Participation of the poor in development

Contributions to a seminar

Edited by
Benno Galjart
and
Dieke Buijs

Leiden Development Studies no. 2   7oICA 81- 4119

PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR

IN DEVELOPMENT.

Contributions to a seminar.

Edited by
Benno Galjart
and
Dieke Buijs

Leiden 1982
Institute of Cultural and Social Studies
University of Leiden

LEIDEN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 2

LEIDEN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Institute of Cultural and Social Studies

1. Participatie, toegang tot ontwikkeling. Verslag van een
   onderzoek naar de mogelijkheden van participatie in ont-
   wikkelingsprojekten. ⟩
   Benno Galjart et al, 1982.

2. Participation of the poor in development. Contributions
   to a seminar.
   Benno Galjart and Dieke Buijs (eds), 1982.

3. Cooperación al desarrollo y movimiento popular: Las
   asociaciones privadas de desarrollo.
   Mario Padrón, 1982.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CONTENTS

1

INTRODUCTION

Dieke Buijs and Benno Galjart

Institute of Cultural and Social Studies
University of Leiden

This reader is the fruit of a two-day seminar on popular participation in development projects, held at Leiden University in the autumn of 1981. Two years earlier a group of five development sociologists working at the Institute of Cultural and Social Studies in Leiden had submitted a research proposal, in which the implications of popular participation in development projects were to be studied in some depth. DGIS, the Dutch Agency for International Development Cooperation, agreed to fund the field research part of the study. Some of us five sociologists could dedicate practically all available time to the ensuing research project, which came to be called Access and Participation; others only a part. Each of us focused on a different problem, though there was enough overlap to work as a team. The seminar was planned as an occasion to present to a scientific audience some of the results of our work. Since the first draft of our final report to DGIS was written at about the same time as the seminar papers, most of the latter covered the same ground as the chapters each of us had contributed to the report. Galjart turned out to be the only exception; a teaching commitment abroad had forced him to write his seminar contributions earlier than the other members of the team. As it seemed illogical to leave out one part of the report, his "Project groups and higher-level associations" was added later. To compensate, one of the case analyses which he did present at the seminar is not included here.

However, the reader is not simply a translation of the report, the final version of which has been published recently (Galjart et al, 1982).

A number of contacts had been established over the last few years with Dutch and foreign colleagues working on problems of participation. As a result, several investigations, which had been started independently, became linked to our research, mostly in the form of Ph.D. projects. Two of these colleagues, to wit Mario Padrón, associated with Desco in Lima, and Koen Verhagen of the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam, also presented papers at the seminar. So did Peter Nas, Wil Prins and Wasif Shadid, our colleagues in the Institute in Leiden, who responded to the invitation which we extended to the staff of the Institute to partake in the seminar. As participants we invited most of the Dutch social scientists of whom we knew that they were doing research on participation in development or had practical experience with participatory development projects. Our meagre funds allowed us to invite only two foreign colleagues, Norman Uphoff from Cornell and Hans Münkner from the Philipps-Universität. One of our guests, Flud van Giffen of the University of Amsterdam, was sufficiently inspired by the discussions to write a paper, which is partly his personal conclusion, partly a theoretical statement in its own right. We decided to include it in this reader. The discussions also led to major or minor revisions in the papers that were presented.

Participation is a rather vague concept. It is used in political science, in development sociology, and in the sociology of organizations. Even if one limits the use of the term to the realm of decision-making, and defines it as the attempt to exert upward influence (Lammers, 1970), there remain problems. Is participation in development projects itself a goal, or is it a means to another goal? It can be seen as a means to one - or more - of four different goals. In the first place, popular participation could be solicited to promote the acceptance and use of a new idea, a new technique or some other innovation. Experience has taught that innovations, which to an outsider appear to be improvements, can nevertheless be rejected by those for

whom they are meant. If people are consulted in an early stage, a better fit between their needs and the innovations which are offered may be expected. This was one of the ideas behind the Community Development movement of the fifties. A second goal for which participation can be a means is cooperation in the economic sphere, either in the form of an occasional working party, or in the form of a permanent organization. The developing countries were hit in the sixties by a wave of promotion of cooperatives. These were not very successful (cf. the UNRISD publications on cooperatives in 1972), but cooperatives still are set up every day.

A third, often more implicit goal of participation is self-help. This may mean different things. It may mean a contribution by the beneficiaries towards meeting the costs of a project. It may mean an increase of their capacity to sustain a joint economic activity and promote other activities, in short, to have a hand in their own development. Finally, self-help may refer to the establishment and maintenance by members of an association of a set of rules with regard to contributions and rewards. Such rules depart from the dictates of the market and indicate the solidarity of the participants.

A fourth goal of participation is the acquisition of political power, either through the mobilization and creation of interest groups, or through affiliation with a political party.

We - i.e. the Leiden research group - did not study all the forms that participation could take. We have restricted ourselves in various ways, for various reasons. First of all, we were interested in participation in, and by means of, a permanent organization. Hence, we did not look at popular participation as a means to gain the adoption of innovations. To get something adopted, some form of consultation of the potential adopters is often thought sufficient. Also, forms of occasional cooperation were not included in our research. We focused on instances of associations founded for the purposes of permanent economic cooperation and the realization of self-help. Although political associations are also meant to be permanent, we did not take them into account. For one thing, political mobilization - at least that of peasants - has already received a great deal of attention from

sociologists (cf. Landsberger (ed.), 1969; Huizer, 1976; Galjart, 1976; Singelmann, 1981). Moreover, DGIS as an international agency was much more likely to promote participation in economic cooperation than in political associations, and would be better served by an emphasis on the former.

Our intention was to arrive at recommendations of the how-to type. This implied analyzing our data, not to construct a merely descriptive ideal type of a participatory development association, but to construct a normative ideal type. We were not interested in what is usually done by promotors or members or leaders, but what they should do if they were to forestall certain dysfunctional developments and guard against certain mistakes. The obvious drawback of such an emphasis is that the recipe which results is too demanding to apply, so that in practice only deviations from the ideal can be seen. Nevertheless, it is necessary to know what the ideal is before deviations can even be observed.

As we have said earlier, the five of us focused on different aspects. Dieke Buijs studied participation within small development associations or project groups, and what promotors should do to guide such groups. Bouwe Grijpstra's problem was what properties a project implementing agency should have when it is seriously interested in promoting the participation of its target group. Benno Galjart focused on the external relations of project groups, and especially on the question if and how a surplus generated by one project could be transferred to get a similar project elsewhere off the ground. Leen Boer has been working on a comparative analysis of local communities in developing countries; the paper is a midway inventory of findings. His aim is not only to detect characteristic development processes and paths, but also to find out whether or not some settings are more promising than others for small-scale participatory development projects. Laurens van Vroonhoven evaluated the experience of a country where the promotion of popular participation in development has been official policy: Tanzania. Why have the results been rather disappointing?

The other contributions fit into the design of the Access and Participation research in various ways.

Participation, and access, too, for that matter, are complex concepts.

One way to approach such concepts is through the theoretical literature. Another way starts with the notion that the realities or situations indicated by such terms might contribute to a solution of concrete development problems. In fact, most of the research done on problems of access and participation is of the applied kind, that is, it does not start with well-defined concepts. Especially with regard to the idea of participation, Uphoff, Cohen and Goldsmith (1979) content that development practitioners have run ahead of social scientists. Applied sociological research has to "ground" its concepts and theories (cf. Glaser and Strauss, 1979) and often does so in a roundabout way. The paper by Dieke Buijs, "On Admittance, Access, Cooperation and Participation", outlines the reasoning which has led us from poverty and the lack of access to services, to cooperation and participation. The contribution of Peter Nas, Wil Prins and Wasif Shadid discusses the concepts of access and participation as found in the literature. Contrary to Dieke Buijs who sees participation as a means to get access, participation in the opinion of Nas et al is also a condition for access.

Koen Verhagen provides a description of an ongoing research-cum-action project in Thailand and Sri Lanka, intended to promote joint economic activities and associations among the poorer peasant strata. In a later stage of the project, its aim is to establish strong links between these associations and the existing cooperative federations. Another case history of a participatory project is provided by Galjart. This DGIS-financed project was to set up and test a methodology for the promotion of small self-managed enterprises in rural as well as urban areas of Colombia. The project was rather successful, although the promotion of and necessary assistance to such enterprises turned out to be more expensive than was at first hoped. Benno Galjart is critical of DGIS' inability to digest and make further use of this experience. Mario Padrón, who has worked more than ten years in a Non-Governmental Development Agency in Peru and is at present engaged in a study of such organizations and their aims and procedures throughout the developing countries, presents his first conclusions. Not only their growing number, but also the fact that they appear to be better able to foster participation and self-reliance, make these private development agencies

fascinating phenomena. At present they depend very much upon foreign funding, and this may raise doubts as to their durability. Nevertheless, their role seems to be underestimated in official development circuits.

