type VI is now represented in 10 of the 11 bastis in this group.

Percentages scored by house types I - III are again lower, and the categories beyond type IV score higher than in the previous group.


Two diagrams may illustrate our point.

Graph VIII.3.4.1. House conditions in Siddomal and Johar Colony.





1.



Several houses have been plastered with cement. On photo 2, mark the manhole of the piped water system; beside it is a cover of a soakpit.

On photo 3, mark the cemented part of the street and the open drain.

Johar Colony.

2.



3.

VIII.3.4.1.1. Profile of an incomplete semi squatter settlement with continuous development: Johar Colony.

The history.

Johar Colony became inhabited in 1950, when a number of Muhajirs who were living in the centre of the city (Ranchore Lines, amongst other places) in a provisional way (often as pavement dwellers), shifted to the then open site which is now the basti. One attraction of the place was that it was close to the industrial area (SITE) that came into being during the same period. Also at present, about one quarter of the inhabitants of Johar Colony reach their places of work on foot or by bicycle; 57% go by bus.

The whole area around, however, was empty waste land and there were no facilities or even transport at the time the basti was created.

In the beginning, the inhabitants used brackish water obtained from a well, which they dug themselves.

There was also a fear of robbers, one reason why the first settlers tried to attract more people to the colony, thus increasing their own safety by the number of settlers. The police had order to demolish every jhuggi, but demolition took place only on rare occasions. It is interesting to see how the new squatters solved the problem:

"He (the policeman in charge, JL.) was carrying out surprise visits to see the new jhuggis..... The newcomers brought old reed mats. These were used for making outside walls and the new mats were used inside - just to give it the appearance of an old jhuggi. Those who were not able to bring old mats, dipped the new mats in a mixture of mud and water. All the jhuggis were constructed during the night and in the morning we had to give Rs 5/-- or Rs 10/-- to the police." (interview).

After about two years, an anjuman was created one of the members of which was a friend of the then Prime Minister's private secretary. A ceremony was organized in which this secretary promised to get the land allotted and to arrange for water and other facilities. As a result, KMC started providing water by tanker from 1954 onwards. Moreover, KMC never took steps to evict the population after the ceremony. The water carriers who distributed water in the area managed to make an arrangement with the KMC staff to double the officially sanctioned quantity of water.

Around 1960, Mr X., who was a chamchah of two ministers, arranged for three community water taps and one year after, electricity connections were also sanctioned. From this time onwards, the inhabitants started to build their houses pakka. Many plots were subdivided and sold or let on rental as the area attracted more and more people. When rebuilding of

houses took place, often the width of the streets and lanes decreased, so that - at places - the lay-out of the basti has become somewhat problematic. This fact has caused fear that many houses would be affected in the event of full regularization.

A plan for the regularization of the colony has been submitted by the anjuman in 1959 and KMC's reaction was favourable, but no solution could be reached when the price of land was discussed. As a result, the population became divided into two groups, and even the anjuman split. The leaders have left the basti, and neither anjuman is active any longer. When the P.P.P. came to power, Mr Y., a provincial minister, visited the colony several times and promised better facilities. Since then the number of taps has further increased, and recently a start has been made on laying sewers. There is confidence now that the basti will be regularized, subject to adjustments in streets and lanes. Such adjustments may affect quite a number of houses.

The population is no longer very active in organized efforts to obtain improvements.

The inhabitants.

Even today, the majority (65%) of the inhabitants are Muhajirs, but Pathans and Panjabis have also settled in the basti.

40% of the inhabitants settled straight after migration to Karachi in Johar Colony; around one third moved to this place from a stagnating basti, either because they were forcibly evicted or moved voluntarily. Another 30% of the population settled here after having lived in an other basti of Karachi, often in the centre of the city, e.g. in parts of Lyari. Those who had already lived in Karachi, were often owners of their houses (53%). In the present situation of Johar Colony, there are 64% owners-occupiers. Nevertheless, we may conclude that the majority of the residents improved their situation upon moving to Johar Colony, as many of them came from stagnating bastis. Usually it is the newcomers, those who settled directly in the basti upon migration, who live in rented houses.

Almost all the inhabitants live here in families (95%).

Of the total population 43% live in their own, self-built houses and the number of tenants is quite high (35%). However, the turnover of population has not been extremely large, in view of the fact that 43% of the previous owners of houses sold and of the landlords of houses let, still live in the basti. Of those leaving, 16% moved back to their homeland, and 41% to

other bastis, mostly located farther from the city centre (Orangi), where apparently the previous Johar Colony inhabitants found more opportunities to improve their situation.

"This place is somewhat crowded. Thus, people who first had subdivided their plots, later on - when they became better-off financially - moved to more spacious places." (interview)

Moreover, it should be noted that this relates to no more than about one fifth of the population, so that Johar Colony can be still considered a place of permanent settlement for the majority of its population.

In conclusion, Johar Colony exemplifies a basti of semi-squatters: the inhabitants are confident they will not be evicted. Their struggle for further improvements (security, facilities) has almost ended. Typically, there is no more anjuman to take care of matters of the basti, although the P.P.P. is active. But this party works in a larger area, of which Johar Colony is only a part. Further development would probably affect the lay-out of the basti - therefore not many people are interested.

Moreover, in the event of full recognition of the right to dwell here and provision of all facilities, the population would have to pay for rights and services they are now getting almost free.

Those who are interested in and can afford, further improvements, move to other bastis. However, the colony is located conveniently and is reasonably well serviced, so understandably the majority of the residents stay where they are and do not care too much about further improvements.

VIII.3.4.2. Incomplete semi-squatter settlements with initial partial development.

As was the case with the incipient squatter settlements with initial partial development, house-types I -III are only sparsely represented, and the diagrams of house conditions do not show the pattern we found in the comparable bastis two stages earlier, although the distribution of houses over the different types is often remarkably wide.

Therefore, again, only by knowing the history of the colonies, can it be decided whether a particular basti should be considered to have taken off with a start. In this group of bastis, this decision was sometimes difficult to take, as the (by definition unofficial) sanction given was of a very arbitrary nature in some cases. Besides, many of these bastis are older than the previous types, so that tracing the history is also more difficult.

A good example of this problem is given by Liaqat Ashraf Colony, of which

the history will be extensively described in Chapter X.

We have, in this case, considered the sanction given for the occupation of Liaqat Ashraf Colony as serious enough to include this basti in the group that is typified by a "start", although - contrary to previously described "start-types" - attempts were made to evict the inhabitants of Liaqat Ashraf Colony (Cf Chapter X).


We have included the following bastis in this category:


Jam Nagar (111)	Rashidabad (209)
Chorwarh Colony (46)	Swat Colony (235)
Kokan Colony (139)	Saeedabad (Baldia) (216)
Liaqat Ashraf Colony (144)	Delhi Colony (52)
Haji Qasim Colony (89)	Junaghar Mahallah (122)
Madina Colony (Baldia) (152)	Anjam Colony (10)
Ghaus Nagar (75)	Akhtar Colony (7)

Although the frequencies of houses of different types do not show the jump from the previous stage one might expect, the tendency is clear. House type I has almost completely disappeared. However, types II and III score higher and type V scores lower than in the previous category, contrary to what one might expect. It should be noted, however, that the group "incipient squatter settlements with initial partial development" - i.e. the previous group, with which we compare this group - consist of three bastis only, so that slight deviations in the averages do not necessarily contradict the tendency found that bastis do develop with time. Rather these slight deviations can be attributed to chance. Indicative of the general tendency also is the fact that the average scored by house type VI is now 12, as compared with 4.7 in the group of bastis representing the previous stage.

A few examples may again illustrate our point.

Graph VIII.3.4.2. House conditions in Ghaus Nagar, and Swat Colony.





1.



2.

Swat Colony.

Mark the de-aeration pipes or soakpits
on photo 1.

VIII.3.4.2.1. Profile of an incomplete semi-squatter settlement with initial partial development: Swat Colony.

The history.

Swat Colony was first inhabited around 1963. Some other parts of Baldia had been inhabited a few years earlier in some cases with a very reliable sanction: (New) Anjam Colony had started five years earlier, when jhuggi dwellers from Wazir Mansion had been issued with written permission to live there after fire had destroyed their previous basti. Other people had been moved from Mahajir camp, a nearby basti that was affected by the extension of a military air base, to Delhi Colony and a few other bastis of Baldia. Although in the beginning no permission was given to dwell permanently in these places, and especially those people who had been moved from the air-base feared they might again be affected by a further extension of the air-base, it became slowly apparent that Baldia was becoming an area of permanent settlement. In 1965, it was officially launched as a "Plot Township" and some previously unoccupied parts were laid out for occupation (Saeedabad, amongst other bastis). By the time Swat Colony began, it was clear enough that there was not much danger of the inhabitants being evicted.

Some unofficial arrangements had been made by "middlemen", so that from the very beginning, there was provision for water that was brought in by trucks. Also due to the efforts of the middlemen, who probably had had unofficial instructions from the official side, the lay-out of the basti was made reasonably regular, with rather wide roads and streets and more or less rectangular building blocks.

As a result, the plots to be occupied illegally, were rather expensive. Reportedly, between Rs 100/-- and Rs 200/-- per plot had to be paid to the middlemen. Plots are of different sizes, and this probably explains why one informant reported that even in the beginning up to Rs 500/-- was paid for an empty plot.

"This colony started exactly the same way as you can see nowadays in the outskirts of Orangi." (interview).

The basti is well located, as it is not far from the main industrial area SITE. Of the heads of households interviewed in our sample 25% reach their places of work on foot or by bicycle.

Initially almost all the houses were built of stones and mud. Gradually, some were converted into semi-pakka houses and especially when during the heavy rains of 1967 many houses had collapsed, there was a boom in building (semi-)pakka houses. By now, there are only very few houses of

types I - III left.

The first public water taps were installed in 1970, after a local anjuman had collected contributions from the inhabitants and made arrangements with the authorities. Electricity connections were provided from 1973 onwards. For several years, taxes have also been collected from many of the houses.

The inhabitants.

A majority of the inhabitants (more than 64%) originate from N.W.F.P. About one third are Panjabis, mainly from Hazara and Mianwali, i.e. the parts of Panjab that are adjacent to and influenced by the N.W.F.P. The great majority of the inhabitants settled in Swat Colony after having lived elsewhere in Karachi - often in bastis of Lyari - either as single men living in deras or in families.

In Swat Colony, there are also a number of deras housing the men living alone, but the majority of the population live in families. 30).

In our sample, among 69 houses, we found only one dera, but this proportion cannot be considered a yardstick, as often deras cluster in one part or some parts of a basti (special streets, corners, outskirts of the basti: people living in families often do not like to have groups of single men close by).

From the inhabitants who had been living in Karachi previously, only a few came from stagnating bastis or bastis that can be considered "inferior" to Swat Colony. No less than 83% of them came from "superior" (31) bastis, but of these people, 80% had been renting accommodation, whereas now, in Swat Colony, only 17% of them pay rent. So, again in this case, we may conclude that the inhabitants have improved their condition by moving to Swat Colony.

About one fifth of the population settled here at the time of migration to Karachi. Among these, the proportion of tenants is 33%.

Obviously, more or less established house-owners offer this opportunity to newcomers, either by subdividing their plots, owning more than one plot, or by moving out themselves. It is surprising to note in this connection that 57% of the population live in bought houses, and only 23% in self-built houses.

This phenomenon can be partly explained by a rather high turnover of

30) Cf van Pinxteren, 1974-B, p. 63, where he characterizes Swat Colony as a "New Family Colony".

31) The words "superior" and "inferior" refer to our categorization of bastis in terms of the stages of development they find themselves in.

population: from the 41 cases where we collected data on the whereabouts of previous owners who had sold houses and landlords of houses let, 14 (i.e. 34% of the cases) had left Karachi; 3 had moved to a superior basti and in 4 cases their whereabouts were not known. In these last cases we may assume at least that these previous owners/landlords have left the basti. Thus, half of the previous owners/landlords have left the colony. Another 49% are still living in the colony. These proportions are not uncommon in other bastis, but the total of 78% of the population living in rented or bought houses, is extremely high, the more so in view of the relatively young age of Swat Colony.

Many plots must have changed hands and probably land speculation has taken place. Indicative of this last assumption is also the fact that 7% of the houses in the sample were found unoccupied.

In conclusion, Swat Colony can rightly be called a semi-squatter settlement: it is beyond all doubt that the population will not be evicted: their right to dwell in the colony is already officially recognized to some extent since tax is levied on them.

The fact that the land market mechanism is operating so evidently also underlines the "semi-normal" situation.

The anjuman that once did its best to obtain water for the colony, is hardly functioning anymore. The inhabitants do not seem to be very much interested in obtaining better facilities, although a few complaints about the absence of a sewerage system were noted.

VIII.3.5. Developing bastis in security level group "4 items": complete semi-squatter settlements.

Again, in this group, a distinction is to be made between bastis that took off with a start and bastis that developed continuously. As in the previous group, the distinction between both sub-groups could not always be made easily. There are, in this group, a number of bastis that came into existence at the time of or very soon after partition. In this time, there was a very urgent need for living space for a great number of refugees, and in some cases, the authorities indicated that certain areas might be inhabited by them. Liaqat Ali Khan's famous statement may be recalled again here: "Golimar abad karo", i.e. "settle in Golimar". It is questionable whether statements of this kind should be interpreted as a genuine approval of the occupation of these areas. As a matter of fact, in several of the bastis of Golimar I, the inhabitants felt they might

still be evicted even a few years back. 32).

This has been a reason for us to exclude these bastis from the type that is characterized by a start in development.

Thus, only the evident cases have been retained in the sub-group of complete semi-squatter settlements with initial partial development.

VIII.3.5.1. Complete semi squatter settlements with continuous development.

The following bastis belong in this category:

Zarin Khan Colony (250)	Baghicha Hashim Khan (18)
Khoja Muhallah (135)	Shah Jehanabad (220)
Wahidabad (246)	Farooqabad (59)
Golimar I (80)	Jinnahabad (117)
Saeedabad (Lyari) (217)	Lalukhet Pockets (141)
Sir Agha Khan Road (231)	Angara Goth (9)
Koila Godown (138)	Niazi Colony (185)
Mohammadabad (162)	Nishtar Colony (187)
Liaqat Colony (145)	New Kalri (181)



Again this category represents a step forward as compared with the former one, viz. the incomplete semi squatter settlements with continuous development. Although percentages of houses of types I - III have not further diminished, in types V and VI, the percentages have significantly increased. The diagrams of the house conditions again show one peak.

In most of the cases this peak is found at type IV, but in one case out of the 18 cases, it is at type V, and in three cases it is at type VI. Only in one colony of this type, do we find a high percentage of houses of type II. This is the case in Saeedabad (Lyari), which basti - although being a post-partition settlement - follows the pattern typical of goths as far as the development of the houses is concerned. The explanation may be that Saeedabad (Lyari) is in fact an extension of adjacent goths (Miran Naka, Bakra Piri, and Singo Lines). 33).

The following graphs may illustrate this type of colony.

32) No doubt, this would have been different had Liaqat Ali Khan survived.


33) Cf van der Linden, J.J., 1974, p. 13.



Angara Goth.

Many plastered houses can be observed. Some streets have open drains; in other streets, the inhabitants have laid sewer pipes.

Graph VIII.3.5.1. House conditions in Liaqat Colony and Angara Goth.



VIII.3.5.1.1. Profile of a complete semi squatter settlement with continuous development: Angara Goth.

The history.

Under the guidance of Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan, Lalukhet became inhabited shortly after partition. When - in 1951-1952 - that area had been almost occupied, Muhajirs started settling in Angara Goth - amongst other places - which is adjacent to the Lalukhet area. The place of Angara Goth consisted of a small Sindhi Village, which still exists (34) and of which the name has been retained, with fields all around it on which fodder was grown. The Muhajirs bought the land from the Sindhi farmers and settled. They had a leader who had already been a politician before partition, and who had contacts with other politicians and officers at different levels. Perhaps this fact explains that attempts were never made to demolish the houses, although in the beginning the residents feared they would be evicted. Only after some years, was this fear lifted. As early as 1954, a community tap was installed on the main road that runs along the colony. For this tap, the residents paid the expenses, both in terms of the real costs and of the bribe involved.

From 1958, there was a great influx of population: many people who were forcibly moved from other places in Karachi, and who were offered plots in Korangi, preferred to move to places closer at hand like Angara Goth.

Reportedly also a number of people who had been moved to Korangi, left that place and moved back to the city, settling in Angara Goth.

In 1960, the above mentioned leader became the chairman of the Union Committee. Through his efforts, Rs 40,000 was sanctioned for the development

34) This is also noticeable in the diagram of the house conditions (VIII.3.5.1.).

of the basti.

In 1968, over 300 private water connections and public standpipes were installed. From 1960 onwards, fear of being moved had diminished and the inhabitants had started to build their houses pakka: up to 1958, all the houses were of bamboo and reed matting. In the process of rebuilding houses, there has been little encroaching upon lanes, so that the lay-out of the basti is still reasonable: in most of the streets, rickshaws can pass.

When KMC was approached to provide sewers (in 1965), it was stated that a number of houses would have to be demolished for that purpose. Thereupon, the inhabitants preferred to make their own arrangements for sewerage, with the consent of KMC. Most of the sewers lead to the Gujro Nala (a watercourse); some have been connected to KMC's trunk sewers.

In 1969, The governor of West Pakistan visited the colony and gave orders to fill a nala that crossed the area.

During 1971-1972, electricity connections were sanctioned and a few roads were metalled, thanks again to the efforts of the same leader, who arranged for three provincial ministers to visit the basti.

"All of them are my colleagues" said this leader when interviewed. Leasing of the land has been sanctioned but not yet carried out, as there are still discussions about the land price. The land price proposed (Rs 7/-- per square yard, for residential land) is higher than that proposed and in fact being charged in Lyari. Therefore, the residents resist and in 1975, they staged a procession, organized by the P.P.P., to protest against this proposal.

The basti, right from its start, had a good location: it was adjacent to the pre-partition part of the city and to the extensions that came about immediately after partition. At present, 31% of the population reach their place of work on foot or by bicycle.

The inhabitants.

Besides the original settlers, Sindhi villagers - whom we excluded from our sample - the basti is inhabited by Muhajirs almost exclusively (98%). Only a few of the settlers came to Angara Goth immediately upon migration to Karachi (5%), while 65% came from stagnating bastis and the others from "normal" bastis. Previously, 27% of them had been living in rented houses and 33% "free", i.e. in most cases living with relatives.

At present, 82% of the population live in their own houses. More than half of the inhabitants have built the houses themselves, about a quarter

of them live in bought houses and only 12% live in rented houses. Out of those who sold or let their houses, 69% are still living in Angara Goth, so that we may conclude that plots were subdivided, and that the basti is considered a place of permanent residence by most of the inhabitants. Without exception, the residents live here with their families.

In conclusion, Angara Goth is literally a complete semi-squatter settlement. For a long time, there has been no fear of eviction and all the basic facilities are available, albeit the sewerage system needs some upgrading. The lay-out is such that not many adjustments would be needed in the event of full regularization which is already accepted in principle by the authorities concerned.

Instead of fighting and applying for allotment, the residents have staged a procession in protest against the conditions for allotment, a sure sign that they are confident no-one will challenge their right of residence in Angara Goth, still less evict them.

VIII.3.5.2. Complete semi squatter settlements with initial partial development.

The following bastis fit into this category:


Kumbharwara (Baldia) (140)	Wilayat abad (247)
Azam Basti (12)	Mahmoodabad (153)
Sher Shah Colony (225)	Bihar Colony (32)
Hazrat Mohani Colony (94)	Asif Colony (11)
Agra Taj Colony (4)	

Compared with the previous group of bastis with initial partial development, this group represents a further development. Houses of types below type IV have nearly disappeared, and those beyond type IV have greatly increased in frequency.

In five cases out of nine, the peak in the diagram is found at housetype IV, in two cases at type V and in two cases at type VI.

The following diagrams may illustrate this type.

Graph VIII.3.5.2. House conditions in Mahmoodabad and Asif Colony.



VIII.3.5.2.1. Profile of a complete semi squatter settlement with initial partial development: Asif Colony.

The history.

The colony came into existence in 1954 on the waste land that belonged to KMC's "gutter baghichah" (35), the place where sewage is treated. Liaquat Ali Khan had already proposed the area as a place of future settlement for mill workers. The then president of the Pakistan Muslim League helped the people in occupying the area. Settlers came from different parts of the inner city, e.g. from Pologround and Purana Numaish. This leader had roads, streets and plots demarcated. Plots were 80 square yards in size. The plots were distributed free of cost. Within one year, the supply of water from KMC was well organized: the colony was divided into seven wards, each having its own tank that was filled with water from KMC trucks. The inhabitants had made a contribution towards the construction of these tanks. Water carriers distributed the water to individual houses.

In 1957, Mr X., the elected president of the local anjuman, "being a Muslim leaguer, who had acquaintance with many officials" got community water taps for the area. Actually, "he was helped by Mr Y, who was the elected assembly member for the area, and who was a chamchah of Mr Z." (interview)

Although KMC kept on claiming the area as part of the gutter baghichah - i.e. their property and not intended for residential occupation, the existence of the colony was never seriously threatened:

"In 1956, they sent their demolition squad, but we beat them. The Muslim League leaders had told us to do so. Therefore, the police never came again." (interview)

In 1962, KMC attempted to evict the inhabitants by legal action, but they lost the case.

35) baghichah - (little) garden.



Asif Colony. The lay-out has been well preserved; several plots have been subdivided (visible on the upper photo). Mark the multistoreyed houses.



When, in 1967, Mr Y became a minister, the colony received more water taps, it was electrified and several roads were metalled.

A drainage system was introduced from 1972 onwards.

Although initially, the inhabitants lived in reed jhuggis, very soon after settling, they started to build their houses pakka. Reportedly, within a year, many houses were already made with pakka walls.

Soon, when water had been made available, land prices went up, and - according to one informant - in the years 1956 - 1958, about 40% of the population moved to other places after having sold their plots.

According to the same informant, when Orangi Township and New Karachi were created, again 10% of the inhabitants left the colony, obtaining good prices for their houses.

Today, a semi-pakka house (type IV or V) on an 80-square-yard plot fetches Rs 15,000 at least; single storied R.C.C. construction on a plot of the same size is being sold for at least Rs 25,000.

Not many people had been able to obtain more than one plot per family; therefore, speculation took place only at the level of the individual house and not on the scale we sometimes noticed in other bastis with initial partial development, when for example, rows of 20 houses were claimed by one person.

It should be noted that the figures from our sample indicate that 59% of the population live in self-built houses. These people can be considered the original inhabitants, who did not move to other places.

It should also be remembered that many of the plots were subdivided afterwards. As Karachi grew and the place became more and more centrally located, pressure on land also increased and in view of the rising land prices, it is understandable that many people subdivided their plots and often built a second storey, so that they could sell or rent out a part of their property. In view of this, 59% original inhabitants is quite a high proportion, and the percentages given by the informant quoted above seem to be somewhat exaggerated, although - no doubt - he pointed to genuine tendency.

When rebuilding houses, sometimes the inhabitants occupied part of the roads and lanes. Even so, the lay-out of the colony is quite regular and almost everywhere cars can pass easily.

The location of the basti is good: close by are the mill area SITE, the markets of Mango Pir Road and Nazimad area and 16% of the heads of households from our sample reach their place of work on foot or by bicycle.

The inhabitants.

To this day the great majority of the inhabitants are Muhajirs (92% of our sample). Almost one third of them came to settle in Asif Colony immediately after arrival in Karachi, often from other cities of Pakistan, like Hyderabad, Sukkur, Lahore.

Over 60% of the residents settled here coming from other bastis of Karachi, more than half of them from stagnating bastis.

Over 80% of the population live in their own houses: two thirds of them have built their houses themselves, another third have bought their houses and 16% live in rented accommodation.

Half of the previous owners of houses sold and of landlords of rented houses still live in Asif Colony. The others have left, in most cases for other parts of Karachi with a completely legal status and in a few cases to new bastis with initial partial development, e.g. in Orangi. Nearly all the residents live in Asif Colony with their families.

In conclusion, Asif Colony really is a complete semi-squatter settlement. All the necessary facilities are present and the inhabitants can hardly be considered squatters any longer, as their settlement has been accepted de facto by the authorities. Also the lay-out is no obstacle to full legalization of the colony. The condition of the houses does not leave much to be desired.

Allotment of the land is pending. Here again, the main issue holding up further progress in this respect, is the amount to be charged for the land. Although the colony has not yet attained a fully legal position, the free market mechanism operates fully. Many people have subdivided their plots and/or built a second storey in order to sell or let a part of their property and earn income from it. Others have left the area. Two persons (out of the 29 previous owners/landlords in the total sample of 75) have gone to other, "cheaper" bastis with initial partial development, where they could do the same thing over again. Potentially, they could be "professional squatters". Unfortunately, we have not been able to trace these people, so we do not know what really happened. It should be noted however, that there can be many more reasons, beside "professional squatting", for moving to another, "cheaper" basti. Moreover, the number of these potential professional squatters is very small. We have only mentioned this aspect, because "professional squatting" is often used as an argument against slum upgrading.

Asif Colony is one of the colonies where this "professional squatting"

could be expected to assume the highest proportions. Having found only two cases in a sample of 75 where professional squatting could possibly have taken place, we may conclude that the phenomenon does not assume disquieting proportions. In this connection it is also of interest to note that amongst the 208 settlers from our samples in 4 developing bastis with initial partial development which we studied, we found only 3 settlers who had been owners of their house in another similar basti (2 in Faqir Colony; 1 in Swat Colony.).

Many more people have used the profit they made by selling their property to improve their situation further, namely when they could afford to start living in a completely legal locality. As one informant put it: "Especially the poor built houses, earned income from them, and after earning, they went to legal places (pakke 'ilaaq. 36).

VIII.3.6. Three more developing bastis.

Three bastis require special attention, viz. Bilal Colony (34), Reta Plot (212) and Kashmir Colony (129).

Bilal Colony is a very young basti (1 year old), located adjacent to the new illegal extensions of Orangi. Here, the "middle man" has not managed to arrange for water from an official source. Thus, the one item normally present in the bastis' initial development, is absent. By definition this basti does not meet the requirement to qualify for this group of bastis. Nevertheless although the middle man had to arrange for water from a private firm, the development of the basti is not essentially different from that of adjacent bastis, as the diagram of house conditions shows (Graph VIII.3.6.). In view of this, it would be justifiable to include this basti in the group typified by initial partial development. The subgroup to which it belongs, we will call: "squatter settlements with anticipated partial development".

A second basti that we propose should be included in this group is Reta Plot. According to the set criteria this basti would not qualify for the broad group of developing bastis, and should therefore, be considered as a stagnating basti.

This basti is relatively old (11 years) and the development of the houses does not meet the criteria for the group of developing bastis. There is, however, a complication. Large numbers of settlers have come in only

36) 'ilaaqah - region, area.

during the last year and have built their reed jhuggis. This is the reason why - as a whole - the basti houses do not show the development that could be expected in an eleven-year old basti. However, the basti develops in a way comparable to that of the bastis with initial partial development. The diagram of the house conditions is also indicative of that fact (Graph VIII.3.5.). It should be noted that the houses of types IV and V are not wholly the property of "old settlers", but to a small degree belong also to newcomers.

Reta Plot is situated adjacent to a legal colony (Drigh Colony) and the inhabitants expect that it will - in the long run - be treated as an extension of this last colony. This is a reasonable assumption, as that is what has happened to a number of mini-slums situated along the borders of Drigh Colony.


In view of the great influx of settlers during the past year, we may consider the basti as a young one, although a minority of settlers have been in the basti for the past eleven years. The development of the basti is comparable with that of other bastis with initial partial development.

The third basti of this type is Kashmir Colony, to which we have paid some attention already in VIII.2. It is a basti with a security level typified by the presence of no "hope-providing items". Nevertheless its development has been remarkable. The reason for this is that the basti is adjacent to Akhtar Colony, an incomplete semi-squatter settlement with initial partial development (VIII.3.4.2.).

The manner of settlement and the development of Kashmir Colony have been exactly the same as we found in Akhtar Colony.

By reason of its location, the inhabitants of Kashmir Colony have not yet obtained the "hope-providing" items present in the colony itself, but they have absolutely no doubt that they will eventually get them. This fact is also reflected in the diagram showing house conditions. (Graph VIII.3.6.)

Graph VIII.3.6. House conditions in three colonies with anticipated partial development: Bilal Colony, Reta Plot and Kashmir Colony.



VIII.4. Review of the developing bastis.

As can easily be seen from the previous paragraphs, there is in these bastis a steady development from stage to stage. Apparently, the majority of the bastis (129 out of 190 post-partition settlements) fit into this broad type-group.

We will illustrate this in the next table, from which the difference between the bastis with continuous development and those with some initial development, will also become apparent.

Table VIII.4. Post partition settlements with continuous development: average percentages scored by different house types, average index and age, according to type of basti.

Type of Basti	N	Av. Index	H o u s e - t y p e s							Average age
			I	II	III	IV	V	VI	S	
Tentative sq. settlement	3	- 153	10	47	28	14	-	-	-	3.6
Provisional sq. settlement	27	- 28	2	7	26	50	13	2	-	12.6
Incipient sq. settlement	21	- 1	1	4	14	63	15	3	-	19.5
Incomplete semi sq. settlement	11	+ 32	-	1	8	62	22	7	-	24.7
Complete semi sq. settlement	18	+ 67	-	3	6	47	26	18	-	23.9

Post partition settlements with (anticipated) initial partial development: average percentages scored by different house types, average index and age, according to type of basti.

Type of Basti	N	Av. Index	H o u s e - t y p e s							Average age
			I	II	III	IV	V	VI	S	
Sq. settlement with anticip. partial development	3	- 112	31	13	9	37	7	3	-	7 (37)
Provisional sq. settlement	21	- 116	27	15	14	37	6	1	-	3.2
Incipient sq. settlement	3	+ 40	1	1	4	53	36	5	-	6.6
Incomplete semi sq. settlement	14	+ 41	-	4	7	57	20	12	-	13.3
Complete semi sq. settlement	9	+ 114	-	1	2	35	33	28	-	21.0

37) As has been explained in the text, age and development in this group are special cases, not comparable with figures from other groups.

Subject to exception made for very few figures, the averages found show a tendency of the bastis to develop continuously. In the case of incipient squatter settlements, N is very low, so that some deviations from the pattern may be attributed to chance. These figures also show the same pattern, but, they are - so to speak - somewhat "ahead" of what could be expected in view of the figures scored by other types of bastis.

The percentages found for house types I, II and III decrease continuously, while those in types V and VI increase continuously. Percentages of house type IV first increase, later decrease.

Comparison of the two parts of the table further reveals that bastis with initial partial development proceed more quickly than the ones with continuous development. Not only are the average ages of bastis in comparable groups lower for bastis with initial development, but also the differences between figures in subsequent types of basti tend to be larger in the case of bastis with initial partial development.

Figures scored by house types II and III in the bastis with initial development never reach the level scored by bastis with continuous development. This is the place to come back to our hypothesis (Cf VI.1) that improvements on houses that take place at once, and houses of types IV - VI built at once, occur in bastis having a relatively high level of security of tenure from the outset and that staged improvements on houses up to type IV or beyond coincide with bastis that see the level of security increase by stages.

So far as the diagrams of house conditions and the case histories of the different bastis have not yet supported our hypothesis, table VIII.4. clearly shows that in bastis with initial partial development, house types II and III are for the most part omitted when the house develop to type IV or beyond. The other bastis show a much more staged development. Two cases at the individual level may finally, illustrate the two patterns of development.

A Muhajir came to Karachi in 1955. He lived with relatives for 3 years, on Nishtar Road. When a child was born, he and his wife had to look for other accommodation. They found an open plot in a basti where some of their relatives and acquaintances were already residing: Jamhurya Colony II. They put up a reed jhuggi in 1958. The house, doors, the roof, the compoundwall were made of chatai. Soon afterwards, the walls of the place that was used as a kitchen, were plastered with mud, as a protection against fire.

After a year, the outside door was replaced by a new one, made of canister. After three years, all the walls of house, compound

and kitchen were rebuilt with mud. Again after a year, the walls of the latrine were replaced by tin sheets and a new compound-wall was constructed of second hand concrete blocks, laid in mud. For a period of seven years, only small improvements were brought about: the floor of the room was plastered and the chatal roof was replaced by one of corrugated iron sheets. During the rains of 1967, the house had suffered much damage, although it had not completely collapsed. In 1968-1969 a process of complete rebuilding started. Presently - in 1972, when the interview was taken - house and compound-walls were made of cement blocks, laid in cement mortar. The house wall is also plastered with cement mortar. Doors and windows are made of wood.

The old sheet roof is still being used and will soon require replacement by a new one.

The latrine is still the same tin structure; reportedly, it will be rebuilt of cement blocks some time next year. In the kitchen, a watertank of plastered concrete blocks replaces the earthen jars that were previously used for storage of water.

For the last two years, a home-made arrangement of cement pipes conducts waste water towards the river.

The other case concerns a Panjabi bachelor who migrated to Karachi in 1964. After staying with relatives in Golimar for 3 or 4 months, together with a friend, he rented a room from one of his fellow-villagers residing in Liaquat Ashraf Colony. In 1967, his friend married and wanted the room for his wife and himself. Then the Panjabi rented another room from another villager in Mujahid Colony (Gujro Nala). After a year, he went home on leave and came back married.

In 1971, when the accommodation became too small - two children had been born meanwhile - he bought a plot in Manzoor Colony. At first, the family lived in a reed jhuggi, which they wanted to replace by a pakka house as quickly as possible. However, in view of recurrent thefts in the colony, priority was given to a pakka compound-wall that was constructed within six months of the family having settled. Soon afterwards, a pakka room was constructed, covered still with the reeds of the erstwhile jhuggi. This was the situation a year after the family had settled. Cooking was still done in the open, and the latrine consisted of a small reed enclosure in a corner of the plot. In 1973, the walls of the room were raised by about two feet; raushan dans were installed and a new roof of asbestos sheets was put on. In the same year, a start was made on building pakka enclosures for the kitchen and latrine. For the latrine also a soakpit was dug. This work was completed in early 1974. In 1975, the floor of the room and the outside walls of the room were plastered.

Plans for the future include plastering the inside walls of the room, plastering the compound wall and the construction of a second room.

Having concluded that post partition settlements do indeed improve - continuously or in stages -, there is one objection that could be raised against the proposition that bastis generally improve. One might argue that

bastis that fit the patterns found have been carefully selected (Cf VIII.2.) and thus the reasoning is circular. Stated in popular terms, one could argue that the right bastis have been selected and subsequently it is explained that these are the right bastis.

To meet this objection, we may point out first of all that the majority of the bastis (almost 70% of the post-partition settlements) fit into one of the two patterns of development.

Secondly, we hope to show that bastis which do not fit these patterns, really are exceptions, the reasons for which can be shown.

This we will try to do in the next chapter.

VIII.4.1. Some further details of developing bastis.

From the nine cases we used in the foregoing descriptions, as examples of different types of developing basti, we collected some information from samples of the population. Some of the figures thus found were mentioned in the descriptions of these bastis.

Generally speaking, the number of bastis from which data were collected is too small to draw any conclusions from the figures. All kinds of consideration like location, ethnic factors and chance, play their role in individual bastis. Figures may therefore obscure tendencies or suggest tendencies where they do not really exist.

If nevertheless we mention some of the facts found and present them in a way that could make tendencies appear, we do so mainly to point to fields where further research may be fruitful.

VIII.4.1.1. Improvement at the individual level.

Generally speaking, the impression we have is that people in all kinds of colonies improve their position, either by betterment within the colony itself, or by moving from one colony to another.

The percentage of inhabitants who were previously tenants, and are now owner-occupiers, and of people who moved from an "inferior" basti to a "superior" one, give indication of this fact.

It should be remembered however that sometimes the figures may understate this tendency. In some well-established bastis, the inhabitants have subdivided their plots, or - in some cases - built second stories on to their houses. Often these plots/stories are offered on rent and thus may attract a different type of inhabitant who affect the overall picture.

Table VIII.4.1.1.1. Previous living conditions of inhabitants of 9 colonies.

Name Colony	I n h a b i t a n t s			Total Improvers (%)
	coming from stagnating bastis (%)	coming from inferior bastis (%)	former tenants in superior or equal bastis, now owner-occupiers (%)	
Pathan Colony (scheme 24)	59	-	15	74
Wahid Colony	26	-	23	49
Rudad Nagar	7	12	34	53
Johar Colony	19	5	5	29
Angara Goth	41	5	25	71
Faqir Colony	-	-	58	58
Mujahid Col. (Jail-Drigh Rd)	43	-	11	54
Swat Colony	8	2	32	42
Asif Colony	37	3	14	54

In this table we have not shown those who came from "superior" bastis, where they were owners of their houses. The reason is that moving to an "inferior" basti does not have a single-interpretable meaning. In some cases, it is a retrograde step, as far as living conditions is concerned. In other cases, it can be still viewed as having a more positive meaning, especially when the movement is to a basti with initial partial development, holding brighter prospects for development in the future than a fully developed settlement somewhere in the city centre.

Figures on the whereabouts of previous owners of houses sold and landlords of houses let, are indicative of improvements at the individual level.

Table VIII.4.1.1.2. Some information on previous owners of houses sold and landlords of houses let.

Name basti	Pathan Col.	Wahid Col.	Rudad Nagar	Johar Col	Angara Goth	Faqir Col.	Mujahid Col.	Swat Col.	Asif Col.
Information on houses (N)	27	44	71	37	39	50	35	53	70
Houses sold or let (%)	22	18	66	59	46	18	66	77	41
p.o./l.l. in same basti (%)	16	38	45	59	61	11	57	46	45
p.o./l.l. left for legal place (%)	33	12	17	14	33	11	39	2	38
p.o./l.l. left for superior basti (%)	16	12	-	5	-	33	-	5	-
whereabouts of p.o./l.l. unknown (%)	-	38	2	-	-	11	-	10	3
p.o./l.l. left for inferior basti (%)	-	-	6	9	6	-	-	-	7
p.o./l.l. left Karachi (%)	33	-	30	14	-	33	4	37	7
Houses locked (N)	-	1	4	-	1	7	6	4	4

It is interesting to note that the place of provenance seems to be influential in the proportions of people who move out of Karachi.

The Muhajirs, whose homeland is outside Pakistan, generally do not leave Karachi (e.g. Angara Goth); from the other groups, especially Pathans appear to leave Karachi in relatively high proportions. In most cases, it regards shifting back to the home-country (e.g. Swat Colony).

We may offer a few comments on the above table.

Often, a majority of the previous owners and landlords live in the colony itself. We may conclude in these cases that either some of the inhabitants have subdivided their plots - or built a second storey on their house - ,

or inhabitants have initially managed to occupy more than one plot. The extra plots later on are sold or let on rent.

Generally speaking, people who left their basti for another part of Karachi improve their situation. Obviously, this is the case when they move to superior bastis or legal places. But moving to an "inferior" basti can be often considered as an improvement: in most cases, these will be bastis with initial partial development, e.g. in Orangi. This fact also explains why in the last four bastis (those with initial partial development) so few cases were found of a person moving to an inferior basti.

Migration from one basti with initial partial development to another (i.e. potential professional squatting) seems hardly ever to take place. On the other hand, the number of unoccupied houses scores relatively high in bastis with partial development. This fact can probably be explained in part as an indication that land speculation does take place.

VIII.4.1.2. The length of stay of the inhabitants of bastis.

In table VIII.4.1.2. we have collected data on the period which different kinds of inhabitants of different types of bastis spend in Karachi.

It appears that house owners have generally stayed longer in Karachi than tenants. This is in accordance with our previous conclusion that many people who at present own their houses, have previously lived in a rented house.

It seems that many tenants aspire to own a house when they have an opportunity.

A second fact worth mentioning is that the length of stay (in Karachi) of people living in bastis with initial partial development is greater than in bastis with continuous development. The difference is not large, but it should also be remembered that the bastis with initial development are relatively young (length of stay in Karachi and age of the basti also seem to correlate).

This fact is in accordance with what we mentioned about bastis with initial development (VIII.3.2.2.): "These colonies attract many people from other bastis, who have established themselves in the city and can afford to live at greater distances from their jobs than the newcomer to the city."

Of course, this applies mainly to those people who have more or less definitely settled. The tenants, who have stayed for shorter periods in

Karachi, probably selected as their place of settlement locations where friends or relatives were already residing (cf IX.3.1. and IX.4.). It is plausible to assume that they do not live in bastis with initial development because of the prospects for the future of these bastis.

Table VIII.4.1.2. Length of stay in Karachi of inhabitants of 9 colonies.

Name Colony	Average length of stay in Karachi of	
	Owner-occupiers (Years)	Tenants (Years)
Pathan Col.	11	8
Wahid Col.	14	9
Rudad Nagar	13	12
Johar Col.	20	11
Angara Goth	24	25
Total bastis with continuous development	16 (N = 174)	13 (N = 44)
Faqir Col.	17	7
Mujahid Col.	17	10
Swat Col.	17	9
Asif Col.	23	19
Total bastis with initial partial development	19 (N = 168)	12 (N = 40)

VIII.4.1.3. The occupational profile.

We had expected to find some differences in the occupational profile between bastis with initial development and bastis with continuous development. We also expected differences between tenants and owner-occupiers in this respect.

However, nothing of the kind was found from the data we collected. Although proportions of salesworkers appear to be lower in the bastis with initial development than in other bastis, figures scored by semi- and unskilled workers - a second economically weak group - tend to outweigh this difference. For salesworkers, the location of the basti plays an important role. A far-off basti with continuous development,

viz. Pathan Colony (sch. 24) scores a relatively low percentage of salesworkers, comparable to that of bastis with some initial development.

Proportions of salesworkers in Johar Colony (continuous development) and Asif Colony (initial development), that are in exactly the same position as regards distance from the city centre, are almost equal (Cf Table VIII.3.3.1.).

CHAPTER IX

ON THE TYPOLOGY OF BASTIS:

POST-PARTITION SETTLEMENTS, STAGNATING.


"Ham chhat nahin mangte, ham diwar bhi nahin mangte;
ham sirf thori si jagah mangte hain."

(We do not ask for a roof, nor do we ask for a wall;
we only ask for a little place." - From an interview
in Wahid Colony).

"Some of their worst features derive from insecurity;
families who know their shacks may be torn down at any
time have no incentive to improve them." ')

') U.N., 1961, p. 321.

GRAPH IX.11. STAGNATING BASTIS ACCORDING TO SECURITY AND CONDITION OF HOUSES



numbers refer to the alphabetic list of bastis in III.2.4

IX.1. Stagnating bastis according to level of security and physical development.

As we have explained in II.4.2.2., the bastis that do not follow the development pattern as found to exist in a majority of the post-partition settlements, can be further categorized in different ways.

Firstly, we can distinguish them according to the level of development reached, by using - as we did in the case of other bastis - the level of physical development and the security level as our criteria.

As can be seen from graph IX.1.1., there is - even in the group of stagnating bastis - a remarkable variety, both of levels of security (ranging from the 0-item group to the 4-item group) and of the condition of the houses (the index ranging from - 12 to - 242).

We will only make a few observations regarding graph IX.1.1.

First of all, it may be mentioned here that within the group of stagnating bastis, the correlation between security of tenure and physical development is still apparent, as may appear from table IX.1.2.

Table IX.1.2. Stagnating bastis, average index house conditions and security.

Number of hope-providing items	0	1	2	(3)	(4)
Nr of bastis	15	30	12	1	2
Average index house conditions	- 129	- 93	- 63	- 65	- 91

In the categories 0, 1 and 2 items respectively, we find the same tendency found before, in connection with other bastis: the average index is higher, the more hope-providing items are present. In the categories 3 and 4 items, there are so few bastis represented, that we cannot speak of an "average index".

Secondly, and notwithstanding the above observation, perhaps the most eye catching feature of graph IX.1.1. is that it shows there are bastis - although few in number - that belong to the categories of 3- and 4- hope providing items, but still stagnate in their development. In view of our constant emphasis on the correlation between physical development and security, one may ask what could be the reason for stagnation in these bastis.

Rather than elaborate further on graph IX.1.1. subdividing the bastis in groups that can be easily found by drawing arbitrarily chosen horizontal

lines in the graph, let us look for the different causes of stagnation.

IX.2. Causes of stagnation.

Before exploring the causes of stagnation, it should be immediately apparent that quite often, there is not a single cause, but rather a combination of causes to which stagnation can be attributed.

However - as we will try to demonstrate below - there is in all but a very few cases one basic cause underlying the stagnation: the low security level. That in its turn can be explained in various ways for the various bastis.

IX.2.1. Bastis on land with other (potential) destinations.

In a number of cases the land on which the bastis are situated has been designated for other specific purposes by the authorities in whose jurisdiction these bastis are located.

The following bastis belong to this category. Along with the names of the bastis, we give the other designations and further details in brackets.

Bukhari Colony (38) (Commercial area planned; was being demolished end 1975, beginning 1976).

Aqab Jail Colony (200) (Extension of jail planned).

Husseiniat Colony (97) (Hospital planned).

Kausar Niazi Colony (131) (Extension of the circular railway planned; attempts to bulldoze the basti were made in 1974 and 1975).

Moosa Nagar (168) (Extension of existing school and police station planned).

Bengali Area (Orangi) (28) (Recreation ground planned).

Pak Ghausia Colony (190) (Commercial area planned).

Shah Rasul Colony (222) (Recreation area planned).

Ismail Village (108) (Recreation area planned; in 1975, the basti was surrounded by tight fitting barbed wire in order to exclude further settlers. The background to this is that KDA wants to move the present occupiers and offer them alternative plots. By preventing further extension of the basti, both the opposition against demolition and the number of plots to be provided, are kept within limits).

Central Muslimabad (40) (Connection Love Lane - Mango Pir Road planned; houses on this track and a few encroachments along Mango Pir Road make for the relatively low index of house conditions. The rest of the basti qualifies for the typegroup of developing bastis. This explains how this basti, having 4 hope-providing items still falls in the group of stagnating bastis. The track of the new road was bulldozed in 1975-1976).



"Alternative destinations". On photo 2, mark the flat buildings under construction (left side). Photo 3: A family removed from its previous home is taken to a new (illegal) site by KMC truck.

3.



Hajicamp (86) (The basti consists of barracks intended to lodge pilgrims on their way to the Holy City. In between and all around the barracks huts have been erected.)

Gharibabad (Lyari) (69) (The basti consists of cabins that previously formed a market. As such, the basti - as in the former case - could be called a classic slum. But here also more huts appeared beside the cabins. The inhabitants were moved by KMC in 1976).

Pak Sarhad Colony (192) (Extension to existing school proposed).

Panjabi Para (Dastgir) (193) (Land is claimed by a contractor who intends to build bungalows on this site).

In other cases, the alternative use of the land may be less explicit, but the owners of the land do not intend to allow squatters to settle permanently, so, it seems they have some other purpose in mind.

We have already mentioned in Chapter IV that it is the decided policy of the CB, PWD, KPT, and P(W)R not to provide squatters on their land with facilities and eventually they intend to evict them.

The following bastis belong to this category:

Azeemabad (14)

Baluch Colony (21)

City Station Colony (47)

Hanifi Colony (89)

Hazara Colony (93)

Iqbalabad (101)

Qadafi Colony (203) (Was completely demolished, autumn 1975)

Abyssinia Lines (2)

Railway Camp (204)

Usmania Mahajir Colony (244)

Behind Jacob Lines (27)

Jamhurya Colony (Race Course) (109) (Was partly bulldozed, beginning 1976)

Railway Colony (205)

Bath Island (25)

Gharibabad (Pologround) (72)

Jinnah Hospital II (119)

National Tyre Colony (178)

Reti Lines (213) (Was partly demolished in 1975).

Bizerta Lines (36)

Tunesia and Jutland Lines (239)

Central Jacob Lines (39) (Partly demolished from 1974 onwards).

We may also add in this category:

Umr Colony (241), the land of which is disputed by both KMC and PWR.

Typically, 21 of the 31 bastis where the land belongs to the bodies named, fit into this category. From the 10 bastis of this group that were categorized as "developing", five do indeed have a relatively high security level (two items), which is exceptional for bastis on the land of these bodies. The remaining five bastis fit into the group of developing bastis because their age is not great. In at least three cases out of these five there is a real fear that in the future development in these bastis will also stagnate, even though for the time being the potential for development is still present.


Finally, the inhabitants of a number of bastis built on privately owned land feel they may be evicted. The following bastis fall into this category.

Bowani Chali (37)
Abdul Jabbar Compound (1)
Karnali Basti (128)
Gule Rana Colony (83)
Gharibabad (Purana) (71)
Shanti Nagar (223)
Gharibabad (Nea) (70)

Typical of these stagnating bastis is the occurrence of one peak in the diagram of house conditions. This peak is found at one of the types below IV in most cases. Even when the peak occurs at house-type IV, the inferior types still score high and the superior types are hardly represented, if at all.

The following graphs may illustrate this.

Graph IX.2.1.1. Average house conditions in 43 stagnating bastis on land with alternative uses; house conditions in Baluch Colony, Hazara Colony, Ismail Village, Husseiniat Colony and Bukhari Colony.



It should be noted that out of these 43 bastis, seven were partly or wholly demolished recently. In one other basti of this group attempts were made to bulldoze it, and in a ninth basti preparatory measures were taken for eventual eviction of the inhabitants. All this is evidence of how realistically the basti dwellers assess their security position. Possibly, the fact that bastis on privately-owned land show slightly better house conditions than the other bastis of this group can be explained by the plausible assumption that bastis on privately owned land enjoy a slightly better security position: it is more difficult

to oppose one of the large institutions - like the Cantonment Board - when they want to demolish a basti, than to oppose private persons or organizations.


The number of bastis on privately owned land, is however small, so that it does not make much sense to go deeper into the matter here.

Again, differences in the condition of houses in different bastis may reflect differences in the security position that we may reasonably assume, but are unable to measure.

It should be noted that these differences do indeed exist. As an example, we may recall some of the observations in the above list of bastis: of some bastis, it is said that they were fully bulldozed, other bastis were only partly demolished and of one basti, it is stated there was an attempt to bulldoze it. Apparently, the inhabitants of this last colony have successfully opposed their eviction, whereas the inhabitants of several other bastis failed to do so.

Another indication of the same tendency can be found when comparing the condition of houses in the nine bastis mentioned above that were either demolished or seriously threatened recently, with the condition of the houses in the other 34 bastis of this group.

Graph IX.2.1.2. Average condition of houses in 9 bastis that were demolished or physically threatened recently, and 34 other stagnating bastis on land with alternative uses.



When we compare the average indices of house conditions in groups of bastis between which we may assume there are differences in the level of security, we find the same tendency.



1.



2.

Bastis in riverbeds. On photo 2, the houses on the left can still be protected by a raised floor level. The houses on the right cannot.

Photo 3: basti on railway land.



3.

Table IX.2.1.3. Average indices of house conditions in different types of stagnating bastis, of which decreasing security is assumed from 1 - 4.

	average index.
1. Stagnating bastis on privately owned land	- 75
2. Stagnating bastis on land belonging to CB and similar institutions (except those mentioned under 4)	- 101
3. Stagnating bastis on land with defined other destinations (except those mentioned under 4)	- 108
4. Stagnating bastis that were demolished or physically threatened recently (except Central Muslimabad, a special case - see text)	- 110

We must repeat that we cannot measure the differences in security level. Still, it is striking that plausibly assumed differences are indeed reflected in the conditions of the houses.

IX.2.2. Bastis that - for physical reasons - can stay only partly or with difficulty.

Four bastis are situated in such a way that they are very susceptible to flooding, either completely (Yahya Nagar), or partially (Gujro Nala). The following bastis belong in this category:

- Naddiabad (174)
- Lyari Naddi (149)
- Gujro Nala (81)
- Yahya Nagar (248)

Here again, the basti dwellers know that their residence in these bastis may be of a temporary nature only. The diagrams of the house conditions show the features characteristic of the previous type. (cf IX.2.1.).

A number of bastis are typified by a problematical lay-out.

In the first place, those bastis fall into this category that are real encroachments: bastis that have grown up on existing roads and streets.

As such, we may mention:

- Lotus Road (147)
- Mujahid Colony (Barsati Nala) (170)
- Chooni Bhatti (45)
- Garden Area (66)

In the second place, there are a number of bastis that have encroached in themselves. Bastis in this category are:

- Raksar I (206)
- Rattan Talab (210)
- Police Risala Line (202)
- Ultri Maidan (240)
- Narain Pura (176)
- Maulwi Musafir Khana (159)
- Mama Road (154)

Typical of the bastis with a problematical lay-out is the presence of houses of type S, conspicuously absent in almost all the bastis of the categories previously dealt with, but present in no less than 10 out of the 11 bastis of this category, sometimes in fairly high proportions (up to 28%).


It will be recalled that type S is the double storied jhuggi.

The double storied jhuggi is perhaps the clearest sign that the inhabitants fear eviction: they do invest in their house but this investment does not enhance the permanency-quality of the house.

For the rest, the diagrams can be typified by relatively high percentages of houses of types II - IV and extremely low percentages of houses in types V and VI, if these types are represented at all.

A few diagrams may illustrate this type.

Graph IX.2.2. House conditions in Choona Bhatti and Garden Area.



We have given the problematical lay-out as a reason why bastis of this type stagnate in their development, and, indeed, clearly enough there are hardly any possibilities of improvement in these bastis in their present form.

The question, remains, however, whether the poor lay-out of these bastis has been the cause of stagnation from the beginning, or whether this lay-out is the effect of a deeper under-lying cause, an effect that in its turn also inhibits development.

We will devote a separate paragraph to some further consideration of this problem.

IX.2.2.1. Problematical lay-out: cause or effect?

C. Benninger has described a number of situations in which the migrant to the city finds himself and a corresponding number of environments that "indicate possible physical by-products of each situation under discussion". 1)

Benninger shows that - at least in India - deviations often occur from Turner's model of the stages through which migrants to the city pass. 2).

Moving - more or less smoothly - through the stages called "reception", "intermediate" and "consolidated", Benninger argues, "could be called an optimal model because all systems respond to the needs and means of the situations, and the environment which results has great potential in terms of the physical needs of a growing transitional city. As the situation changes, or is perceived to be changing, there are adequate resources available to make a change in environment. In this model, certain conditions are assumed to exist, such as available open land, transportation at reasonably low fares, a low level of police protection for private and municipal land. Moreover, it assumes that conditions in the city centre slum are satisfying enough to prevent people from undertaking a premature unplanned or haphazard move to the consolidated areas. Thus, Turner's optimal model assumes a great deal of planning.

In Asia, and particularly in the settlement patterns we have studied in India, a model which could be indicated as premature consolidation is more relevant.

In this model, the migrant moves directly from "reception" to "premature consolidation". The environment which results is quite different from the optimal model. The most noticeable difference in the resultant environments is that the premature model has no capacity for growth and change.

Accessibility and utilities may only be improved by destroying some of the dwelling units, and lots are small and usually undefined." 3).

The bastis "with a problematical lay-out" - as we have called them - correspond to Benninger's description quoted above, and there is reason to investigate whether the environments so described in Karachi are the "by-product" of the migrants' situation: premature consolidation.

Stated in popular terms, Benninger postulates that migrants, as yet unripe - mentally, financially, or otherwise - for real consolidation,

1) Benninger, C., 1970.

2) Benninger does not refer to any particular study of Turner's. A clue can be found in Turner, J.F.C., 1968.

3) Benninger, op. cit. p. 126.

consolidate prematurely and thereby cause the environment to change in such a way, that it has no more capacity for growth and change.

"Conditions which cause premature consolidation are highly unsatisfactory conditions in the city centre slum; a desire to live with relatives and traditional social groups; good location of the areas coming under consolidation, and lack of funds for rent." 4).

Indeed, the circumstances under which the stagnating bastis with a problematical lay-out in Karachi came into existence, very much resemble Benninger's description. Except for Mujahid Colony (Barsati Nala), these bastis came about during the period immediately following partition and they are inhabited by Muhajirs almost exclusively.

For most of the inhabitants, it is the first place of residence in Karachi, i.e. they settled there either after a short period of street- or station-sleeping, or after having put up with relatives temporarily, or they settled immediately upon arrival in Karachi, often joining relatives already residing there.

No doubt, during the period after partition, the whole centre of Karachi was very crowded and there were hardly any possibilities of settling in city centre slums, "the environment which is most representative of the intermediate situation." 5).

The intermediate situation is exactly the stage that is omitted in the case of premature consolidation.

Besides, the bastis under discussion appear to be places of residence for an extended period of time to most of the inhabitants, so their settling can indeed be viewed as "consolidation", the more so, as the majority of the residents own their houses.

The following table may illustrate the above remarks.

4) Benninger, C., 1970, p. 126.

5) id. p. 125.

Table IX.2.2.1. Origin, average length of stay and home ownership of inhabitants of 10 stagnating bastis with a problematic lay-out; age of those bastis. 6).7).

Basti	O R I G I N		Age of basti (years)	Av. Length of stay (years)	Home-owners (%)
	Directly from outside Karachi (%)	From rented property in Karachi (%)			
Lotus Road	71	15	28	21	100
Mujahid Col. (B.N.)	50	44	18	8	65
Choona Bhatti	77	15	28	22	97
Garden Area	93	3	28	26	100
Raksar I	79	18	24	22	97
Rattan Talab	92	8	27	25	100
Ultri Maidan	78	4	27	24	35
Narain Pura	76	24	28	19	100
Maulwi Musafir Kh.	48	29	28	20	100
Mama Road	88	10	28	25	100

In the period during which most of these bastis came into existence, more bastis sprang up, all over Karachi, housing Muhajirs who tried to "consolidate". Examples are the bastis of Jacob Lines Area, Khuda Dad Colony, Usmania Mahajir Colony, Angara Goth, Agra Taj Colony, Khoja Muhallah, Delhi Colony (Gizri Rd), the bastis of New Golimar, and many more.

As can be concluded from the previous chapters, the situation of these bastis varies greatly. Agra Taj Colony, being a basti with initial partial development is a good example of consolidation under ideal circumstances. (cf VIII.3.5.2.).

In Angara Goth (cf VIII.3.5.1.1.), circumstances were a little less favourable, but finally, the basti was able to develop well. So did Khuda Dad Colony (Cf Chapter X), but the adjacent Qaidabad did not.

The question now is, whether the differences between these colonies should be explained in terms of (pre-)maturity in the way of settling.

In fact, all these bastis - excepting again those with initial partial development - were inhabited in the same period and in the same way.

6) Unfortunately, we were unable to make use of the data on the eleventh basti: Police Risala Line.

7) Samples were taken the same way as the house samples, cf. App. II. Full data on stagnating bastis in Appendix V.

The difference is that some of the bastis saw their security level increase and other bastis did not.

The difference in maturity, then, could be interpreted as a different ability to plan ahead, to foresee which places would be safe, by the various groups of Muhajirs settling in one basti or another.

It should be noted however that - again with the exception of bastis with initial partial development - in practically all these bastis several attempts were made to remove the population forcibly (Cf also Chapter X). In fact, the Muhajirs who settled in Delhi Colony (Gizri Rd) and Khuda Dad Colony (now regularized bastis) made as much of a leap in the dark as did their fellows who settled in Mama Road (stagnating) or Qaidabad (demolished). The argument that security of tenure could not be expected to be easily achieved near the centre of the city does not completely hold: Jinnahabad is a good example of successful consolidation in the city centre. One might further argue that at least those Muhajirs who settled as encroachers in existing streets, have assessed the situation wrongly. However, putting up shops or dwellings in front of existing buildings is not uncommon in the Subcontinent. Several buildings on Delhi's famous Chandni Chauk are fair examples of this. Also in the central business district of Karachi, this practice is not uncommon and - more importantly - it is accepted. It should also be noted that the settlers in these "real encroachments" were often explicitly invited by the inhabitants of the regular dwellings to put up their shelters in front of the existing houses.

As we will explain in Chapter X, an increase in the level of security is not so much the result of the way of settling or of the place chosen, but mainly a matter of influence, contacts, etc.

It is important in this connection to note that several bastis with initial development have not yet been fully legalized; the inhabitants of Delhi Colony (Gizri Road) and Khuda Dad Colony had many more barriers to overcome than for example the inhabitants of Agra Taj Colony or the bastis of Golimar I. Yet, the first two bastis are legalized, the others are not yet. Again anticipating Chapter X, we may quote:

(regarding Liaqat Ashraf Colony) "No lay-out was prepared for this colony. The houses and huts constructed in this colony are not according to any lay-out..... they have been constructed in such unscrupulous manner, that it is very hard to verify the persons in whose names the standing committee made allotment of the plots" (Underlining mine, JL). 8).

8) Memorandum Landmanager KMC, 31/XII/'56.

(regarding Khuda Dad Colony): "Khuda Dad Colony is by no means a planned colony. The houses have been built in a haphazard way....." 9).

From these quotations, it may appear that the lay-out of bastis that were finally legalized was not up to the required standard in the initial stages. In these bastis, however, care was taken to keep houses more or less in a line, when they were rebuilt in the process of improvement.

"Those who have hope for allotment ("pakki abadi" 10).), they keep (the street) straight" (Interview Gharibabad (Nea)).

"We soon discovered that demolishing our huts was dangerous, because the police would not let us rebuild them in a better shape. Therefore, we kept on patching up and extending our old jhuggis" (Interview Mama Road).

"Previously, a truck could pass through this same street (that - at places - is no wider than 5 feet now, J.L.), but the population increased. Slowly, the place has become crowded ("tang").

Who cares? After all, we know that one day we will be shifted." (Interview National Tyre Colony).

Our conclusion is that not the manner of settlement but the absence of changes in the level of security is the primary cause of stagnation. Stagnation, in its turn, is a reason for the inhabitants not to care much about the lay-out - exactly the same way as hope of legalization is an incentive to improve the lay-out.

Particularly when bastis are located in the centre of the city, there is high pressure on land, which can be a stimulus to encroach, if the tendency to encroach is not counterbalanced by care for the future as is the case in other bastis.

Indeed, in many of the stagnating bastis, we were informed that the lay-out had been much better previously, but it had deteriorated, while in other bastis - Liaqat Ashraf Colony is not the only example - the lay-out was improved when it was hoped to advance the cause of legalization. Further support for our proposition can be found in the fact that many of the bastis that stagnate for various, explicit reasons (as enumerated above) also have a problematical lay-out, especially those located towards the centre of the city.

Several parts of Jacob Lines Area, parts of Gujro Nala and Aqab Jail Colony are examples of this.

The location of these bastis is excellent for low-income people, especially when they have no fixed jobs. So, the inhabitants like to continue living in them as long as they can. But, as these bastis do not

9) Press note Ministry of Health & Works, 24/II/'52.

10) abadi - population.

have good prospects for becoming established colonies, the lay-out is not very important.

It is interesting in this connection, to draw a comparison between (e.g.) Nafisabad, Usmania Mahajir Colony and Aqab Jail Colony. These colonies are very much comparable as regards age, composition of the population, location and population density. Their respective levels of security are indicated by the presence of 3, 1 and 1 items respectively. Moreover, for Aqab Jail Colony, there are plans for an alternative use of the land. Thus, we may conclude that the level of security decreases from Nafisabad, via Usmania Mahajir Colony to Aqab Jail Colony, This is also reflected in the indices of the house conditions:

Nafisabad	+ 38
Usmania Mahajir Col.	- 24
Aqab Jail Col	- 50

The lay-outs of these bastis are more problematical in the same order of sequence.

The same kind of comparison can be drawn between other, mutually comparable colonies like: Moosa Nagar and Rudad Nagar; Gule Rana Colony and Gizdarabad; Jacob Lines and Khuda Dad Colony.

In exactly the same way, within Gujro Nala, the closer to the river - i.e. the less hope there is for permanency - the more problematical does the lay-out become: streets tend to be narrower and more crooked.

In conclusion, we hold that the insecurity of tenure in these bastis is the basic cause of stagnation.

In view of the competition in the land market - especially in the central parts of the city - the inhabitants have understood that other interests would eventually push them out of their present holdings. The fact that none or hardly any hope providing items were supplied underlines the insecure position.

The inhabitants of these bastis too have done what they could to obtain facilities and to prevent demolition of their jhuggis. In several cases, the struggle is very active still, but in comparison with other bastis, "hope" has been frustrated.

Two bastis of this group require some special attention, as they have the exceptionally high number of 3 hope-providing items present in each: Mama Road, group 4 items, but one lacking (Cf Table IV.3.2.) and Police Risala Line, group 3 items.

In Police Risala Line, there are also official, legally recognized dwellings, for which tax is levied. A few individual unauthorized dwellers have managed to get their names inscribed in the list of tax payers for the area.

We can only guess how these people managed. Some indications can be found from the history of Delhi Colony (Gizri Road), where the same thing happened (cf. X.4.1.). Although, no doubt, this fact enhances the security position of those who pay tax, and even of the colony as a whole, there are, as yet, no plans to levy tax from all the inhabitants, and thus - in a way - recognize the existence of the colony.

Regarding the sewerage connection in Mama Road, it should be remembered that all the surrounding area is serviced with sewers. Illegal connections can be very easily made - we noticed the same thing happen in many other bastis - and the official sanction which the inhabitants claim to have, is of a dubious nature.

IX.2.3. Other bastis.

Two stagnating bastis are left, which we have not been able convincingly to fit into one of the previous categories: Jamshed Road II (112), and
Natha Khan Goth (177).

Jamshed Road II is a marginal case in more than one respect: it has 88% houses of type IV and beyond, and could almost be considered as fitting into the group of developing bastis.

Its lay-out is somewhat problematical and the population density is high (an estimated 650 per acre), so that there could be reason to class the basti as one "with a problematical lay-out". In view of the absence of house type S, this is not completely convincing either. About this basti, it cannot be said that "it has no capacity for growth and change".

The case of Natha Khan Goth is still less clear: having 19% houses of types V and VI, it reflects a reasonably high perceived security of tenure.

On the other hand, 39% of the houses were found to be of types inferior to type IV, a fact that we have not been able to understand.

IX.2.4. Causes of stagnation: inherent or changeable?

Following our proposal for subdivision of stagnating bastis (Cf II.4.2.3.), and knowing the causes of stagnation, a decision is now to be made which of the stagnating bastis have a potential for improvement and which have not.

As was shown in the previous paragraphs, lack of security of tenure is the basic cause behind stagnation, and - as a principle - security of tenure is capable of manipulation.

Only in the case of bastis that are - partly or fully - located in riverbeds, can we say that there is an inherent cause of stagnation that in all probability cannot be removed. Even in this connection, we may observe that in several bastis - and the more so in the more legal settlements - arrangements have been made to protect the settlement against flooding.

In many places, the ground level of the houses in or close to the riverbed has been raised up to 4 feet, foundations are made of stones, front doors of the houses are placed well above the level of the street, protective walls have been constructed, etc. No doubt, these arrangements which require investments over the normal costs of building a house can be expected only where there is reasonable security of tenure.

A result of this kind of arrangement is that the riverbed is getting narrower and there must be a certain limit beyond which the bed cannot be narrowed further. Thus, we may assume, that at least parts of the bastis located in riverbeds are inherently incapable of improvement.

Regarding all other bastis, we can say that the cause of stagnation can be manipulated, although it seems reasonable to make an exception for those bastis that are located between railway lines or upon the track of an existing railway. Parts of Hazara Colony, Railway Camp, Railway Colony, Reti Lines, and National Tyre Colony can be considered such exceptions. These colonies may, in themselves, have a potential for improvement, but it cannot be expected - or perhaps even advised - that this potential be utilized for betterment of these bastis in their present conditions. All the other bastis do have a potential for improvement that can be utilized. The detailed proposals for upgrading of Usmania Mahajir Colony are a good example of this potential. 11).

Another example is Abdul Jabbar Compound, a stagnating basti, the legal status of which changed recently. The immediate reaction of the inhabitants is well illustrated in graph IX.2.4.: the condition of the houses has become such - and almost overnight! - that the basti in its present shape qualifies for the type-group of developing bastis.

11) JRP.IV, 1975 A, Chapter XII and Appendix III.




1.

The road on photo 1 was constructed in about three years by daily dumping collected garbage in the riverbed. A truck can now go on this road. The basti dwellers plan to construct a protective wall alongside the road. Photo 2: Dwellers of the riverbed have raised the floor level of their houses and have made foundations of stones.

2.



Graph IX.2.4. House conditions in Abdul Jabbar Compound, 1974 and 1976.



In this connection, bastis with a problematical lay-out deserve some special attention: it has been stated that they have "no potential for growth and change". This, however, only implies that some reshaping would be required before substantial improvements could take place, or - to use Benninger's words - "accessibility and utilities may be only improved by destroying some of the dwelling units." 12).

In conclusion, we may say:

"The crucial point is not that these areas are objectively unimprovable, but that they are perceived as such. The prophecy often becomes self fulfilling. Even if objective opportunities for improvement in fact exist, the atmosphere of dejection already dominant in the settlement will disregard or misuse them.

Hence, the fundamental question in predicting the future of a lower class settlement is not what objective opportunities the ecology and economy of the area offer, but how they are defined by those who ultimately can bring about its success or failure." 13).

"....conditions often deteriorate during the period between the declaration of an area in terms of the Act (Group Areas Act, J.L.) when all development is frozen, and the time when the removal actually takes place." 14).

In other words: it is a matter of a policy decision, a weighting of priorities, that decides whether the potential for improvement is going to be used or not. For this decision, it is important to have an understanding of the functions the bastis under discussion perform. Let us, therefore, turn to this next subject.

12) Benninger, C., 1970, p. 126.

13) Portes, A., 1972, p. 176.

14) Duncan, S., 1976, p.3.

IX.3. Functions of the stagnating bastis.

IX.3.1. Possible functions of stagnating bastis - hypotheses.

In II.4.2.3. , we proposed to subdivide the non-improving bastis according to their functions along a continuum that ranges from "transit station" to "human dustbin".

The reasoning is that if bastis that do not improve are to be categorized from a point of view of improvement, this can be done only when paying attention to the inhabitants of those bastis: if the bastis themselves do not improve, their inhabitants may do so. As the bastis do not improve themselves this would imply moving out improving inhabitants.

Thus, data on migration can be used to see in how far the basti serves as a transit station, a temporary abode.

Transit stations - if they exist among the stagnating bastis - are most likely to house fresh migrants, either "bridgeheaders", in Turners terminology (15), or migrants who intend to stay in Karachi only very temporarily. That is, the fresh migrants can be considered people who still have to make their start from the bottom. The bastis described as "stagnating" are those bastis in which both security and physical development are at a low level, bastis at the bottom of the scale. We could imagine that they are extremely suitable for housing fresh migrants. If socio-economic climbers move out of these bastis, there is bound to be a regular supply of accommodation, either for rent or for sale. Because of the insecure position, land prices should be relatively low. In view of the relatively poor condition of the houses in these localities, we may assume that prices and rents of houses are also relatively low, which fact should make these place attractive to people who are practically without resources.

Regarding fresh migrants, (an estimated 90,000 per year in Karachi (16)) there are different views about the places they settle in.

As these views touch on the phenomenon of the "transit station", we will briefly review them here.

1. The traditional view: "The immigrants settled mainly in areas on the fringe or close to the fringe; at the time of their arrival in the most unplanned growth zones." 17).
2. The Turner theory: the fresh migrant, attaching low priority to security and amenity, and high priority to location, settles in rented space in the city centre slums. 18).

15) (e.g.) Turner, J.F.C., 1967-A, p. 44.

16) MPD, 1974, p. 18.

17) Brücher, W., 1974, p. 287. (translation mine, JL.).

18) Turner, J.F.C., 1965; id. 1966, pp. 40-41, id. 1968, p. 356.

3. The Turner theory, modified: The core is no longer a major reception area for rural migrants. Zone II (i.e. the inner low income settlement ring, the earliest squats and low-income subdivisions) is the primary reception area for bridgeheaders who are housed primarily as renters. 19).
4. The non-geographical choice view: "naturally, the great majority of migrants made their decision as to where to locate in Monterrey on the basis of where relatives or friends already lived."
"Our data indicate that low status migrants to Monterrey are not segregated in relatively small, centrally located low income receptor areas. Instead, they tend to gravitate to residential districts lying outside the central parts of the city where most of the lower status blue collar neighborhoods are situated." 20).

As is evident from the previous paragraphs (cf also Map I), the bastis that do not improve find themselves scattered almost all over Karachi, although there is a certain preponderance towards the centre.