References

Galjart, B.F.	Peasant mobilization and solidarity. Assen, Van Gorcum, 1976.
Galjart, Benno, Leen Boer, Dieke Buijs, Bouwe Grijpstra en Laurens van Vroonhoven	Participatie, toegang tot ontwikkeling. Verslag van een onderzoek naar de mogelijk-heden van participatie in ontwikkelings-projekten. Leiden, Instituut voor Culturele Antropolo-gie, Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, 1982.
Glaser, Barney G. and Anselm S. Strauss	The discovery of grounded theory. Strategies for qualitative research. New York, Aldine Publishing Company, 1979. Oorspronkelijke uitgave 1967.
Huizer, Gerrit	Boerenverzet in Latijns Amerika. Nijmegen, Sun, 1976.
Lammers, C.J.	Demokratisering van bedrijf en universiteit. In: Braam, A. van (ed.) Aktuele sociologie. Assen, Van Gorcum, 1970, pp. 187-210.
Landsberger, H.A. (ed.)	Latin American peasant movements. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1969.
Singelmann, Peter	Structures of domination and peasant move-ments in Latin America. Columbia and London, University of Missouri Press, 1981.
Uphoff, N.T., J.M. Cohen and A.A. Goldsmith	Feasibility and application of rural develop-ment: A state-of-the-art-paper. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University, Rural Development Committee and Department of Government, 1979.

2

ON ADMITTANCE, ACCESS, COOPERATION
AND PARTICIPATION; THE BASIC CONCEPTS
OF THE "ACCESS AND PARTICIPATION" RESEARCH

Dieke Buijs

Institute of Cultural and Social Studies
University of Leiden

1. Admittance, access and self-sufficiency

To reproduce and to improve their quality of life, people need
resources. By resources we mean products, means of production and
services; but also the knowledge of how to acquire these resources has
to be considered as a resource.
There are three ways to obtain goods, services and means of production;
e.g. via distribution systems, the market and the administration, and
through self-sufficiency.
The possibilities that people have to dispose of resources depend on
their ability to 'manipulate' these "access-routes".
One of the main distribution points is the market were supply and
demand meet. Here one gets admittance to resources if one is able to
exchange. Someone's position on the market is determined by the
resources he can offer for exchange. Admittance is defined as the
possibility to dispose of resources distributed via the market system.
As the resources one wishes to have become scarce, their prices rise,
and one must have more resources at one's disposal to be able to buy.
Someone who has nothing to offer will get nothing and has no admittance
to the market. Another distribution system - in which poor people

should be more successful - lies in the institutional sphere, where
government and private institutions offer and distribute resources on
conditions which are not based on purchasing power. The term "access"
is used in the literature for this institutional distribution
(Schaffer[*], 1972, 1973, 1975; Schaffer and Lamb, 1974, 1981; Schwartz,
1976).

We define access as the possibility of people to dispose of services
and goods intended for them which are not distributed via the market
system but through administrative institutions.

Yet here we also notice that the services supplied by the government,
like education, extension and medical care, are used relatively little
or even not at all by the poorest people, even when these services are
explicitly meant for all categories of the population (cf. special
issue of Development and Change, Problems of Access to Public Services,
1975, vol. 6, no. 2).

So in this distribution there is a question of access problems. As
these are not brought about by lack of purchasing power, there must be
other causes. But which ones? When searching for the answer, both
supply - the service organization - and demand - the client - have to
be taken into consideration.

Firstly, a cause can be found in the lack of sufficient coverage of the
service with respect to the clients; they can hardly reach each other,
or are even both unaware of each other's existence.

Secondly, the price one has to pay for the service can be too high:
directly, when it concerns the payment for the service; indirectly,
when the use of the service implies other costs. For example, for a
family the education of their children means losing a part of their
labour power. If this causes a labour shortage, other workers must be
hired. A third cause lies in the cultural sphere. Service organizations
are often not attuned to lower social strata, e.g., clients from these
strata do not feel "at ease" in the often Western-oriented institutions.
Pressure is exerted on service organizations to produce quickly-visible

[*] In Schaffers model access is defined as "the relations between the
administrative allocation of goods and services and the people for
whom they are intended" (Schaffer and Lamb, 1973) in non-market
distribution systems, where factors other than income determine
allocation (Schaffer and Huang, 1975).

results. The effect is that these organizations direct themselves to
the more approachable groups, that is, they select only those people
who give the least problems, i.e. the middle and higher strata
(Sjoberg et al, 1973).
Also, the promotion policy for functionaries reinforces this process
of a poor service distribution to the lowest strata. Poorly qualified
and beginning functionaries are often placed in the poorest neighbour-
hoods and remote villages. When, in addition, the goods and services
are scarce, corruption and favouritism crop up. Corruption and
favouritism imply the possesion of resources or a good relationship
with the functionaries, which poor people do not have.
So, services are benefiting the lower social strata only to a very
small extent.
And, when a person of the lower strata wishes to make use of a service
he is confronted with all kinds of procedures unknown to him, such as
priorities, allocation rules, waiting time and application forms,
which he, as an illiterate, has to fill in (Schaffer, 1973; Schwartz,
1976). His ignorance of such matters discourages him to make (further)
use of the service. Concluding we can say that poor people neither
have admittance to resources distributed via market systems, nor do
they have access to resources allocated in the institutional sphere.
People could try to take the third 'access-route' to resources, namely
through self-sufficiency. For some goods this is possible, but it is
seldom done.
The questions which now worry development agents are how a person can
gain admittance or access, and how he can create his own goods.
Let us start with admittance. Suppose someone has hardly any means for
exchange on the market. He could ameliorate his situation in the
following ways:
a) He could enter into a relation with a rich patron, landlord or
   shopkeeper. They can give him a certain admittance to resources in
   exchange for political loyalty, free labour, etc. This, however,
   creates a dependency which can obstruct admittance to other
   resources.
b) He could cooperate with people in a similar position and form an
   organization with them. By working together and combining the

individual resources one can operate on the market as one actor,
realizing at the same time economies of scale and efficiency.
What about someone's possibilities to enhance his access?
On the supply side the service organization can adapt itself to the
situation of the lower social strata. These adaptations can take place
in the form of changing rules, priorities, waiting-times, or by
other recruitment procedures for staff, and also by organizing the
clients into groups through which they can be reached in a better and
more efficient way (cf. Pearl and Riesman, 1965; Farrell, 1969;
Ashcroft et al, 1974; Buijs, 1979).
In the present paper this method of access enhancement will be left
out and we concentrate on the client side.
To a poor client who wants access, the same sources as for admittance
are open:
a) "alternative" routes to the services, for example through patronage;
b) cooperation and organization with companions to make their voice
heard in claiming a certain service or even commanding it.
For an individual it is very hard to create his own resources. It is
too great an effort for one person to buy an expensive truck or to
build a school or a road. Cooperation with others produces more
results.
Thus, when people want resources, cooperation and patronage relations
are solutions. In practice we see that poor people seldom organize
themselves for access, admittance or self-sufficiency purposes. But
they do enter into relations with richer and more powerful persons.
Because of competition this last route, however, is not open for every-
body; and it often creates dependency relations, which cause in their
turn new problems of access or admittance. Although cooperation seems
to be the most plausible solution, it is more simply said than realized.

2. Cooperation

Given the fact that one cannot solve certain problems individually, it
does not logically follow that cooperation is the best way to go.
Cooperation is not as simple and evident as is sometimes suggested (cf.
Olson, 1971; Lulofs, 1978).

People with personal interests or problems will advance or solve these individually. "There is obviously no purpose in having an organization when individual, unorganized action can serve the interests of the individual as well as, or better than an organization" (Olson, 1971, p. 7). It becomes different when others have the same problem - like a dispute about wages with the landowner. But even when people share a common problem, they will not cooperate immediately. Only when they cannot solve it individually they will think about cooperation and calculate the costs and benefits. Cooperation can be of a temporary nature, like the construction of a community building or a road. It can also lead to a permanent organization, for example one which controls the irrigation works; or takes care of the sale of the members' production; or provides employment by means of a common enterprise. The last forms potentially will have the greatest impact, but they are hard to realize because they require a continuous effort and commitment of the members. The intended benefits of cooperation are the admittance or access to resources. Of course there are also costs. Cooperation implies a certain loss of individual freedom in favour of the group of which one forms a part (Dore, 1971). The members have to contribute labour, capital or land and have to spend time at meetings, etc.

Even when the individual profit from group membership exceeds its costs, people will not cooperate unless there is a control on free riders. They want to be sure that no one is plucking the fruits of cooperation without a proportionate contribution.
Thus, concluding we can say that people only want to cooperate if they cannot solve their common problems individually. They only cooperate when a) the individual profits exceed the individual costs; and b) when there is a strong control on free riders. However, we must recognize that cooperation in order to solve common problems seldom arises spontaneously. The reasons include the above-mentioned insecurities and risks and other impediments, like the lack of knowledge about or experience in organizing such a group. Outside incentives can help to remove these impediments and disadvantages.
Nowadays the number of organizations which motivate poor people to solve their admittance and access problems through cooperation is in-

creasing. Most of these stimulating organizations are non-governmental (NGO's). But also in government circles attention for this development approach is growing.

3. Participation

The joint promotion of the members' interests demands an involvement and a great commitment by the members to their organization (Etzioni, 1975). They must have a willingness to stay in the organization, to develop a group cohesiveness, and to conform to the norms, procedures and decisions of the organizations (Moss Kanter, 1972). In a voluntary private organization this willingness can rarely if ever be forced from the members. Such commitment must rely on normative considerations and rational utilitarian expectations of the costs and benefits ratio.
This involvement of the basis of commitment can better be developed and maintained in an organization where the power-distance between members and management is small, and where people do not think in terms of "we and they" (Mulder, 1977; Bernstein, 1976; Fox, 1977).
Such an organization in which the members exert influence on management and decision-making we call participatory. The members expect to enhance their admittance and access in the society through this participatory organization.
In our view of participation this concept is limited to the political and organizational sphere. It thus runs counter to the ideas of Uphoff, Cohen and Goldsmith (1979), who use the term participation also to denote a rise in the standard of living and for an increase in social status. Participation is not a static concept as some writers suggest (FAO, 1973; Hatfield, 1972), but it concerns a dynamic process.
In this process members can try to increase through common efforts their influence on the management of and the decision-making within their organization.
It can be said that participation - a certain amount of influence on decision-making - lies on a sort of continuum.
The line drawn by Bernstein (1976) ranges from minimal influence (like a suggestion box) to a full workers' control. Arnstein (1971) constructed a ladder with eight levels of participation, which go from

manipulation and therapy via information, consultation by the management and a minority representation, to the last three levels, on which the members have the most important or even the only voice in the chapter.

When an organization has a certain participation level - like self-management - it does not mean that there can be no other, lower level -like consultation - at the same time. From the efficiency and efficacy point of view, it is undesirable that all members have a say in all matters; in order to let an organization function well it is advisable to delegate certain decisions to managers and representatives. The immediate influence of members is voluntarily reduced to a lower level. And at set times, when the managers or representatives have to account for their activities and decisions to the members, or when important decisions have to be taken, the group participates again at the higher level.

So the amount of influence is a variable aspect of the concept of participation. In the context of industrial democracy Bernstein (1976) distinguished still two other dimensions: the range of issues and the organizational level.

By the range of issues is meant those issues over which members exert influence. The organizational level indicates in which sections of the organization one can exercise influence. An example of a regional marketing cooperative with local branches may serve as an illustration. When local members may decide upon the purchase of a lorry, their level of influence is greater than when they are only consulted. A choice between lorry x of y illustrates a smaller range of issues than a choice between one's own transport department or contracting the transport out to others. And finally, decisions on the starting-time of meetings seldom exceed the level of the local branch. Decisions on staying or leaving the cooperative do.

Between these three dimensions there exist no lineair relations. A higher amount of participation regarding one aspect does not imply an increase for the two other dimensions. A total valuation of the amount of participation in an organization cannot be made by simply taking the sum total of the valuations of each dimension. Delay of participa-

tion or lowering of participation at one dimension does not mean that the effectiveness of an organization decreases. On the contrary, it can add to the alertness and flexibility of the organization to reach the stated goals. In this way the various members can devote themselves better to the aspects entrusted to them.

In our research we use the term "participatory project". That is an organization of people who by cooperation try to increase their admittance or access.
The participants have a great deal of influence on the decision-making in, and the management of the organization, which they try to extend. For reasons of efficiency certain decisions are delegated to managers or representatives, but the final responsibility stays with the members. A participatory project has to fulfill three functions (Galjart, 1980, p.11). Firstly, education and training are necessary in the beginning phase to develop an involvement of the members and train them in technical and social skills, and later on to maintain and to extend this. Secondly, there must be an organization which functions. This means that there are meetings, that books are kept, appointments are made and tasks delegated. Thirdly, in order to improve standards of living, some productive activity is to be promoted.

Participatory projects are rarely, if ever, founded spontaneously by the participants. Usually they are initiated by some outsider. Sometimes this person is functioning individually, bur more often he is employed by a change agency. The task to take care of the education and training of the members rests primarily on these promotors. They also help to let the newly-founded organizations function, and they may advise on how to reach the goals.
The group thus formed we call the project group. As the project group gets acquainted with the various aspects of the participatory project and masters the tasks attached to it, its influence on decision-making and management grows. While the amount of participation increases, the influence of the promotor decreases. This development we call a participation process.

4. Participation: where does the idea come from?

In the seventies development agencies got the idea that in development projects and programmes the participation of the population for which they were intended would be desirable. Where did this idea spring from and what was meant by participation?
One important source of the call for participation has to be sought in the practice of development work. Uphoff, Cohen and Goldsmith wrote in 1979 that in this case the politicians and policy-makers were ahead of the social theorists.
Already in the forties one realized that the governmental service organizations could never reach the level of the small village or hamlet. Therefore, the inhabitants of such communities would have to organize and commit their own resources. The government would help when technical or financial problems were too great to be solved by the villagers themselves. This lead to the Community Development approach, and a few years later especially in French-speaking African countries to the "Animation Rurale". In this last approach especially the greater integration of the rural population into the market was emphasized. Both strategies produced dissapointing results and there-fore were abandoned in the sixties. Evaluations made afterwards con-cluded that despite the good intentions, there was hardly a question of participation, but rather of too much bureaucratic decision-making (see Charlick, 1980). After the Community Development era the solution to the problems of development was often sought in the technical sphere. But research in the seventies showed that production-raising techniques in agriculture were only used by a small part of the population, mostly the richer farmers. The socio-economical differentiation in rural areas of developing countries increased. The small farmers - let alone the landless - came into difficulties, because they appeared to have less admittance (or admittance on less favourable conditions) to markets and institutions (Griffin, 1972). In the future, projects and programmes should be attuned more specifically to the categories of the poor. However, because it was unlikely that the governmental services would proceed in action with-out much ado, one thought of giving the participants a say in such

projects.

Maybe the experiences of some non-governmental organizations which initiated these special projects (like Vicos, see Dobyns et al., 1971) influenced the opinion-forming on participation. The Chinese model of rural development certainly did, despite the fact that reliable information was scarce (Aziz, 1978). This model not only included a land reform, but also an collectivization of agriculture.
In the opinion of many townsmen this is a sovereign remedy to increase production: industry demonstrated this point already for a long time, did it not? Moreover, it was said by enthusiast eyewitnesses, this model included participation.

The term participation was also used in other contexts. In that way we see in the early seventies in the United States the opinion on internal planning changed (Friedman, 1981). It should be more of a social learning character and less in the nature of blueprinting plans before. Those were the years in which one tried to improve the position of especially the American Blacks by means of large-scale participatory programme's (Moynihan, 1969).
The political scientists too, studied participation, but they limited this concept mainly to the participation in elections and in canvassing for votes. In the mid-seventies some of them extended political parti-cipation to the exercise of influence on the distribution of public goods, and even to the creation of the latter by self-help (Seligson and Booth, 1979).
Already since the fifties participation was studied by people engaged in industrial democracy and self-management. In several developing countries, like Chile, Peru and Algeria, the Yugoslav model of workers' control has been very popular, but one can hardly say that the policy-makers in these countries were guided by, for example, Vanek's theory (1975) on self-management.
It might be true that the ideas and theories on participation in development projects in developing countries hardly link up with the above-mentioned concepts and theories. This does not mean that they are useless. On the contrary, they can be fruitful.