Thus, if stagnating bastis have a potential function as transit stations to fresh migrants, locational preferences of these migrants will not exclude stagnating bastis as a possible place of first settlement.

This is one more reason to hypothesize that - at least some - stagnating bastis are transit stations for fresh migrants. (Hypothesis I).

Stagnating bastis that do not see their inhabitants migrate to better bastis can be viewed as stagnating in two respects: not only the absence of improvement in the basti, but the combination of this fact plus the retention of its population, qualify such a basti as a place of no hope, a "human dustbin", to use an expression of Stokes'. 21).

Also in this case, we can try to assess what the inhabitants of human dustbins are probably like.

Here, we can make use of Seeley's classification of types of slum dwellers. 22). For this classification, Seeley uses two main dichotomies, viz. necessity - opportunity and permanence - change.

Four main types result from the possible combinations of these concepts.

For our purpose, only the two combinations with "permanence" are relevant, viz. "permanence - necessity" and "permanence - opportunity".

Under these concept-pairs, Seeley classes a number of identifiable types of slum-dwellers, as shown in table IX.3.1.

19) Cowan-Brown, J., 1972, p. 25. In fact, Turner himself, when writing about the "late transitional city" (Turner, 1969) has postulated the same.

20) Vaughan, D.R. and W. Feindt, 1973, pp. 395 and 394; Jackson, J.C., 1974, p. 26.

21) Stokes, C.J., 1962, p. 121.

22) Seeley, J.R., 1966.

Table IX.3.1. Classification of permanent slum-dwellers according to Seeley.

Likeliest term of involvement	Primary reason for slum involvement	
permanent	Necessity	Opportunity
	a) the indolent b) the adjusted poor c) social outcasts	a) fugitives b) unfindables c) modelš d) sporting crowd

In the light of some of the groups mentioned by Seeley, the term "human dustbin" appears somewhat loaded, but the expression fits the majority of Seeley's groups.

Having defined what groups of people can be expected to live in the human dustbin, we may now formulate our second hypothesis: (at least some) stagnating bastis are human dustbins, in the sense that they are the home for any (combination) of the groups that have a permanent term of involvement in the slum as enumerated in Table IX.3.1.

IX.3.2. Testing of the "transit-station" hypothesis.

If certain stagnating bastis function as transit stations for fresh migrants, we may expect this to be reflected in the following ways:

- a) relatively (23) many inhabitants have settled in these bastis as their first place of residence in Karachi (i.e. immediately upon arrival, or after temporary street sleeping or staying with relatives/friends).
- b) the average period the inhabitants dwell in the particular basti is relatively short.
- c) in view of the large turn-over of population, relatively large numbers of inhabitants live in either rented or bought accommodation (as against self-built).
- d) previous owners of sold houses and landlords of rented houses have, relatively frequently moved to other parts of Karachi or returned to their home country (as against staying in the same basti).

As a principle, the combination of assumptions a) and b) should be sufficient to characterize a basti as a transit station. Young bastis, however, by definition house inhabitants who have lived in those bastis

23) With the expression "relatively", we mean here: as compared with developing bastis. The figures of 9 developing bastis which we studied in some detail may serve as an approximation of a cross section of the developing bastis of Karachi.

for short periods only. The same thing applies - at least partly - to older bastis that are still expanding. Thus, assumptions c) and d) are necessary specifications of assumption b).

Stated in popular terms, assumption c) and d) make sure that the newcomers indeed take the place of older residents, and that these older residents indeed leave the basti.

Only three of the stagnating bastis fulfil the four above requirements, and not in a very convincing way, as comparison of the relevant figures with those from a cross-section of developing bastis shows.

Table IX.3.2.1. Figures from 3 "transit station" bastis compared with figures from a cross-section of developing bastis.

Basti	place of first residence for population %	average length of stay in basti (years)	houses bought & rented %	p.o./l.l. who left basti. % of total H.o.H.
Yahya Nagar	28	4	59	44
Mujahid Col. (B.N.)	50	8.1	87	29
Pak Sarhad Colony	36	8.1	49	27
Average of 9 developing bastis	26	8.3	47	25

Other stagnating bastis do, of course, also house new migrants who move out after shorter or longer periods, but this can be said about practically every basti of Karachi. The fact that the nine developing bastis house an average of no less than 26% of people to whom the basti is the first place of residence in Karachi, proves this.

Generally speaking, we may not conclude that stagnating bastis of Karachi fulfil the function of transit stations for fresh migrants. In view of the figures found on basti dwellers who have previously lived in a stagnating basti (Cf Table VIII.4.1.1.1.), this may have been the case previously.

It should be noted however, that many of those who previously lived in stagnating bastis moved out because the basti, or a part of it was demolished. Of necessity, the basti assumed the role of a transit station in these cases, but it was not intended as such by many of the residents expelled.

The percentages of newcomers we found in the nine developing bastis rather suggest that newcomers settle all over the city and from interviews, we have the impression that - in accordance with the non-geographical choice view - fresh migrants first settle in places where relatives and/or friends reside. Our figures are insufficient to prove or disprove this view; more research on the subject is needed.

Table IX.3.2.2. may serve to give an impression about the choice of the place of first residence of newcomers to Karachi.

Table IX.3.2.2. Percentage of the population living in the first place of residence after migration, in 9 developing bastis.

Name basti	% population who settled here as the first place of residence.
Pathan Colony (Sch. 24)	19
Wahid Colony	48
Rudad Nagar	29
Johar Colony	40
Angara Goth	5
Faqir Colony	14
Mujahid Colony (Jail-Drigh Rd)	26
Swat Colony	23
Asif Colony	31
Average	26

IX.3.3. Testing of the "human-dustbin"-hypothesis.

Some of the definitions of the groups Seeley has enumerated are difficult to give. Here, we will follow Seeley's circumscriptions closely, and group by group we will examine if it is represented in any of the stagnating bastis. 24).

- a) The indolent. "the indolent are those whose most striking characteristic is a general apathy or immobility..... these are the do-nothings, those who have "no get up and go", those whose immobility is grounded now in their very physique or character."

As in all the stagnating bastis a majority of the inhabitants own their houses (highest percentage of tenants found is Shanti Nagar: 36%; the

24) all the definitions and circumscriptions of the different groups distinguished are from Seeley, 1959.

average is 8.9% only), we may reason that apathy should be reflected in a very poor state of upkeep of the houses. In other words, we may expect "the indolent" in stagnating bastis with the poorest house conditions, and in those bastis, apathy should be reflected in neglect of the houses, the upkeep of which is the sole responsibility of the occupants in most cases. When we pay attention to the ten stagnating bastis with the lowest house indices, it is striking that none of these bastis gives an impression of passivity or apathy.

Yahya Nagar is a young basti with a relatively high turnover of population: a transit station to some extent (Cf IX.3.2.) and as such a special case.

Bengali Area (Orangi) and Hanifi Colony are bastis where the reed-element in the houses catches the eye. The upkeep of the houses in both bastis is good. Reed jhuggis quickly deteriorate and require continuous attention; their upkeep is a relatively expensive affair: "its monthly cost is almost as high as that of a semi-pucca house." 25).

Karnali Basti and Baluch Colony are bastis where regular improvements of the houses can be easily observed. In both bastis newcomers still build their shacks, which soon undergo all kinds of changes and improvements.

Mama Road and Garden Area are bastis typified as "encroachments". The most common house type is the wooden shack. Again, the upkeep of the houses is striking: most of the houses are colour-washed regularly.

Railway Camp and Railway Colony are the bastis that perhaps have the least perspectives for the future. On several occasions in the past, parts of Railway Camp have been demolished. Still, the upkeep of houses in both bastis is quite reasonable and even improvements are noticeable.

Leaving Yahya Nagar aside as a special case (in view of the relatively high turnover of population, the concept of "immobility" is not very relevant), we may make some more observations regarding the remaining 9 bastis.

In four of them (viz. Bengali Area, Hanifi Colony, Karnali Basti and Baluch Colony) the inhabitants do not view their basti as a hopeless case: they have hope and work for the provision of facilities and eventual legalization of their bastis. In Hanifi Colony and Karnali Basti, organizations have been formed that are quite active in promoting the cause of the bastis. Regarding the other four bastis, hope is not completely absent:

"the best thing would be if the land would be allotted to us:
I would like to build a real house" (interview Garden Area).

But the inhabitants realize that there is little chance for them.

"But we like the place: it is cheap; it is close to our work (26); so the government - if they do not want to give us this place - should give something else nearby instead. They should do the one thing or the other: we cannot go on eternally in these bad houses." (interview Garden Area).

This attitude is quite common in a number of stagnating bastis where there is little or no hope that the basti will be legalized.

Thus, although the inhabitants are characterized by a certain "immobility", this cannot be ascribed to indolence, but to their preference for the place. Rather than indolence, the interviews reveal the wish that something should happen, upon which the inhabitants can - and want to - react. The fact that they are indeed waiting for a decision from above cannot be interpreted as indolence: the basti is extremely well located as regards job opportunities. On their own initiative, the dwellers - of e.g. Garden Area - have the choice between illegal squatting in a nearby location or settling in a more secure place far away. By staying where they have been living for the last twenty-odd years, they certainly have a better bargaining position once the authorities decide they have to move.

b) The adjusted poor. "In this group are many of the very old, the "single" women with many dependents, and other persons prevented in one way or another from working continuously enough or at pay high enough to qualify for a more respectable poverty."

The adjusted poor are a group that should be easily recognizable amongst the groups that characterize a stagnating basti as a human dustbin. From the above description, it appears that regularity of employment and income are the main criteria distinguishing this group from others. Collecting reliable data on both subjects is very laborious as it requires a situation of good rapport with the respondent and much probing. This cannot be easily achieved when data are needed from 50 stagnating bastis. However, data on occupations - which can be easily obtained - can very well be used to get a fair impression of the employment and income situation. From the different occupational groups, salesworkers, semi- and unskilled labourers and servants have the lowest incomes. The semi- and unskilled labourers form the group with the most irregular employment. The salesworkers have the most unfavourable employment status. Many of the unskilled labourers have irregular work in workshops, house- and road building, in the seaport, etc. A number of them can be found sitting on the footpath every morning and waiting for somebody to employ them. Most of the irregularly employed, however, find work through

26) Indeed, 44 heads of households out of our sample of 60 either work in the basti itself or reach their place of work on foot.

established contacts. No doubt, many of them have regular employment in factories or workshops. When many semi- or unskilled labourers are found in an area close to an industrial establishment, we may assume that a fair percentage of these labourers have regular employment. Otherwise, many semi- and unskilled labourers can be assumed to work irregularly. The salesworkers in bastis have the most unfavourable employment status. Many of them are street-vendors or petty shopkeepers.

A good - though extreme - example of such a salesworker is the man who supplies fruit to less than a dozen customers every day, by carrying the fruit - as ordered on the previous day - from the market and selling it to the customers. In a case like this, one wonders if the man should really be classified as a salesworker, rather than as a coolie, or simply as a disguised unemployed person.

Although the regularity of employment in this group is high, the financial position of many is very weak and their security is low. Mostly unskilled and/or uneducated, working in a business with an absolute minimum of money invested (in the above example no more than the price of a basket!), through great numbers heavily competing on the market and often dependent on slight fluctuations in wages and prices, they may well be considered the group economically most vulnerable.

The servants, although mostly lowly paid, often enjoy at least fairly regular and more or less secure employment.

These observations are confirmed in the literature (27), and - specifically for the Karachi situation-by the figures found in Usmania Mahajir Colony. 28). When comparing percentages of salesworkers and semi- and unskilled labourers, we can get some insight into the question whether the stagnating bastis or some of them house relatively many "persons prevented.....from working continuously enough or at a pay high enough to qualify for a more respectable poverty."

We may, in this connection, recall statements in interviews and from the literature to support the view that the income and/or employment situation can indeed be decisive to the permanent character of a person's involvement in a particular basti.

"If I had a fixed job ("pakki naukari"), I would not mind, but as I have no fixed job, I want to live in the centre of the city." (interv. Naddiabad).

"Those who have no fixed job, cannot come here: only on condition there is some confidence ("bharosa") of a fixed job,

27) Cf. e.g. Mc Gee, T.G., 1974.

28) JAP.IV, 1975 A, pp. 35-37.

they can come and live here." (interv. Umr Farooq Colony).

".....proximity to central areas is essential for those with the lowest incomes and the least secure employments." 29).

"It may be concluded that the households tended to find residence as close as possible to their place of employment." (regards "flood affected structures in Lyari River, Orangi Nala and Gujro Nala, i.e. stagnating bastis). 30).

As the basis of comparison, data on a low income area should be used, rather than on Karachi as a whole. Not only are figures on semi- and unskilled laborers more comparable, but the meaning of "salesworker" in a low-income area is different from the meaning of the same term in the whole city, which also includes a number of middle and upper middle class merchants and shopkeepers, not to be found in the bastis under consideration.

In order to approximate this low-income area, we will again make use of the data of the 9 developing bastis, we have previously also used as a basis for comparison. An additional advantage is that criteria for the decisions on classification of the workers are completely consistent. A complication, however, is that sometimes semi- and unskilled labourers may have a different employment status in developing bastis and stagnating bastis. In view of our characterization of the bastis with initial partial development (Cf VIII.3.2.2.) and the above complementary quotations, it is reasonable to assume that many of the semi- and unskilled labourers in bastis with initial partial development have a relatively favourable employment position, contrary to what we expect to be the case in stagnating bastis. Therefore, figures are not completely comparable, after all. High percentages of semi- and unskilled labourers in stagnating bastis probably have a much more negative meaning than in bastis with initial development. Unfortunately, our figures do not allow further elaboration of this phenomenon. We can only make mention of it and conclude that it is justified to view a high percentage of semi- and unskilled workers in a stagnating basti as more negative than the same percentage found in a basti with initial partial development.

The following table shows the percentages scored by the two economically weakest groups: semi- and unskilled labourers and salesworkers, in nine developing bastis.

29) Caminos, H., J.F.C. Turner and J.A. Steffian, 1969, p. vii.

30) MPD, 1972-B, Ch. III, p. 3-4.

Table IX.3.3.1. Semi- and unskilled labourers and salesworkers in nine developing bastis.

Name of basti	Information on cases (N)	Semi- and unskilled lab. %	Salesworkers %	Total %
Pathan Col.(Sch.24)	27	15	7	22
Wahid Colony	48	42	12	54
Rudad Nagar	71	31	24	55
Johar Colony	37	43	11	54
Angara Goth	39	26	18	44
Faqir Colony	50	48	6	54
Mujahid Col.(J.-D.Rd)	35	31	3	40
Swat Colony	53	53	6	59
Asif Colony	70	37	10	47
Total	431	37	12	49

With this basis of comparison, we may now consider bastis where both the economically weakest groups score higher than in this cross section as "human dustbins" in the sense that these bastis house a high proportion of people who - for economic reasons - find it difficult or impossible to change their situation.

Table IX.3.3.2. shows the figures on the 17 stagnating bastis that score 60% or higher for both the economically weakest groups.

Table IX.3.3.2. Semi- and unskilled labourers and salesworkers in 17 stagnating bastis.

Name basti	Information on cases (N)	Semi- and unskilled lab. %	Salesworkers %	Total %
Garden Area	60	18	42	60
Ultri Maidan	25	9	52	61
Gujro Nala	112	36	28	64
Mama Road	42	10	55	65
Abdul Jabbar Compound	28	29	36	65
Yahya Nagar	36	19	47	66
Raksar I	71	35	31	66
Rattan Talab	25	21	46	67
Hanifi Colony	36	67	-	67
Railway Colony	42	57	12	69
City Station Colony	45	49	22	71
Bengali Area (Orangi)	38	47	24	71
Hajicamp	66	30	47	77
Choona Bhatti	39	33	43	77
National Tyre Colony	40	76	2	78
Bukhari Colony	28	61	21	82
Bowani Chali	54	69	15	84

Of these bastis, Yahya Nagar takes a particular place, as it was already defined as a "transit station". The high proportion of economically weak professions - contrary to the situation in the other bastis - may be interpreted here as "normal" for a floating group of freshly arrived "bridgeheaders", who may be in the process of establishing their position in the city.

Regarding the other bastis, we may conclude that indeed they are "human dustbins" in the sense that they house elevated percentages of economically weak people for long periods of time.

c) Social outcasts.

"The people include the "winoes", the drug addicts, peddlers and pushers, the "hustlers", prostitutes and pimps, and others whose marginal, counter-legal or "shady" activities both excluded them from better organized neighbourhoods and made the slum a more receptive or less rejecting habitat."

Regarding counter-legal and "shady" activities, we have absolutely no figures. From observation, we may say that these activities are rare in the stagnating bastis. Other bastis that rank much higher, even amongst the most developed of the developing bastis - viz. various bastis of the so called Lyari area - are somewhat notorious for these activities, but not the bastis that we have listed as "stagnating".

In all these bastis, we found a great majority of people who work as regularly as possible in completely honest and legal occupations. (Cf App. V) Offering drugs for sale, or the services of a prostitute, not uncommon in a few bastis of Lyari, very seldom occurred when we visited the stagnating bastis.

Amongst "marginal" activities, we may reckon sweeping, mostly performed by Panjabi Christians or Hindus.

".... the Hindus, Christians and tribal people who are engaged in sweeping are ranked lowest." 31).

Another group that bears the characteristics of social outcasts are leprous professional beggars.

Bastis containing a high proportion of people belonging to one of these groups, can be considered "human dustbins" for this reason: although there is nothing illegal or dishonest about the professions these people perform, the society regards them as unclean. The fact that sweepers are often referred to as "chuhras" (which is a rank amongst the untouchables in the traditional Indian caste system) is only one indication of this. 32).

Amongst the 251 bastis in our inventory, we found 14 bastis exclusively or mainly inhabited by these groups.

Amongst the stagnating bastis (N = 60), 4 such bastis were found. Thus, proportions are approximately equal and there appears to be no correlation between belonging to the lowest ranking groups and living in a stagnating basti.

The stagnating bastis that house these groups are:

Jinnah Hospital II
Ismail Village
Narain Pura
Panjabi Para (Dastgir).

d) The "fugitives" and "unfindables".

"The "fugitives" are really of two types: those whose encounters with the law or the credit agency have led

31) Streefland, P.H., 1974, p. 17.

32) ibid. pp. 1 and 17.

them into a life of subterfuge and flight, more or less permanent; and those whose nature or experience has decided them to flee the exigencies of rigorous competition in a better area in their own business or profession."

"The former..... are really using the possibility of anonymity which the slum offers..... protection from the too pressing inquiries of the more respectable world.

(many of the latter)... were merchants, doctors, lawyers or other professionals....."

(regarding "unfindables"): "These were not so much people in flight as people whose individualism of outlook and whose detachment from urban ways led them to seek no clear social identity."

We have very seldom come across any "fugitive" in stagnating bastis, and - by definition! - never any "unfindable".

Both for the first type of fugitive and for the unfindables, the slum functions as a hiding place. In this respect, we believe that the stagnating bastis of Karachi do not fulfil this requirement. A hiding place may be found in one of the relatively old bastis of Lyari or in one of the far-off bastis with initial development.

Also in view of the generally long period of residence in the stagnating bastis, it is to be expected that the inhabitants would know each other. In fact, we always found it quite easy to locate persons of whom we knew only the name and the name of the locality they lived in; and we know of cases where people managed to locate a relative living in a basti, within a day, although they knew no more than the name of the relative plus the fact that he should be living in Karachi! This appears to be characteristic of the Karachi bastis.

"We live here quietly amongst our own people." (interv. Ajab Khan Colony).

"In these agglomerations, it is possible to lead a neighborhood life....." 33).

"Indonesian cities are by no means stone deserts where human beings are completely dissociated from their natural environment the individual does not get isolated....." 34).

In this connection, we may also recall Lewis' conclusion that in Mexico city the distance between city and countryside is not large. 35).

Indeed, most of the bastis of Karachi too, bear some characteristics

33) Benet, F., 1963, p.9.

34) Wertheim, W.F., 1964, p. 168.

35) Lewis, O., 1952, pp. 31-41.

that are also typical of the village: it would be extremely difficult to live there unnoticed.

By that is meant not only unnoticed by other inhabitants of the basti, but also by any person in search for the "fugitive".

Regarding the second category of "fugitive", both the occupational profile of the stagnating bastis and the information about the places where the inhabitants lived before they settled in the basti under consideration, give evidence that this category is hardly - if at all - represented: hardly any inhabitant had been the owner of a house in "better" localities of Karachi.

Regarding the occupations, in the sample (total N = 2709), we did not come across a single doctor, lawyer or other professional of comparable status.

e) "models" and "sporting crowd".

"(models) are people who have somehow become, or conceived of themselves as social or religious missionaries. They are people who stay in the slum primarily in order to "furnish an example" or "bring a message" to "the others", the "less cultured", or "the unsaved".

"(the term "sporting crowd") connotes a range of characters noted primarily for their jollity and informality.... they live in the slum for a complex of reasons. First, living in the slum leaves them more money to spend on "other things"; second, having spent a large share of their incomes on those "other things", what is left is only enough for slum rents; third, the slum is the place to meet others similarly situated; fourth, the slum itself provides facilities for their pursuits, such as taverns, bookmaking and other betting facilities, and so on."

It is difficult, if not impossible, to prove that the stagnating bastis of Karachi neither house "models", nor the bohemian-like "sporting crowd". Both categories could afford to live in better localities and certain status considerations are sacrificed for - or considered unimportant against - the benefits or profits which living in a slum is supposed to entail.

This is a very improbable thing in Karachi. Often, we noticed a great reluctance on the part even of students of sociology, to spend so much as a few hours in a basti, to share tea with the basti dwellers, etc.

The bastis of Karachi certainly do not have a romantic appeal to Pakistani missionaries, students or artists, as is sometimes the case in cities of

Europe or America. Even if it has this appeal, to the individual, the decision to go and live in a slum is much harder in Pakistan than in some countries of the West. As one student put it:

"I cannot afford it: the whole world would turn itself against me."

We have not studied the problem to any extent, nor have we even tried to collect data on the phenomenon. So, we can only give this explanatory remark plus the assurance that in the stagnating bastis of Karachi, we never encountered a person who could be labelled as a model or as a member of the "sporting crowd", as described above. 36).

IX.4. Stagnating bastis: review and conclusions.

By definition, the stagnating bastis have developed little physically, although there is still a remarkable variety in levels of physical development, as can be seen from Graph IX.1.1.

The security, in almost all cases, is low. The very few cases where higher security levels are scored relate either to bastis part of which enjoys this security (and the "secure" part is well developed), or bastis of which the pretended security is dubious.

When looking into the causes of stagnation, in all but two cases explicit causes could be indicated to explain why these bastis stagnate in their development. Lack of security of tenure appears to be the basic cause behind stagnation and also the cause behind the problematical lay-outs often found in stagnating bastis.

Benninger's explanation for problematical lay-outs does not hold true for the Karachi situation. As a consequence, it can also be concluded that in almost all cases, the causes of stagnation are capable of manipulation.

"Every shanty town passes through four stages in its secular development, but this development can be halted at any stage or even destroyed completely by government action." 37).

Regarding the functions of the stagnating bastis, only three bastis could be labelled as "transit stations".

Generally speaking the stagnating bastis hardly function as reception centers.

Knowing that developing bastis, including those with initial development on the outskirts of the city, house considerable proportions of people who settled there upon migration, the non-geographic theory about the

36) Curiously, the few missionaries whom we found residing in (non-stagnating) bastis, were foreigners.

37) Eyre, L.A., 1973, p. 134.

first place of settlement of fresh migrants appears to fit the Karachi situation best. It is of interest to note that Turner also implicitly supports the same view, when he states:

"especially for those with very low incomes who cannot afford to build or own a property..... and who, therefore, demand rental accommodation. This demand is met by original settlers seeking secondary sources of income who subdivide and sublet their property in part." 38).

This is exactly what happens, as we have seen in almost all the case studies on the different types of developing bastis.

The need for rental accommodation which Turner notes, exists equally for the fresh migrants, who, moreover, are dependent on their relatives or acquaintances in many respects.

"Since low-cost housing is mainly advertized by word of mouth and since the neighborhoods are usually heterogeneous in terms of available lodgings, it is usually easier for the newly arrived migrant to find homes in the general location of his friends or relatives.

The job market functions in a similar manner....

Therefore, locating with or close to a friend or relative not only means help in housing but also probable entry into the informal network of job recruitment. 39).

The proposition that fresh migrants settle close to their fellow-villagers and relatives, dispersed all over the city, explains further why the stagnating bastis function as specialized transit stations so seldom - especially when they are inhabited by Muhajirs.

To test the "human dustbin" hypothesis, use was made of Seeley's enumeration of groups of typical permanent slum dwellers.

Although Seeley does mention "shacks and shanties" (40), he is, in his article, referring to the situation in a classic slum of the Western world, when enumerating the different "users" of slums (viz. Indianapolis).

Sometimes therefore absolutely no similarity with Seeley's model could be traced.

When investigating whether any of these groups are also typical of the stagnating bastis of Karachi, we found a convincing degree of similarity only where "the adjusted poor" are concerned.

Of the 60 stagnating bastis 17 show an occupational profile wherein economically weak groups are over represented compared with a cross section of developing bastis.

38) Turner, J.F.C., 1969-A, pp. 40-41.

39) Vaughan, D.R. and W. Feindt, 1973, p. 395.

40) Seeley, J.R., 1966, p. 414.

Thus, a total of 19 bastis (Yahya Nagar figures in both categories, transit station and human dustbin) was found differing from the cross section; the other bastis resemble the cross section so far as the mobility and the economic position of the inhabitants are concerned. As a consequence, the proposed continuum "Human dustbin - transit station" does not appear to fit most of the stagnating bastis. In fact, the majority of the stagnating bastis do not differ from other bastis except for the fact that lag behind in development - for which mostly external causes can be indicated.

To explain this situation, we will once more follow the argument from the beginning.

In IX.3.1., we reasoned that if bastis that do not improve are to be categorized from a viewpoint of development, this can be done only when paying attention to the inhabitants of those bastis: if the bastis themselves do not improve, their inhabitants may do so - by moving out. Data on migration - following this line of thought - would have to be used as indicators to decide how far the basti serves the function of transit station for fresh migrants and how far its inhabitants also stagnate.

There appears to be, however, a considerable number of stagnating bastis that do not figure as transit stations, but neither can be labelled as human dustbins, although the population is rather stable.

There are a number of reasons why this is so, reasons which we have implicitly dealt with already above, and which we may now summarize as follows:

First of all, the above ideas apply only to bastis where there is absolutely no hope that things will change. Wherever there is some hope, people may remain in their bastis, just patiently waiting - and time often works in their favour -, or fighting for their chance.

We have already made mention of stagnating bastis where active anjumans are at work.

The example of Abdul Jabbar Compound in a previous paragraph (Cf Graph IX.2.4.) is extremely revealing about how realistic this may be.

It should also be remembered that many - now developing - bastis of Karachi have known periods of stagnation. The history of Rudad Nagar (Cf VIII.3.3.1.1.) is only one of many examples of this.

In addition, for most bastis, it is very difficult to estimate how real is the danger that the basti will be demolished. In this connection, we may

refer to the histories of many bastis - including even bastis that have since been legalized (Cf Chapter X) - where at one time attempts were made to demolish them.

In Usmania Mahajir Colony, one of the stagnating bastis, just over 50% of the population expressed themselves "rather" or "very" hopeful that they might continue living in their basti. 41).

That this hope is real, can be seen in its consequences: improvements do take place, even in such stagnating bastis:

"Striking, however, is the fact that almost one quarter of the households living in semi pucca houses spent more than Rs 500 (on their house, JL) in the past year, which amount cannot be explained as maintenance costs, but as expenses on additions to, or improvements of the semi-pucca houses." 42).

Secondly, the mobility of the population may, in some cases, be deferred and therefore obscured. In several interviews, respondents have informed us that they had bought a plot in one of the colonies with partial development in order to be sure of a good place to live, should their present basti be demolished. 43). Only, as the location of the basti they now live in, is more convenient, they prefer to hold out as long as possible. Beside the good location of the basti regarding job opportunities, the presence of friends and relatives, proximity of schools and similar facilities, and other reasons of the same kind may prolong the stay of people in stagnating bastis. These people can by no means be viewed as "human dust"!

A third reason is that - reportedly - some of the inhabitants of stagnating bastis reside - or at least: stay - there because they think this is the only possibility open to them to obtain a properly leased plot within their economic means.

Under the law, the Government is to provide alternative cheap plots to people forcibly removed from bastis of Karachi. Obtaining a plot in a legal way is quite difficult: the number of "illegal" bastis and basti-dwellers are sufficient proof of this. Living in a basti that may be bulldozed shortly, is one way to gain the chance of a properly leased plot. It is not a very secure way, and often it is a long way. Therefore, we believe that this is hardly ever the main reason why people reside in stagnating bastis. It may however be one of the considerations preventing people from looking for alternative accommodation, if that accommodation cannot be acquired legally.

41) JRP-IV, 1975-A, p. 80

42) *ibid.*, p. 39.

43) van der Linden, J.J., 1973-A, p. XIX.

From these points, we may draw the following conclusions:

- a. "stagnating" is by no means an absolute notion: by definition, the stagnating bastis do not show the development we noticed in the other bastis, but this does not mean that hope and development are completely absent.
- b. in the few cases where the residents can have absolutely no hope that their settlement will be of a permanent nature, their mobility may be deferred or obscured.

These points explain, why mostly there is only a difference in degree between stagnating and other other bastis. It is not the characteristics of the people, nor their reactions to government action that are different. Their prospects for the future, mostly dependent upon decisions by outside authorities, differ.

Although, in a number of cases, the stagnating bastis do house the economically weakest sections of the low-income groups - sections that cannot afford a choice in the location of their habitat - these bastis cannot be adequately described by the terms "transit station" or "human dustbin".

CHAPTER X

SOME CASE STUDIES OF LEGALIZED AND IMPROVED BASIS.

"None of the three countries (Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, JL) has a definite policy of urbanization." ')

"To some extent government favors depended on influence, bribes, and pressures, and personal contact was essential..." '')

') Samdani, G.M., 1975.

'') Papanek, G.F., 1968, p. 22.

X.1. A prefatory note.

Some of the data used in this chapter is of a sensitive nature.

One might wonder whether it is the task or even the right of a foreigner to meddle with these facts and to publish them.

We have discussed this problem with several officers concerned.

We think it fortunate that they showed themselves quite willing to cooperate and give us access to the data which they knew would not all be very flattering.

When - still somewhat hesitant - we publish this kind of data, we try to do so in the spirit of one officer who stated:

"I am not afraid of criticism; let us face the facts as they are. We can win nothing from hiding them. If we face the facts, we can learn a lot and improve our performance."

Evidently, criticizing is not our task.

The recording of facts and attempts to interpret them may be of help in the learning process.

X.2. Introduction.

Throughout this study we have - implicitly and explicitly - emphasized that:

1. bastis generally have a great potential for self improvement
2. the legal status of bastis is a key issue in determining how far this potential is being made effective use of.

Therefore, it seems to be of relevance to study the few cases where bastis were legalized and improved by action from the authorities' side, so as to see what happened.

Main problems in which we can expect to gain some insight from the case studies, are:

1. what factors made certain bastis eligible for legalization?
2. how was the process of decision making; which agencies are involved; what was the population's share in the process?
3. in how far did the programs undertaken in these bastis give the desired results?

In only very few bastis of Karachi the land has been leased to the inhabitants and official improvement programs were executed. In a number of bastis, where such actions are undertaken, the process is not yet complete. As far as we could discover, in the following bastis land has been leased officially to the residents and improvement plans were implemented, or such actions are well under way:

1. Khuda Dad Colony.
2. Hyderabad Colony.
3. Delhi Colony complex (comprising of Delhi Colony, Panjab Colony, Madina Colony, Nei Basti).
4. Mahmoodabad complex (comprising of Liaqat Ashraf Colony I and II, Mahmoodabad I - VI, Chanesar Goth and Azam Basti).

In other bastis, the process of leasing and improving has just started. Especially the Lyari-area, that is now being dealt with with some priority, may be mentioned in this connection

For our case studies, we selected three bastis where leasing and improvement is almost completed: Khuda Dad Colony, Delhi Colony and Liaqat Ashraf Colony I. Hyderabad Colony did - on preliminary investigation - not show a pattern different from that in Khuda Dad Colony. Age wise, location wise and population wise, it is very much comparable to Khuda Dad Colony, which last colony we thought would be more interesting as it is adjacent to some bastis that were forcibly removed (Qaidabad, Islamabad) and to some bastis that are proposed to be removed shortly (Jacob Lines Complex).

Initially, we had planned to take Panjab Colony (from the Delhi Colony complex) as a second case. We had selected it, because we expected a majority of non-Muhajir population in this colony - the name of this basti could suggest so. On investigation, this turned out not to be the case. Therefore, we shifted our attention to Delhi Colony proper, as it is the oldest part of the complex. The study of this colony is of especial interest as it is located on land that belongs to the CB. As stated earlier (Cf IV.3.1. and IX.2.1.), it is not in the line of the policy of the Cantonment Board Authorities to lease land in their jurisdiction to squatters.

Again here, it is interesting to see what makes a particular colony so special that its development so greatly differs from other bastis.

From the Mahmoodabad complex, finally, we selected Liaqat Ashraf Colony I as a case to be studied because it is the oldest colony of the complex and because leasing is nearer to completion than in the other parts, although far from being a fact still.

X.2.1. Methodology.

To trace the history of the development of the different colonies, we took some interviews from randomly chosen inhabitants of the areas, who had been residing there from the beginning. Besides, in all the three cases, we took

interviews from persons who had been mentioned to us by informants because of their having been instrumental in achieving the legalization and improvement of the basti.

In each of the bastis, Mr Masood Ul Hassan also took a few interviews, the results of which provided a check on our own findings.

Authorities in KDA, KMC and the CB were kind enough to allow us to see their files regarding the bastis under study. Besides, some files of local Anjumans were studied.

Besides, to obtain information about the present situation in the bastis, some quantitative data was collected from samples of the population (the same method we used elsewhere was applied also here, Cf App. II).

X.2.2. Presentation.

In our presentation we will - as far as possible - remain invisible and let files and informants speak for themselves.

Regarding information gathered from interviews, we have always tried to verify information either with the help of the files, or with the help of other, independent, informants.

Whenever certain information was not confirmed, we will make mentioning thereof by using the expression: "according to one informant....."

In all other cases - i.e. when the information was confirmed one way or other - we assume that there is reason to believe the information is correct.

X.3. Khuda Dad Colony.

X.3.1. The history.

1948: the Collector of Karachi directed some refugees to shift to the place where now Khuda Dad Colony is located.

"1. This is to inform you that you are in unauthorized occupation of Plot....., Garden East Quarters where you have erected your huts.

You are accordingly directed to vacate the said land within one week from the service of this notice.

.

2. You are directed to shift to the East of Exhibition Ground on the Bunder Road Extension which has been reserved for refugees.

11/IX/1948. (signed)

Collector of Karachi."

According to a letter from the Khudadad Cooperative Housing Society Ltd (to be called CHS in the following) to KDA (10/X/'60):

"Hundreds of these notices were given".

According to a press note from the Ministry of Health and Works (24/II/'52),
"the plot they were occupying in Garden East had no more than 13 huts..."

According to one informant, only 3 or 4 of these notices were distributed, but many more notices were forged later, as they were the only possible document that could provide some kind of legal basis to the occupying of land by the dwellers.

Whatever be the case, also refugees from other colonies or straight from India came and settled in Khuda Dad Colony.

Liaqat Ali Khan had already stated that dwelling on the place around the spot where Qaid-e-Azam's mazar (1) was planned would never be sanctioned. Many people from the bastis in that area shifted to the adjacent Khuda Dad Colony.

From the start onwards, there has been hope the colony would eventually be regularized. As the population was relatively well educated, from the beginning, care was taken that streets were kept more or less straight and wide. Some people did not care; therefore soon an organization was created to organize the settlement and to solve all related problems: the "Anjuman Mahajarin Khudadad Colony". The anjuman, however, never set rules about plot sizes. The plots became irregular and unequal in size. The police would - in the beginning - not allow people to build, so mostly building was done during the night. When next morning the police came, they were to be given something ("chaepani" 2.) to keep them quiet. According to some informants, houses were built of concrete blocks from the beginning, as the people were "educated middle class people, who could afford it". Other informants said they had first erected reed jhuggis and built better houses later only.