References

Arnstein, S.R.	Eight rungs on the ladder of citizen participation. In: Cahn, E.S. and B.A. Passett (eds) Citizen participation: Effecting community change. New York, Praeger, 1971, pp. 69-91.
Ashcroft, J., N. Röling, J. Karubi, F. Chege	Extension and the forgotten farmer. Bulletin nr. 37. Wageningen, Landbouwhogeschool, Afdeling voor Sociale Wetenschappen, 1973.
Aziz, Sartaj	Rural development. Learning from China. London, Macmillan, 1978.
Bernstein, Paul	Workplace democratization: Its internal dynamics. Kent, Kent State University Press, 1976.
Buijs, H.Y.	Access and participation. On the access problems of poor people and participation as a solution. An interim report. Leiden, Instituut voor Culturele Antropologie en Sociologie der Niet-Westerse Volken, Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, (ICA-publikatie nr. 33), 1979.
Charlick, Robert	Animation rurale: Experience with "participatory" development in four West African nations. In: Rural Development Participation Review, Vol. 1, no. 2, 1980, pp. 1-6.
Development and Change	Problems of access to public services. Vol. 6, no. 2, April 1975.
Dobyns, H., P. Daughty and H. Lasswell	Peasants, power and applied social change. Beverly Hills, Sage, 1971.
Dore, R.F.	Modern cooperatives in traditional communities. In: Worsley, P. (ed.) Two blades of grass. Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1971, pp. 43-66.
Etzioni, A.	A comparative analysis of complex organizations (revised edition). New York, London, Free Press, 1975.

Farrell, G.   The view from the city: community action in
                            Trenton.
                            In: Sundquist, L. (ed.)
                            On fighting poverty.
                            New York, Basic Books, 1969, pp. 127-157.

F.A.O.   Peoples participation in development, vol.
                            I. Action for development/FFHC.
                            Poona, Calcutta, India, Asian Regional
                            Workshop, 2-12 sept., 1973.

Fox, A.   Beyond contract: Work, power and trust
                            relations.
                            London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1977.

Friedmann, John   Planning as social learning.
                            Working Paper 343.
                            Berkeley, University of California,
                            Institute of Urban and Regional Development,
                            February 1981.

Galjart, B.F.   Participatieve ontwikkelingsprojekten: Hoe
                            moet dat?
                            Interim rapport n.a.v. de bevindingen van
                            5 maanden onderzoek in Colombia, Peru en
                            Mexico.
                            Maart 1980.

Griffin, K.   The green revolution. An economic analysis.
                            Geneva, UNRISD, 1972.

Hatfield, C.R. Jr.   Livestock development in Sukumaland: The
                            constituents of communication.
                            In: Sociologia Ruralis, Vol. XII, no. 3/4,
                            1972, pp. 361-383.

Lulofs, J.G.   Theorie van het collectieve handelen (1):
                            De theorie van Olson.
                            In: Mens en Maatschappij, 53e jaargang,
                            no. 2, 1978, pp. 139-172.

Moss Kanter, R.   Commitment and community: Communes and
                            utopias in sociological perspective.
                            Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, Harvard
                            University Press, 1972.

Moynihan, Daniel P. (ed.) On understanding poverty: Perspective from
                            the social sciences.
                            New York, London, Basic Books Inc., 1969.

Mulder, M.   Omgaan met macht.
                            Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1977.

Olson, M.   The logic of collective action. Public goods
                               and the theory of groups.
                               Cambridge, London, England, Harvard
                               University Press, 1971, revised edition.

Pearl, A. and F. Riesman   New careers for the poor.
                               London, Collier - MacMillan, 1965.

Schaffer, B.B.   Easiness of access: A concept of queues.
                               Brighton, I.D.S. Communication 104, 1972.

Schaffer, B.B.   The administrative factor.
                               London, Cass, 1973.

Schaffer, B.B.   Editorial.
                               In: Development and Change, Vol. 6, no. 2,
                               April 1975, pp. 3-11.

Schaffer, B.B. and   Distribution and the theory of access.
Huang Wen Hsien   In: Development and Change, Vol. 6, no. 2,
                               April 1975, pp. 13-37.

Schaffer, B.B. and   Exit, voice and access.
G. Lamb   Brighton, I.D.S., 1974.

Schaffer, B.B. and   Can equity be organized? Equity development
G. Lamb   analysis and planning.
                               Farnborough, Paris, Gower Press, UNESCO,
                               1981.

Schwartz, B.   Queueing and waiting: Studies in the social
                               organization of access and delay.
                               Chicago and London, University of Chicago
                               Press, 1976.

Seligson, M. and   Political participation in Latin America.
J.A. Booth (eds)   New York, Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1979.

Sjoberg, G., R.A. Brymer   Bureaucracy and the power class.
and B. Farris   In: Katz, E. and B. Danet (eds)
                               Bureaucracy and the public.
                               A reader in official-client relations.
                               New York, Basic Books, 1973, pp. 61-72.

Uphoff, N.T., J.M. Cohen   Feasibility and application of rural
and A.A. Goldsmith   development participation: A state-of-the-
                               art-paper.
                               Ithaca, Cornell University, Rural Develop-
                               ment Committee, 1979.

Vanek, J. (ed.)   Self-management. Economic liberation of man.
                               Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1975.

3

ACCESS AND PARTICIPATION:
A THEORETICAL APPROACH [*]

Wasif Shadid, Wil Prins and Peter J.M. Nos

Institute of Cultural and Social Studies
University of Leiden

1. Introduction

It is argued by many authors that the concepts of 'access' and
'participation' provide the best approach to the study of the relations
between the 'haves' and the 'have nots', the distribution of scarce
goods and services, the activating and motivating of target groups, and
the planning, organization and implementation of development projects.
After reading a number of studies on this topic, which primarily deal
with concrete development projects, we got the impression that these
concepts comprise something unfathomable. The initial difficulty in
verbalizing this unfathomability was the stimulus to work out a further
definition of these concepts. With some exceptions (Schaffer, Schwartz,
Lamb) the meaning of the concept of access is seldom given. The
theoretical foundation of the concept of participation, however, has
been studied by a number of authors, such as Buijs, Van Dusseldorp,
Meister, etc.

In this article we shall discuss questions concerning the meaning of these concepts, their usage in a theoretical or concrete sense, and their mutual relation.

2. Access: theoretical problems

Before systematizing the meaning of the concept of access, we shall ascertain some noteworthy characteristics of its theoretical basis, namely the incomprehensability of the discussions, different definitions, and conceptual and level contamination.

First of all we shall consider the problem of incomprehensability. The discussions on the theoretical base of access are mostly vague, unsystematic and difficult to understand. We shall illustrate this with a few examples.
In his discussion of access rules, which can be presented in terms of the model of the simple queue, Rew (1975, p. 41) states: "The essential idea is that the queue individuates an access application by disentangling it from its surrounding social matrix and making it a bureaucratic 'case' to be ordered and dealt with by calculable rules of eligibility".
A more appropriate example of incomprehensibleness is given by Lamb (1975, p. 119), who writes: "The connections between access relations and other political phenomena can be stated, ..., with a clarity which established precisely why and over which range of situations these relations are significant: there is thus initially no need for further explanation, although it will be useful in the course of the argument to refer to the creative tension between the different categories and levels of theoretical construction represented in the analysis of access relations and in the consideration of the more inclusive problems of Marxist social analysis".
The concept of access is besides being vague and incomprehensible, defined and operationalized in different ways. The definitions and delineations create again a diversity of new terminologies, such as 'counter', 'queue', 'delay', 'waiting', 'organizational connection', 'administrative allocation', 'distribution' and the like.

Sometimes the word access is used as a paradigm, as an abstract
concept, and sometimes as a concrete term with the meaning of 'entrance
to'. The concept of participation is also used in a diversity of ways,
in some cases even synonymous with democracy. For the present we
define it as taking part in the decision-making and implementation-
process of an organization. Access is considered here as having
entrance to a system (distribution system, action group and the like)
and sharing the rights derived from such a system; it also means
having entrance to the goods and services which are distributed within
that system.
The earlier-mentioned contamination is the third problem concerning
this topic. As to the conceptual contamination, generally speaking, in
the literature the usage of the concepts of access and participation
is not very consistent. As a consequence participation problems are
sometimes considered as access problems and vice versa. As regards
level contamination, the access and participation process is related
to the distribution system as well as to the institutions and organiza-
tions in society. Two levels have to be distinguished here: the (self)
organization of the target-group and the ultimate access and participa-
tion which they strive to initiate. This means that the (self)organiza-
tion of the target-group has to be considered a separate level of
access and participation.
In the following outline we consider level 1, and especially access 1,
to be of great importance, because in practice it seems very difficult
to mobilize the groups that have poor chances.

This process can be presented schematically as follows:

$$\boxed{\text{Access}_1 \longrightarrow \text{Participation}_1} \longrightarrow \boxed{\text{Access}_2 \longrightarrow \text{Participation}_2}$$

Level $_1$	Level $_2$
The (self)organization of the target-group	The ultimate aim for which one strives

Furthermore, it is important to point out that the time sequence of
both processes (access and participation) is often not clear in the
literature. It is of fundamental importance to ascertain that in time

sequence access takes place before participation.
The distinction between the two levels mentioned is important for the assessment of the time sequence of access and participation.
However, the first level does not necessarily need to occur, which means that the access and participation process begins at level 2. The (self)organization and extension of the target-group to take part in the decision-making process of an institution concerns in the first place the access process for that particular institution. When this is satisfactorily fulfilled we consider it participation. Therefore, there exists a participation problem when access does not lead to incorporation of the individual in the decision-making process. However, it is possible that a pressure group only wants to change some access rules without striving to take part in the decision-making. This we consider an access problem.

3. Access

The approach to access as a theoretical concept implies questions about the distribution of goods and services, functioning of public services, and the connection lines between the distributing organizations and the target-group. This implies, furthermore, the study of access problems concerning mainly factors that, in the opinion of the target-group, disturb the adequate distribution of goods and services. These factors comprise, among others, the organization itself, the goal, the means, the target-group, and their mutual relation.
But what is access? Is it what Palmer (1975, p. 51) calls 'including the excluded'; does it mean merely 'entrance to'? Or is the concept of access a paradigm that implies "the relation between the administrative allocation of goods and services and the people who need them, and for whom they are intended' (Schaffer, 1975, p. 3)?
Schaffer, an authority on this topic, finds much support in the literature for his approach. Colebatch (1975, p. 107), for example, argues that access is more than direct contact between client and functionary. Access "encompasses the whole range of interactions, both of people and of institutions, that govern the administrative allocation of goods and services - or, in Schaffer's phrase - the problem of the

'organizational connection'".

In fact, access implies all the above-mentioned definitions and descriptions. In the first place it concerns 'entrance to', and also the course of the entrance process. In other words, the process concerns the relation and difficulties which may arise between the members of an organization which tries to grasp the problem, and the target-group. For the sake of taxonomy and clarity, it is necessary to distinguish between two dimensions, namely the formal dimension and the factual dimension of access. We define access as the formal right to have entrance to a certain institution and its products, as well as the factual use of that right if the individual desires it. The formal dimension can be based on legal rules incorporated in legislation, as well as on private ones which refer to the entrance conditions of an organization or institution. The factual dimension refers to the realization and realization possibilities of the formal right to access. The realization of factual access can be hindered by either the organization itself, the individual, or the target-group. In practice a tension-field between both dimensions comes into existence when their mutual synchronization or especially the effectuation of one or both does not succeed. We shall call this field, which comprises access problems, the 'access tension-field'. Schematically the access situations are the following:

Formal dimension

		Right to access	No right to access
Factual dimen- sion	Access	Incorporation	Corruption
	No access	Denial	Exclusion

The importance of the formal dimension of access is also referred to, though in general terms, by Schaffer and Wen-hsien (1975, p. 22). In discussing their simple queue model they state that "access is possible for those who have the resources to demonstrate that they have those rights. Once individuals have demonstrated their rights to be placed in

the category of applicants, there is no fur er way in distinguishing
between one applicant and another: they are in that sense equal".
Access problems are those problems which arise in situations where the
client has no formal right to access but actually possesses access
(corruption), or in those situations whereby the client has no formal
right to access, which he challenges, and also possesses no factual
access (exclusion). The emphasis here is put on the views of the
individual or target-group. The access tensionfield can also extend
to the situation whereby the client possesses formal access and
realizes actual access (incorporation). Evidently the situation of
denial also belongs to this access tension-field. This approach implies
that access is a multi-dimensional concept. In the above schema four
situations are distinguished, which will be discussed below.

a. The situation of incorporation
Formally this situation has no access problems. The target-groups have
entrance to the organization and, if necessary, make use of it.
Problems in the access tension-field appear only when analysing the
factual course of the process. The time factor plays an important role
here. Waiting, delay, etc., as aspects of the queueing structure, form
indices for the proper functioning of factual access. This concerns
the total structure as well as the functioning of the organization or
institution, i.e., the way of registration, service at the counter, or
the means of distribution of goods and services. The power of the
individual or group, either personally or through social networks and
bureaucracy can influence this process.
Deviations from the formal access rules induced through the power of
the individual (such as not waiting one's turn) can lead to problems
identical to those under the situation of corruption. In other words,
each type of power, especially in situations of scarcity, can be used
to deviate from the formal access rules. Conversely, scarcity can be
caused by different kinds of power abuse, through which an unequal
distribution of goods and services can be generated. In such a case we
speak of quasi-scarcity.
Eventually this could lead to the situation of denial, in which
individuals who generally have formal access can no longer gain

factual access. The factual access problems can therefore occur in the so-called perfect as well as the non-perfect market systems.

In contrast to this view and in relation to the distribution systems, Schaffer and Wen-hsien (1975, p. 15) argue that access problems primarily occur in non-perfect market systems and in non-market systems of distribution. This is because in the more or less perfect market situations a disposable income is the decisive condition for access. They write: "Insofar as things can be bought in more or less perfect markets, what is needed is disposable income. There is no problem of access as such. There is no question of loyalty, influence, rights or number...".

Two comments can be given on this view:

1. Having an income at one's disposal is a consequence of the realization of factual access to the labour market. It is always the poor-chance group that does not possess a disposable income by which it can gain factual access to the more or less perfect market system. In other words, the income distribution in practice creates an unequal power structure through which the problems of factual access can arise.

2. Even in the more or less perfect market system, the influence of power, loyalty, preference and other criteria which can be used for special treatment of individuals, are present in the same way as in the non-perfect market systems. In our view the difference is not fundamental, but only a matter of degree.

b. The situation of corruption

In this situation access problems are obvious and traceable. The most important question here is why people receive services or goods to which they have no claim. In cases of scarcity the situation can occur that the offered goods and services do not reach the target-group. This can be caused by (1) corruption, whereby the individual who can lay no claim to formal access, can apply his power, status or social networks to profit from the distributed goods and services. In other words, the individual uses his power as an instrument for illegal realization of factual access. (2) Such situations can also be induced by inefficiency, namely through poor functioning of the organization. This can be caused

by insufficient or inadequate control mechanisms and personnel. Furthermore, it can be caused by an unclear outline and delineation of the target-group and control criteria.

c. The situation of exclusion

This situation is characterized by the fact that individuals or groups possess neither formal nor factual access to goods and services of an organization or institution. It can be caused either by the delineation of the general access rules (in the legislation) or by the specific ones, i.e., those which are applicable within the organization. At first glance, this situation - as with the earlier-discussed incorporation - seems to have no access problems. However, in certain cases, exclusion can be the cause of the greatest and most specific access problems. In fact the foundation of the formal dimension of access has to be analyzed. The central question is whether or not the ascertained access rules lead to discrimination, i.e. to the denial of formal rights of clients to claim public goods and services. The problems of this access situation can best be illustrated by the discriminatory legislation of countries with an 'apartheid' ideology. These problems do also appear in the distribution of scarce goods and services in other societies, and by the exclusion of some groups from specific kinds of labour or housing on basis of unjust criteria, such as colour, religion, race and the like.

d. The situation of denial

This is the situation we are familiar with in developing countries and which can lead to participatory projects. The situation of denial is also related to poor-chance groups in general and has given rise to vast ideological movements in history, among others, socialism and communism. This theme is in the first place directed towards answering the question of how poor-chance groups that possess the formal right to access to certain organizations and institutions can get factual access to the goods and services. In other words: why don't they have factual access and how can we solve this access problem?

In relation to the causes of access problems Buijs (1979, p. 3) has developed a model of distances, in which the geographical, financial

and cultural distances are distinguished as thresholds for access. In
the case of too great a geographical distance between the target-group
and the services offered, not only factual access is prevented, but
also a reduction is taking place of the knowledge of the target-group
concerning the existence of the services. The financial distance means
that access is hampered by high costs or by financial losses occurring
in case of factual access. The cultural distance is composed of two
components, namely the client component and the institutional component.
The former is related to the differences within the frame of reference
of the members of the target-group and also between them and the
employees of the service organization. The institutional component is
connected with the problems caused by the orientation to survive and
the striving towards success of the institution itself. For example,
the orientation of the institution towards creating measurable
efficiency of the programme with regard to the formulation of the aims
can lead to less concern for the content and quality of the programme
itself. As a result the selection of the clients leans towards
individuals providing the least problems. The policy of the institution
to better itself will be directed towards promotion of the most
efficient officials, which will cause and increase the problem of
neglect of the clients from the lower strata of society. Earlier we
have noted that the treatment of the theoretical fundaments of access
is superficial and chaotic in most studies. Buijs, however, tries to
deal systematically with the problems of access and their solution by
means of a literature study.