In the beginning, every day there was a meeting of the Anjuman, often attended by most of the dwellers, to discuss and solve daily problems. The occupants were Muhajirs from many different origins in India.

The land on which the colony was built, belonged to the Central Government, a part of it was claimed by PECHS, other parts by the Qaid's Mazar Committee and by the CB.

Very soon after the first settlers came in, KMC started to cater to the needs of water in the colony by sending a truck daily.

1) Mazar - Mausoleum; Qaid-e-Azam: Mr M.A. Jinnah
2) chaepani - (literally: tea-water) bribe.

1949 - 1959.

"Khuda Dad Colony has long been a headache to KDA, because it was to be shifted, as it was in the area planned for the surroundings of the Qaid's Mazar. Later, the Qaid's Mazar Committee let us know it was not needed by them." (interv. officer, KDA).

"At the same time, Karachi Administration took steps to inform the residents of Khuda Dad Colony on several occasions that they were unauthorized occupants.....Khuda Dad Colony is by no means a planned colony. The houses have been built in a haphazard way with no arrangements whatsoever of either watersupply, drainage or sanitation....." (Press note Ministry of Health & Works, 24/II/'52).

"After approximately two years, the KIT (3) sent a bulldozer that demolished a few houses, but we pleaded and managed to stop the driver. In the evening, there was a large meeting and our secretary told us that next day we should all keep standing in the way of the bulldozer to stop it.

Meanwhile, we had contacted several ministers of the Central Government and the Governor. You know, we are educated middle class people. We have good connections and we know how to approach.

So, we got a stay order." (interview)

(The same informant in answer to our question why an adjacent colony was in fact bulldozed: "that was a labour class colony" (muzdur tabaqah") 4).

"Some of its area was originally included in PECHS" (Minutes meeting KMC, 8/XI/'54)

"There was a courtcase filed by our anjuman against PECHS. We won after 13 years." (interv.)

"Instead of the 47 acres which belonged to PECHS, the government gave them a total of 200 acres of land elsewhere in recompensation." (interv.)

"The CB claimed the land, but it was overruled." (interv.)

"Under notification.....dated 11/X/'52 Delhi Colony and its adjoining area was transferred to the CB and the area of Jacob Lines and Khudadad Colony was given to KMC." (letter Landmanager KMC, 8/X/'64).

"The Government therefore propose to ask the KIT to prepare a lay out plan for the proper development and improvement of the area.... In the meantime, the Govt. are pleased to decide that those refugees whose pucca permanent structures are complete would not be disturbed at present.

As regards the huts and kutchra or temporary structures in the colony, the Govt. regret that they cannot be allowed to remain undisturbed..... and the refugees concerned may apply to the collector for allotment of alternative sites in the refugees colonies which Karachi Administration propose to set up in

3) KIT - Karachi Improvement Trust (the predecessor of KDA)

4) muzdur - laborer, porter, carrier
tabaqah - rank

the near future....."

(Press note Min. of Health & Works, 24/II/'52).

"In 1952, the first survey was held by KIT. The surveyors were given bribes so that they mentioned semi-pakka structures only. Thus, we could go on building. In 1952, the first really pakka houses were built." (interv.)

"The secretary of our anjuman gave much tea to KDA..." (interv.)

"In 1953-54 most of the houses became semi-pakka." (interv.)

"On 28/VII/'55, our anjuman was transformed into the "Khudadad Cooperative Housing Society Ltd.", because KMC had advised us so. The CHS was officially registered in 1955." (interv.)

"On 5/IX/'54, KMC passed a resolution to develop Khuda Dad Colony and to grant lease of 99 years to the present occupants." (letter of the CHS, 10/X/'60)

"In 1954, the first community taps were installed." (interv.)

(On May, 31st, 1956,) "a round table conference took place in the office of the chief commissioner in which it was decided that the colony will remain and KIT will develop it in stead of KMC." (letter of CHS, 10/X/'60).

"the suggestions about the wholesale removal of the entire colony were impracticable and fraught with dangerous consequences to the law and order situation in the city." (said the commissioner, minutes round table conference, 31/V/'56).

"In 1956, we gave a big party for Mr X from KIT, who originally came from..... in India. Khuda Dad Colony dwellers from the same place handled him after the party was over." (interv.)

On 31/I/'58, the minister of works pays a visit to the area.

On 12/IV/'58, the chairman KDA (that had meanwhile replaced KIT) has decided this area to be placed under KDA development scheme no 19.

On 14/IV/'58, KDA requests the Government to bring the land under their jurisdiction.

On 1/V/'58, KDA invites objections against the scheme.

Some particulars of the scheme are:

"..... No house will be allowed to have access from a lane less than 20 ft wide. The side and backlanes, however, have been left as they are, but in no case they should be less than 10 ft wide."

"The plots have a minimum size of 140 square yards, and there is a special provision to allow built-up plots with a minimum size of 100 square yards."

"..... Height of the building shall not exceed 28 feet or two stories (ground and one upper).

In the plan, there is a provision for a 150' wide link road to Qaid-e-Azam's Mazar (had been planned 240' wide originally, JL), and a park, covering 0.67 acre, in the centre of Khuda Dad Colony."

On 6/IV/'59, tenders for sewerage, water and stormwater drainage are invited.

On 26/VI/'59, the actual work starts.

The population is involved in the actual work:

"I hereby confirm that the Governing body of KDA have been pleased to decide that the services of the CHS should be utilized as intermediary in the collection of occupancy value." (letter of KDA, 1/V/'59).

By the end of 1959, the CHS deposits approximately Rs 1 lakh for occupancy value.

On 4/IX/'59, the Gazette of Pakistan publishes the Governments's sanction to the improvement scheme of Khuda Dad Colony, under KDA scheme no. 19.

We will now interrupt the chronological order, and follow up some events item wise.

Lanes: "There was hardly any demolishing done for widening of roads, although some are narrow. But there was much pressure on KDA (from the side of the Central Government, JL)" (interv.)

"Here and there, some walls had to be demolished, but not many, because the colony existed before the plan was there." (interv.)

"Some of the lanes are no wider than 6 feet." (interv.; was checked on the spot, JL)

Plots: In a meeting under chairmanship of the Director General of KDA, on 2/III/'66, it was decided that a minimum plotsize of 40 square yards would be allowed.

"The Provincial Government has allowed the KDA to accommodate all plots upto a minimum of 40 square yards in the redevelopment plan for Khudadad Colony." (Dawn, 27/I/'67).

"A few plots measure 20 square yards." (interv.)

Height: "We are allowed to build two stories, if somebody wants to go beyond that, he has to get his plan approved with the help of chaepani." (interv.; several buildings in the colony have more than two stories, JL).

150' wide link road: On 31/X/'59, in a letter from the Ministry of Works, Irrigation and Power to KDA, it is requested that KDA stop its sending notices to people whose houses are located on the trace of the planned 150' wide link road, because an earlier letter from the same Ministry (/VIII/'59) had stipulated that KDA should not do so before the other link roads have been provided.

On 6/XI/'59, the same Ministry requests KDA to consider modifications in the plan for this road.

On 5/XII/'59, KDA informs the Ministry that - in view of the overall townplanning for Karachi - modifications are not possible.

Meanwhile, the inhabitants affected by the planned road also directly approach KDA with requests for modifications. From their letter, telegrams, appeals, we can see that:

"..... its width and course have already been changed a number of times." (telegram to KDA, 21/X/'59).

"..... the said scheme originated in prerevolution days and certain influential persons could bring about their pressure in its formative stage..... Originally, this portion of the road was also (planned to be, JL) 250' wide" (letter to KDA, 21/X/'59).

"In the planning of this road, a very slight curve was introduced to utilize an existing road in the colony." (Statement KDA, June '60)

In April 1969, people affected by the 150' wide road write a memorandum of appeal to KDA, in which they ask for "allotment of an alternative place."

In reply, KDA informs them that as early as 1961, 266 plots in KDA scheme no 16 were given, which the CHS was supposed to divide among people affected by the construction of the road.

According to an interview, these plots had been sold, as people banked on their chance that the plan for the road would never come into effect.

New plots were made available by KDA; shifting of the population and construction of the road took place in 1971-1972.

Park: "There is a rumour that a park is planned in the middle of the colony. This is cause to resentment among the residents of the colony." (letter from the CHS to KDA 27/VIII/'59).

On 12/I/'61, a printed handbill is issued, in which "the Administrator sahib, Karachi, and the Chairman sahib KDA" are requested to annihilate the plan for a park, as, firstly, there are plenty parks and open spaces all around the colony and, secondly, because experience from other places in Karachi teaches that the atmosphere in the Mosque - located in front of this planned park - cannot be maintained as it should, once the park is created.

An article in support of this handbill appears in Dawn, 2/VI/'61.

On 12/XI/'62, the CHS adopts a resolution that "KDA be requested not to take out the proposed 150' wide road and not to build the proposed 1 acre park in the middle of the colony."

In the beginning of 1964, "a case against KDA regarding the planned park is pending since the last three years." (from an appeal of 7/I/'64).

The park never came about.

Continuing the chronological sequence of events, we can add a few interesting facts.

On 21/XI/'59, referring to a permission, dated 4/IX/'59, the CHS asks for electrification of the area.

On 25/VII/'60, KDA informs KESC that there is "no objection in giving permission of electrification."

On 12/I/'61, the CHS submits a printed plan, on which individual plots have been indicated. KDA, thereupon, requests "most urgently" that the plan be certified by an engineer.

On 9/VIII/'61, all individual siteplans have been certified by the CHS.

".... the work of regularization was now going apace and 150 plots would be regularized shortly." (minutes meeting KDA, 29/IV/'66)

In 1975, the work of regularization was completed and the CHS was dissolved in the same year.

X.3.2. Recent developments and present state.

"After allotment, some 40 - 50% of the dwellers left. Many others built flats which they partly give on rent. Some 20% of the inhabitants are renters now." (interv.)

"Many people divided their plots or built flats, so that they could accommodate renters." (interv.)

"Approximately 25% of the population lives in rented places in Khuda Dad Colony." (interv.)



From our data, collected from a sample of the population, we found the following distribution of occupancy statuses.

Table X.3.2.1. Households according to occupancy status.

Occupancy status	N	%
Selfbuilt + Owned	22	37
Bought + Owned	12	20
Rented	20	34
Position unknown	5	8
Total	59	99

The 59 households of our sample live in 56 dwellings. In three cases, households live on (rented) stories of houses.

The length of stay of households also reflects a considerable turnover of population, as can be seen from the next table.



Khuda Dad Colony. Mark the difference between improved "basti houses" and the new buildings that tend to replace them.

Table X.3.2.2. Households according to length of stay.

Arrived in	N	%
1947 - 1955	22	37
1956 - 1965	13	22
1966 - 1975	19	32
not known	5	8
Total	59	99


Table X.3.2.3., finally, may give some impression about where those who have left Khuda Dad Colony go.

Table X.3.2.3. Whereabouts of previous owners of sold houses and of landlords of houses let.

p.o./l.l.	N
Whereabouts <u>unknown</u>	6
Lives in <u>same colony</u>	4
Lives in authorized area	16
Lives in high ranking un-authorized basti	1
Lives in lower ranking un-authorized basti	2
Left Karachi	3
Total	32

Graph X.3.2.4. gives an impression of the condition of the houses in Khuda Dad Colony.

Graph X.3.2.4. House conditions in Khuda Dad Colony.



X.3.3. Summary.

When summarizing the history of Khuda Dad Colony, we can see that the inhabitants had to overcome a number of difficulties.

1. Initially, they were not allowed to live in the area.
2. Different agencies (PECHS, CB, Qaid's Mazar Committee) claimed (parts of) the land.
3. Different agencies wanted to take up the development of the area (KMC, KIT, later KDA).
4. The 1958 KDA's plan included several regulations the inhabitants were opposed to.

From the description of the history, we can see that the inhabitants managed to overcome all the difficulties, and that they had to give in only in connection with the "link road" which - being a part of the national monument, the Qaid's Mazar, - could not possibly be annihilated altogether.

Still, the width of this road was reduced and its course was somewhat diverted.

Regarding the methods used to get things done, besides all legal procedures, appeals, round table meetings, payments, etc. two methods attract the attention:

- a) chaepani was used to erect the first dwellings
 - to build pakka houses
 - to get permission to stay
 - to build houses beyond the permitted limits
- b) sifarish (5) was used in overruling prior plans, regulations and claims by other agencies.
In almost all instances, the Central Government intervened (to stop bulldozing, to stop issuing of notices, to request local agencies to take up and to change the scheme, etc.)
"We organized everything directly via the Central Government." (interv.)

When asked about the causes of the success, all informants agree that a main cause was that this colony is one of "educated, middle class, somewhat well-off people who have contacts, who know to approach." (interv.)

"Their links go very far in the Government." (6) (interv.)

- 5) sifarish - recommendation, intercession, influence. Streefland (1974, p. 20) defines sifarish as: the possibility to influence somebody's decisions via an indirect relation, using an intermediary.
- 6) "Uske links government men dur dur tak hote hain". Note the mixed Urdu-English wording of the phrase. This is typical of middle and upper class language in Pakistan.

Besides, the following causes were mentioned by our informants:

- "This is a self supporting and self earning community that does not need help from outside." (interv.)
- "Because we are educated people, we took care that streets were kept more or less straight and wide." (interv.)
- All informants mentioned the continuous efforts of their Anjuman, later CHS, as a main cause for having attained the goals. (Even one informant who alleged that one secretary once ran away with the Anjuman's money, admits the effects of the Anjuman's efforts).

Regarding the development of the colony, we can see that the houses have developed quite well. Not a single house inferior to type IV - that constitutes only 20% of the sample - was found.

Half of the previous owners/landlords of the - relatively many - houses sold or let have left for better areas, mainly PECHS. Some have stayed in Khuda Dad Colony, when they subdivided plots or built stories on their houses.

Of the present population, still 37% can be regarded as original settlers.

X.4. Delhi Colony.

X.4.1. History of Delhi Colony.

At the time of partition, the area on which Delhi Colony is located, was "jungle". Muhajirs coming from India - mainly from Delhi - settled here because it was an open place which was safe to live in because it was close to a military camp; its location is also convenient as it is near to the Cantonment Railway Station. Moreover, it was under some sort of official protection, the refugees squatted in Delhi Colony - which initially was called Pir Ilahi Bakhsh Colony -.

"Nearabout all the persons living here - except a few lines at the outskirts - are from Delhi. We had opened an office of the Muslim League in Delhi, in our muhallah, where Messrs Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan and other leaders of the Muslim League were coming very often. In this way we got acquainted to them..... When Liaqat Ali Khan became the Prime Minister, we called upon him. Our faces were not new for him. He offered us a plot on Golf Ground, but we refused. and we informed him about our selection. He agreed to our proposal and ordered the officials to help us." (interv.)

Soon, a number of Muhajirs had settled and as early as September, 20th, 1947, a letter bearing 126 signatures of inhabitants of the basti is sent to the Chairman, Temporary Plot Committee, Municipal Corporation, Karachi.

"We, the undersigned refugees coming from Delhi most

respectfully beg to request you to kindly grant us each at least one plot on temporary occupation lease measuring about one hundred square yards on usual terms and conditions for our residential purposes.

You are aware of the fact that in very peculiar circumstances we have saved our lives and have arrived in Karachi. All our belongings and properties have been mercilessly looted and we with great difficulty by the grace of Almighty have arrived in your city and are wandering for shelter....."

It is worth noting that the letter, from which this quotation is taken, was on printed letterhead, mentioning the name of one of the undersigning refugees, as the owner of a shop in Elphinstone Street (one of the main shopping streets of the Central Business District).

Apparently, this undersigner had organized his affairs quite quickly.

On 27/IX/'47, "the standing committee of the Corporation, vide resolution no 779..... granted 126 plots on temporary occupation lease." (undated note of KMC).

In reply, a representative of the group of 126 refugees writes to KMC on 4/X/'47: "I agree on behalf of all the 126 refugees that they will put only temporary structures and that the land will be vacated within three years' time."

Thereupon, 126 grants are given on 7/X/'47.

Meanwhile, and all the time to the present day, more and more people settled in the area.

"The lessees have constructed permanent buildings in stead of temporary structure, against the terms and conditions of temporary occupation leases and without getting the building plans passed by the Corporation. They further erected 51 houses in addition to 126 houses, plus 12 incomplete houses plus 2 masjids (7), thus encroaching upon a considerably large area without any authority." (Note from Landmanager KMC, 18/VII/'51).

It is of interest to follow the history of these 51 houses further.

".....therefore, it is requested that..... further 51 plots which some Muhajirs due to urgent need have built may kindly be regularized and leased out individually at your earliest..." (private letter to KMC, 27/III/'51).

Attached to the letter, from which we took this quotation, is a sifarish, from which we take the following quotations:

"the applicant is a very famous respectable and deserving refugee of Delhi.

..... I am also pleased to certify that he has left big property in Delhi costing nearby Rs five lakhs.

I shall be thankful to you if he is given chance to develop land of Delhi Colony or if he is permitted to rehabilitate his family in the excess land of Delhi Colony." (attached to letter of 27/III/'51).

7) masjid - mosque

A short time afterwards, the same applicant makes the necessary arrangements for having the plots leased out officially:

"I am sending you herewith a cheque..... being the total of two years rent at the rate..... plus your registration and other charges for 51 plots of 100 square yards each (no 127 - 177) list of which along with the names of persons who have built their houses on them is attached herewith. I shall be highly obliged if you please arrange to issue the individual receipts of the rent etc." (Private letter to the Landmanager KMC, 15/V/'51).

In reply, the Landmanager states:

"..... it is to inform you that this cheque cannot be accepted and it is herewith returned as no such land has been granted to you by the Corporation." (letter Landmanager KMC, 26/V/'51).

On 25/VI/'55, notices to vacate the land are served to the occupants of these plots. In reply, the managing society of Delhi Colony informs

KMC:

"With reference to the notices served on the following occupants of residential plots in Delhi Colony, this managing society on behalf of the residents is glad to inform you that the recipients of these notices are regularly paying the house taxes and the land rents, etc. to the KMC as per list attached. We assure you that you will find these details quite in order....." (letter 2/VII/'55).

The landmanager KMC, thereupon, in an office memo asks for clarification:

"..... later on, 51 plots have been encroached and built by the persons in the list attached. The managing society Delhi Colony vide their letter 2/VII/'55 informed that the land rent as well as the property taxes have been payed by them..... Would you please verify and let this office know the position."

Apparently, things have been found "quite in order", because in all subsequent documents, mentioning is made of allotment of "177 plots", as - e.g. - in the following quotation which, by the way, also gives a clue to the procedure to get things "quite in order".

".....Fortunately, at that time Mr X who was president of the city Muslim League Karachi, member of the Municipal Corporation and member of the standing committee, Municipal Corporation, Karachi, helped us to a great extent in Government circles as well as in the Municipal Corporation, and ultimately, we were allotted 177 plots."
(letter of the Secretary, Delhi Colony, to KMC, 15/IX/'55).

Besides these 51 houses, many more were constructed all around the 8 rows officially sanctioned houses, albeit on temporary basis.

"It is intimated that unauthorized construction of houses on the municipal land in the Delhi Colony is in progress in full swing... It is therefore requested that immediate necessary steps may kindly be taken in the matter." (letter of Health Officer KMC, 27/X/'54).

"Mostly, we built houses at night and we had to give something to the police next morning." (interv.)

"We had to bribe the chauki dar (8) to build our houses." (interv.)

"....that it is not known whether they have obtained necessary sanction from the municipal authorities for constructing their houses. We doubt that they have obtained any such permission as they have been constructing their houses mostly in the night time.....

..... Police seems to be in link with them in doing such things." (letter from inhabitants of a neighboring goth, to KMC, 12/V/'54).

It will be observed that one and party have constructed a set of 19 quarters last night.... this deliberate defiance of Municipal Act and grabbing municipal land..... Our demolition gang has been on the site on several occasions but were prevented by the womenfolk to take any action..... (note from the Landmanager's office, KMC, 8/X/'53).

Besides sending the "demolition gang", KMC also takes legal steps against the offenders. In 1950 and 1952, lawcases are suited, which apparently were withdrawn after intervention of some influential persons.

Regarding the cases of 1950, we may quote:

"After the allotment of 177 plots..... on our approach and request, the then chief officer....., the chairman of the standing committee....., and also the leader of the Congress Committee in Municipal Corporation....., and the leader of the Muslim League Party....., very kindly allowed the rest of the applicants to construct their houses...

On our representation to the Government, the District Magistrate was pleased to pass the following order....., 12/VIII/'52, ordering the withdrawal of the cases filed by....., Municipal Corporation...." (letter of the Secretary Delhi Colony, 15/IX/'55).

Regarding the cases filed on 12/V/'52:

"We beg to state that we are heartily indebted to the great favour you did in our favour in withdrawing the cases against us."

(private letter to Municipal Commissioner, 11/XI/'52).

It is interesting to note that several of the original squatters by this time had already moved to some other place and sold or let their houses to others:

"From enquiries on the spot it is found that persons occupying houses are different from those who originally paid the land rent in 1947." (letter landmanager KMC, 18/VII/'51).

8) chauki dar - watchman.

"At the time of the budget preparation for the year 1959-1960, it was found that these unauthorized structures were fetching high rents to the occupants." (undated note KMC).

In 1952, the land on which Delhi Colony stands is transferred from KMC jurisdiction to the Karachi Cantonment Board.

"Under notification..... dated 11/X/'52, Delhi Colony and its adjoining area was transferred to the CB and the area of Jacob Lines and Khudadad Colony was given to KMC." (letter Landmanager KMC, 8/X/'64).

Still, KMC continues to collect taxes and to cater to some of the needs of Delhi Colony:

"..... The KMC managed this area upto June, 1960 and collected all sorts of taxes...." (letter from Delhi CHS, 16/IV/'65).

In 1964, a courtcase on this issue is fought between KMC and the CB; KMC loses.

KMC was already providing water and cleaning services to Delhi Colony, almost from its beginning. When the inhabitants complained about the insufficiency of these services, KMC replies that:

"it would be for the CB to take necessary action for making provision of civic amenities in that area and for regularizing..." (undated note of KMC).

For a long period of time, the situation is very unclear:

"The esteemed mayor accompanied by the ward councillors, the chief officer, the chief engineer and other officers visited this morning, the 21st July 1958 Delhi Colony.

The residents of the area received the esteemed mayor and the party and took them in a pavillon where an address of welcome explaining the difficulties of the residents was given to the mayor.

The main difficulties were regarding shortage of water, drainage, insanitation, electrification, non-availability of streets and roads, leases of plots and about recent demolitions that had been carried out there. The esteemed mayor..... assured the residents that he had special regard for this colony and he would see that the Corporation extends all possible help within its power.

He also mentioned that this colony would also soon come up for regularization." (letter from Deputy Chief Officer, KMC, 28/VII/'58).

It is only in 1960, the CB issues a press note, stating that

"Delhi Colony and some adjoining area was transferred to CB in..... 1952".

"... taxes from now onwards should not be paid to the KMC." (Press note 21/VI/'60).

Although the then President of Pakistan had already announced in 1958 that Delhi Colony would be legalized, in the early sixties the CB attempted to shift the inhabitants forcibly, but

"they pressurized in the offices and they have been manipulating in the political field also, so they have been successful." (interview from officer in the CB).

A deputation of residents of Delhi and adjacent colonies, led by Mr went to see and meet with Mr Minister of Local Self Government, Government of West Pakistan, at Lahore, on 23/VI/'64.

Thereupon, this minister wrote a letter to the Directory Military Lands and Cantonments:

"...I hope you would give your sympathetic consideration to their request and afford them all genuine help."

Meanwhile, the CHS had also approached KDA, that had

"agreed in principle to regularize Delhi Colony" (letter KDA to CHS, 27/VI/'64).

Also a private firm had submitted proposals for a development project in the colony, on 21/V/'64.

On 1/II/'65, the CHS directs itself to the CB, requesting that the land be leased.

In reply, the CB informs that:

"it is regretted that the land..... as applied by you cannot be leased to Delhi CHS." (letter from CB, 12/II/'65).

Again, support and intervention is sought from a higher level.

"it is absolutely certain that no agency will be able to uproot this mass of humanity from the site as it will constitute a major problem of rehabilitation which might find echoes on the floor of the National Assembly....

The local military authorities appear to think on the lines of wholesale removal as apparent from the station headquarters.... Therefore, it is suggested that the matter may be discussed at a higher level....

As the local military authorities appear to think differently, it is considered necessary this urgent human problem may kindly be put to them in its proper perspective. (letter from Mil. Estates Office to the Dir. Mil. Lands and Cantonments, Govt. of Pak., 2/VIII/'65).

Shortly afterwards, the CB seems to have changed its mind:

"These colonies came to us as a result of realignment and revision of boundaries of the cantonment. At the time of taking over, these colonies were already built up area. The occupation of these lands is unauthorized and whatever efforts may be made, it will not be possible to remove the encroachers who have built in many cases large buildings and shops etc." (Note of the CB, 18/IX/'65).

On 5/III/'66, the CB passes a resolution that

"the KDA should be asked to develop the area."

On 10/II/'67, KDA makes an inspection visit.

On 3/V/'67, the CB requests KDA to submit an estimate of costs of the development plan; on 14/VI/'67, KDA sends its plan and asks for comments. The CB proposes that the land should be declared "Bazar Area", one of the implications being that the management is to be taken care of by a "bazar committee", of which the chairman is to be a representative of the CB. The Delhi CHS, on the other hand, insists that the land should be handed over to and managed by their organization.

On 23/X/'68, a resolution is passed and sanctioned to declare Delhi Colony as Bazar Area.

This resolution is challenged by the CHS and on 31/X/'70, an amendment is made "in view of the demand of the residents" (Note Depty. Dir. Mil. Lands and Cantonments).

Meanwhile, KDA, that sent a project estimate in 1969, keeps on requesting the CB to communicate what is to be done.

"I am directed to refer to this Authority's letter..... and subsequent reminders (five in number, JL) on the subject mentioned above and to request you kindly to intimate the present position of the case at an early date." (letter KDA to CB, 23/II/'70).

On 15/I/'70, a representation of the problems of Delhi Colony is made to the Governor, West Pakistan, by the Jamiyat Panjabi Saudagaran, Delhi. 9).

On 13/I/'72, the Peoples Party of Pakistan, Karachi, writes to the Governor of Sindh:

"..... that a decision is yet to be taken by the authorities concerned for their regularization.

"..... that the population is in a very uncertain position afraid of being removed out from these areas." (letter P.P.P., Karachi, 13/I/'72).

Also the chief minister of Sindh is approached:

"...the chief minister has been pleased to make the following observations: "Please deal with this"." (letter from Chief Min.'s secr., 13/X/'72).

The Provincial Minister for Communication and Works had meanwhile approached the Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi, requesting for implementation of the development plan and granting of leasehold rights.

Early 1973, applications for leases are invited.

".... so far, i.e. upto 21st March 1973, only 165 have been issued by this office. No application for grant of lease has so far been received from the occupants....." (Note Land Superintendent CB, 22/III/'73).

9) Jamiyat - organization, congregation
Saudagar - merchant

"..... since there was little response from the occupants, it was considered advisable to fix a final date (25/VI/'73) for the submission of the applications." (Note Land Superintendent CB, 4/IV/'73).

"The last date for submission of applications was fixed on 25th June 1973 and till that date the total of 2170 applications was received." (Note Land Superintendent CB, 6/VII/'73).

Still, in 1974, the plans have not yet been finalized:

".... the lay-out plan is under preparation" (letter CB to P.P.P., Delhi Colony, 3/IX/'74).

A report of 8/VI/'74 says:

"work of regularization..... is now at full swing and 59 leases have so far been executed."

In April 1975, the Chief Minister Sindh distributes a few leases during a ceremony organized for this historic event.

By that time, it has been decided that

"the area is being leased on "as it is-basis".
The area of the plots is however between 30 to 600 square yards." (letter CB to District Registrar, 2/IV/'74).

Also rates and rents are fixed as well as the lease period which is fixed at 30 years.

"It was limited to 30 years, as this was a special and unusual concession by the CB." (interv. officer of CB).

It was only from 1974 onwards, that roads were paved, more water connections were given and sewers were laid.

Before concluding this history of Delhi Colony, we would like to devote some attention to the Jamiyat Panjabi Saudagaran-e-Delhi, an organization that throughout the history of the colony has played a major role.

This organization is a brotherhood of Muslim businessmen from Delhi, who had originally come from Panjab (reportedly some 300 years ago).

The organization has branches all over Pakistan (Sukkur, Rawalpindi, Lahore) and is quite powerful.

"all of them are very rich and influential persons." (interv.)

To form an idea about the Jamiyat, a few quotations from the presidential address on the annual session of the Jamiyat, on 23/VIII/'75, may be useful:

"Gentlemen, in fact our jamiyat consists of businessmen and industrialists....."

"The funds of the jamiyat are increased every year..... by nearly two lakhs and eight thousand in the current year."

".... in the coming year, at least two more buses should be added in the jamiyat's property."

"Implementation of the plans for next year would need nearby 16 lakhs rupees."

The jamiyat runs a hospital and has opened a school in Delhi Colony, it extends help to widows and orphans, runs two industrial homes and a library in Delhi Colony.

Although according to several informants some persons made profit when new squatters came to Delhi Colony, by pretending they would only extend their protection on payment of sums of Rs 200/-- to Rs 500/--, this has never been common practice from the side of the jamiyat. Once, when a member of the jamiyat became known for doing these things, he was expelled from the jamiyat.

The different groups of people who have worked for the regularization of Delhi Colony, can all be seen as branches of the jamiyat: the "managing committee", the Delhi CHS.

Members of the jamiyat were not only relatively wealthy and well educated merchants, several of them had functions in all kinds of public institutions. One member - for instance - was also member of the finance sub committee of KMC, and of the local advisory committee PWR; an other member was also a member of the CB.

Quite often, our informants have told us that someone from Delhi Colony knew a president or a minister personally.

No wonder: "the people of this place solve their problems themselves."
(interview. (10)).

X.4.2. Present state of Delhi Colony.

Also from Delhi Colony, many inhabitants moved to other places of Karachi. This is the more understandable as the jamiyat is also running a CHS in "Society Area" (off Shaheed-e-Millat Road, adjacent to PECHS), since the last 19 years. From inquiries in this Society Area, we found that an estimated 200 families from Delhi Colony had shifted to this place.

The information from a sample of the population comprises of 59 household, distributed over 46 dwellings. As compared to Khuda Dad Colony, there are more families per dwelling. Indeed, there are more double- and multistoreyed dwellings in Delhi Colony than in Khuda Dad Colony.

In general the condition of the houses in Delhi Colony is slightly better than in Khuda Dad Colony.

Other figures found are somewhat comparable, as can be seen from the following tables.

10) "Yahan ke log apne problems khud solve karte hain" Again the peculiar mixing of Urdu and English is well noticeable.

Table X.4.2.1. Households according to occupancy status.

Occupancy status	N	%
Selfbuilt + Owned	21	36
Bought + Owned	15	25
Rented	23	39
Total	59	100

Table X.4.2.2. Households according to length of stay.

Arrived in	N	%
1947 - 1955	21	36
1956 - 1965	19	32
1966 - 1975	19	32
Total	59	100


Table X.4.2.3. Whereabouts of previous owners of sold houses and landlords of house let.

p.o./l.l.	N
Whereabouts unknown	1
Lives in same colony	12
Lives in C.B.D. (11)	4
Lives in authorized area	9
Lives in unauthorized, high ranking basti	3
Total (12)	29

11) C.B.D. Central Business District.

12) As several renters live in the house of one landlord, the total of this table is not equal to the numbers of buyers and renters of table X.4.2.1.

Graph X.4.2.4. House conditions in Delhi Colony.



X.4.3. Summary.

Initially, the people of Delhi Colony had overcome their problems extremely quickly and during the time KMC was in charge, it seemed as though they would go on doing so.

When the CB took over, the struggle had to start afresh, albeit with the same means.

Still, for a long time, the CB resisted the idea of regularizing Delhi Colony. The fact that electricity came to Delhi Colony in 1967 only and that the sewerage system, the roads and the majority of the public taps came about during the past two or three years, is indicative of this. Attempts on the part of the CB to declare the area "bazar area" and giving leases for a much shorter period than is usual in Karachi, are again indications that the CB wants to retain the area within their influence.

Yet the inhabitants have surmounted their problems, mainly by using chaepani when day to day problems were concerned (squatting on a plot, building of walls, building pakka) and by using sifarish, when major issues were involved (withdrawal of courtcases, changing minds of authorities). No wonder, the Jam'iyat, being an organization of wealthy people with many connections all over the country, was the main instrument in getting things done.

"Whenever an attempt was made to demolish construction, Mr..... arranged a public meeting, which was generally addressed by some minister, once even a president." (interv.)

Certainly, neither this basti gives a picture of an average squatter-settlement of Karachi. Although, reportedly, profits of Rs 10,000/-- to Rs 20,000/-- can be easily made by selling not very large plots with simple structures, there may have been also other reasons for the

inhabitants to move out of the colony. 13).

The during absence of all kinds of facilities may have been not acceptable to especially the class of people that formed the core of the inhabitants in the beginning.

Still, 36% of the inhabitants are original dwellers of Delhi Colony.

X.5. Liaqat Ashraf Colony.

X.5.1. History of Liaqat Ashraf Colony.

The files about Liaqat Ashraf Colony were less rich in material than the files on other colonies we studied.

Therefore, in the following description, more use is made of information gathered in interviews. A complication is that the informants do not agree amongst themselves about some of the issues.

We interviewed one leader and five more residents of the colony.

The leader on the one hand and the other informants on the other, hold strongly different views. When quoting the leader - whom we shall call "L." in the following - we will make mentioning of that fact.

"In the year 1952, during heavy rains, the Rehabilitation Commissioner, Govt. of Pakistan, shifted about 110 refugees from low lying area of the city to this place. Later on, some of them went back to their original abodes and some sold out their huts to others after the rainy season was over."

(Letter Municipal Commissioner to Chief Commissioner Karachi, 14/III/'57).

"Liaqat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan shifted us from Korangi Road. Nearabout 200 - 300 jhuggis were shifted here....

Unfortunately, it rained heavily. The people were discouraged by rain, diseases and the water problem. Again the Government came and helped us and those who wanted to leave the area, were shifted to Purana Numaish (i.e. Qaidabad, Islamabad, bastis that were later demolished, JL). Only 13 houses were left..... In 1953-54, when Mahmoodabad came into existence, once again people rushed to the area. Soon afterwards L. was named the president of the area. That man was very tricky." (interv.)

"On behalf of a number of needy refugees, I claimed the area for their rehabilitation, as early as 1950. We had an anjuman: "Anjuman abadkar muhajirin Liaqat Ashraf Colony". Our president was Mr....., a barrister who never resided in this colony, but

- 13) leases were given against a premium of Rs5/-- plus development costs of Rs 13/-- per square yard. Reportedly, a sixty square yard plot with simple structure (type IV) is being sold for Rs 20.000/-- to 30.000. Estimating the cost of the "simple structure" on Rs 10.000/-- (cf van der Harst, 1974-C, p. 110), the profit in selling is between Rs 9.000/-- and Rs 19.000/--.

he did much for us. He was a friend of Liaquat Ali Khan's and he was councillor of KMC. So we were granted the right to settle here on temporary basis. By the commissioner, I was entrusted with the organization of settling the people.

Settlers started to come in 1951. The area was very large, but part of it was claimed by others: that is the colony now known as Mahmoodabad.

Initially, we lived in reed huts and we built pakka houses at night time, as the Corporation objected: there was permission for temporary arrangements only. But we managed with the police when we paid them something." (interv. L.)

"KMC had posted some chauki dars to prevent people from building pakka houses. L. provided those chauki dars free housing and whenever somebody was constructing a pakka house without consulting L., he asked the chauki dar to demolish it, and he would allow him only if he was paid some money. He himself had occupied 18 plots. When any police officer visited this colony, L. invited him for tea; these parties were arranged in front of his house, so that people should see. He had also friends in the Government. One of them was a barrister who helped him a lot. Those leaders still have many houses here which are on rent.....

He did nothing for the people." (interv.)

"Only when L. was replaced by B.D. member....., something was done for the people: he claimed that the taxes from the colony should be used for its betterment. In this time, cleaning, more water, electricity and further plans came about.

..... Moreover, this member is also owner of some 50 plots. You see, the leaders told KMC they had done the plotting, but they had in fact sold the plots or rented them out.....