Her distinction of a number of distances in relation to access problems
must be considered necessary in order to systematize the subject matter.
An alternative for the 'distance approach' in our view is the
'component approach'. In the latter, two components can be distinguish-
ed, namely the client component and the institutional component. Within
the client component the geographical, financial and cultural distances
can be treated as obstacles for factual access. The institutional
component should be dealt with exactly in the same way as Buijs is
doing. So the two principal components of the access problem, namely
the client and the institution, can remain the focus of the analysis.

In addition Buijs (1979, p. 7) is systematizing a number of solutions concerning the access problem. The central questions are why certain services are not offered or not offered well enough, and why the target-group does not make use of the services. The problem with the solutions enumerated by Buijs, such as credit programme, training of local persons, mobile services, etc., or combinations of these, is that these solutions are generating access problems themselves, thereby creating a vicious circle. For example, in the case of the access problem being of a geographical nature, it is proposed that 'the extension of the service and mobile service' be combined with the 'training of local persons'. The realization of this training, however, creates financial and cultural access problems in relation to the selection of personnel, the motivation, the earnings after training, etc. The same can be said about the making of credit programmes as a solution to the problems caused by the financial distance. The access problems related to this are typical for every access situation, too. Problems can arise as to the delineation of the target-group, the motivation of the client to make use of the programme, the conditions for the provision of credit, etc. These factors and especially the guarantees for repayment of the credits in their turn will lead towards favouring the middle class. This, however, also according to the author, is constituting a problem in its own right, and so 'the credit programme' would not reach the group it is meant for. The search for solutions to access problems in our opinion is a very complex activity that cannot be encapsulated within one theoretical matrix. Schaffer (1975, p.10) adds to this that "the analysis of access demands a consistent comparative methodology... The methodology is dependent on the premise that access consists of actions about eligibility, priority and administrative encounters, how these are handled, how they are avoided, what it means from the point of the applicants, or organiza- tional connection, and what it means from the point of view of institu- tional performance, and of action through institutional levels". In our opinion it is better to consider the actions presented as solutions, as starting points in the search for solutions. The study of the access problems in one or another sector of society requests an analysis taking the context of the total society into account, i.e., a study of

the economic, socio-political and cultural systems of society. In fact
it is even advisable not to speak of solutions, but of the development
of intervention-strategies to improve or influence disturbing factors.
The very word 'solution' suggests that the problems are rather simple
in nature and can be solved with the help of limited intervention,
which of course is not true at all.

4. Participation

So far we have discussed the concept of 'access' and it turned out to
be quite difficult to derive a precise and consistent meaning of it
from the literature. The concept of 'participation', however, raises
similar problems of definition. In this article we place participation
within the framework of development sociology, but first we must
realize that during the last few decades the concept of participation
became popular in a number of fields, sometimes having different
meanings. Ideas about participation - to take part or to have a part
of something - developed as a reaction to a felt need. On the whole
people aim at getting a maximum hold on their existence, and when
possible organize themselves in different ways to realize that. But this
is not to say that in general one participates just for the sake of
participating; one has certain ends in mind which can range from
political or economic power, material benefits or social status, to the
improvement of living and working conditions. Sometimes, however,
participation can be an end in itself. Meister (1977, pp. 87-99)
presents an overview of a number of different kinds of participative
organizations which all have their contribution to, or are directed at
specific elements of the development process in Latin America. There
are cooperatives, based on consumption or production and trade unions
and employers' organizations, which pursue the interests of their
respective members. Political parties, universities, churches, the army,
other institutions and sometimes also revolutionary movements try to
exercise their influence. However, these organizations function not only
as a means to achieve a greater amount of participation by the people,
but also within such organizations the lower strata exercise pressure to
get a better grip on what is going on. One can find examples of the

striving for democratization in all these fields, but in this paper we shall discuss the fields of politics, commerce and industry.

Pateman (1970) attempts to define the place of participation in a 'modern and viable theory of democracy'. Participation is a necessary but insufficient condition for democracy, because even full participation can exist on a low level within a non-democratic structure. In this connection the distinction made by Lammers (1970) between functional and structural democratization is of importance. In the case mentioned above one can speak of a functional democratization within a non-democratic structure. It is only possible to speak of real democratization when full participation exists on all levels. This does not imply that everyone should be directly involved in all decision-making, but that everyone should feel himself represented. Here one cannot speak anymore of two (or more) antagonistic parties, but of a situation in which 'each individual member of a decision-making body [has] equal power to determine the outcome of decision' (Pateman, 1970, p. 71). In order to be able to participate on the level of national politics, one has to possess, according to Pateman, certain psychological characteristics that can be learned in other fields than that of politics. Particularly industry can be of importance here.

Blumberg has analysed a great number of participatory projects and experiments in industry and concludes very enthusiastically: "there is hardly a study in the entire literature that fails to demonstrate that satisfaction in work is enhanced, or that other generally acknowledged beneficient consequences accrue from a genuine increase in worker's decision-making power" (Blumberg, 1968, p. 123). The studies show that alienation of the work diminishes considerably when the workers obtain an important share in the decision-making power, even when technological aspects of the work and the nature of the tasks remain unchanged (Blumberg, 1968, p. 91). Nonetheless, Blumberg stresses the distorting role that the normative milieu, in which participation takes place, can have. The studies mentioned concern social and cultural milieus in which democratic values are highly prized. Similar studies in other cultures could produce quite different results

(Blumberg, 1968, p. 77, 107). But even within our Western culture the effect of participation depends on certain conditioning factors. French, Kay and Meyer state that most studies show that "participation is associated with favorable attitudes towards the job and high performance for those employees with a high need for independence, but not for those with a low need for independence" (French, Kay and Meyer, 1966, p. 4). Except for these psychological characteristics, the usual participatory level in the sphere of work is important: "Under conditions of high threat and low usual participation, however, ex- perimental participation has strong negative effects on subsequent performance improvement" (French, Kay and Meyer, 1966, p. 18).

So it appears that an exaggerated emphasis on the need for participa- tion, of which Grijpstra (1980, p. 2) ironically gives an example, is not justified. Psychological, social and cultural factors can influence participation. When participation is considered a means, one also has to examine whether or not participation is always the most effective means in realizing a certain aim. When the answer is positive, it is necessary to decide which amount of participation is desirable, who should participate, and how particiaption can be effectuated.

5. Defining participation

Going through the literature on participation we find very little about participation in general. In most cases the concept of participation is directly applied; a purely theoretical discussion about participation is often missing. To a certain extent Meister forms an exception, and after analysing the concept he concludes that participation must mean 'to take part' or 'to have a part of something' (Meister, 1977, p. 128). Although this view will generally arouse little resistance, it is not clear from the literature what that something exactly should be. Nevertheless, when we consider a number of current definitions, it is possible to discover some lines of thought.
Many authors place 'decision-making' in the centre of their view on participation. An example of such a definition is the one by French: "Participation refers to a process in which two or more parties in-

fluence each other in making plans, policies and decisions. It is re-
stricted to decisions that have further effects on all those making
the decision and on those represented by them" (Blumberg, 1968, p. 70).
Such a definition, however, may encompass a great number of different
types of participation.

Van Dusseldorp (1981, pp. 10-24) attempts to formulate a classification
of the different forms of participation with the use of nine character-
istics: level of voluntariness, base of involvement, involvement in
different stages, intensity and frequency, range of activities,
organizational level, efficiency, participants, and style of planning.
With each of these characteristics certain types of participation can
be distinguished. Combination of all nine characteristics will yield
a very large number of types, of which we fear that their practical
usefulness if doubtful. From a theoretical point of view, however,
Van Dusseldorp's approach is interesting, because he presents a number
of criteria that can be used for the study of participation.

Arnstein (1974, 3.3), Pateman (1970, pp. 68-73) and Blumberg (1968, p. 71)
present more limited typologies. On the lowest steps of the participation
ladder (to use the words of Arnstein) there are forms of manipulation,
persuasion and therapy which do not permit real participation in
decision-making, and which could better be called pseudo-participation
or non-participation. In this case it is the small group of those in
power which makes the decisions without discussion about the content,
the procedures of decision-making, or the position and authority of
those in power.

On the next steps we find some types of participation that do have
possibilities for cooperation and consultation, but without those in
power having to abandon their position. Discussion about means and ends
is possible, but the institutionalized relations cannot be changed. In
these cases we cannot really speak of participation, but of partial
participation at most. The highest froms of participation are finally
those in which the group as a whole makes the decisions, sometimes
through representatives.

Arnstein (1974, 3.3) and many other authors stress the importance of
a redistribution of power for real participation: "it is the strategy
by which the have-nots co-decide how information is spread, how ends

and policies are formulated, how taxes are spent, how programmes are
completed, and how benefits such as contracts and customs are
distributed". So it implies not simply both parties taking part in
decision-making, but an emancipation in political and economic
processes for those without power or possesions. In addition, this
definition of participation means a broadening of the concept; it is
not confined to participation in decision-making only. Cohen and
Uphoff (1977, pp. 7-8) develop such ideas systematically and state
that participation in development projects deals with the fields of
decision-making, implementation, benefits and evaluation. In the
decision-making process first the needs and priorities have to be
formulated, and further the policies and the people involved have to
be chosen. Decision-making is an ongoing process, which continues
during the implementation of the programma (pp. 31-38). The implementa-
tion element includes questions of who contributes to the programme
and in which way (pp. 39-40). As regards the benefits, not only their
quality and quantity are of importance, but also their distribution
within the group (pp. 47-55). Sharing of harmful effects is also to be
considered. Finally, there has to be participation in the evaluation
and it is important to note that views, preferences and expectations
can vary among different groups (pp. 55-56).

In this attempt to bring the concept of participation into focus we now
have reached the field of development sociology. which is ultimately
the field from which we shall perceive the problems of access and
participation. From this perspective another aspect is added, namely
that initiation of development projects often comes from the outside, as
Galjart's definition shows: "participatory projects are projects set
in motion by a change agent or a single promotor, in a circumscribed
geographical area, which aim at a permanent improvement of life chances
of a category or group of relatively deprived people" (Galjart, (2),
p. 4). The contribution of the target-group, however, is not mentioned.

When the given definitions are reconsidered, one can see that each of
them emphasises a certain aspect of the concept of participation.
French's definition puts participation in decision-making in the centre

together with the aspect of representation. From the typologies discussed above it can be concluded that real participation implies the redistribution of power. Cohen and Uphoff broaden the concept in such a way that is not only includes participation in decision-making, but also participation in the implementation, the benefits and the evaluation. A useful definition of the concept of participation should, according to our point of view, encompass all these aspects, and could therefore be as follows: participation means that all members of the target-groups or those concerned have the possibility to take part directly or indirectly in decision-making and evaluation of a distribution system or institution, and have an essential part in its functioning and the results.

This definition shows that participation is not always necessary, and also that the form of participation in a distribution system does not need to be the same for all participants in all situations. When a distribution system functions well in the opinion of the target-group, it should not be necessary to participate, that is to say, also to take part in the decision-making and evaluation. When the institution does not function according to expectations, we are confronted with a different situation in which taking part in decision-making and evaluation is essential. In this situation two possibilities exist. In the first case, when the target-group has access (formal or factual), one can attempt to participate in the decision-making process within the institution to improve its functioning. In reality, however, one very often has no access to the institution or distribution system. In this second case the possibility exists that those who are barely reached or not at all, organize themselves to gain access to that institution. In this situation the aim of organizing is in the first place to get factual access to the institution. Within this new organization at grass-roots level the possibility has to exist for all members to take part, directly or indirectly, in the decision-making. Here we refer to level 1 of the schema in paragraph 2. Often it will be possible to work more efficiently with indirect participation, which means that decisions are made by a limited number of people who represent the group as a whole. Being a member of a participatory

organization does not automatically implicate that one has to take part in all activities of the organization, i.e. direct participation. This also holds true for the elements such as decision-making, implementation and so on. One does not have to participate in all these parts. The contribution, however, has to be one that is of importance for the functioning of the organization and the realization of its aims.

6. The participation process in development projects

So far we have looked at participation in general; in the next sections we shall focus on the problems of development projects and development in general. But before looking at the participation process in detail, we have to consider the fact that projects can have different backgrounds. The possibility exists that it will be necessary to build an entirely new participative structure, especially when the project is initiated from the outside. But it is also possible that a project more or less corresponds with traditional forms of cooperation or feelings of solidarity. This could especially be the case in projects that are initiated by the target-group itself. The differences in background of the participatory projects influence the phases which one can observe in the participation process:
1. the preparatory phase
2. the action phase
3. the autonomization phase

In the preparatory phase, which is seldom discussed in the literature, decisions must be made on the aims that have to be pursued and the means that are the most suitable to reach them. However, this is only possible after the problem has been accurately defined; the latter process has to take place in narrow cooperation between the group or category of people who are confronted with the problem, the government, and when applicable, the aid-organization or change agent. One has to find out, besides general information on the culture and social structure of the target-group, why those people are not reached by the existing institutional structures. When this is clear, it can be

formulated how they can be given factual access to the goods and services in question. A participatory project is one of the possible intervention strategies. When such a project is chosen as a solution, decisions have to be made on the level and nature of participation and on the goals of the project. Together with the formulation of the goals it is necessary to define the group of people that has to be reached through a specific project: the target-group. Such a group may coincide with cooperative structures already in existence, but this does not need to be the case. Particularly in the latter situation choices have to be made which have, besides political, economic, social, cultural and geographical aspects, also an ethical side. Is it acceptable to exclude certain groups? Or rather, is it acceptable that participation of one group leads to the blocking of access and participation of another group?

After the preparatory steps have been taken, the concrete programme can be started. In this stage of action the phases described by Buijs (1979, pp. 32-37) as the phases of the participation process are included. At first the target-group has to be motivated and mobilized for the implementation of the programme. This will probably lead to less problems, or at least to problems of a different character, if a connection is made with an existing participative structure. In that case the target-groups have to be stimulated to incorporate a new aim in their organizational structure. Especially if the initiative is taken by the target-group, external motivation and mobilization will be less urgent. In the case of no connection being made with such a structure, the target-group has to be motivated towards both the aims and cooperation. Then a new participatory structure must be developed. Local leadership will play an important role here. According to Buijs (1980, p. 6) particularly expressive leadership will be most effective in this phase of the participation process. There are no tangible results to be reached, and therefore a leader is needed who works with normative stimuli and is able to create a high concern within the target-group. Charismatic leaders are especially well-suited to play this role. In the next phase the first action will be taken. It is important at this point to obtain some benefits, taking as few risks as

possible. In addition, it is necessary to make a project plan with regard to the continuation of the project, in order to prevent it from getting stuck in an early phase. It can be attempted to broaden the scope of the activities. Because of the growing complexity of the participation process, division of labour and specialization will become unavoidable. A danger exists that such a development will lead to the creation of a small elite. Therefore, it is important to guarantee the legitimate position of the leaders and to keep the gap between the latter and the other members of the target-group as small as possible. This can be done by the leaders taking part in ordinary daily activities, by the creation of as many functions as possible, and by the rotation of functions. During these later phases there is more need for instrumental leadership, through which concrete aims are pursued by means of material stimuli.

Charismatic leadership in these later phases can become an obstacle for real participation, because the leader concerned does not want to give away the power of decision-making (Galjart, (1), p. 10). It will be clear that the idea of participation can also be in conflict with other forms of local leadership, creating all sorts of problems. The participation project in the end will have to be stabilized and institutionalized in all its aspects: economical, political and socio-cultural. It is of great importance to keep the target-group motivated by an emphasis on tangible advantages.

The third phase of the participation process is the phase of autonom-ization, and exactly in this phase a lot of projects get stuck. The projects have to start functioning on their own in this phase, and change agents and other employees of the government or donor organiza-tions are withdrawn. In the past it appeared that this was often done without sufficient preparation. That is why already from the start people from the target-group have to be educated to fulfil leading and specialized tasks. It is also very important that the target-group works with its own means as much as possible from an early stage to avoid a dependent position; such dependence could prove to be fatal after the external resources have been withdrawn.

The distinction of phases in the participation process of course
should just be understood as an ideal-typical outline, and in reality
all elements of the phases described will not be met. Sometimes the
sequence of the phases will be different or elements will be omitted.
Of course it is also possible that a project fails right in the
beginning, and later phases will never be reached. One more difficulty
is the fact that the phases distinguished are not completely separated.
They are fluently changing from one step into the other or are over-
lapping each other sometimes, which will create a picture of a project
that is much more complex than is suggested in the outline presented
above. The utility of such an outline, however, is found in the
description of the different steps that logically can be distinguished,
and in which decisions are taken that are very important for the
success of the participation process. This way the possibility is
created to analyse concrete projects as to the phases that have been
executed and the possible mistakes or omissions that have been made.
Therefore, an ideal-typical outline can make a contribution to the
successful completion of future development projects.