Financially, they were in a position to approach the officers." (interv.)

"In the midst of these holdings, certain persons came and acquired vested interests by purchasing structures on these plots and certain persons started unauthorized construction on open land." (Letter of Munic. Commissioner to Chief Commissioner, 14/III/'57).

"The leaders took money from newcomers and grabbed many plots themselves. This is one of the reasons the lay-out is not too bad." (interv.)

"It may be pointed out that there are certain plots where people have enclosed by putting up compoundwalls etc. and meant for disposal to others by illegal means." (Note Landmanager KMC, 16/VII/'57).

"Efforts were made to remove these encroachments, but they could not prove successful. In 1954, about 384 applications were received from the inhabitants of this colony for the regularization of their possession..... the Chief Officer was directed to look into the matter...." (letter Munic. Commissioner to Chief Commissioner, 14/III/'57).

On 11/V/'55, resolution 87 is passed:"..... the Standing Committee is pleased to adopt the report of the subcommittee..... and allot

to 384 applicants on temporary occupation lease on usual terms and conditions." However, no lay-out was prepared for this colony. The houses and huts constructed in this colony are not according to any lay-out as a result of which no road or bylane exist.

They have been constructed in such unscrupulous manner, that it is very hard to verify the persons in whose names the standing committee made allotment of the plots." (Memo Landmanager KMC, 31/XII/'56).

"I am told that the people occupying the area are unauthorized, and that certain persons have been selling land to them at various figures and these persons bought land from these unauthorized salesmen and seem to think that they have some right to the land.

We should, therefore, investigate what is their title to the land on which they have put up their buildings." (Minute recorded by the Prime Minister, 1/II/'57).

On 15/VII/'57, "..... the Standing Committee is pleased to cancel its previous resolution granting 384 plots, and to approve of the scheme of regularization." (Note Landmanager KMC, 15/VII/'57).

"It is requested to expedite the estimate as early as possible, as the Municipal Commissioner is pressing hard for early compliance." (Letter to Executive Engineer Designs, KMC, 16/XI/'57).

"No, I never applied. I only approached Assembly members and our President had many contacts. Matters were always pushed from above." (interv. L.)

"In 1959-1960, there were again attempts made to shift us, but the KMC to some extent protected us." (interv.).

On 14/II/'66, KDA gives its No Objection Certificate to the proposed KMC lay-out plan.

On 1/VI/'70, the landmanager KMC requests KDA to issue a new No Objection Certificate, as "some amendments have become necessary."

On 29/IX/'70, the landmanager sends his fourth reminder to KDA.

In an undated reply, KDA raises certain objections against the new plan, whereafter the consulting firm revises the lay-out plan and returns it to KDA after "compliance of objections raised by the KDA" (27/I/'71).

On 6/III/'72, KDA requests KMC to be informed about the present situation in Liaqat Ashraf Colony and sends seven reminders to KMC afterwards.

On 9/XII/'72, a press release from KMC appears in the newspapers:

"The KMC has decided to grant leases to the unauthorized occupants of Liaqat Ashraf Colony. The concessional occupation value of Rs 10/-- per square yard will be charged for residential plots."

By this time, the P.P.P. also took action and "they had the then Sindh Prime Minister visit the colony." (interv.)

In a letter, the residents request KDA:

"narrowing of the planned road from the proposed 60' to 40': this widening of the road and sidestreets will result in the demolition and reconstruction of each and every house which the poor inhabitants cannot afford these hard days." (letter to KDA, 12/VI/'73).

On 27/II/'73, the local representatives of the P.P.P. request that

"the lease charges may be very kindly reduced..... to Rs 4/-- per square yard on compassionate grounds."

As a reason, it is - amongst other things - stated in this letter that

"the residents have already spent a huge amount on acquisition of plots".

On 14/VII/'73, the Government of Sindh, Housing, Townplanning and Local Government Department writes to the Administrator KMC:

"..... Cabinet Subcommittee deciding that another Rs 1/-- per square yard may be reduced for residential plots in Liaqat Ashraf Colony, and for this reduction the Government will provide subsidy."

A note of KMC, dated 5/XII/'73, states that the

"rate was reduced by two rupees and fixed at Rs 8/-- per square yard."

On 11/III/'74, a note from the Administrator KMC states:

"the work of issue of leases..... is very important and is to be completed very early as per direction of the Government and the Minister For Local Bodies."

"Still, the position is not completely clear: amongst other things, there is an extension of the railway line planned through this basti." (interview).

"Those leaders who have their plots on the tract of the railway extension (proposed, JL), have filed a case against PWR. I hope they will loose, because I hate those capitalists. Besides, if the rail comes here, it will increase the commercial value of my plot." (interview).

X.5.2. Present state of Liaqat Ashraf Colony.

Our sample comprises of 60 households, dispersed over 60 dwellings.

Apparently, gaining from unauthorized sale of houses has assumed high proportions, as may be seen from the next tables.

Table X.5.2.1. Households according to occupancy status.

Occupancy status	N	%
Selfbuilt + Owned	11	18
Bought + Owned	17	28
Rented	25	42
Unknown	7	12
Total	60	100


Table X.5.2.2. Households according to length of stay.

Arrived in	N	%
1947 - 1955	11	18
1956 - 1965	17	28
1966 - 1975	27	45
unknown	5	8
Total	60	99

Table X.5.2.3. Whereabouts of previous owners of sold houses and landlords of houses let.

p.o./l.l.	N
Whereabouts <u>unknown</u>	10
Lives in same <u>colony</u>	16
Lives in C.B.D.	4
Lives in authorized area	4
Lives in unauthorized, lower ranking basti	1
Left Karachi	7
Total	42

Graph X.5.2.4. House conditions in Liaqat Ashraf Colony.



X.5.3. Summary.

Beside the fact that the legalization of Liaqat Ashraf Colony is not yet a fact, also in the history there are many unclarified points. Still, from our scanty material, we may conclude that again, in this relatively easy case, sifarish and chaepani have played important roles as catalysts (at least) in the process of legalization of the occupancy of land in the colony.

On the basis of the material, it is plausible to assume that some people who had very good sifarishes gave protection to the settlers in exchange for considerable material gain. The sifarishes seem to have worked for themselves: the files do not reveal much intervention, but there seems to be a continuous protection.

In this respect, the history of Liaqat Ashraf Colony is a good example of what happens in bastis with initial partial development, where this continuing protection is a basic characteristic contributing to the relatively high security of tenure. The apparent misuse of this protection, as we saw it in Liaqat Ashraf Colony, does not necessarily have to be a constant accompanying feature.

The lack of organization, apparent in Liaqat Ashraf Colony, may be partly the result of the appearance of middle men who take care of the affairs of the basti, and who may even manipulate people so that they do not organize themselves. The change that took place after an elected B.D. member took over can be interpreted against this background.

This, moreover, does not exclude the possibility of organization in bastis with initial partial development. The case of Faqir Colony

(Cf VIII.3.2.2.1.) is evidence thereof, although it should be noted that the dervish who initially acted as a middleman in Faqir Colony, soon lost his influence when he had left the basti for a few months when he went on pilgrimage.

X.6. Conclusions.

The three problems we want to approach in this chapter, cannot be seen in isolation from each other. (Cf X.2.)

We will, therefore, make some general observations regarding the three cases, observations which, alone and in combination, touch the problems set, alone or in combination with each other.

- a) None of the colonies described is very representative of the average basti of Karachi. In the first two colonies, the inhabitants had exceptional strong links with highly placed Government Officials, who could promote their case. Liaqat Ashraf Colony may be somewhat representative of bastis with initial partial development.
- b) In all the three cases "sefarish" and "chaepani" have been main instruments in getting things done, just as in the developing bastis, described in Chapter VIII.
- c) In view of the importance of these instruments, we may - in all objectivity - conclude that successful settlement is - at least partly - dependent on the question whether the settlers have these instruments at their command.

The difference between "a very famous respectable and deserving refugee of Delhi....(who) has left big property in Delhi costing nearby Rs five lakhs" (Cf X.4.1.) on the one hand, and - if we may paraphrase - "a nameless, unknown, but not less deserving migrant of N.W.F.P.....(who) has left a small parcel of rocky land in his village, costing very little as it is insufficient for his family to survive" on the other hand, should speak for itself.

- d) There is a conspicuous absence of a policy regarding all the three bastis studied: in all the three cases, at some stage it was attempted to evict the dwellers. It was the politician rather than the policy-maker who eventually saved the life of the three colonies.

"Again, national political decision processes and not national planners, do the allocating." 14).

- e) Another aspect of d) is that local agencies seem to be running behind

14) Wingo, L., 1969, p. 130.

the facts: in stead of reacting on and interfering with developments in a positive way, as long as these developments take place, they seem to resist the developments as long as they can, and finally resign themselves to these developments, in a stage when hardly anything can be changed anymore.

- f) One cause hereof may be the often poor coordination between different agencies at the local level. Quarrels and even courtcases about jurisdictions, large numbers of reminders, are evidence thereof.
- g) Another cause may be the helplessness of such agencies against orders from above - partly caused, in its turn, by the absence of a well defined policy -. The local bodies' decisions regarding regularizing a basti or not, regarding prices, regarding rules and regulations are repeatedly overruled.
- h) Regarding the role of the town planner, we can make the following observations:
 1. in accordance with e), the townplanner makes his appearance in a late stage only.
 2. in accordance with d), the rules he sets are often quite unrealistic. We may recall the proposal for a park in Khuda Dad Colony, that is adjacent to a vast open area. We may also recall a few instances quoted earlier, regarding Lyari and Chanesar Goth (Cf IV.2.1.). Very seldom, in these plans, there is the least evidence that they are based - albeit partly - on needs or requirements of the population, or even that there has been discussion on these points with the population.
 3. in accordance with g), the townplanners' ideas are invariably overruled.
- i) In all the three colonies, many people profited from reduced land prices by selling or renting out their cheaply acquired plots. In Khuda Dad Colony and Delhi Colony, the turnover of population can be considered more or less "natural". In Liaqat Ashraf Colony, evident misuse of the situation was made by people who took possession of large numbers of plots which they sold later.
- j) None of the bastis can be called a slum anymore. The house conditions have improved upto a level where no more types below type IV can be found. The infrastructure may -here and there - still lend itself to further improvements, but the level reached is such that we can see no "explicit reasons the physical health of the inhabitants is endangered by these conditions" (Cf II.3.).

k) Regarding possible differences between types of bastis (with continuous development or initial partial development), our material is insufficient to draw any conclusions. Besides, the case of Liaqat Ashraf Colony as example of a basti with initial partial development is of a somewhat dubious nature (Cf also VIII.3.4.2.).

Still, in a tentative way two possible tendencies may be mentioned which may mark differences between the two types of bastis.

1. bastis with a start in the development may do with less organization on the part of the average dweller. To some extent, this assumption is supported by differences in this respect between colonies of the two types described in Chapter VIII.
2. bastis with initial partial development lend themselves better to land speculation/misuse of certain opportunities, than other bastis do. Some support to this proposition can be found from Table VIII.4.1.1.2. The probable cause of this is that bastis with initial partial development enjoy a relatively high level of security already when the land is not yet fully occupied.

More research would be required to confirm or falsify these assumptions.

CHAPTER XI

MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND SOME SUGGESTIONS.

"The immediate future for India and most other poor lands holds the very real prospect of bigger and worse slums, absolutely and relatively." ').

"The inescapable fact is that Karachi will continue to experience a serious housing problem throughout this century." ").

"....we cannot afford the luxury of sophisticated methods and equipment which require pumping of unlimited amount of money.

We are a poor country.

Therefore, our approach must be simple, unorthodox, practical, and maximum efforts be made to use unconventional methods based on human ingenuity to achieve our goals." "").

') Tangri, S.S., 1968, p. 519

") MPD, 1974, p. 188.

"") Bhutto, Z.A., 1972, p. 212.

XI.1. Conclusions.

In the introduction, we formulated some of the aims of this study. Firstly, we wanted to catalogue the bastis of Karachi and see what is the meaning and distribution of the concept "slum" in Karachi. Thereafter, we wanted to try and create some order in the concept by distinguishing types of bastis. We think, we have succeeded in doing so. Within the inventory, different broad types could be distinguished each of which has its own characteristics, viz.

1. The pre-partition settlements
2. The developing post-partition settlements, in their turn to be differentiated into those with continuous development and those with initial partial development.
3. The post-partition settlements that have stagnated in their development.

The different broad types could be further subdivided into several sub-types each with its own characteristics.

Secondly, we wanted to indentify trends, if present.

Again, trends have shown themselves quite clearly. Both type-groups mentioned under 1. and 2. show a strong trend towards self development. Regarding type-group 3., we concluded that for the most part they have a potential for self-improvement which is often manifest in actual developments, although these lag behind developments in other types of bastis. Where this is not the case, very explicit causes could be indicated to show why this is so.

We may summarize this potential, this willingness of the basti dwellers with one more quotation:

"When officers teased us ("hamko tang karte the"), we had to build our pakka walls inside the kachcha walls, lest they should see us doing so." (interv. Pirabad).

Thirdly, once the extent, the variety and some trends are identified, we wanted to derive some suggestions for slum improvement from our data. We will devote the rest of this chapter to this subject

XI.2. Suggestions. 1).

XI.2.1. Slum improvement versus slum clearance.

Nowadays, it is generally accepted - at least in theory - that slum clearance does not provide a relevant solution to the problems of

- 1) Partly, use is being made of two earlier papers, van der Linden, J.J., 1973-B and 1976.

spontaneous settlements. That this acceptance is sometimes only theoretical, may be illustrated by the ambitious plan to resettle more than 20,000 families living in the Jacob Lines Area, into "lowcost flats", to be built on the spot. It could be demonstrated that

- a) in (at least large parts of) the area, alternative approaches would be possible, and that
- b) for the overwhelming majority of the present inhabitants, the "lowcost flats" would not be financially a reasonable alternative. 2).

The Master Plan Department says about this project:

"If projects such as Jacob Lines are implemented in the ways proposed currently, they will make the overall housing situation worse because it will divert substantial government financial and management resources into essentially a dwelling unit replacement project which will not generate a sufficient net addition to the housing stock." 3).

The acceptance of slum improvement (albeit sometimes theoretical) as a starting point in the policy is based upon a number of considerations, most of which we have dealt with - implicitly or explicitly - in the previous chapters. We will now review these considerations as they mark to some extent a number of details of a policy of slum improvement.

XI.2.1.1. Positive features of spontaneous settlements.

a) Shelter at low cost.

In Karachi, neither from the legal private market, nor from the government house market, can the low income groups find shelter.

The "quarters" (cf I.2.2.) are probably the only exception to this rule. However, their number is so small, that only a privileged minority can be housed in these quarters.

As can be concluded from our case studies, the different types of bastis and the wide variety of house types in them which can be changed and improved at will, cater to the varied and changing needs of housing low-income groups at prices they can afford.

It is of interest to note that the average cost of three different types of "semi-pakka" basti houses (the most common type, cf V.3.2.) calculated by Van der Harst in 1974, viz. Rs 3300. (4) is less than half the price of the cheapest official "low-cost" house type mentioned by Segaar for 1973, viz. Rs 7000. 5).

Besides, as is apparent from the histories of bastis (cf Chapter VIII),

2) Weijs, M.H., 1975, pp. 59 and 60.

3) MPD, 1974, pp. 190 - 191.

4) Van der Harst, J., 1974, p. 114

5) Segaar, T.J., 1975, p. 46, Cf also I.2.1.

the much cheaper basti house is attained in stages as the means and aims of the basti dweller permit and prescribe.

"..... the costs of residing in a slum can be met by the dweller, and within the slum there is a scale of possibilities: a flexible response to housing needs." 6).

"The average earnings are small in relation to the cost of living, but only sometimes do they reveal abject poverty. Most of the people are well fed. There is, after all, one major item of expenditure which does not have to be faced, for squatters pay no rent." 7).

"A survey of 18 rancho communities..... in 1964..... found that the average annual income per family..... was 8.7.023.00. Considering the cost of other things basic to human life, most of these families would not be able to exist on this income if 20 per cent or so of their income will go to housing costs. So long as they live in the ranchos, they may be able to avoid paying for housing, which in effect augments their income. In public housing however, unless the government is willing to provide heavy subsidies, the rancho dwellers may find it very difficult to make both ends meet." 8).

b) Reception centres: cultural shock absorbers.

As we noted already in connection with stagnating bastis (cf IX.3.3.d.), the bastis of Karachi show traits of the villages the inhabitants have come from. The basti dwellers in a way feel at home in their bastis.

"We live here quietly amongst our own people. At night, one has not to be afraid of theft and such things. In other areas, our pardah will break down. Here, we can remain what we are.... To the children, this is a good place: there is no traffic and no danger as all of our own people can keep an eye on them." (interview, Ajab Khan Colony).

At the same time, within this sheltered context, the inhabitants exchange information on how to go about their problems (cf IX.4.) and find ways to adapt to the new environment. As an example of this, we may recall that in all our case studies we found that some kind of organization had been created for communication with the authorities.

"Urban lower class neighborhoods provide the poor with the security of personal ties necessary in recurring crises and mediate their interaction with the larger metropolitan environment.

They do not keep the migrant rural but allow him to turn into an urbanite at an amazingly rapid rate." 9).

"In these agglomerations it is possible to lead a neighborhood life without too abrupt a change; the rural migrant becomes an active inventor of urban social institutions." 10).

- 6) Rosser, K.C., 1974-A, p. 129.
- 7) Jones, E., 1964, p. 123.
- 8) Franco, P.S., 1971, p. 44.
- 9) Hollnsteiner, M.R., 1972, p. 39.
- 10) Benet, F., 1963, p. 9.

"There is little evidence of disorganization or breakdown, of culture conflict, or of irreconcilable differences between generations..... family life remains strong in Mexico city." 11).

c) Job opportunity.

Figures found in our case studies indicate that approximately 45% of the heads of households, both in developing and stagnating bastis either work in the colony itself or reach their place of work on foot or by bicycle. Evidently, the bastis, besides providing job opportunities, are well located regarding these opportunities outside the bastis.

"Don't ask me about the house; we want to live some place where we can find work. The question of a house does not yet arise." (interview in Khyber Colony - Mastan Colony).

We have already noted that the bastis perform an important function in the informal network of job recruitment. (Cf IX.4.)

The immigrant without resources has a better chance for finding the means of livelihood and ways of life he needs in the slum than anywhere else in the city, even if he could afford the rent." 12).

d) Possibility for entrepreneurship.

Small savings in the basti can easily be turned into small investments, e.g. in small (home-)industries, or in the house itself.

The fact that in the stagnating bastis and in the 3 developing bastis we collected some figures on, 11 and 15% respectively of the heads of households find work within the basti, proves that this indeed is the case. Besides, quite often, some additional income for people working elsewhere is found in the basti, e.g. from small shops or simple machines, run during spare hours.

"They provide, within the bustee, a wide variety of employment in family and cottage industries, particularly in the vast numbers of marginal small scale engineering enterprises which provide both the means of livelihood for large number of bustee dwellers, but also the opportunities of acquiring production and entrepreneurial skills." 13). (Cf also points b) and c) above).

In our case studies, we have noted that many bastis house fresh migrants who live in rented accommodation (Cf Chapter VIII, passim, and Table IX.3.2.2.) This fact reflects how small savings are invested productively in the house itself.

".....original settlers, seeking secondary sources of income who subdivide and sublet their property in part." 14).

- 11) Lewis, O., 1952, p. 40.
- 12) Howton, F.W., 1969, p. 431
- 13) Rosser, K.C., 1972, p. 182.
- 14) Turner, J.F.C., 1969-A, p. 41.

e) Security.

In our study of the background of differences found between houses in goths and colonies, we have demonstrated how important the house is to squatters as a source of security. (Cf Tables VII.3.3.1.6.2/3/4).

"In cities where many are unemployed, where the majority of the employed are either underemployed or underpaid, and where few enjoy any institutionalized forms of social security, home ownership is very often the only practical way in which the majority secure their socio-economic status and maintain their expectations." 15).

"Investments made in the expansion and improvement of a dwelling unit accrue as capital to the family. Not only is realty capital formation one of the few inflation hedges available to urban low income families, but families also benefit from realty appreciation values stemming from rapid urban growth." 16).

f) Simple technology.

From our description of house types in Chapter V, it is apparent that building of most of the types of houses requires a simple technology, that is common knowledge. (17). This is one of the main factors that make for the capability of mass application and keeps prices relatively low. Mostly, the building can be done by the owners themselves or by informal contractors.

g) Mobility.

Figures found in several of our case studies indicate that the basti population is rather mobile. The variety in location, in sorts of bastis and of dwellings and in modes of occupancy provides for the low-income groups a scale of options, from which they can select whatever best suits their needs and means at a certain moment. It is remarkable that considerable percentages of the population of developing bastis improved their situation by moving from one basti to another. (Cf Table VIII.4.1.1.1.). Another reason for mobility is the desire to live near to the place of work. To the low-income groups, mobility is probably one of the weapons against poverty.

Besides, this fact no doubt has important consequences for the transport situation in the metropolis.

15) Turner, J.F.C., and R. Goetze, 1967, p. 126.

16) Vernez, G., 1976, p. 10.

17) Cf Kessler, E. and S., 1974, p. 276.

"They (i.e. the bastis, JL) provide the means to the bustee dwellers of a very considerable physical mobility within the urban area in search of employment, and through their ubiquitous location, the opportunity of finding accommodation in close proximity to the work place." 18).

h) Freedom.

Within the strict limitations imposed by illegal dwelling and by belonging to low-income groups, curiously enough the inhabitants of spontaneous settlements enjoy a number of privileges that - in the Western world - seem to be exclusive to the upper class. As such, we may mention:

- 1) freedom of community self selection (19).
- 2) freedom to budget one's own resources (19).
- 3) freedom to shape one's own environment (19) and self expression (20).

The freedom of community self-selection is mostly exercised in the shape of clustering of traditional groups. On several occasions, however, we came across the opposite phenomenon: people who wanted to escape their traditional class and caste stigma and who therefore settled in colonies not so stigmatized.

Freedom of budgetting is evident enough: the basti house builders rely upon themselves. No decision to invest in improvements or extensions of the house is imposed.

The freedom of creativity and expression is being enjoyed by many basti-dwellers, as can be seen for example in the fact that almost every single house has its own individual specialities in design, specialities geared to the taste and the needs of the family that lives in it.

"This place is somewhat crowded and it is difficult to get sufficient fresh air. That is why I made this queer shaped roof. I designed it with the help of my neighbour. We built it together. See how nicely it works." (it was a pointed roof, of which the upper half of one side could be moved on hinges, JL) (Interview Usmania Mahajir Colony).

"This room (on top of the living room in a 37 square yard plot, JL.) I made when my daughters grew up and we felt need of having a separate guest room. The room was built by a contractor. The mosaics in the floor I made of pieces of tiles that I had collected from a garbage dump." (Interview Jamshed Road II).

XI.2.1.2. Negative aspects of slum clearance.

In the first place, it should be noted that with the removal of spontaneous settlements, most of the above mentioned positive aspects will also disappear.

18) Rosser, K.C., 1972, p. 186.

19) Turner, J.F.C., 1959-A, p. 43.

20) Emery, P.A., 1963, p. 269.

In the second place, economically, there are enormous disadvantages in destroying dwellings - however poor they may be - when there is a shortage of dwellings and financial means are scarce.

As the people who have been forcibly removed will have to live somewhere, alternative accommodation will have to be built and invested money in it either by the government or by the dwellers. This implies increased pressure on the building- and capital market. Additional problems arise when large groups of people have to be resettled, because in that case all kinds of facilities will also be needed, facilities for which in the old settlement mostly some solution existed.

We may mention schools, transport, medical facilities, the physical infrastructure. 21).

"The destruction of jhuggi dwellings represents a drain upon available resources and results in worsening of the overall housing situation. " 22).

In the third place, we may mention a point that to some extent has been dealt with under the positive aspects of spontaneous settlements.

This concerns the new experimental forms evolving in autonomous settlements, forms we know very little about as yet, but which may contain many a lesson for planners and architects (especially Western educated).

Particularly as we know so little about them and also because we know that the alternatives tried hitherto are far from ideal solutions, we might hope to learn from these forms and, therefore, be careful not to destroy them hastily.

One example in the Karachi situation may be the multipurpose function of streets, hardly ever achieved in any of the planned settlements we know in Karachi. In many of the bastis, streets are closed to traffic (sometimes even to pedestrians), and used for apparently more relevant purposes: gathering places for men and/or women, market corners, teashops, places where infants can play safely, where the laundry is washed or dried, or simply as outdoor extensions of the house, etc.

Some of the uses of streets require that the street can be easily covered against sunlight. For this and similar reasons the optimal street width - for instance - might be quite different from traditionally prescribed widths that are based on much narrower concepts of the use of streets.

21) A tentative calculation of such costs has been made for Usmania Mahajir Colony, JRP-IV, 1975-A, pp. 109-113.

22) MPD, 1974, p. 35.

Two quotations may further clarify what kind of promise may be hidden in the autonomous settlements.

"Accepting that social change to Western forms in emerging countries is neither inevitable nor desirable, I assume that the rich variety of cultures, value systems, and life styles typical of most developing countries, will survive.

There is a link between culture and built forms, and the forms of the physical environment can be supportive or destructive of life styles, values, systems and cultures.

The stress in most housing design has been based on health, climatic, economic and technological criteria, but this is too limited, and in many cases absolute housing and planning standards are extremely questionable.

Variables related to traditional social organization, family structures, symbolic values, cultural definitions of environment quality and the like should be considered, and there is a need to see housing in the broadest social context - what could be called the cultural ecology of housing." 23).

"The true significance of the squatters is not that they exist, but that they exist independently of the imposed colonial legal system which dominates the environment and life style of those in the authorized housing areas.

By being outside the law, they have shown the irrelevance of the law. They are evolving a new way of living that is related to Africa, and not to local authority by-laws evolved in 19th century Britain.

Zambia is always complaining about the overshadowing of traditional culture by the West and there is an inferiority complex about traditional values.

The "European" house in the "European" street is regarded by most, both educated and uneducated, as the proper solution, while ignoring completely the implications of this approach.

By contrast, the squatters are extending traditional values into a new situation and participating in the evolution of a relevant urban culture. Without consciously laying out their townships, but by using commonly understood laws of human rights and needs they have evolved a planning philosophy that is based firmly on traditional values, modified to suit urban conditions." 24).

Finally, it should be noted that the basti dwellers themselves realize very well the disadvantages of "slum clearance". For one reason or another they prefer living in a neighborhood comparable to that they have been removed from, rather than locating where the Government wants them to. As a result, in slum clearance, no problem is solved, but problems get geographically shifted from one place to another.

23) Rapoport, A., 1973, p. 145.

24) Andrews, P., M. Christie and R. Martin, 1973, p. 25.

"(regarding Karachi) KDA notes that about 50% of the households leave the open plot site after resettlement." 25). 26).

"(the squatters) take the monetary compensation which the Government offers as an alternative and move to another down town area (in Bangkok). Many of those who are scheduled for resettlement never reach their destination, but are soon back on Djakarta streets." 27).

XI.2.1.3. The impossibility of other alternatives.

a) the provision of cheap land.

In Chapter I, we have already described the government's attempts to resettle basti dwellers in the so called "Plot townships" and in Korangi and New Karachi. (Cf. I.2.2.).

In addition, in Chapter IX, we found that the stagnating bastis have a low security level and might be demolished. The stagnating bastis especially house people who - from the government's point of view - might be the most eligible for resettlement.

In IX.3.3.b., however, we found indications that several of the stagnating bastis house "the adjusted poor", people who have lowly paid and/or irregular jobs and therefore have a high preference for living in places that minimize transport costs and/or that maximize the chances of finding employment.

"I have no fixed job, and therefore I want to live in the centre of the city." (Interview Naddiabad).

Experience in other places supports this view.

"The provision of cheap land located far from the centres of employment does not represent a solution for most residents of slums and uncontrolled settlements. 28).

"There is a need to take a hard second look at the government's program of relocating squatters and slum dwellers to such places as Sapang Palay..... More than 55 per cent of the people relocated to Sapang Palay have moved out of the area." 29).

"In 1956, the..... Corporation made available..... 166 hectares at Kamarin..... 25 km. from Manila, for more squatter relocation. This project was demarcated to accommodate 3.542 families. by 1965 less than 100 families remained whilst the remainder had returned to live in other squatter colonies throughout Manila." 30).

25) MPD, 1974, p. 145.

26) cf. also Onibokun, A., 1972, pp. 51 and 56.

27) Poethig, R.P., 1971, pp. 121-122.

28) U.N., 1971, p. 106.

29) Laquian, A.A., 1969, p. 223.

30) Juppenlatz, M., 1970, p. 34.

In this connection, it should also be noted that "cheap" is a rather elastic concept. Caused by the high service level, reportedly, plots in the so called "Metroville" - a site and service project - cost around Rs 40/.. per square yard. For the really poor, this price is absolutely prohibitive. (cf I.2.2.f).

b) low cost flats.

We have already explained above that "low cost flats" in Jacob Lines cost more than the average inhabitant of this area can afford.

Reportedly, the cheapest flats (two rooms), built on a no-profit basis, cost around Rs 30,000/--, an amount that cannot be paid by a large group of families having an income between Rs 150/-- and Rs 450/-- per month, even when favourable hire-purchase, or hire- conditions are introduced.

"High density tenements cost two or three times as much as ordinary one story houses , and five to six times as much as self help units with more space and equal sanitary facilities." 31).

Besides, even more than other imposed solutions, the flats may pose serious adaption problems. Low cost flats that were previously built in Karachi, appear to be in a process of "slummification". 32).

"Furthermore, as a general rule, the popular housing programs implemented hitherto, provide accommodation endowed with more amenities than are consistent with the economic situation of their future occupants, so that not only such housing is too expensive, but problems arise in connexion with social adjustment to a new environment." 33).

One of the experts of the Master Plan Department indicates that flats are not a good solution for low income groups, in view of the agrarian background of many in this group, the impossibility of keeping animals, carrying on home-industries and cooking in the open for flat dwellers. 34). From interviews, we noted that many hawkers resisted the idea of living in a flat because of the impossibility of keeping their push carts with them. More significantly to poor families, an open place is very important during the hot season. Many informants reported that they expected they would have to use an electric fan, if they were obliged to live in a flat. Other disadvantages anticipated regard lack of privacy (pardah!), amongst other things. (35).

31) Bauer-Wurster, C., 1962, p. 285.

32) Cf Weijs, M.H., 1975, pp. 46-53.

33) Hauser, P.M., 1961, p. 63.

34) van Huyck, A.P., 1972.

35) Cf also Weijs., M.H., 1975, p. 37, and JRP-IV, 1975-A, p. 98.

Generally, it seems as though flats presently being built reflect Western values to a great extent. These values are less relevant in Karachi.

Contrary to common belief, flats do not compare favourably with many spontaneous settlements in respect of density.

The density calculated in Usmania Mahajir Colony - 650 per acre - cannot be attained in low cost flats. Significantly, in this colony, a majority of the population found the present population density acceptable and chose flats as the least appealing alternative form of housing. 36).

c) low cost houses.

In low cost houses, some of the disadvantages mentioned under a) and b) are combined. In Karachi, even when subsidized, the houses provided turned out to be too expensive.

"During the past efforts have been made to clear these slums but this experience has not been successful. The slum dwellers when moved to a new subsidized house either did not properly clear their payments or made illegal deals with other parties and sold the houses.

Besides, the real standard of living in a new colony deteriorated since the residents had to bear heavy transportation costs because of isolated locations of such townships.

The slumclearance approach which means bulldozing the jhuggies and carting the residents far away from their work to Government built quarters has created more problems than it has solved. 37).

"The fourth plan (1969-74) observes that "the experience of public housing so far is that its unit cost is high and that with the constraint of resources it is not possible for public operations to touch even a fringe of the problem." (regards India, J.L.) 38).

d) the economic impossibility.

In I.2.1., we have already noted that most low-income people cannot afford to find shelter in the formal private house market and hardly from the government "low-cost" house market.

In I.2.2., we noted that for financial reasons, the government was unable to continue its "low-cost" housing programs in Korangi and North Karachi.

"it was estimated that three quarters of the urban families belonged to lower income groups and could not afford even to rent a modest dwelling at an economic rent." 39).

"We were given a quarter in New Karachi on rent, but after some time, I fell ill and we had no savings, so after a few months

36) JRP-IV, 1975-A, pp. 74, 75 and 92.

37) Salimullah, Ch., G.M. Samdani, C.A. Qawi and A. Hussein, 1973.

38) Bose, A., 1973, p. 227.

39) Pakistan Conference of social work, 1966, p. 8.

we had to leave that house and now we are back in a "kachchi basti" again." (interv. Kausar Niazi Colony).

"The government has never been able to obtain satisfactory recoveries from its public housing stock. In Korangi and North Karachi, only 7 karor have been realized and Rs 11.62 karor are in default despite of the fact that both of these projects were heavily subsidized. 40).

e) the quantitative impossibility.

From our review of the governments's attempts to provide alternative solutions to squatter housing, it is clear that all these attempts have been deficient quantitatively. (Cf I.2.2.).

"The government has tried for many years to resettle population from jhuggi areas. Over 10.000 jhuggi-huts have been removed, but still their number is increasing. The CSO estimates that there were approximately 800.000 persons living in unauthorized jhuggis in 1972." 41).

Comparison of the estimates of a "Metroville program" with what is really happening, reveals that quantitatively too this program is a failure so far, apart from all the other shortcomings of the program (Cf I.2.2.).

"It has been spelled out in the Housing Programme of the Karachi Development Plan 1974 - 1985, that about 40.000 dwelling units will be required for housing 200.000 persons added to the city each year according to rather modest population projections. It demands annually 4 metrovilles for 50.000 persons each to accommodate the additional population alone. Proper housing for the already existing 1 million squatters may require at least one more metroville per year under the slum improvement programme. To meet the statistical need, 5 metrovilles must be planned, developed, built and fully occupied by the ultimate planned population of 50.000 persons each, within each year....." 42).

The first, and as yet only, metroville took about three years to come about and had not housed a single inhabitant after these years, up to the end of 1976:

"For many years to come, it is very unlikely that the volume of new public housing for the needy sections of the population will be equal to the task of making up the arrears as well as coping with an increasing urban population." 43).

f) the economic-cum-quantitative impossibility: the problem of subsidies. As a principle, the low paying capacity of low income groups could be complemented by subsidies. However, the scale on which this would have to be done, a priori excludes this possibility to any great extent.

40) MPD, 1974, p. 178.

41) MPD, 1974, p. 183.

42) MPD, 1975, p. 1.

43) Barve, S.G., 1962, p. 356.

The disadvantages of subsidies can be summarized as follows:

1. The need is so extensive that only limited application is possible.
2. The need increases, but the funds do not revolve. As a result fresh funds will be continuously required.
3. There is always a tendency to keep subsidies at a minimum. As a result, again a marginal or sub-marginal situation is being created.
4. There is a tendency to misuse subsidies, especially when these are given for things that can be resold in the free market. 44).

g) The impossibility of technical solutions. In Karachi, as far as we know, never was any invention of the Building Research Stations happily adopted by low income people. If such inventions occur at all, their application is limited to Government sponsored pilot projects or schemes. 45)

"There has been a quite pointless research for technological solutions to the problem of shelter. The cheapest form of a house or shell has already been discovered by the people who have their backs to the wall of harsh economic reality. One of the biggest crimes is the failure to recognize that there is no alternative to the self-constructed shelter." 45).

XI.2.1.4. The positive response to improvement in existing settlements.

We can be brief with this subject. Many quotations in support of the idea that basti dwellers do respond to Government action in improvement, have already been given throughout this study. (Cf. e.g. IV.1.2.)

Figures, case histories and quotations from interviews throughout the study demonstrate clearly how eager the squatters are to improve their housing conditions.

"The apparent paradox of simultaneous existence of bankrupt, or rapidly desintegrating low income housing projects and rapidly developing squatter settlements in the same city, and occupied by people with the same characteristics is difficult to explain if conventional premises are upheld. The resistance of families to pay for or even to maintain subsidized housing projects is baffling to the observer with conventional views when confronted with the fact that the same families make extraordinary sacrifices in the building of their own homes. However, ... the self sacrificing squatter builders are in fact either achieving what they want, or - if falling short of this - they are making the best of a situation for which they take full responsibility." 46).

"In an economy of scarcity, the mass of the common people, though poor, possess the bulk of the nation's human and material

44) van Huck, A.P. 1972.
 45) Rosser, K.C., 1971-8, p. 293, cf also Nierstrasz, F.H.J., 1976.
 46) Turner, J.F.C., 1972, p. 155

resources for housing. Their collective capacity for small savings and their collective enterpreneurial and manual skill (and their spare time) far surpass the financial and administrative capacity of even the most highly planned and centralized institutional system, whether dominated by the state or by private corporations." 47).

"The greatest available resource is the spare time of the people and this should be the basis of their investment." 48).

"Perhaps, most important, its people have the capacity to improve their own conditions. Even low income households, once they have a footing, will often progress from katchha hut to semi-pakka house..... Karachi's people are perhaps the greatest untapped asset." 49).

XI.2.2. Some principal conclusions and further implications.

From the above, four main conclusions can be drawn:

1. "The housing gap will continue into the foreseeable future and thus new slums and shanty settlements will continue to be created to meet the need of the numerically dominant low income groups." 50).

"The test of any proposed solution to the low cost shelter problem will be whether or not it is capable of mass application to meet the needs of all low income people." 51). 52).
2. It cannot be denied that living in spontaneous settlements entails a significant number of positive aspects.

Results of attempts to withdraw autonomous settlements have been disappointing, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Alternative solutions do not appear to give any positive results.

Improvement of existing spontaneous settlements can bank on an enormous potential for improvement and, indeed, provokes positive reactions from the residents of these settlements. It appears to make an optimum use of the population's saving- and investment capacities.

"Thus we find that there exist, in this country, in fact there have always existed in this country, solutions at a price which the people can afford.

In other words, we do not really have a problem of low-cost housing. What exists is a problem of land-use planning. 53).
- Therefore, we may conclude that the existing housing stock must be preserved as far as possible.
3. When bringing about improvements in existing spontaneous settlements, a first, indispensable step of crucial importance is the assurance

47) Turner, J.F.C., 1972, p. 157.

48) Benninger, C., 1972, p. 163.

49) MPD, 1974, p. 24.

50) Rosser, K.C., 1971-A, p. 129.

51) Van huyck, A.P., 1968, p. 88.

52) It is of interest to compare this statement with KDA's proposal of 1969 to imprison squatters (Cf II.2., last quotation).

53) Carrea, C.M., 1972, p. 2.

of the right of dwelling - in whatever shape - to the inhabitants, if the initiative, the investments and cooperation of the inhabitants is required.

4. Regarding priorities in improvement, on the basis of the previous paragraphs, we may say that all improvements of individual dwellings can be left to the inhabitants themselves. As a result, the Government can limit its activities to a great extent, and - as a consequence - can reach a much larger part of the population than would be the case should the Government try to improve individual houses as well.

"Even in this situation we would like to go on living here; you can well imagine how much more we would like it, if we got the land and some improvements were brought in. They can give us the land: it is no use anyway. ("faltu"). Then, let them - after a year - see the improvements we can bring about ourselves. They will see that at least 80% of the houses will be pakka (probably meaning types IV and V, JL); we will have gutters and whatever we can provide for ourselves. We are willing to pay taxes. From that money the Government can give us the improvements we cannot bring about ourselves. So, it does not cost anything to the Government." (interv. Ajab Khan Colony).

"The choice is between the provision of infrastructure for many and the provision of infrastructure plus housing for a few." 54).

"Major and rapid improvements in the living conditions of slum-dwellers can be achieved through well organized programs of environmental improvement without replacing existing housing units." 55).

"A program of basti improvement must be devised to bring the basic amenities of sanitation and environmental decency to the hundreds of thousands of basti dwellers who must remain in their present bastis for many years to come." 56).

An important implication of the four above points is that the existing situation in spontaneous settlements is to be accepted as a starting point for any program of improvement and not a theoretical, supposedly - ideal situation.

Accepting the existing situation as a starting point does not only imply the acceptance of bastis as they happen to exist, but - perhaps more importantly even - it also implies the acceptance of the informal system that gives rise to the birth and growth of these low-income settlements. We have already quoted (in VIII.3.2.2.) an officer who rightly stated he could not compete with the "Pathans" - meaning the middlemen in the settlement process in several bastis with a start in their development. From the case studies, it appears that whatever attempts are made by the

54) Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization, 1956, p. 88.

55) Van Huyck, A.P. and K.C. Rosser, 1957, p. 11.

56) Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization, 1956, p. 91.

authorities, the informal delivery system takes its own course.

Alternative solutions thus far offered - as we have briefly reviewed them in Chapter I - do not seem to cater for the quantitative needs in any case and the qualitative needs in most cases.

It is worth noting that from the alternative solutions offered, the least unsuccessful ones are those that most resemble the informal system. In short, we may say that the housing needs of low-income people in Karachi are catered for by an informal system that in the circumstances works reasonably well. It works better than any alternative thus far tried and whatever the attempts are made it could not be stopped.

Given these facts, the authorities would do well if they were to accept the system and the situation and try to accompany and guide the process rather than first oppose it and later "run behind the facts" which as we noted in several of our case studies is what commonly happened.

The acceptance of the system gives a basic guideline not only for the upgrading of existing settlements, but also for the planning of the future settlement of more low-income people.

The role of the government does not appear to be "competing with the Pathans", nor leaving them completely on their own, but rather cooperating with them even more than is presently being done in an informal way.

"Institutional involvement must not threaten but must respect the existing rules and systems.

It must be seen as a support system, not a corrective.

The residents must have an executive role, and must be given responsibility for taking decisions.

This intervention must be seen as a means of accelerating the development along an existing continuum, not as a first or final stage in enforcing a certain level of official standards." 57).

We cannot elaborate much on all the implications of this acceptance.

What we can do is to raise a few questions. It is not up to us to answer them. Regarding answers to the questions we raise, we can - on the basis of our study - note some options, the list of which may be extended.

The questions we raise are to be answered by planners, administrators and politicians. When - in the following paragraphs - we pay some attention to these answers, this is only to give orientation to thoughts.

What we can give beyond the raising of questions are merely suggestions, options and possibilities.

Besides, it should be noted that the questions we raise and the options we note are all geared to the existing socio-economic and political situation in Pakistan, and the present and anticipated migration pattern.

57) Martin, R., 1976, p. 233.

The main problems, then, to which solutions have to be found, are: the standards problem, problems of land policy, the problem of stagnating bastis, problems of decision making, problems of finance, problems of execution, and problems of the future settlement of more people in new low-income settlements.

XI.2.3. The standards problem.

When accepting the existing situation as a starting point, regarding standards, two immediate questions are:

- a) what is the aspired level of improvements?
- b) what is the acceptable minimum level of improvements?

It should be noted that both the maximum aspired and the minimum acceptable are to be found between the actual and the ideal situation. As such, accepting of one of these optima already is much more realistic than what was usual in Karachi until recently.

Still, fixing of such an optimum remains problematic as long as one insists on all kinds of standards.

In a development plan for Lyari (a huge complex of bastis in Karachi's centre, with a population of around 600,000) it was stated that approximately 30% of the population would have to move to other places for the execution of this plan. 58).

Upon revision of this plan, it appeared that this percentage could be reduced to 3 - 5%, without affecting the level of facilities (water, drainage, garbage disposal, electricity, etc.) 59).

"The setting of minimum standards means that fewer houses get built and the lucky (i.e. the relatively rich, JL) few get houses at the cost of the unlucky many." 60).

"The only basic standards which can be significantly and realistically sought and maintained in the situation of the Calcutta type, are not those of the single house but those of the public services and environmental sanitation." 61).

The point in the above quoted case of Lyari is that a distinction has to be made between figurative and real minimum standards. The figurative standards only facilitate the provision of certain facilities.

Real minimum standards are those standards below which it is technically impossible to provide such facilities.

58) KMC, 1969-1971.

59) KMC, 1975.

60) Ewing, J.R., 1969, p. 1591.

61) Rosser, K.C., 1971-A, p. 129.

A good example of this is the minimum street width based on figurative minimum standards as proposed in 1969-1971 for Miran Naka. 62).

This width was considered necessary for the provision of sewers.

Upon reconsideration of the plan, it appeared that technical solutions could be used to greatly reduce the minimum street width. These solutions, no doubt, entail somewhat higher expenses in the execution of the plan, but these increased expenses are more than outweighed by the advantages (financial and otherwise) of leaving as many dwellings as possible undisturbed. 63).

Beside the weighing of figurative and real standards, an important point is the flexibility of standards.

A good example of this can be found in the proposals for improvement of Usmania Mahajir Colony (64). In this basti, the existing street width does not allow house to house connections to a sewer system for all the houses of the basti. The plan for this basti proposes a sewerage system for the (greater) part of the basti where this is possible, and a system of septic tanks plus soakpits for those plots where connection to the sewerage system is technically too difficult.

Another controversial minimum standard regards plot sizes.

As in the case of facilities (regarding sewers, cf history of Angara Goth, VIII.3.5.1.1.) also here the practice is far ahead of discussions at the official level. When discussions were held on the decision whether a minimum plot size of 80 or 60 square yards would be acceptable, the inhabitants of Asif Colony - and many more bastis - (Cf VIII.3.5.2.1.) had already subdivided their 80 square yard plots. Apparently, it is the basti dwellers who have discovered empirically that a family can decently live on a 40 square yards plot. Experience from elsewhere teaches the same conclusion. It should be noted for example that in Bombay pitches of 15' x 10' are considered fit for habitation. 65).

"In view of the pressure on land in New Delhi the size of the plot was reduced to 25 square yards." 66).

"With regard to space standards in Government resettlement projects in Hong Kong (until recently 24 square feet per person), the fact that there is as yet no evidence that the high densities involved have led to the kinds of breakdown that sociological theory would postulate is of great significance. 67).

62) KMC, 1969-1971.

63) Chughtai, R.A., c.s., 1975, drawings 83 and 86.

64) JAP-IV, 1975-A, pp. 135-137. Cf also Kiestra, H., 1975.

65) Greater Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1972, p. 3.

66) Planning Commission New Delhi, undate, p. 2.

67) Dwyer, D.J., 1974, p. 215.

"This space including two rooms and a verandah or courtyard along with the wall thickness, would work out to a total plinth area of about 250 square feet or 28 yards." 68).

"The standard proposed (in an mimeographed report, Ecafe, Bangkok, 1/VIII/'60, p. 47) for the gross area of a house is 40 square meters (= 47.8 square yard, JL.). Such a house will be presumably meant for a family of the average size of, say, 5 or 6. In the context of the existing housing situation in the countries of the Ecafe region, this standard looks like almost unattainable." 69).

All this is not to advocate minimum plots as an ideal. The point we want to make is that discussions on what is an acceptable minimum could better start on the practical knowledge of what is being done and what is acceptable to the people who actually live on these plots, rather than on any theoretical standards.

So far about the acceptable minimum.

Regarding the desirable maximum, first of all, basti improvement should be considered a process rather than an instant development.

It is completely in line with the trends discovered - or rather confirmed: there is evidence from all over the world that Karachi is by no means a unique case - and it is also in line with what can be expected if the basti dwellers take a main part of the improvement on their shoulders, to view it as a process.

The history of bastis - even those with initial partial development - shows that there is a natural, gradual development from scrap to a decent environment. In none of the 251 bastis was an instant development found. This is a natural course of events, as low income people cannot possibly be expected to invest large sums in their houses or environment all at once. All the time, there seems to be a balance between needs (that may change over time) and means.

When considering further improvements, there is no reason to deviate from this way of doing things; a way that appears to be quite efficient.

In view of this, it is important that plans for improvement of bastis leave room for further improvements in the future.

The proposals for improvement of Usmania Mahajir Colony may again illustrate this:

"It has to be clear that these measures are not intended to make the existing situation fixed but to create possibilities for a steady improvement." 70).

68) Rao, D.V.R., 1974, p. 60.

69) Sovani, N.V., 1966, p. 22.

70) JRP-IV, 1975-A, p. 137.

In this connection, one of the proposals is that the Government retain a first right of acquisition in case any inhabitant leaves the colony.

At every moment, the level of development is determined only by what the inhabitants want and can pay for.

In view of the enormous scale - both in space and time - on which improvement plans will have to be executed, and also in view of the disadvantages (and impossibility) of subsidizing, improvement plans will have to be based on the principle of cost recovery by the inhabitants.

As we are not expert on finance, we cannot go into much detail regarding the cost recovery. However, from the experience gained in this study, it seems to be of importance to note a few main points.

In the case of purely technical facilities, like the provision of water, sewers, etc., the expenses will have to be recouped directly from the inhabitants. To some extent, these items are incremental. One could imagine the situation where the residents of one poor basti are not able or willing to pay for house-to-house connections. A few standpipes would do in such a case - at least for the time being. When needs and means change, the number of standpipes can be increased, and finally, house-to-house connections may be provided.

In the same way, waste water disposal can be partly catered for by open drains until there are means and reasons for a greater perfection.

Moreover, in some cases, the definition of an area to be improved can be adjusted so that cross-subsidizing within the area is possible.

In the case of less obvious items, like schools, hospitals etc., it will have to be seen how far costs can - in the long run - be recovered, e.g. by anticipated higher revenues from taxes etc. Some kind of economic basis for the investments will be required because of the tremendous scale on which the improvements are needed.

It is of special importance to point to this principle of cost recovery, as there seems to be a tendency to deviate from it, for whatever reasons.

We may refer to the example quoted in VIII.3.5.1.1., where the inhabitants of Angara Goth refuse to pay higher prices for the land than what is being charged in Lyari. If in any basti uneconomic prices are charged, this may prove to be disastrous for the development of innumerable other bastis, or for municipal finance.

Regarding the desirable level of improvement, it is, finally, important to note that a fixed maximum standard (especially of plot sizes, possibly also of facilities) may be a good instrument for keeping low-income settlements out of the sphere of interest of middle- and high income groups,

and with it, keeping the land prices lower than would be possible should better off groups start competing in the land market.

Another possibility is the imposition of strongly discriminating taxes on housing above a certain standard.

In conclusion, we may circumscribe the points that should rule solutions to the standards problem in the following terms:

Standards will not be fixed to an ideal solution, but rather will fluctuate in between an acceptable minimum and a desirable maximum.

Regarding the acceptable minimum:

- a) the only significant standards regard public services and environmental sanitation.
- b) a distinction is to be made between figurative and real minima.
- c) flexibility.

Regarding the desirable maximum:

- a) incrementability.
- b) cost recovery.
- c) a fixed maximum which protects the settlement against the effects of competition of higher income groups.

XI.2.4. Land policy.

As stated earlier, the recognition of the right of dwelling of inhabitants of autonomous settlements is a basic condition for any attempt to achieve improvement of such settlements.

"The right of dwelling, however, does not necessarily imply ownership of land." 71).

This point is of great importance, because in a rapidly growing city like Karachi, land prices rise enormously. So, land is an interesting object for speculation (Cf VIII.4.1.1.; VIII.3.2.2.1.; and Chapter X, passim).

Not only may this stimulate "professional squatting", which does not seem to assume disquieting proportions in Karachi (Cf VIII.3.5.2.1.), but another result is that the owners of the land get bids for the land, varying from attractive to fantastic.

On the one hand, this impedes the legalization of several bastis:

"We cannot allot the area to the inhabitants: the land is our gold." (a high government officer).

On the other hand, the result will be that the poorest sections of the population especially are pushed towards the periphery of the city.

As we have already explained, especially the poorest people perforce have a preference for living in the city centre. (Cf VIII.3.2.2. and IX.3.3.b.)

71) Havlik, L., 1974, p. 3. Cf also van der Harst, 1974-A.

From a land policy, we may expect that it not only recognizes the right of dwelling in the desert, but also actively applies this right in the city. "Pure gold" is a false argument: if it is considered important or necessary, land can be withdrawn from the influence of the free market mechanism, e.g. for the building of a hospital, for laying out a park, etc. In exactly the same way, it can be decided what priority should be attached to central living of a certain, lowly paid, part of the population, a part that will also have to be actively protected against the forces of the free market, once this right of dwelling is applied.

A third reason why an active land policy is required, is to guarantee the incrementability of improvement plans which we mentioned in the previous paragraph.

Regarding the practice of a land policy, basic concepts appear to be the distinction between the right to dwell and the ownership of land; or between the ownership of land and the ownership of the use of land. Study and advice of experts on the subject is much required.

As yet, there is very little experience with different systems in Karachi. Leases for shorter periods than the usual 99 years (which de facto means ownership) may not be very effective if the experiences in Delhi Colony can be viewed as a yardstick in this respect. (Cf X.4.3.)

Other possibilities perhaps worth considering are: restricted transferability, fixed landprices linked to the service level, or a first right of acquisition by the government. Strongly discriminating taxation systems might be another possibility, linked to taxes that check speculation. Also the fixing of maximum standards to which we referred above, should be mentioned in this connection.

In combination with this, still another possibility might be found in two-stage leases. A main problem is that relatively low prices of land in bastis exist thanks to their illegal character.

"This very illegality of sale eliminates demand from the middle- and higher-income groups, and keeps prices low." 72).

A recognition of the continuation of the existence of bastis will often cause land prices to rise. The case studies in legalized colonies (Cf Chapter X) confirm this. Thus, a mere institutionalization of the informal system could well cause it to collapse.

The idea of two-stage leases is that a provisional, or "kachcha" lease can be given against a low price. The "kachcha" lease intitles the occupant of a plot to dwell upon it and to improve his house up to a certain,

72) Sudra, T.L., 1976, p. 349.

defined level. Once the dwelling is being improved beyond this level, the full market value of the land is chargeable, in exchange for a normal, or "pakka" lease.

Whatever possibility or combination of possibilities (73) is selected, it can bank on one main asset:

"Karachi is one of the very few urban areas which retains public ownership of extensive amounts of land. But this extraordinary asset is not used to guide urban growth or urban development patterns." 74).

Especially in view of this "extraordinary asset", it appears that much can be done to safeguard the rights of the poor sections of the population, who are - after all - legitimate citizens of Pakistan and Karachi.

XI.2.5. Problems of decision; stagnating bastis.

As we have explained in IX.2.4., there are a few bastis that do not lend themselves to improvement. They include a few of stagnating bastis in localities that are inescapably destined to other purposes: courses of rivers, railway lines, etc. In the long run these bastis will have to disappear, and most of the inhabitants realize this very well.

Again, we want to stress that a majority of the stagnating bastis are not inherently beyond improvement. The examples given of Usmania Mahajir Colony, Abdul Jabbar Compound and the Jacob Lines Complex prove this sufficiently. Regarding stagnating bastis that will have to disappear, much caution is required when alternative solutions are considered. If there is any relevant characteristic of the stagnating bastis, most probably this is the weak economic position of the inhabitants (Cf IX.3.2.b).). In view of this weak position, the location of the habitat especially of these inhabitants is of the utmost importance.

At present, when stagnating bastis are demolished, alternative accommodation is (mostly) offered to the inhabitants. This accommodation is located, almost without exception, in far off places like Korangi, New Karachi, Orangi. In view of the function of at least a number of the stagnating bastis - viz. housing the economically weakest sections of the low income groups - this does not appear to be a viable solution. As long as there is no better alternative, it would be better for these stagnating bastis to stay, lest the problem is simply geographically shifted from one place to the other, at the expense of investments made by the poorest sections of the population.

73) An extensive review of housing policy options is given in Grimes, Jr., O.F., 1976, pp. 91-103.

74) MPD, 1974, p. 179.

A much more complicated problem concerns the bastis that cannot be - or are not - legalized, but which evidently do not fit into the group of bastis that will have to disappear. As - on the one hand - the government is not able or willing to provide an alternative solution, but - on the other hand does not (yet) consider regularization of these bastis, a continued semi-legal situation exists, which, in our view, is very dangerous.

If it is not made clear explicitly to the inhabitants that they will have to move in the long run (e.g. through publication of alternative plans for the area), the inhabitants conclude a slowly increasing legality during time, even if "hope providing items" do not make their appearance. At the same time, there is much fear that the basti will be demolished some time. The situation in Usmania Mahajir Colony is an extremely clear example of this. (Cf IV.1.1.b).)

As a result of this ambiguous situation, the inhabitants do make investments in improving their houses (Cf IX.4.) but at the same time do not care too much about the lay-out of their basti. This is a situation where developments take place that, in a later stage, may stand in the way of further improvements.

Many bastis of Karachi show features characteristic of this situation, which is created by an apparatus that has to some extent recognized that slum clearance is not a viable solution, but on the other hand keeps on dreaming of the final disappearance of these settlements.

"The third approach, i.e. slum clearance & redevelopment is the ideal one which views slums as incompatible with well ordered urbanization. The main difficulties in this approach may be summarized as below:

- a) high costs of land acquisition and rehousing; inability of the slum dwellers to pay..... consequent restraints on expanding the size of the rehousing programme.
- b)reluctance of slum dwellers.....
- c)displacement of work opportunities.....
- d) The failure to follow-up slum clearance with redevelopment of the cleared land for alternative and more remunerative uses mainly due to financial reasons.

Despite these difficulties, there is still a strong case for continuing with the clearance approach." 75). (Underlining mine, JL).

The quotation does not refer to Karachi, but describes exactly what is happening in Karachi. We have already mentioned the Jacob Lines Scheme (XI.2.1.), the plan to rehouse 500.000. people in nucleus houses and flats (IV.2.1.) and the plan to create "at least one Metroville per year" for "proper housing for the already existing 1 million squatters" (XI.2.3.3).).

75) Planning Commission Delhi, undated p. 5.

These examples show how relevant a quotation from Delhi may be in Karachi! In stead of the de facto laissez-faire policy regarding these settlements, a general policy should be formulated, on the basis of which the inhabitants can conclude what are the prospects for their basti. On the one hand, this will prevent useless investments of individual dwellers in these settlements, on the other hand, it will enable the inhabitants of bastis with brighter prospects to direct their investments in a better way, especially if it is also made clear what conditions a basti should meet to qualify for regularization.

On the basis of our findings, we may state that all bastis that do not have to disappear for very obvious reasons (Cf IX.2.4.) should be considered for improvement.

The "socio-economic viability", in Karachi used as one of the criteria to the decision whether a basti should stay or not, appears to be a poor yardstick. Criteria to judge the socio-economic viability are unclear, when it regards settlements in which - after all - people do survive. The argument that squatters should not be "spoiled" by the provision of all kinds of facilities and rights, as this would provoke an increase of migration to the city, is probably not very valid.

"....it has been the general conclusion of researchers into rural-urban migration in the Southeast Asian region that the "push factors" have been the more significant in forcing migrants to the city.

For instance, Hauser reports that it is the push of people from the country side to the cities rather than the pull of industrial and employment opportunities in the urban areas." 76). 77).

"Much of Asia's recent urbanization has not occurred in response to an economic need for large urban population concentrations, that is, from employment opportunities in industrial development within the towns and cities. It has primarily been the result of "push" factors arising from the low level of rural development." 73)

Also in Karachi, we noted in many interviews that people keep on dreaming of a return to their home villages, and in a way, hate to live in Karachi, regardless of the condition of the basti. Opinions of women about living in Karachi, noted by Bos-Kunst, are fully confirmed in interviews we took from men:

"According to their stories, everything was better in the villages. They become almost lyrical about the moon and stars, which shine brighter in their native place.

They are convinced that they lived a healthier life in the country..... Moreover, they think that Karachi's climate is so bad... In the villages they were sure of the help of other villagers..." 79).

76) McGee, T.G., 1972, p. 109.

77) Hauser, P.M., 1957, p. 33.

78) Dwyer, D.J., 1964, p. 152.

79) Bos-Kunst, E., 1970, p. 35.

One quotation from an interview may complete the picture:

"What they, in Karachi, call water, we call plainly urine at home; so it is with everything here. The only thing is that there is no work at home." (interv. Pathan Colony).

Another problem in the field of decisions regards priorities.

In X.5. we concluded that local agencies charged with the execution of improvement and regularization programs in bastis tend to be "running behind the facts". The same tendency can be found from several of the case histories described in Chapter VIII.

As a result, there is a tendency of the local agencies to concentrate their attention on bastis that have achieved a de facto legal status already plus the corresponding level of physical development. Not only is it very difficult to change anything in such bastis - e.g. because of the pakka construction -, but it seems that in these bastis, it is much more difficult to bank on people's participation in an improvement programme.

The case histories of Chapter VIII suggest that the level of organization decreases, when the inhabitants have no more fear that they will be shifted. In the initial stages, there is an outspoken eagerness to cooperate with the authorities, to pay taxes and to contribute in the expenses for all kinds of improvements. In a final stage, apparently, the squatters feel strong enough to resist proposals from the Governments' side, e.g. regarding the rates for land to be charged.

Typically, in Delhi Colony, after years of efforts on the part of the inhabitants, very few came forward to apply for grants of lease, once it had been firmly decided that leases would be given. (Cf. X.4.1.).

The same thing happened in Lyari in recent years.

If the people's cooperation in improvement programmes is recognized as a main asset, it is advisable to make use of it at a stage when it is capable of the best results.

"The barriada governments have not lacked the usual trouble of municipal administrations including charges of corruption and factional splits. Moreover, their prestige and authority have declined as the need for community cohesion and defense against attacks from outside has been reduced." 80).

"..... it may be that what importance squatters attach to title depends on how threatened they feel without it." 81).

In view of this, it is strongly recommended that a generally applicable policy is formulated in which it is made clear

- a) which bastis cannot possibly qualify for legalization
- b) what requirements other bastis should meet (in terms of realistic minimum standards and of finance) to qualify for legalization.

80) Mangin, W., 1967-8, p. 27.

81) Michl, S., 1973, p. 160.

It may be anticipated that especially those bastis with a poor level of security and a poor level of physical development - and where as a consequence there is much scope for improvement and possibility of necessary reshaping - will be the first to make use of this possibility, and that the execution of improvement programmes will be greatly facilitated in such bastis.

XI.2.6. Problems of execution.

From our study, we may draw a few general conclusions regarding the execution of improvement programmes:

- a) authorities appear to be running behind the facts.
- b) improvement programmes appear to be undertaken under certain pressures on an ad hoc basis rather than in the framework of a general policy.
- c) all kinds of plans and regulations can be easily overruled.
- d) there are major problems in cost recovery (especially noticeable in rehousing schemes). In 1974, an officer of KDA estimated that this Authority had realized 11% of the due installments from resettlement projects (Cf also XI.2.1.3.d.).

The points a), b) and c) are strongly suggestive of the formulation of a generally applicable slum-policy, to be approved at the highest possible level, so as to reduce the possibility of overruling (any of) the regulations by opportunists.

Improvement programmes, if they are to be capable of implementation, should be simple. This implies a minimum of regulations (which always can be evaded) and a minimum of expense to the government.

This last point has already been dealt with above.

A minimum of regulations can fit very well in a general slum-policy. It should be noted that presently KMC is in the process of formulating, refining and experimenting with such a policy, in which concepts like people's participation, flexibility and incrementability form the basis of the thinking. 82).

Regarding the problems in the field of cost recovery, it is recommended that realizing installments could be done by either selected leaders in the bastis, or - preferably - by commercial institutions.

The last alternative especially may be a safeguard against overruling of previously fixed rates.

In view of the poor cost recoveries at the moment, a substantial percentage of the money to be collected can be spent on realizing the money and still guarantee better recovery to the executing agency.

82) KMC, 1976.

XI.2.7. Problems of future settlement of more low-income people in new settlements.

From our study (Cf e.g. I.2.2. and VIII.3.2.2.), it appears clear that the bastis with initial partial development are quite successful in catering for the needs of large groups of low-income people who can afford this step.

Much more than the Metroville, these "Pre-metrovilles" (83) are geared to the needs and potential of these groups, and in addition, they are capable of providing opportunity for shelter in the quantities required. Especially here, we may say that the system has proven itself cheap and efficient; "competing with the Pathans" is out of the question for local agencies that are overburdened already with the problems posed by a city growth that is practically unknown in the Western world.

So it is an almost ideal situation when others voluntarily take upon their shoulders the tasks that local agencies cannot perform as efficiently. Here, the role of the government is to give access to the elements needed (e.g. land on a "kachcha" lease, and, perhaps, water and transport in the initial stages) and to set the limits within which the game can be played.

To a certain extent, the government is doing this already.

Regarding the limits, what is still lacking is a provision for the reservation of land for future needs that can be anticipated: schools, hospitals, parks and playgrounds, etc.

Regarding the provision of elements, the question arises in what stage of development the unofficial sanction should be made official (albeit perhaps in a "kachcha" shape).

We may note a few facts that may guide thoughts on this problem.

- a) an official sanction can also entail some revenue to the government, which can be used for the provision of services needed.
- b) in view of the decreasing interest basti dwellers take in titles to the land and - in general - in cooperation with the government in improvement programmes (Cf case studies of Chapters VIII and X; cf also XI.2.5.) there is reason not to delay giving official sanction too long.
- c) as the official sanction may have very serious consequences for the prices of land and - as a result - for the very system that is the base of this kind of settlement, measures are needed to protect the prices of land.

83) the term is borrowed from an officer of KMC.

XI.3. A final remark.

Throughout this study, we have described and emphasized two important characteristics of the autonomous settlements of Karachi: in the first place their enormous potential for providing a solution to housing problems and in the second place their shortcomings and weaknesses which characterize the settlements as slums.

The terms "colony" and "basti" reflect these characteristics. (Cf III.1.3.3.) In this last chapter, we have enumerated the problems as they can be concluded from our study and we have noted some thoughts on how solutions to these problems might be found.

Basic to all optional solutions enumerated is the notion that the bastis themselves are the solution.

It is now up to the government's policy and politics to work with it. In Pakistan, there are large groups of deprived people. Deprived not only economically but also deprived of power in the decision-making processes. Throughout this study, we have tried to voice their preferences and potential. The way to many tentative solutions is clear.

Success will depend on the government's political will to respond.

SAMENVATTING.

Karachi is een stad met bijna 5 miljoen inwoners en een geschatte bevolingsgroei van 5% per jaar.

Ongeveer 75% van de bevolking van Karachi kan beschouwd worden te behoren tot de lage inkomens groepen. Deze groepen zijn praktisch uitgesloten van toegang tot de formele woning- en grond markt, alsook van het verkrijgen van crediet uit formele bronnen.

Zij wonen veelal illegaal in woningen die gebouwd en gefinancierd worden vanuit de informele sector, hetzij door de bewoner zelf, hetzij met behulp van informele netwerken, waarvan de bewoner gebruik kan maken. Woonwijken, die zo ontstaan zijn, worden autonome nederzettingen genoemd. In navolging van lokaal spraakgebruik, noemen we in deze studie zulke woonwijken "bastis".

Ondanks vele pogingen van overheidswege om deze bastis kaal te slaan en het ontstaan ervan tegen te gaan, neemt hun aantal toe en de geboden alternativen blijken in elk geval kwantitatief, en meestal ook kwalitatief te kort te schieten.

In deze studie wordt nu getracht een typologie te ontwerpen van bastis in Karachi en om aan de hand van deze typologie tot inzicht te komen in de dynamiek die deze vorm van nederzetting in Karachi eigen is.

De bastis van Karachi vallen grotendeels te vatten onder het begrip "slum", indien opgevat als: "een urbane nederzetting, waarin de woonomstandigheden van dien aard zijn, dat daardoor de lichamelijke gezondheid van de bewoners in gevaar gebracht wordt."

Onder de bastis van Karachi vallen zowel de zogenaamde "squatter settlements" (d.z. illegale nederzettingen van migranten) als de zogenaamde "goths" (d.z. passief geurbaniseerde dorpen).

Als leidraad voor het opstellen van een typologie wordt gebruik gemaakt van een model van Turner, die autonome nederzettingen indeelt aan de hand van twee variabelen, n.l. de zekerheid van het recht tot wonen en de fysieke ontwikkeling.

Om met dit model te kunnen werken worden schalen ontwikkeld, waarmee deze beide variabelen te meten zijn.

De zekerheid van het recht tot wonen wordt gemeten als deze zekerheid, zoals opgevat door de basti bewoners. Uit interviews blijkt, dat de bewoners deze zekerheid gemanifesteerd zien in de mate waarin de overheid in bepaalde diensten en faciliteiten voorziet in zo een wijk (b.v. reinigingsdienst, watervoorziening, etc.). Na inventarisatie blijken deze "hoop gevende

factoren" in een vaste volgorde op te treden. Uitgezet in een Guttman-scalogram, markeert dan de aanwezigheid van 0, 1, 2, 3 of 4 van deze factoren steeds een groep van bastis, die gekenmerkt wordt door een bepaalde graad van zekerheid van het recht tot wonen, vergeleken bij andere groepen.

Waar in de schaal van "zekerheid" reeds gebruik gemaakt is van het voorkomen van bepaalde publieke faciliteiten als indicatoren, wordt de fysieke ontwikkeling uitsluitend gemeten aan de hand van individuele woningen. In een aantal interviews is aan de basti bewoners gevraagd de in bastis gebruikelijke bouwmaterialen te rangschikken naar kwaliteit. Op grond van deze rangschikking kunnen woningen nu ingedeeld worden naar kwaliteit. Er worden zeven typen onderscheiden: I t/m VI en S.

Een simpele techniek om woning samples in bastis te nemen, blijkt redelijk te voldoen. Van elk van de 251 als zodanig herkende bastis in Karachi kan na inventarisatie nu een profiel opgesteld worden van de toestand van de woningen. Tevens wordt een index berekend die de woning toestand reflecteert.

De gevonden waarden voor zekerheid van het recht tot wonen en de indices van de toestand van de woningen kunnen nu samengebracht worden in een tabel, waaruit duidelijk de positieve correlatie tussen beide variabelen blijkt.

Deze correlatie geeft echter nog geen uitsluitel over de dynamiek: een basti die op de beide variabelen laag scoort en bovendien jong is, bevindt zich in een totaal andere positie dan een oude basti die laag scoort op beide variabelen. (Populair gezegd is het verschil vergelijkbaar met dat tussen een mens van drie maanden en één van dertig jaar, die geen van beiden kunnen lopen: in het eerste geval een gezond verschijnsel; in het tweede geval iets verontrustends, hoewel verbetering niet per se uitgesloten hoeft te zijn). Daarom wordt de leeftijd als derde variabele ingevoerd.

Op grond van deze drie variabelen kan nu beslist worden of een basti zich ontwikkelt, dan wel of ze stagneert in haar ontwikkeling.

De goths vormen op grond van hun leeftijd en ontstaanswijze een groep apart. De meerderheid van de goths is reeds een aantal generaties oud en de leeftijd kan dan ook nauwelijks als variabele gehanteerd worden binnen deze groep. De door de bewoners opgevatte graad van zekerheid van het recht tot wonen is, mede op grond van de leeftijd van de goths, hoog en leent zich ook nauwelijks tot gebruik als variabele.

De goths zijn dus alleen onder te verdelen op grond van hun fysieke

kenmerken. In deze studie is het gevonden percentage woningen van relatief hoge kwaliteit als maatstaf gebruikt. Er blijkt een patroon van toenemende percentages van zulke woningen in goths, naarmate deze dichter bij het centrum van de stad liggen.

Tevens valt bij vergelijking van de profielen van de toestand van de woningen in goths en in jongere autonome nederzettingen op, dat in de jongere bastis vrijwel steeds één type hoog scoort, en de andere typen lager naarmate ze verder van het hoog scorende type verwijderd zijn. Grafisch voorgesteld vertonen de woningtypen van de squatter settlements het patroon van een dromedaris-rug. De woningtypen in de goths daarentegen laten meestal het silhouet van een kamele-rug zien in grafische voorstelling. Waar de grafieken van de verschillende squatter settlements als een aanwijzing voor geleidelijke ontwikkeling opgevat kunnen worden, lijkt het erop, dat in de goths een meer schoks gewijze verbetering van de woningen optreedt.

Op grond van enkele aanwijzingen in de literatuur kon de hypothese geformuleerd worden, dat de goth bewoners een lagere prioriteit aan hun woning toekennen dan meer recente bewoners van Karachi doen.

Bij gevolg zouden ze dan hun woningen pas verbeteren, wanneer ze relatief "rijk" zijn, hetgeen de sprongs gewijze verbeteringen begrijpelijk zou maken. De lagere prioriteit, op zijn beurt, zou begrepen kunnen worden uit de relatief hoge waarde die migranten aan hun woningen hechten als bron van zekerheid, als symbool van status en als symbool van hetgeen ze als migrant in een vreemde omgeving bereikt hebben.

Onderzoek aangaande de opvattingen van de twee groepen (goth bewoners-migranten) wijst inderdaad uit, dat de migranten een veel hogere waarde toekennen aan de woning als bron van sociaal-economische zekerheid.

Wat betreft andere redenen waarom migranten een hoge waarde toekennen aan hun woning, zijn de gevonden uitkomsten minder duidelijk. Wel blijkt het voor de migrant een normale zaak te zijn dat vooral in het huis geïnvesteerd wordt, terwijl de goth bewoner voor investeringen tussen een aantal alternatieven kiest.

De jongere bastis kunnen, zoals boven reeds gesteld werd, verdeeld worden in zich ontwikkelende en stagnerende nederzettingen.

Wat betreft de zich ontwikkelende bastis kan weer onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen die bastis, die volkomen illegaal ontstaan en die, welke van meet af een officieuze sanctie van de overheid genieten.

Deze laatste soort bastis ontstaat vooral aan de rand van de stad, trekt bewoners aan, die het zich kunnen permitteren op relatief grote afstand van het centrum van de stad te wonen (b.v. t.g.v. vast of redelijk goed betaald werk) en kenmerkt zich door een vrij sterk gepland stratenpatroon en een snelle ontwikkeling van de woningen.

Beide typen zich ontwikkelende bastis kenmerken zich door een voortdurend proces van verdere fysieke ontwikkeling. Case studies wijzen uit dat pogingen van overheidswege om deze bastis kaal te slaan, niet slagen en dat - veelal m.b.v. omkoping of door tussenkomst van invloedrijke personen - het proces van ontwikkeling vrijwel onstuitbaar voortgaat.

Vooraf in de beginstadia zijn de bewoners georganiseerd en wordt er hard gewerkt voor het verkrijgen van faciliteiten en erkenning van overheidszijde. Later lijkt de graad van organisatie af te nemen, evenals de bereidheid om met de overheid samen te werken.

Van de stagnerende bastis kan - op een enkele uitzondering na - aangegeven worden wat de fundamentele oorzaak van de stagnatie is, n.l. een gebrek aan zekerheid omtrent het recht tot wonen, of - in andere woorden - de voortdurende dreiging, dat de overheid tot kaalslag zal overgaan. Expliciete oorzaken, waardoor die zekerheid laag is, konden tevens worden aangegeven (b.v. wanneer een basti gelegen is op land, dat een andere bestemming heeft).

De veronderstelling dat stagnerende bastis een relatief belangrijke functie zouden vervullen als tijdelijke woonplaats voor recente migranten, werd slechts in zeer geringe mate bewaarheid.

Een andere veronderstelling, n.l. dat de stagnerende bastis huisvesting verlenen aan sociaal of economisch marginale groepen, werd ten dele juist bevonden: vergeleken bij een doorsnee van zich ontwikkelende bastis, herbergt bijna één derde van de stagnerende bastis een aanmerkelijk hoger percentage mensen die laag betaald en/of ongeregeld werk hebben. Andere marginale groepen (b.v. criminelen) werden niet in noemens waarde percentages aangetroffen.

De stagnerende bastis verschillen dan ook slechts gradueel van de zich ontwikkelende. Ook in de stagnerende bastis heeft - een meestal relatief geringe en/of langzame - ontwikkeling plaats, die plotseling sterk versneld kan worden, wanneer de zekerheidsgraad verhoogd wordt.

Het dikwijls ongelukkige stratenpatroon in stagnerende bastis is gevolg en geen oorzaak van de stagnerende ontwikkeling.

Case studies in gelegaliseerde bastis wijzen uit dat legalisatie verkregen werd als een mijlpaal in exact hetzelfde proces dat beschreven werd in andere zich ontwikkelende bastis. Een proces, waarin naast het gebruik van legale middelen, het gebruik van steekpenningen en tussenkomst door invloedrijke personen dikwijls de doorslag blijkt te geven.

De legalisatie is eerder afgedwongen van een achter de feiten aanlopende overheid, dan dat deze overheid het proces actief begeleidt.

Bij legalisatie komen de bastis in de sfeer van formele land markt: ook andere dan de lage inkomens groepen krijgen belangstelling voor de grond, die - o.a. hierdoor - sterk in prijs stijgt, en niet of nauwelijks meer in aanmerking komt voor aankoop door de lage-inkomen groepen.

Voor het beleid is van belang dat de bastis een groot aantal zeer belangrijke functie vervullen, dat zij in feite de enige betaalbare gelegenheid tot huisvesting van de late-inkomens groepen vormen, dat zij - mits met rust gelaten - een grote capaciteit tot verbetering vertonen, en - tenslotte - dat de overheid niet in staat is de spontane ontstaans- en ontwikkelings processen van deze bastis op grote schaal tegen te gaan of te doorkruisen. Het beleid dient dan ook gericht te zijn op een actieve begeleiding van de beschreven processen.

Een aantal problemen, waarvoor de overheid bij de voorgestelde actieve begeleiding oplossingen zal moeten nastreven, kunnen op grond van de studie geformuleerd worden.

1. problemen bij het vaststellen van standaards.
2. problemen bij het vinden van een juiste grondpolitiek.
3. het probleem wat moet gebeuren met stagnerende bastis.
4. problemen van beslissing of bastis kunnen blijven bestaan, en zo ja, met welke fysieke standaards (zie 1) en met welke legale status (zie 2).
5. problemen van financiering van verbeteringsprogrammaas.
6. problemen van organisatie en uitvoering.
7. problemen in de ontwikkeling van een beleid voor de opvang van de jaarlijkse groei van de lage-inkomens groepen.

Het is aan de overheid oplossingen voor deze problemen te vinden.

Op grond van deze studie kunnen alleen suggesties gedaan worden aangaande mogelijke oplossingen.

Fundamenteel in deze suggesties is dat het informele woning distributie systeem de ruimte en bescherming gegeven moet worden om optimaal te kunnen functioneren.

LITERATURE QUOTED.

- Abrams, C. Man's struggle for shelter in an urbanizing world.
1964 Cambridge, Mass.
- 1969 Housing policy 1937 - 1967.
 in: B.J. Frieden and W.W. Nash (ed.) Shaping an urban
 future.
 Cambridge, Mass.
- Ahsan, A. Historical development of Chanesar Goth.
1972-A Karachi.
- 1972-B A study of the migration pattern in Chanesar Goth.
 Karachi.
- Alcock, A.E., K.N. Misra, J.L. McGairl and C.B. Patel, Self help housing
1962 methods and practices. Ekistics, Vol. XVI, pp. 81-87.
- Ali, A., A. Mahmood, A.K. Barwa and Z.A. Nezami, Operation Rehasp.
1969 Karachi.
- Alonso, W., The form of cities in developing countries.
1964 Regional Science Association Papers, Vol. XIII,
 pp. 165-173.
- Andersen, S.A.N., Slums of hope
1972 Ekistics, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 114-115.
- Anderson, N. The urban community.
1960 London.
- Andrews, P., M. Christie and R. Martin, Squatters and the evolution of
1973 a life style. Architectural Design, Vol. XLIII, pp. 16-25.
- Angel, S. and S. Benjamin, Seventeen reasons why the squatter problem
1976 cannot be solved. Ekistics, Vol. XXXI, pp. 20-26.
- Associated Surveyors, Redevelopment plan for Chanesar Goth.
1972-A Karachi.
- 1972-B Feasibility report of Azam Basti.
 Karachi.
- Baillie, A.F. Kurrachee, past, present and future.
1890 London (reprinted Karachi, 1975)
- Barve, S.G. Urbanization in Maharashtra State: problems and a plan
1962 of action.
 in: Roy Turner (ed.), India's urban future. California.
- Bauer-Wurster, C., Urban living conditions, overhead costs and the
1962 development plan. in: Roy Turner (ed.), India's urban
 future. California.
- Benet, F. Sociology uncertain: the ideology of the rural-urban
1963 continuum. Comp. Studies in Sociology and History, Vol. VI,
 pp. 1-23.
- Benninger, C. Models of habitat mobility in transitional economies.
1970 Ekistics, Vol. XXIX, pp. 124-127.
- 1972 Design criteria for developing contexts: housing for Jaroda,
 India. Ekistics, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 152-155.
- Bhutto, Z.A. Speeches and statements April 1972 - June 1972.
1972 Karachi.
- Blenck, J. Slums und Slumsanierung in Indien.
1974 Abhandlungen Deutscher Geographentag Kassel, pp. 310-337.

- Bos, A. Structure of social welfare services.
1970 Karachi.
- Bose, A. Studies in India's urbanization 1901-1971.
1973 New Delhi.
- Dos-Kunst, E. Women of Azam Basti.
1970 Karachi.
- Brücher, W. Mobilität von Industriearbeitern in Bogotá.
1974 Abhandlungen Deutscher Geographentag Kassel, pp. 294-293.
- Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization, Basic development Plan
1966-1986.
1966 Calcutta.
- Camino, H., J.F.C. Turner and J.A. Steffian, Urban dwelling environments.
1969 Cambridge, Mass.
- Carneiro, R.L., Scale analysis as an instrument for the study of cultural
1962 evolution. South Western Journal of Anthropology,
Vol. XVIII, pp. 149-169.
- Carrea, C.M., Self help city.
1972 Bombay
- Casasco, J.A. The social function of the slum in Latin America: some
1969 positive aspects. Ekistics, Vol XXVIII, pp. 168-175.
- Chughtai, R.A., T.E.L. van Pinxteren, H. Kiestra and M.H. Weijs, Miran Naka.
1975 Karachi.
- Clinard, M.B. Slums and community development.
1962 New York.
- Cowan-Brown, J. Patterns of intra-urban settlement in Mexico City.
1972 New York
- Descloîtres, R., J.C. Reverdy and C. Descloîtres, l'Algérie des bidonvilles.
1961 Paris.
- Dietz, A.G.H., M.N. Koth and J.A. Silva, Housing in Latin America.
1965 Cambridge, Mass.
- Drakakis-Smith, D.W., and W.B. Fisher, Housing in Ankara.
1976 Ekistics, Vol. XLII, pp. 92-98.
- Duncan, S. Vat jou goed en trek.
1976 Race relations News, June 1976, p. 3.
- Dwyer, D.J. The problem of immigration and squatter settlement in
 Asian cities: two case studies: Manila and Victoria
 Kowloon.
1964 Asian Studies, Vol. II, pp. 45-169.
1974 Attitudes towards spontaneous settlements in third
 world cities. in: D.J. Dwyer (ed.), The city in the third
 world.
 London.
- Ekistics, Report by a consultant.
1965 Ekistics, Vol. XX, pp. 325-333.
- Emery, P.A. Creative aspects of shanty towns.
1963 Ekistics, Vol. XV, pp. 268-271.
- Enche Ali Ben Esa, Kuala Lumpur.
1971 in: A.A. Laquian (ed.), Rural migrants and metropolitan
 development. Toronto.

- Engels, F., 1892 The condition of the working class in England. Published in 1969, London.
- Ewing, J.R. 1969 Town planning in Delhi, a critique. Economic and Political Weekly, 4/X/'69, pp. 1591-1600.
- Eyre, L.A. 1973 The shantytowns of Montego Bay, Jamaica. Ekistics, Vol. XXXVI, pp. 132-138.
- Fathy, H. 1973 Architecture for the poor. Chicago.
- Flinn, W.L. 1971 Rural and intra urban migration in Colombia. Two case studies in Bogotá. Latin American Urban Research, Vol. I, pp. 83-93.
- Franco, P.S. 1971 Caracas. in: A.A. Laquian (ed.), Rural urban migrants and metropolitan development. Toronto.
- Frank, E. A yet unpublished study of autonomous settlements in Karachi.
- Frankenhoff, G.A., 1957 Elements of an economic model for slums in a developing economy. Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. XVI, pp. 27-36.
- Fried, M. and J. Levin, 1963 Some social functions of the urban slum. in: B.J. Frieden and R. Morris (ed.) Urban planning and social policy. New York.
- Gadourek, J. 1957 Sociologische onderzoekstechnieken. Arnhem.
- Gans, H.J. 1962 The urban villagers. New York.
- Soede, de, J.H. 1971 On a definition and typology of slums in Karachi Metropolis. Amsterdam
- Greater Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1972 Slum improvement. Bombay.
- Grenell, P. 1972 Planning for invisible people. in: J.F.C. Turner and R. Fichter (ed.), Freedom to build. New York.
- Grimes Jr., O.F. 1975 Housing for low income urban families. Baltimore & London.
- Grünwald, W. 1972 Housing report. Karachi.
- Guttman, L. 1944 A basis for scaling qualitative data. American Sociological Review, Vol. IX, pp. 139-150.
1950 The basis for scalogram analysis. in: Studies in social psychology in World war II, pp. 60-90. Princeton.
- Harst, van der, J., 1974-A Land policy for spontaneous settlements. Karachi"Amsterdam.
1974-B Low income housing. Karachi.
1974-C Cost of residing of low income groups. Karachi.
- Hashmi, S.H. 1972 Survey report on Daryabad Union Committee. Karachi.

- Hashmi, S.S. The people of Karachi, demographic characteristics.
1965 Karachi.
- Hauser P.M., (ed.), Urbanization in Asia and the Far East.
1957 Calcutta.
- 1961 Urbanization in Latin America.
Paris.
- Havlik, L. New urban land policy, notes for discussion.
1974 Karachi.
- HBFC Housing Finance.
1975 Islamabad.
- Hollnsteiner, M.R., Becoming an urbanite
1972 in: D.J. Dwyer (ed.) The city as a centre of change in
Asia. Hongkong.
- Howton, F.W. Cities, slums and acculturative process in the developing
1969 countries. in: P. Meadows and E. Mizruchi (ed.) Urbanism,
urbanization and change, comparative perspectives.
Massachusetts.
- Huyck, van, A.P., The housing threshold for lowest-income groups, the case
1968 of India. in: J.D. Herbert and A.P. van Huyck (ed.)
Urban planning in the developing countries.
New York, Washington, London.
- 1972 Towards a housing policy for Karachi.
Morning News, 18/III/'72.
- Huyck, van, A.P. and K.C. Rosser, An environmental approach to low income
1967 housing. Ekistics, Vol XXIII, pp. 11-12.
- Islamuddin Siddiqi, Goths at a glance.
1971 Karachi.
- Jackson, J.C. Urban squatters in Southeast Asia.
1974 Geography, Vol. LIX, pp. 24-30.
- Jedraszko, A.B. The shelterless and squatters.
1966 in: KDA: The problem of shelterless people and squatters
in Pakistani cities. Karachi.
- Jones, E. Aspects of urbanization in Venezuela.
1964 Ekistics, Vol. XVIII, pp. 420-425.
- JRP-IV,
1975-A Usmania Mohajir Colony.
Karachi.
- 1975-B Socio economic survey of Lyari.
Karachi.
- Juppenlatz, M. The urban squatter problem of the developing world.
1970 Queensland.
- Kazmi, S.R. Housing finance.
1975 MPD Newsletter, special issue May 1975, pp. 16-23.
- Kalk, E. Stadsvernieuwing in het "jaar van de waarheid".
1975 Plan, no 3, pp. 21-32.
- KDA
undated-A Classification of colonies.
Karachi.
- undated-B Recommendations.
Karachi.

- 1961 Lyari redevelopment scheme, draft proposals and programme. Karachi.
- 1965 The problem of shelterless people and squatters in Pakistani cities. Karachi.
- 1969 A note on KDA's plot townships at Aurangi, Qasba and Baldia. Karachi.
- 1973 Minutes meeting townolanning department with MPD and UN experts, 17/II/'73.
- KDA-JRP-IV
1974 An inventory of building materials used in slums. Karachi/Amsterdam.
- Kessler, E. and S., Popular housing systems in Colombia.
1974 Ekistics, XXXVIII, pp. 263-276.
- Keyes, W.
1976 The housing philosophy of John F.C. Turner. Impact, Vol. XI, pp. 310-315.
- Kiestra, H.
1975 How to improve a slum? Karachi.
- KMC
1969-1971 Lyari land regularization plan. Karachi.
- 1975 Lyari improvement programme. Karachi.
- 1976 A new approach to substandard urban areas. Karachi.
- Laquian, A.A.
1969 Slums are for people. Honolulu.
- 1971 (ed.) Rural-urban migrants and metropolitan development. Toronto.
- Leeds, A.
1969 The significant variables determining the character of squatter-settlements. America Latina, Vol. XII, pp. 44-84.
- Lewis, O.
1952 Urbanization without breakdown. Scientific Monthly, Vol. LXXV, pp. 31-41.
- Linden, van der J.J., Verslag vrije interviews Usmania Mahajar Colony.
1973-A Karachi.
- 1973-B An essay on improvement of slums: some thoughts about policy-making in slum improvement. Karachi.
- 1974 Lyari, an inventory. Karachi.
- 1975 A typology of slums in Karachi Karachi.
- 1976 Enige gedachten over beleidsvoering t.a.v. spontane settlements in grote steden van de derde wereld. Karachi.
- MacGee, T.G.
1972 Rural urban migration in a plural society, a case study of Malays in West Malaysia. in: D.J. Dwyer (ed.), The city as a centre of change in Asia. Hongkong.
- 1974 Policies for the urban informal sector of the less developed countries. Paper presented at the seminar of the Australian National University Department of Human Geography, October 1974.

- MacNamara, R.S. Annual speech of the President of the World Bank.
1975 Washington.
- Mangin, W. Latin American squatter settlements: a problem and a
1967-A solution. Latin American Research Review, Vol. II,
pp. 55-93.
- 1967-B Squatter settlements.
Scientific American, Vol. CCXVII, pp. 21-29.
- 1969 Latin American squatter settlements, a problem and a
situation. Ekistics, Vol. XXXVII, pp. 37-40.
- Martin, R. Comments in Architectural Design 4/'76, pp. 232-237.
1976
- Matos Mar, J. The problem of slums in South America.
1963 Ekistics, vol. XV, pp. 266-267.
- Mehta, A. The future of Indian cities: national issues and goals.
1962 in: Roy Turner (ed.), India's urban future. California.
- Merton, R.K. The social psychology of housing.
1966 in: W.L.C. Wheaton, G. Milgran, and M.E. Meyerson (ed.),
Urban housing. Toronto.
- Michl, S. Urban squatter organization as a national government tool:
1973 the case of Lima, Peru.
Latin American Urban Research Review, Vol. III, pp. 155-178.
- MPD, Socio-economic homogeneous areas.
1972-A Karachi.
- 1972-B Study of flood-affected structures in Lyari River,
Orangi-Nala and Gujro Nala. Karachi.
- 1974 Karachi development plan 1974-1985.
Karachi.
- 1975 Institutional arrangements for Metroville cell.
Karachi.
- Nierstrasz, F.H.J., Betaalbare woningen, wat verstaan ontwikkelingslanden
1976 daaronder? Bouw, no 42, 16/X/'75. pp. 557-550.
- Onibokun, A. Nigeria, strategies for urban redevelopment.
1972 Journal of the Royal Townplanning Institute, Vol. LVIII,
pp. 51-56.
- Pakistan Conference of Social Work, Urban development: implications for
1965 social welfare. Report to the 13th international conference
of social work. Washington.
- Papanek, G.F. Pakistans development, social goals and private incentives.
1968 London.
- Peattie, L.A. Social issues in housing.
1965 in: Cath. Bauer-Wurster Memorial Lectures. Cambridge, Mass.
- Pinxteren, van, T.E.L., The population of Chanesar Goth
1972 Karachi.
- 1974-A Minislum in a posh locality.
Karachi.
- 1974-B The dera, a housing facility for the male migrant.
Karachi.
- 1974-C Report on Koila Gudam in Lyari.
Karachi.

- Planning Commission, New Delhi, Report of the working group on slums undated New Delhi.
- Poethig, R.P. The squatters of South East Asia. Ekistics, Vol. XXXI, pp. 121-125.
1971
- 1972 Integrating rural migrants into urban life: Philippines. Ekistics, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 388-390.
- Portes, A. The urban slum in Chili: types and correlates. Ekistics, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 175-180.
1972
- Pijper, de, W.M., Syllabus statistiek I. Amsterdam.
1974
- Rao, D.V.H. Housing of squatters in Delhi. Search for a solution. Ekistics, Vol. XXXVII, pp. 57-62.
1974
- Rapoport, A. The ecology of housing. Ekistics, Vol. XXXVI, pp. 145-151.
1973
- Rauf, M.A. Report on Aqab Jail Colony. Karachi.
1971
- Ray, T.F. The politics of the barrios of Venezuela. Berkeley and Los Angeles
1969
- Raymaeckers, P. L'Organisation des zones de squatting. Paris.
1964
- Reurink, M. Notities n.a.v. "Land policy for spontaneous settlements", door J. van der Harst. Amsterdam.
1975
- Roberts, R. The classic slum. Manchester.
1971
- Rosser, K.C. Housing for the lowest income groups: the Calcutta experience. Ekistics, Vol. XXXI, pp. 125-131.
1971-A
- 1971-B Housing the urban poor in the poor countries. Ekistics, Vol. XXXII, pp. 293-294.
- 1972 Housing and planned urban change, The Calcutta experience. in: D.J. Dwyer (ed.), The city as a centre of change in Asia. Hong Kong.
- Salimullah, Ch., G.M. Samdani, C.A. Qawi and A. Hussein, National housing policy. Report prepared by Government Subcommittee. Islamabad.
1973
- Samdani, G.M. Notes regarding the definition and typology of slums; paper for JRP-IV. Islamabad.
1971
- 1975 Scope and extent of regional cooperation in urban development and housing. Paper presented at the RCD seminar, Islamabad, May 1975.
- Santos, M. Vues actuelles sur le problème des bidonvilles. in: M. Santos, Dix essais sur les villes des pays sous-développés. Paris.
1970
- Seeley, J.R. The slum, its nature, use and users. in: W.L.C. Wheaton, G. Milgran and M.E. Meyerson (ed.), Urban housing. Toronto.
1966
- Segaar, T.J. Karachi en de basti. Amsterdam.
1975

- Shibli, K. Salimullah, and others, Housing: short tange tactics and
1965 long range strategy. Islamebad.
- Sovani, N.V. Urbanization and urban India.
1966 London.
- Soocial Committee of the National Housing Council (Philippines), Squatting
1969 and slum dwelling in metropolitan Manilla.
Ekistics, Vol. XXVII, pp. 29-36.
- Stokes, C. J. A theory of slums.
1962 Land Economics, August 1962, pp. 187-197.
- Streefland, P.H. The Christian Panjabi Sweepers.
1974 Rawalpindi.
- 1975 Slaughterhouse, een samenleving van Christen Panjabi
Sweepers in Karachi, Pakistan. Amsterdam.
- Sudra, T.L. Low-income housing system in Mexico City.
1976 Cambridge, Mass.
- Tangri, S.S. Urban growth, housing and urban development: the case of
1968 India. Asian Survey, Vol. VIII, pp. 519-538.
- Turner, J.F.C. Lima's barriada's and corralones.
1965 Ekistics, Vol. XIX, pp. 152-155.
- 1966 A view of the housing deficit.
Paper presented at the conference on housing in developing
countries, San Juan.
- 1967-A Progress report on the activities of the Centre for Housing,
building and planning. U.N., Economic and Social Council,
Committee on Housing, Building and Planning. Geneva.
- 1967-B Barriers and channels for housing development in modernizing
countries. AIP Journal, May 1967, pp. 167-180.
- 1968 Housing priorities, settlement patterns and urban
development in developing countries. AIP Journal, Nov.
1968, pp. 354-363.
- 1969-A Architecture that works.
Ekistics, Vol. XXVII, pp. 40-44.
- 1969-B Uncontrolled urban settlement, problems and policies.
in: G. Breese (ed.), The city in newly developing countries.
Prentice-Hall.
- 1972 Housing issues and the standards problem.
Ekistics, Vol XXXIII, pp. 152-158.
- 1976 Housing by people.
London.
- Turner, J.F.C. and R. Goetze, Environmental security and housing input.
1967 Ekistics, Vol. XXIII, pp. 123-128.
- United Nations Some policy implications of urbanization.
1961 in: P.M. Hauser (ed.), Urbanization in Latin America.
Paris.
- 1971 Improvement of slums and uncontrolled settlements.
New York.
- 1973 (Economic and Social Council), World housing survey,
report of the Secretary General. Geneva.

- Vaughan, D.R. and W. Feindt, Initial settlement and intra city movement of migrants in Monterrey, Mexico, AIP Journal, Nov. 1973, pp. 388-400.
- Vernez, G. 1976 A housing services policy for low income urban families in developing countries. Ekistics, Vol XLI, pp. 3-14.
- Wertheim, W.F. 1964 Urban characteristics in Indonesia. in: W.F. Wertheim, East West Parallels. The Hague.
- West Bengal, Government of, West Bengal Slum Areas Act. 1971 Calcutta.
- Weijs, M.H. 1975 Report in depth study of Jacob Lines Area. Karachi.
- Wingo, Jr., L. 1969 Latin American urbanization: plan or process? in: B.J. Frieden and W.W. Nash, Shaping an urban future. Cambridge, Mass.
- Working group on slums, Planning Commission, New Delhi, Report. undated.

APPENDIX I

List of abbreviations.

BD	Basic Democracies
CB	(Karachi) Cantonment Board
CBD	Central Business District
CHS	Cooperative Housing Society
CSO	Central Statistical Office
GOS	Government of Sind
HBFCC	House Building Finance Corporation
JRP-IV	Joint Research Project nr IV, for urban development and slum improvement; a joint undertaking of the Pakistan and Netherlands Governments in which the Karachi University and the Free University of Amsterdam were charged with the execution of the project.
KDA	Karachi Development Authority
KESC	Karachi Electric Supply Company
KIT	Karachi Improvement Trust
KMC	Karachi Municipal Corporation
KPT	Karachi Port Trust
MPD	Master Plan Department (of KDA)
NWFP	North Western Frontier Province
PEGHS	Pakistan Employees Cooperative Housing Society
PIB	Pir Ilahi Bakhsh
PIIF	Pakistan International Industrial Fair
p.o./l.l.	Previous owner (of sold house) and landlord (of let house)
P.P.	Pre partition
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PWD	Public Works Department
P(W)R	Pakistan (Western) Railway
RCC	Reinforced concrete cement
Rs	Rupee (approximately equivalent to 10 U.S. dollar cents)
SITE	Sind Industrial Trade Estate
T. & T.	Telgraph & Telephone
WOTRO	Stichting Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek in de Tropen (Netherlands foundation for the advancement of tropical research).

APPENDIX I, cont'd.

LIST OF URDU WORDS USED, WITH CLARIFICATION.

abadi	- population
anjuman	- association (mostly:) voluntary welfare organization.
anna	- 1/16 part of a rupee (Rs) (Rs 1/-- is approximately equal to 10 U.S. dollar cents.)
'arizi	- temporary
baghichah	- (little) garden
baraderi	- brotherhood, small community, group, patrilinear group of relatives.
basti	- settlement (Cf II.1.3.3.)
be samajh	- stupid
bharosa	- trust
chaepani	- (litt.: tea water), bribe.
chamchah	- (litt.: spoon), follower of an important man
chatai	- (reed) matting
chauk	- quadrangle, square
chauki dar	- watchman
dehat	- villages, countryside
dera	- dwelling, tent, a dwelling where single living men reside together.
faida	- advantage, profit
faltu	- spare
fikr	- anxiety, fear
'ilaqah	- region, area
'izzat	- grandeur, glory, dignity, honour, respect, esteem, reputation, fame.
jam'iyat	- assembly, organization, congregation
jhuggi	- hut
jidd-o-jahd	- effort, hard labour
kachcha	- unbaked, clay-built, below a fixed standard, half done.
kaorel	- roofing tile
karor	- 10 millions
lakh	- 100.000.
mali	- gardener
martabah	- degree, dignity, class, order
masjid	- mosque
maulawi	- learned man, religious instructor
mazar	- mausoleum

APPENDIX I, cont'd.

muhajir	- refugee, evacuee, emigrant.
muhallah	- district, division, quarter (of a city or town), ward, parish.
mujahid	- warrior (in defense of true faith) crusader.
mulk	- country, region
muzdur	- labourer, porter, carrier
nala	- canal, gutter, watercourse
naukari	- service, employment, post
nishan	- sign
pakka	- baked, strong, solid, firm, lasting, permanent.
pardah	- veil, curtain, cover, privacy
qaum	- a people, tribe
rabitah	- connection, liaison
raushan dan	- skylight, ventilator
rozi	- daily subsistence, livelihood
sarkanda	- reed, also simple reed mat
saudagar	- merchant
shakk	- doubt
sifarish	- recommendation, intercession, influence
tabaqah	- rank, class
tang	- contracted, narrow, tight, scanty
ummid	- hoop
yakin	- confidence

APPENDIX II

INSTRUCTIONS FOR TAKING SAMPLES OF DWELLINGS IN SLUM MUHALLA'S


1. Walk around the muhallah and be secure of its boundaries.
Make a rough sketch. Count your steps when walking around and keep record of the thus found distances.
2. a) if the muhallah has a more or less rectangular or square shape, the two streets will be taken, approximately running through the centre of the area, connecting the middle of one bordering street with the middle of the bordering street on the opposite side.
b) if the length and/or width of the basti exceeds 300 steps (to be found out in your first tour around), then cross the area more than once, approximately after every 300 steps of length in a bordering street.
c) if the shape is very irregular, subdivide the area into more or less rectangular parts and treat them as above indicated. (always keep record of how you do it, e.g. in the rough sketch.)
d) if the muhallah is very much long stretched, (e.g. some basti's alongside river beds) and has little width, then zig-zag from the first crossing street (not bordering street) and go left, right, left, etc. until reaching the other end, from where you start anew.
3. Take information on all houses (no shops) on your left and include the left side of all dead-end little streets you find on your left. Skip open end streets.
4. Before entering into a street always record its location with any clear indication you find. E.g.: South side, approximately in the middle, house with green doors, opposite the tap, next to a pan-shop, pole, etc.
In this way checking will always remain possible.
5. In case of two storey buildings, only mention the roof of the ground floor (= floor of the top floor).
5. If there is a storey, code with the abbreviations for walls.
If one of the items is not present code with "-"

Appendix II, cont'd.


If it is impossible to find out the nature of one of the items, code with "?".

7. If the total number of houses found according to the instructions for the route to be taken does not exceed 25, then follow again the same route back and describe the houses on the opposite side.
9. If in the first stage (walk around and establishing of boundaries) it is found that a certain type of houses exists in one corner which is not covered in the sample, then make a note of that fact, and take a separate sample of that cluster.


HOUSE CONDITIONS IN PRE PARTITION SETTLEMENTS OF GROUP A)




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN PRE PARTITION SETTLEMENTS OF GROUP B)




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN PRE PARTITION SETTLEMENTS OF GROUP C)





HOUSE CONDITIONS IN PRE PARTITION SETTLEMENTS OF GROUP C)





HOUSE CONDITIONS IN PRE PARTITION SETTLEMENTS OF GROUP D)




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN PRE PARTITION SETTLEMENTS OF GROUP D)




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN PRE PARTITION SETTLEMENTS OF GROUP E)





HOUSE CONDITIONS IN PRE PARTITION SETTLEMENTS OF GROUP F)




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN TENTATIVE SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN PROVISIONAL SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS WITH SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN PROVISIONAL SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS WITH SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN PROVISIONAL SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS WITH SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN PROVISIONAL SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS WITH A START IN THE DEVELOPMENT



















HOUSE CONDITIONS IN PROVISIONAL SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS WITH A START IN THE DEVELOPMENT




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN INCIPIENT SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS WITH SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT






HOUSE CONDITIONS IN INCIPIENT SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS WITH SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT











HOUSE CONDITIONS IN INCIPIENT SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS WITH SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN INCIPIENT SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS WITH A START IN THE DEVELOPMENT






HOUSE CONDITIONS IN INCOMPLETE SEMI SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS WITH SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN INCOMPLETE SEMI SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS WITH SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN INCOMPLETE SEMI SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS WITH A START IN THE DEVELOPMENT





HOUSE CONDITIONS IN INCOMPLETE SEMI SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS WITH A START IN THE DEVELOPMENT





HOUSE CONDITIONS IN COMPLETE SEMI SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS WITH SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN COMPLETE SEMI SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS WITH SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT






HOUSE CONDITIONS IN COMPLETE SEMI SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS WITH A START IN THE DEVELOPMENT











HOUSE CONDITIONS IN COMPLETE SEMI SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS WITH A START IN THE DEVELOPMENT




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN THREE BASTIS WITH ANTICIPATED START




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN STAGNATING BASTIS ON LAND WITH EXPLICIT OTHER DESTINATIONS




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN STAGNATING BASTIS ON LAND WITH EXPLICIT OTHER DESTINATIONS




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN STAGNATING BASTIS ON LAND OF CB, PWR, PWD, KPT




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN STAGNATING BASTIS ON LAND OF CB, PWR, PWD, KPT




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN STAGNATING BASTIS ON PRIVATELY OWNED LAND




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN STAGNATING BASTIS IN RIVERBEDS




HOUSE CONDITIONS IN STAGNATING BASTIS WITH PROBLEMATIC LAY-OUT



HOUSE CONDITIONS IN STAGNATING BASTIS WITH PROBLEMATIC LAY-OUT



HOUSE CONDITIONS IN STAGNATING BASTIS (CAUSE UNKNOWN)



APPENDIX IV

Translation of questionnaire on functions of the house in goths and colonies.

Assalamo 'aleikum (Greetings)

I am from Karachi University.

We have come to you to find out what efforts the people of this place have done for the betterment of the area and what the people think about their area.

We are doing this work in all the poor areas of Karachi.

We do this for the purpose of science only; we have not come to take anything from you or to give you anything.

We have come only to gather all kinds of information.

May we ask from you?.

Name basti.....

Place of birth (respondent).....

1. What are, in your opinion, the advantages of having an own house?
2. If - God forbid! - you would fall seriously ill, then it is clear there will be much trouble for your family.
What will they do?
3. If - for example - a poor man improves his position by endeavor and effort, then how will it become known that this man has improved his position?
4. Imagine that a poor man receives a very great sum from a lottery or as a present, and the next day he demolishes his hut and calls a contractor to build a pakka house.
Then, some people say that this is very wise.
Some people say that he should save the sum for the difficult times.
And again some people say that this is not proper if a poor man suddenly becomes equal to a rich man: he should take more care and be less proud.
What do you think about this?
5. If, for some special need, you have to take a loan, then can you - in your opinion - get a loan easily? If yes, where from?
6. If somebody from outside walks about in some colony or area, how then will it be known to him that in this area this man is of great martabah or little martabah?
7. If a poor man saves a sum, what is the best way to keep it? Should he - in your opinion -
keep it in a bank
build a house
invest it in business
buy animals
anything else, viz.

APPENDIX IV, cont'd.

8. Some people live in a kachcha house or a hut although they can (afford to) build a pakka house. They find other things more important. Are there - in your opinion - such people in this area? If yes, what then is the more important thing in their opinion?

APPENDIX VInformation collected from different bastis.Developing bastis.

Name Colony	Sample N	Information refused (N)	House Locked (N)	Information on cases (N)
Pathan Col. (1)	27	-	-	27
Wahid. Col.	47	2	1	44
Rudad Nagar	77	2	4	71
Johar Col.	37	-	-	37
Angara Goth	40	-	1	39
Faqir Col.	60	3	7	50
Mujahid Col. (2)	41	-	6	35
Swat Col.	59	2	4	53
Asif Col.	75	1	4	70

Ethnic Affiliation.

Name Colony	Muhajir N	Baluchi N	Panjabi N	Pathan N	Sindhi N	Other N
Pathan Col.	-	1	4	22	-	-
Wahid Col.	7	-	30	7	-	-
Rudad Nagar	23	2	28	15	-	3
Johar Col.	24	-	7	6	-	-
Angara Goth	39	-	-	-	-	-
Faqir Col.	1	15	18	16	-	-
Mujahid Col.	8	1	18	6	2	-
Swat Col.	1	1	17	34	-	-
Asif Col.	69	-	-	-	-	1

1) In this, and following tables Pathan Colony (Scheme 24) is meant.

2) In this, and following tables Mujahid Colony (Jail-Drigh Rd) is meant.

Household situation.

Name Colony	Living with family (N)	Living alone (N)	Living in dera (N)
Pathan Colony	24	1	2
Wahid Colony	43	1	-
Rudad Nagar	66	2	3
Johar Col.	35	2	-
Angara Goth	39	-	-
Faqir Col.	47	3	-
Mujahid Col.	34	1	-
Swat Col.	51	1	1
Asif Col.	69	1	-

Length of stay in Karachi

Name Colony	'50 (N)	'51-'55 (N)	'56-'60 (N)	'61-'65 (N)	'66-'70 (N)	'71-'75 (N)
Pathan Col.	1	2	5	6	9	4
Wahid Col.	4	8	8	14	4	6
Rudad Nagar	15	5	15	11	12	13
Johar Col.	14	1	9	2	9	2
Angara Goth	28	2	7	1	1	-
Faqir Col.	17	4	6	4	13	6
Mujahid Col.	8	3	7	6	2	9
Swat Col.	9	7	16	5	11	5
Asif Col.	39	18	7	2	2	2

Length of stay in the colony.

Name Colony	'50 (N)	'51-'55 (N)	'56-'60 (N)	'61-'65 (N)	'66-'70 (N)	'71-'75 (N)
Pathan Col.	-	-	2	-	-	25
Wahid. Col.	-	-	2	18	14	10
Rudad Nagar	-	1	4	14	19	33
Johar Col.	4	2	7	4	11	9
Angara Goth	-	2	15	15	4	3
Faqir Col.	-	-	-	-	14	36
Mujahid Col.	-	-	-	-	19	16
Swat Col.	-	-	3	13	23	14
Asif Col.	1	42	9	4	8	6

Occupancy Status 1).

Name Colony	In this basti			Previously (for intra city - migrants)	
	OSB(N)	OB(N)	R(N)	R(N)	O(N)
Pathan Colony	21	2	4	13	9
Wahid Col.	36	4	4	22	2
Rudad Nagar	23	31	17	42	7
Johar Col.	16	8	13	9	13
Angara Goth	21	12	6	24	13
Faqir Col.	41	6	3	31	12
Mujahid Col.	13	7	15	16	8
Swat Col.	12	30	11	33	8
Asif Col.	41	18	11	15	33

Way of settling.

Name Colony	From out- side Kara- chi. (N)	From stag- nating bas- ti. (N)	From infe- rior bas- ti. (N)	From e- qual bas- ti. (N)	From supe- rior basti (N)
Pathan Col.	5	16	-	-	6
Wahid Col.	20	12	-	-	12
Rudad Nagar	22	5	8	-	36
Johar Col.	15	7	2	-	13
Angara Goth	2	16	2	19	-
Faqir Col.	7	-	-	-	43
Mujahid Col.	11	15	-	-	9
Swat Col.	12	4	1	-	36
Asif Colony	22	26	2	20	-

1) OSB - Owned, selfbuilt; OB - Owned, bought; R - Rented; O - Owned.

Whereabout of previous owners/landlords of houses sold/let.

Name Colony	In colony (N)	Left Karachi (N)	In superior place (N) 1).	In equal basti (N)	In inferior basti. (N)
Pathan Col.	1	2	3	-	-
Wahid Col.	4	2	-	2	-
Rudad Nagar	23	14	9	-	1 (1?)
Johar Col.	9	3	5	-	4
Angara Goth	10	-	7	-	1
Faqir Col.	1	3	3	-	- (2?)
Mujahid Col.	12	1	9	-	-
Swat Col.	20	14	4	-	3
Asif Col.	15	3	8	-	2 (1?)

Occupational structure.

Name Colony	Professionals & technicians (N)									
	Administrators & managers (N)									
	Clerical Workers (N)									
	Salesworkers (N)									
	Drivers, postmen & related (N)									
	Skilled labourers (N)									
	Semi- and unskilled labourers (N)									
	Servants & related (N)									
Jobless & retired (N)										
Pathan Col.	-	-	1	2	1	-	4	19	-	
Wahid Col.	1	-	-	6	2	8	20	7	-	
Rudad Nagar	6	-	2	17	6	9	22	9	-	
Johar Col.	1	-	1	4	1	8	16	5	1	
Angara Goth	1	1	-	7	2	7	10	10	1	
Faqir Col.	3	-	-	3	6	6	24	6	2	
Mujahid Col.	1	2	1	3	3	4	11	10	-	
Swat Col.	2	-	-	3	7	3	28	8	2	
Asif Col.	3	4	10	7	1	6	26	7	6	

1) Including "legal places", "quarters".

Transport to place of work.

Name Colony	Works in Colony (N)	On foot (N)	Bicycle (N)	Bus (N)	Other (N)
Pathan Col.	3	22	-	1	1
Wahid Col.	6	15	4	18	1
Rudad Nagar	11	13	4	37	6
Johar Col.	5	9	-	21	2
Angara Goth	4	9	3	16	7
Faqir Col.	10	10	5	21	4
Mujahid Col.	3	8	3	20	1
Swat Col.	8	9	5	27	4
Asif Col.	13	4	8	41	4

Stagnating bastis.

Name Colony	Sample N	Information refused (N)	House Locked (N)	Information on cases (N)
Abdul Jabbar Compound	28	-	-	28
Abyssinia Lines	40	-	-	40
Aqab Jail Colony	57	4	-	53
Azeemabad	25	2	1	22
Baluch Colony	29	-	1	28
Bath Island	25	3	-	22
Behind Jacob Lines	96	-	-	96
Bengali Area (Orangi)	38	-	-	38
Bizerta Lines	79	-	-	79
Bowani Chali	54	-	-	54
Bukhari Colony	30	-	2	28
Central Jacob Lines	73	-	-	73
Central Muslimabad	92	1	-	91
Choona Bhatti	40	-	1	39
City Station Colony	45	-	-	45
Garden Area	70	-	-	60
Gharibabad (Nea)	57	-	-	57
Gharibabad (Pologround)	25	1	1	23
Gharibabad (Purana)	62	-	-	62
Gujro Nala	113	-	1	112
Gule Rana Colony	65	-	-	65
Haji Camp	66	-	-	66
Hanifi Colony	36	-	-	36
Hazara Colony	143	-	-	143
Husseiniat Colony	32	2	-	30
Iqbalabad	44	2	-	42
Ismail Village	66	-	-	66
Jamhurya Colony (Race Course)	44	-	-	44
Jamshed Rd II	37	-	-	37
Jinnah Hospital II	26	-	-	26
Jutland & Tunesia Lines	104	-	-	104
Karnali Basti	46	-	-	46
Kausar Niazi Colony	65	-	-	65
Lotus Road	34	-	-	34
Lyari Naddi	25	4	-	21
Mama Road	42	-	-	42
Maulwi Musafir Khana	42	-	-	42
Moosa Nagar	25	2	1	22
Mujahid Col. (Bars. Nala)	52	-	-	52
Naddiabad	28	-	-	28
Narain Pura	33	-	-	33
Natha Khan Goth	69	-	-	69
National Tyre Col.	40	-	-	40
Pak Ghausia Col.	32	-	-	32
Panjabi Para Dastgir	38	-	-	38
Pak Sarhad Colony	25	3	-	22
Railway Camp	28	-	-	28
Railway Colony	42	-	-	42
Raksar II	71	-	-	71
Rattan Talab	25	1	-	24
Reti Lines	40	-	-	40
Shah Rasul Colony	66	-	-	66
Shanti Nagar	39	-	-	39
Ultri Maidan	25	2	-	23
Umr Colony	54	2	-	52
Usmania Mahajir Colony	67	-	-	67
Yahya Nagar	36	-	-	36

(Information on three stagnating bastis is lacking, viz. Qadafi Colony, Gharibabad (Lyari) and Police Risala Line)

Ethnic Affiliation.

Name Colony	Muhajir (N)	Baluchi (N)	Panjabi (N)	Pathan (N)	Sindhi (N)	Other (N)
Abdul Jabbar Compound	20	-	8	-	-	-
Abyssinia Lines	30	-	1	9	-	-
Aqab Jail Colony	22	-	19	12	-	-
Azeemabad	11	-	10	1	-	-
Baluch Colony	-	-	6	22	-	-
Bath Island	6	-	9	7	-	-
Behind Jacob Lines	73	1	15	7	-	-
Bengali Area (Orangi)	-	-	-	-	-	38
Bizerta Lines	69	-	4	6	-	-
Bowani Chali	-	-	1	53	-	-
Bukhari Colony	-	-	-	28	-	-
Central Jacob Lines	72	-	1	-	-	-
Central Muslimabad	36	-	28	26	1	-
Choona Bhatti	39	-	-	-	-	-
City Station Colony	1	-	5	39	-	-
Garden Area	60	-	-	-	-	-
Gharibabad Nea	51	-	5	1	-	-
Gharibabad Pologround	-	-	1	22	-	-
Gharibabad Purana	58	-	4	-	-	-
Gujro Nala	101	-	11	-	-	-
Gule Rana Col.	57	1	3	4	-	-
Haji Camp	32	-	18	16	-	-
Hanifi Colony	-	-	-	15	-	21
Hazara Colony	2	-	118	23	-	-
Husseiniat Colony	24	-	6	-	-	-
Iqbalabad	42	-	-	-	-	-
Ismail Village	27	-	20	18	-	1
Jamhurya Colony	4	-	37	3	-	-
Jamshed Rd II	37	-	-	-	-	-
Jinnah Hosp. II	-	-	26	-	-	-
Jutland & Tunesia L.	99	-	4	1	-	-
Karnali Basti	28	3	2	13	-	-
Kausar Niazi Colony	4	14	37	10	-	-
Lotus Road	34	-	-	-	-	-
Lyari Naddi	7	-	10	4	-	-
Mama Road	42	-	-	-	-	-
Maulwi Musafir Khana	38	-	4	-	-	-
Moosa Nagar	10	-	-	12	-	-
Mujahid Col. Bars. Nala	1	-	27	24	-	-
Naddiabad	6	-	18	4	-	-
Narain Pura	7	-	13	-	13	-
Natha Khan Goth	-	-	36	31	2	-
National Tyre Col.	-	-	5	32	-	3
Pak Ghausia Colony	23	-	7	2	-	-
Panjabi Para Dastgir	-	-	38	-	-	-
Pak Sarhad Colony	11	-	9	2	-	-
Railway Camp	16	-	8	4	-	-
Railway Colony	-	-	17	25	-	-
Raksar II	69	-	2	-	-	-
Rattan Talab	20	-	-	4	-	-
Reti Lines	1	-	30	9	-	-
Shah Rasul Colony	6	-	16	44	-	-
Shanti Nagar	12	1	19	6	1	-
Ultri Maidan	23	-	-	-	-	-
Umr Colony	3	-	20	29	-	-
Usmania M.C.	56	-	11	-	-	-
Yahya Nagar	24	-	8	3	1	-

Household situation

Name Colony	Living with Family (N)	Living alone (N)	Living in dera (N)
Abdul Jabbar Compound	28	-	-
Abyssinia Lines	40	-	-
Aqab Jail Colony	53	-	-
Azeemabad	21	1	-
Baluch Colony	27	-	1
Bath Island	21	1	-
Behind Jacob Lines	94	1	1
Bengali Area Orangi	37	1	-
Bizerta Lines	78	1	-
Bowani Chali	53	1	-
Bukhari Colony	22	6	-
Central Jacob Lines	73	-	-
Central Muslimabad	83	5	3
Choona Bhatti	36	3	-
City Station Colony	34	11	-
Garden Area	60	-	-
Gharibabad (Nea)	57	-	-
Gharibabad (Pologround)	22	1	-
Gharibabad (Purana)	61	1	-
Gujro Nala	111	1	-
Gule Rana Colony	65	-	-
Haji Camp	65	-	1
Hanifi Colony	36	-	-
Hazara Colony	137	-	6
Husseiniat Colony	30	-	-
Iqbalabad	42	-	-
Ismail Village	62	1	3
Jamhurya Col. (Race C.)	43	1	-
Jamshed Rd II	37	-	-
Jinnah Hospital II	22	4	-
Jutland & Tunesia Lines	101	3	-
Karnali Basti	45	1	-
Kausar Niazi Col.	82	3	-
Lotus Road	34	-	-
Lyari Naddi	17	1	3
Mama Road	41	1	-
Maulwi Musafir Khana	38	4	-
Moosa Nagar	22	-	-
Mujahid Col. (Bars. N.)	44	-	8
Naddiabad	28	-	-
Narain Pura	33	-	-
Natha Khan Goth	65	1	3
Nat. Tyre Colony	26	14	-
Pak Ghausia Colony	32	-	-
Panjabi Para Dastgir	38	-	-
Pak Sarhad Colony	20	-	2
Railway Camp	27	1	-
Railway Colony	37	5	-
Raksar II	69	2	-
Rattan Talab	24	-	-
Reti Lines	38	-	2
Shah Rasul Colony	62	1	3
Shanti Nagar	39	-	-
Ultri Maidan	23	-	-
Umr Colony	49	-	3
Usmania Mahajir Colony	57	-	-
Yahya Nagar	32	4	-

Length of stay in Karachi.

V.9.

Name Colony	'50 (N)	'51-'55 (N)	'56-'60 (N)	'60-'65 (N)	'65-'70 (N)	'70-'75 (N)
Abdul Jabbar Compound	24	2	2	-	-	-
Abyssinia Lines	22	8	5	1	3	1
Aqab Jail Colony	11	10	15	11	4	2
Azeemabad	8	4	7	1	2	-
Baluch Colony	6	3	2	7	9	1
Bath Island	6	3	7	6	-	-
Behind Jacob Lines	40	10	16	13	9	8
Bengali Area Orangi	-	-	5	27	6	-
Bizerta Lines	60	8	7	4	-	-
Bowani Chali	3	26	22	2	-	1
Bukhari Colony	-	9	13	3	2	1
Central Jacob Lines	59	5	7	-	2	-
Central Muslimabad	27	20	18	11	9	6
Choona Bhatti	34	1	3	-	1	-
City Station Colony	1	7	11	12	9	5
Garden Area	54	4	2	-	-	-
Gharibabad (Nea)	47	4	1	-	4	1
Gharibabad (Pologround)	-	-	3	5	13	2
Gharibabad (Purana)	48	9	1	1	3	-
Gujro Nala	43	35	11	11	6	6
Gule Rana Colony	45	11	4	2	2	1
Haji Camp	24	14	9	10	6	3
Hanifi Colony	2	2	8	10	10	4
Hazara Colony	28	26	56	18	12	3
Husseiniat Colony	-	2	12	6	6	4
Iqbalabad	34	4	1	2	-	1
Ismail Village	32	14	6	6	6	2
Jamhurya Colony	5	11	16	10	1	1
Jamshed Rd II	34	1	1	-	-	1
Jinnah Hospital II	-	-	1	2	13	10
Jutland & Tunisia L.	75	14	7	2	4	2
Karnali Basti	8	17	14	5	2	-
Kausar Niazi Colony	3	1	-	10	39	12
Lotus Road	25	7	2	-	-	-
Lyari Naddi	8	6	4	2	1	-
Mama Road	38	3	-	1	-	-
Maulwi Musafir Khana	34	4	2	-	2	-
Moosa Nagar	5	3	7	2	3	2
Mujahid Colony (B.N.)	5	9	8	13	8	9
Naddiabad	9	7	5	6	1	-
Narain Pura	31	1	1	-	-	-
Natha Khan Goth	29	13	11	8	3	5
Nat. Tyre Colony	2	8	14	6	4	6
Pak Ghausia Colony	12	5	5	4	3	3
Panjabi Para Dastgir	2	2	18	10	6	-
Pak Sarhad Col.	6	2	1	4	5	4
Railway Camp	13	3	5	2	3	2
Railway Colony	1	17	15	6	3	-
Raksar II	53	11	5	1	1	-
Rattan Talab	22	1	-	1	-	-
Reti Lines	11	3	9	3	8	6
Shah Rasul Colony	21	10	11	19	4	1
Shanti Nagar	16	6	6	2	4	5
Ultri Maidan	22	-	-	1	-	-
Umr Colony	9	8	8	16	8	3
Usmania Mahajir Col.	30	15	14	4	2	2
Yahaya Nagar	9	4	1	8	5	9

Length of stay in the colony.

V. 15.

Name Colony	'50 (N)	'51-'55 (N)	'56-'60 (N)	'60-'65 (N)	'66-'70 (N)	'70-'75 (N)
Abdul Jabbar Compound	20	2	4	-	2	-
Abyssinia Lines	10	9	6	7	3	5
Aqab Jail Colony	-	3	19	15	11	5
Azeemabad	4	5	2	5	5	1
Baluch Colony	1	-	3	5	7	12
Bath Island	-	4	7	7	4	-
Behind Jacob Lines	12	3	14	8	36	23
Bengali Area Orangi	-	-	-	-	24	14
Bizerta Lines	43	14	10	8	2	2
Bowani Chali	2	24	19	7	1	1
Bukhari Colony	-	-	-	1	18	3
Central Jacob Lines	53	5	6	2	5	2
Central Muslimabad	2	12	19	21	22	15
Choona Bhatti	27	2	4	1	2	3
City Station Colony	1	-	6	14	17	7
Garden Area	52	3	3	-	-	2
Gharibabad (Nea)	-	-	-	13	36	8
Gharibabad (Pologround)	-	-	-	6	14	3
Gharibabad (purana)	-	-	21	26	15	-
Gujro Nala	-	32	21	23	20	10
Gule Rana Col.	27	16	2	3	12	5
Haji Camp	-	-	-	10	46	10
Hanifi Colony	-	-	4	6	15	11
Hazara Colony	7	22	44	22	36	12
Husseiniat Colony	-	-	12	6	6	6
Iqbalabad	32	1	4	2	2	1
Ismail Village	28	10	2	8	6	12
Jamhurya Colony	1	9	16	13	3	2
Jamshed Rd II	31	1	2	1	-	2
Jinnah Hospital II	-	-	-	2	10	14
Jutland & Tunesia Lines	60	17	9	6	7	5
Karnali Basti	-	12	14	9	4	7
Kausar Niazi Col.	-	-	-	9	38	18
Lotus Road	18	8	4	1	-	3
Lyari Naddi	3	-	-	6	9	3
Mama Road	36	2	-	1	1	2
Maulwi Musafir Khana	20	6	5	2	6	2
Moosa Nagar	1	-	3	8	4	6
Mujahid Colony (B.N.)	2	2	6	11	10	21
Naddiabad	-	2	3	3	7	13
Narain Pura	23	4	2	2	1	1
Natha Khan Goth	21	14	13	7	3	11
National Tyre Colony	2	7	10	10	4	7
Pak Ghausia Colony	1	5	2	7	11	6
Panjabi Para Dastgir	-	2	10	10	10	6
Pak Sarhad Colony	-	3	2	2	8	7
Railway Camp	5	1	5	8	7	2
Railway Colony	-	15	15	7	5	-
Raksar II	47	8	5	5	2	4
Rattan Talab	20	1	-	1	-	2
Reti Lines	2	3	12	2	12	3
Shah Rasul Colony	-	7	18	20	13	8
Shanti Nagar	12	3	5	3	3	13
Ultri Maidan	17	1	-	3	1	1
Umr Colony	1	-	2	7	19	23
Usmania Mahajir Colony	18	18	19	5	5	2
Yahya Nagar	-	-	-	-	15	21

Occupancy status.

Name Colony	OSB (N)	OB (N)	R (N)
Abdul Jabbar Compound	12	16	-
Abyssinia Lines	26	13	1
Aqab Jail Colony	15	34	4
Azeemabad	8	10	4
Baluch Colony	12	10	6
Bath Island	21	-	1
Behind Jacob Lines	38	54	4
Bengali Area Orangi	38	-	-
Bizerta Lines	47	31	1
Bowani Chali	53	1	-
Bukhari Colony	18	4	6
Central Jacob Lines	61	11	1
Central Muslimabad	43	29	19
Choonia Bhatti	29	9	1
City Station Colony	24	10	11
Garden Area	55	5	-
Gharibabad (Nea)	52	3	2
Gharibabad (Pologround)	20	2	1
Gharibabad (Purana)	51	8	3
Gujro Nala	103	1	8
Gule Rana Colony	39	19	7
Haji Camp	42	21	3
Hanifi Colony	35	-	1
Hazara Colony	84	36	23
Husseiniat Colony	28	-	2
Iqbalabad	35	4	3
Ismail Village	50	12	4
Jamhurya Colony (R.C.)	36	6	2
Jamshed Rd II	31	4	2
Jinnah Hospital II	14	10	2
Jutland & Tunesia Lines	73	29	2
Karnali Basti	44	2	-
Kausar Niazi Colony	63	1	1
Lotus Road	28	6	-
Lyari Naddi	6	10	5
Mama Road	33	9	-
Maulwi Musafir Khana	20	22	-
Moosa Nagar	19	2	1
Mujahid Colony (Bars. N.)	7	27	18
Naddiabad	6	13	9
Narain Pura	30	3	-
Natha Khan Goth	18	39	12
National Tyre Colony	28	-	12
Pak Ghausia Colony	10	19	3
Panjabi Para Dastgir	26	12	-
Pak Sarhad Colony	9	9	4
Railway Camp	25	3	-
Railway Colony	37	1	4
Raksar II	57	12	2
Rattan Talab	22	2	-
Reti Lines	22	10	8
Shah Rasul Colony	46	15	5
Shanti Nagar	15	10	14
Ultri Maidan	18	4	1
Umr Colony	38	4	10
Usmania Mahajir Colony	39	25	3
Yahya Nagar	15	15	6

Way of settling.

Name Colony	From outside Karachi (N)	From stagnating basti (N)	From rented place in superior basti (N)	From not rented place in sup. basti. (N)	
Abdul Jabbar C.	24	-	2	2	
Abyssinia Lines	21	7	10	2	
Aqab Jail Col.	23	3	24	3	
Azeemabad	12	-	10	-	
Baluch Colony	6	3	18	1	
Bath Island	7	2		13)
Behind Jacob Lines	42	17	30	7)
Bengali Area O.	-	24		14)
Bizerta Lines	59	12	6	2)
Bowani Chali	40	1		13)
Bukhari Colony	4	3		21)
Central Jacob Lines	64	4	4	1)
Central Muslimabad	37	11	37	6)
Choona Bhatti	30	2	6	1)
City Station Col.	34	5		6)
Garden Area	56	-	2	2)
Gharibabad (Nea)	3	13		41)
Gharibabad (Pologround)	15	5		3)
Gharibabad (Purana)	5	9		48)
Gujro Nala	55	9		43)
Gule Rana Colony	40	1	20	4)
Haji Camp	8	13	32	13)
Hanifi Col.	16	1		13)
Hazara Col.	84	13	33	3)
Husseiniat' Col.	26	-	4	-)
Iqbalabad	34	1	7	-)
Ismail Village	45	5	14	2)
Jamhurya Colony (R.C.)	31	8		5)
Jamshed Road II	34	3	-	-)
Jinnah Hospital II	20	3	2	1)
Jutland & Tunesia L.	87	7	5	5)
Karnali Basti	18	21		7)
Kausar Niazi Col.	56	3		6)
Lotus Road	24	1	4	5)
Lyeri Naddi	5	2	13	1)
Mama Road	37	-	4	1)
Maulwi Musafir Khana	20	4	10	8)
Moosa Nagar	8	1		13)
Mujahid Col. (B.N.)	26	2	21	3)
Nadiabad	4	9	12	3)
Narain Pura	25	1	7	-)
Natha Khan Goth	46	1	19	3)
Nat. Tyre Col.	34	1		5)
Pak Ghausia Col.	11	3	17	1)
Panjabi Para (Dastgir)	22	--	10	6)
Pak Sarhad Col.	8	-	12	2)
Railway Camp	16	7		5)
Railway Colony	31	5		6)
Raksar II	56	4	9	2)
Rattan Talab	22	-	2	-)
Reti Lines	13	17	9	1)
Shah Rasul Colony	31	4	29	2)
Shanti Nagar	27	1	10	1)
Ultri Maidan	18	4	-	1)
Umr Colony	9	11	32	-)
Usmania Mahajir Col	49	7	10	1)
Yahya Nagar	10	3	16	7)

*) In this case there is no differentiation between rented and not-rented accommodation.

Whereabouts of previous owners/landlords of houses sold/let.

Name Colony	In colony (N)	Left Kara- chi (N)	In other stagnating basti (N)	In superior place (N)	Not known (N)
Abdul Jabbar C.	2	8	-	2	4
Abyssinia Lines	5	3	1	1	4
Aqab Jail Colony	19	8	-	3	8
Azeemabad	7	4	-	1	2
Baluch Colony	6	1	-	5	4
Bath Island	1	-	-	-	-
Behind Jacob L.	19	14	-	7	18
Bengali Area O.	-	-	-	-	-
Bizerta Lines	10	10	-	8	4
Bowani Chali	1	-	-	-	-
Bukhari Colony	7	-	-	2	1
Central Jacob L.	6	-	-	3	3
Central Muslimabad	22	12	-	9	5
Choonia Bhatti	4	-	-	4	2
City Station Col.	10	9	1	-	1
Garden Area	3	-	-	1	1
Gharibabad (Nea)	-	-	-	4	1
Gharibabad (Polo.)	2	1	-	-	-
Gharibabad (Pur.)	1	-	1	7	2
Gujro Nala	6	1	-	2	-
Gule Rana Col.	10	2	-	3	6
Haji Camp	9	8	1	2	4
Hanifi Col.	1	-	-	-	-
Hazara Col.	27	14	-	11	7
Husseiniat Col.	-	-	-	2	-
Iqbalabad	2	1	-	-	4
Ismail Vill.	3	6	1	3	3
Jamhurya Col. (R.C.)	2	2	-	2	2
Jamshed Rd II	-	-	-	4	2
Jinnah Hosp. II	3	6	-	1	2
Jutl. & Tun. Lines	10	2	-	12	7
Karnali Basti	2	-	-	-	-
Kausar Niazi Col.	2	-	-	-	-
Lotus Rd	4	-	-	2	-
Lyari Naddi	7	1	-	6	1
Mama Road	2	1	-	4	2
Maulwi M. Khana	2	2	-	6	12
Moosa Nagar	-	-	-	3	-
Mujahid Col. (B.N.)	30	3	-	3	9
Naddiabad	10	7	-	3	2
Narain Pura	2	-	-	1	-
Natha Khan Goth	20	12	1	12	6
Nat. Tyre Col.	6	6	-	-	-
Pak Ghausia Col.	9	1	1	8	3
Panj. Para Dastg.	4	4	-	2	2
Pak Sarhad Col.	7	2	-	1	3
Railway Camp	-	3	-	-	-
Railway Colony	3	1	-	1	-
Raksar II	3	2	1	6	2
Rattan Talab	-	1	-	1	-
Reti Lines	11	4	1	2	-
Shah Rasul Col.	11	7	-	-	2
Shanti Nagar	22	1	-	1	-
Ultri Maidan	3	-	-	1	1
Umr Colony	8	1	-	3	2
Usmania Mahajir C.	10	5	-	5	7
Yahya Nagar	5	5	-	5	5

Occupational structure.

Name Colony	Professionals & Technicians (N)									
	Administrators & managers (N)									
	Clerical workers (N)									
	Salesworkers (N)									
	Drivers, postmen & related (N)									
	Skilled labourers (N)									
	Semi- & unskilled labourers (N)									
	Servants & related (N)									
	Jobless & retired (N)									
	Other (N)									
Abdul Jabbar C.	-	-	-	12	6	-	10	-	-	-
Abyssinia L.	-	-	7	2	4	13	5	8	-	-
Aqab Jail Col.	2	-	3	16	7	11	5	9	-	-
Azeemabad	-	1	1	4	1	5	1	9	-	-
Baluch Col.	1	-	-	4	4	4	-	18	-	1
Bath Island	1	-	6	2	-	3	8	2	-	-
Behind Jacob L.	1	-	5	23	5	36	14	12	-	-
Bengali Area O.	-	-	-	9	-	13	15	1	-	-
Bizerta Lines	1	-	5	22	9	14	9	17	-	2
Bowani Chali	-	-	-	8	3	1	38	2	1	1
Bukhari Col.	-	-	-	6	-	3	17	2	-	-
Central Jacob L.	-	1	3	23	9	8	15	12	-	2
Central Muslimab.	2	1	-	15	4	24	28	16	-	1
Choona Bhatti	4	-	-	16	-	3	13	1	1	1
City Station C.	-	-	-	10	4	4	21	6	-	-
Garden Area	1	-	-	25	6	14	11	2	1	-
Gharibabad (Nea)	7	1	2	11	3	14	16	2	-	1
Gharbabad (Pol.)	-	1	5	3	2	1	8	3	-	-
Gharibabad (Pur)	6	1	4	18	3	11	14	5	-	-
Gujro Nala	3	1	5	32	2	19	35	9	1	5
Gule Rana Col.	2	-	-	21	11	13	11	5	-	2
Haji Camp	5	-	-	30	5	5	19	2	-	-
Hanifi Col.	1	-	-	-	-	2	24	1	-	8
Hazar Col.	5	-	11	26	18	20	48	15	-	-
Husseiniat Col.	6	-	-	14	4	2	-	4	-	-
Iqbalabad	-	-	3	6	-	18	5	8	2	-
Ismail Village	5	-	1	4	6	9	9	31	-	1
Jamhurya Col.	1	-	1	6	4	5	21	5	-	1
Jamshed Rd II	1	1	2	13	6	6	-	8	-	-
Jinnah Hosp. II	-	-	1	2	1	4	4	14	-	-
Jutl. & Tun. L.	1	-	11	35	18	11	16	10	1	1
Karnali Basti	-	-	-	12	3	14	15	2	-	-
Kausar Niazi C.	2	-	-	10	13	14	23	1	2	-
Lotus Rd	6	-	-	13	2	7	1	5	-	-
Lyari Naddi	1	-	1	4	2	3	6	4	-	-
Mama Road	12	-	-	12	5	5	4	-	-	4
Maulwi M.K.	2	2	-	12	-	-	6	14	-	6
Moosa Nagar	2	-	-	2	2	6	8	2	-	-
Mujahid C. (B.N.)	2	-	4	4	22	5	10	4	1	-
Naddiabad	1	-	1	11	2	6	1	6	-	-
Narain Pura	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	31	-	-
Natha Khan Goth	1	1	6	10	8	18	7	4	-	14

Occupational structure (cont'd)

Name Colony	Professionals & Technicians (N)										
	Administrators & managers (N)										Other (N)
	Clerical workers (N)									Jobless & retired (N)	
	Salesworkers (N)								Servants & related (N)		
	Drivers, postmen & related (N)							Semi- & unskilled labourers (N)			
	Skilled labourers (N)						Other (N)				
						Other (N)					
Nat. Tyre Col.	-	-	1	2	-		3	31	1	-	2
Pak Ghausia C.	2	-	3	7	3	8	4	5	-	-	
Panj. Para (D.)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38	-	-	
Pak Sarhad Col.	2	-	-	5	3	4	1	7	-	-	
Railway Camp	-	1	1	3	2	1	11	9	-	-	
Railway Colony	-	-	2	6	4	2	23	4	-	1	
Raksar II	1	-	2	22	1	12	27	3	-	3	
Rattan Talab	-	-	-	11	1	7	4	-	-	1	
Reti Lines	-	-	3	5	4	2	18	8	-	-	
Shah Rasul C.	1	-	5	6	10	8	10	22	-	3	
Shanti Nagar	2	1	1	-	9	5	18	1	-	2	
Ultri Maidan	3	-	-	10	1	2	3	4	-	-	
Umr Colony	-	-	2	4	8	7	10	18	2	1	
Usmania M.C.	-	1	4	10	8	8	6	30	-	-	
Yahya Nagar	1	-	2	17	1	2	8	5	-	-	

Transport to place of work

Name Colony	Works in Colony (N)	On foot (N)	Bicycle (N)	Bus (N)	Other (N)
Abdul Jabbar Comp.	4	6	6	10	2
Abyssinia L.	2	4	1	33	-
Aqab Jail Col.	8	16	2	24	3
Azeemabad	3	4	1	3	11
Baluch Col.	-	5	4	17	2
Bath Island	2	1	-	19	-
Behind Jacob L.	6	24	9	48	9
Bengali Area O.	3	6	1	28	-
Bizerta Lines	10	27	4	31	7
Bowani Chali	7	10	-	36	1
Bukhari Col.	-	10	-	18	-
Central Jacob L.	14	17	6	31	5
Central Muslimabad	12	13	9	54	3
Choonia Bhatti	17	16	-	6	-
City Station Col.	-	20	-	24	1
Garden Area	6	32	3	16	3
Gharibabad (Nea)	1	11	1	43	1
Gharibabad (Polo.)	-	6	-	16	1
Gharibabad (Purana)	3	18	-	39	2
Gujro Nala	-	13	2	96	1
Gule Rana Col.	5	18	3	30	9
Haji Camp	10	44	-	8	4
Hanifi Col.	1	-	-	35	-
Hazara Colony	10	36	6	81	10
Husseiniat Col.	6	14	2	4	4
Iqbalabad	9	12	3	13	5
Ismail Village	7	18	17	21	3
Jamhurya Col. (R.C.)	-	11	-	32	1
Jamshed Rd II	13	4	-	17	3
Jinnah Hospital II	2	9	6	9	1
Jutland & Tunisia L.	13	33	5	45	8
Karnali Basti	-	19	-	24	3
Kausar Niazi Col.	3	10	-	43	9
Lotus Road	8	14	1	9	2
Lyari Naddi	6	6	-	9	-
Mama Road	1	16	6	16	3
Maulwi M. Khana	14	18	2	8	-
Moosa Nagar	1	1	-	20	-
Mujahid Col. (B.N.)	10	5	-	23	15
Naddiabad	-	8	3	17	-
Narain Pura	-	20	6	7	-
Natha Khan Goth	27	11	2	28	1
Nat. Tyre Colony	1	19	-	20	-
Pak Ghausia Col.	5	7	-	20	-
Panj. Para (Dastgir)	-	10	18	10	-
Pak Sarhad Colony	4	7	2	5	4
Railway Camp	1	1	-	25	1
Railway Colony	1	12	-	27	2
Raksar II	21	14	1	35	-
Rattan Talab	4	11	5	3	1
Reti Lines	6	16	2	16	-
Shah Rasul Colony	4	12	6	40	4
Shanti Nagar	2	16	2	15	4
Ultri Maidan	-	10	5	4	4
Umr Colony	6	10	7	25	4
Usmania Mahajir Col.	7	11	10	35	4
Yahya Nagar	3	18	-	14	1

Goths.

Name Colony	Sample N	
Ismail Goth	25	No refusals, no houses locked.
Sher Shah Goth	60	
Baluch Para	58	
Taru Line	36	
Zikri Para	44	
Dhobi Ghat	32	

Ethnic Affiliation.

Name Goth	Baluchi N	Sindhi N	Muhajir N	Panjabi N	Pathan N	Other N
Ismail Goth	3	-	-	-	-	25
Sher Shah Goth	55	5	-	-	-	-
Baluch Para	49	5	-	2	2	-
Tuaru Line	36	-	-	-	-	-
Zikri Para	33	-	-	9	2	-
Dhobi Ghat	30	1	1	-	-	-

Occupancy status.

Name Goth	OSB ') N	OB N	R N
Ismail Goth	25	-	-
Sher Shah Goth	55	3	2
Baluch Para	55	2	1
Taru Line	36	-	-
Zikri Para	33	5	6
Dhobi Ghat	31	-	1

Occupational structure.

Name Goth	Professionals & Technicians (N)									
	Administrators & Managers(N)									
	Clerical workers (N)									
	Salesworkers (N)									
	Drivers, postmen & related (N)									
	Skilled labourers (N)									
	Semi- & unskilled labourers (N)									
	Servants & related (N)									
	Jobless & retired (N)									
Farmers & Fishers (N)										
Ismail Goth	1	-	-	3	1	1	10	5	-	4
Sher Shah Goth	4	-	-	12	11	4	12	1	3	13
Baluch Para	3	1	5	6	19	4	4	16	-	-
Taru Line	2	1	2	8	5	10	6	2	-	-
Zikri Para	3	-	-	6	7	4	11	11	1	1
Dhobi Ghat	1	-	3	3	1	-	22	1	-	1

Transport to place of work.

Name Goth	Works in Goth (N)	On foot (N)	Bicycle (N)	Bus (N)	Other (N)
Ismail Goth	14	4	2	5	-
Sher Shah Goth	11	14	2	18	15
Baluch Para	20	8	4	14	12
Taru Line	1	7	4	18	6
Zikri Para	3	18	1	17	5
Dhobi Ghat	-	14	-	12	5