7. Participation and development

In relation to the development process in the countries of the Third
World, the concept of participation gets a very specific meaning. It
does not only relate to development projects and the participation of
different categories of people in the formal political structure; there
is also criticism of the development policy at stake. During the last
few decades approaches have been formulated and carried out to
accelerate the process of development. Strategies have been promoted
one after another with respect to industrialization, upgrading of
infrastructure, stimulation of agriculture, promotion of formal
education, family planning, etc. (Van Dam, 1976, p. 16). Generally the
realized programmes had a 'top-down' approach in common. These
programmes, although not without importance, did fall short of the
- perhaps too highly strained - expectations. Especially deficient
factual access by the mass of the population of these planned activities
has been marked as a cause of further development failing to

materialize. Only the elite in the villages and the middle and high
classes in the cities have been reached. Participation has been
proposed as a remedy to this situation. A development policy
characterized as 'bottom up' should be carried out, implying a better
corresponding with the needs of the masses. Participation of the mass
of the population in development policy would create access for this
group to institutions providing for their basic needs. Thus access and
participation do go hand in hand and are connected with the basic-needs
approach. Participation of the mass of the population in development
policy can this way be considered as a means to gain access to insti-
tutions responsible for the distribution of goods and services to
satisfy important human needs, especially of the masses. This reasoning
is based on two problems:
1. How is participation realized in practice?
2. Is participation indeed only to be considered a means to reach a
   certain goal, or can it also be considered as a goal in itself?

8. The reality of access and participation

In the framework of a solution to the development problems of Third
World countries, a vast number of development programmes and projects
have been organized with participation of the people being of central
importance. Meister (1977) has made a penetrating study of development
projects in practice. In this study he takes the functionalist approach,
in which manifest as well as latent dysfunctions are distinguished.
In short this implies the following.
Meister defines participation, as has been mentioned earlier, as
"prendre part, posséder une part de quelque chose, ce quelque chose
pouvent être une propriété ou un pouvoir" (1977, p. 128). In the reality
of development projects - in the Anglo-Saxon 'Community Development' as
well as in the francophone 'Animation Rurale' - it becomes clear that
participation defined in this way is often not found. These intervention
programmes can follow two models of action, namely the one based on the
local community, such as the 'Promoción Popular' in Peru and the
'Desarrollo de la Comunidad' in Venezuela; or the model based on inter-
ventions at the economic level (and less specifically, bound to certain

local communities), such as market- and production-intervention. The
projects of 'Community Development' and 'Animation Rurale' often take
the shape of all sorts of groups such as cooperatives, syndicates,
employers' organizations, public institutes, action groups, etc.
According to Meister their manifest functions are found in the improve-
ment of the level of living by means of help, or through social change
by redistribution of resources. In projects the accent can be placed
on either the former or the latter. The latent functions are: the
creation of possibilities of social mobility for the members; the
formation of a base for the execution of political pressure, which
creates possibilities to reduce political tensions; and very important-
ly, the redistribution of income.
Important trends of these groups include heavy bureaucratization,
limited supervision, isolation, fragmentation, micro-orientation and
low production. Temporariness of participation is a very striking
feature. This is related to the fact that the groups are more consump-
tively than productively oriented. They do not make a decisive contri-
bution to the creation of wealth, but are rather functioning as a
channel to incorporate the members in the consumption society. Not the
productive but the distributive element is the most important one. The
satisfaction of the needs of consumption is central, and that is why
the projects often take the same shape and character (such as
community centres, cooperatives for mechanization, and the creation of
infrastructure). The most important latent function is thus the
connection with the consumption society; and at the same time from the
often marginal activities no fundamental influence on change of
society can be expected. If we combine access and participation, this
latent function becomes manifest. Through participation groups, access
to the consumption society is obtained; the use of social services is
brought closer. Regrettable, this is not done by way of the augmenta-
tion of production, which results in these groups having a conservative
function rather then being directed towards fundamental transformation
of the structure of society.
So a dysfunction of the participation groups can be found in the in-
sufficient attention paid to and effort put into this production
aspect. The same can be said about the basic-needs approach, which is

also mostly directed towards consumption without offering structural
solutions. In this case production level and consumption level are not
connected with each other, which in the long run will raise problems.
Another dysfunction is, according to Meister, related to the fact that
these groups generally have a homogeneous character. The members are
often recruited from the same social stratum. Because of this the
problems in these groups are taken out of the political arena and
considered in technical-rational terms only. No wonder that participa-
tion - however popular the participation movement may sometimes be -
under these conditions often has a temporary character, and that change
agents feel disoriented and ask themselves what results are reached.
Heterogeneous participation groups, however, also have dysfunctions.
Their heterogeneity leads to the power relations blocking the partici-
pation process; often the lower social strata are excluded or injured.
More insight in the problems of both participants and change agents in
our opinion can only be found by a fundamental analysis of the role of
social relations in the developmental process. This leads us to the
question formulated earlier, which concerns whether participation
should be considered as a means only, or also as an aim.

9. Means or aim

The participation approach seems to have gained considerable influence
since the beginning of the seventies in spite of the problems of
participants and change agents described above. In many cases this has
even led to the use of participation in development projects being
considered as a premise. It serves as a kind of prejudice forming the
basis of other ideas about development. Earlier we have already
mentioned that participation is not always appreciated by the partici-
pant and is often quite temporary. The level of participation reached
in earlier situations and other factors play an important role in this
evaluation. At the same time it is not necessarily so that participa-
tion leads to a higher level of production, although this sometimes is
indeed the case. Other factors, such as intermediate technology,
favorable market conditions, adequate organization, etc., are equally
important.

The core of the matter is in fact the type of relation used to create development. A distinction can be made in this case between so-called 'high-trust relations' and 'low-trust relations'. The former type is defined by Fox (1974, p. 362) as relations "in which the participants share certain ends or values; bear towards each other a diffuse sense of long-term obligations; offer each other spontaneous support without narrowly calculating the cost or anticipating any equivalent short-term reciprocation; communicate freely and honestly; are ready to repose their fortunes in each other's hand; and give each other the benefit of any doubt that may arise with respect to goodwill or motivation". By contrast, in 'low-trust' relations the participants have "divergent ends or values; entertain specific expectations which have to be reciprocated through a precisely balanced exchange in the short term; calculate carefully the costs and anticipated benefits of any concession; restrict and screen communications in their own separate interests; seek to minimize dependency on each other's discretion; and are quick to suspect, and invoke sanctions against illwill or default on obligations". It is clear that the development projects, mostly being implemented top-down (and often from outside), are executed within the framework of societies having traditional characteristics and in which high-trust relations are very important. Of course these societies are not necessarily to be classified as high-trust societies because of this. The presence of high-trust relations is strongly connected with primordial bonds. Conformity of the individual with the culture pattern moulds the relations in the shape of quasi-high-trust relations. Projects initiated from outside are generally based on 'low-trust' relations. The idea of participation is complementary to this and is necessary to generate important information and action of the participants, without which the projects would never have a chance of success. This type of 'low-trust' participation projects has to be distinguished from (quasi)'high-trust' development activities, not implemented top-down (and from outside), but on the contrary started from the bottom and generating cooperation based on solidarity. This distinction is also important with regard to the institutional outcome of the relational base and the base of cooperation. Low-trust relations complemented with participation show a trend towards bureaucratization

of the institutional forms, while this is not the case for quasi-
'high-trust' relations within informal structures of cooperation. Here
the institutional form is not bureaucratic, but rather more flexible
and less subjected to rules and procedures. One could speak of
spontaneous institutions. Schematically we can encompass the develop-
mental activities with help of two ideal-types:

Direction of initiation	Type of relation	Shape of the cooperation	Institutional shape	Ideal-type
Top-down	Low-trust	Participation project	Bureaucratical institution	I
Bottom-up	Quasi-high-trust	Informal co-operational structure	Spontaneous institution	II

The development projects we are dealing with in this part often are
classified as type I: from abroad more or less bureaucratical coopera-
tives, etc., are inititated incorporating the idea of participation
mostly as a means to realize the aims. In type II spontaneous coopera-
tion structures are found, such as savings groups, insurance groups and
neighbourhood associations. They possess broader functions than the
attainment of certain special aims and are more deeply rooted in culture,
because of which they locally take different institutional shapes. They
are not only functioning as a means but also as goals for themselves to
reach a certain level of social integration. In between, several
mixtures of both types can be found. It is, for example, possible that
a project initiated from abroad is accepted under condition of its inte-
gration with other already-existing organizations and institutions, or
the other way around, that a local initiative for a cooperational
association is realized with help from abroad. This connection could be
meant to control the side effects of participatory projects, such as
foreign influence and destruction of existing traditional associations.
Especially the connections of types I and II - in which cooperation has
a trend towards means and aims, respectively - is of the utmost

importance within the discussion on access and participation. For both
are in their own way directed towards creating access for the mass of
people to scarce goods and services. Both, however, do not come up to
expectations. At the intersection of both, the combination of informal
cooperative association from below and top-down participation projects,
the core of access and participation is localized in relation to the
development problems.

10. Conclusion

From the preceding paragraphs it will have hopefully become clear to
the reader that access and participation are not only simple concepts
as used in a normal day-to-day meaning, but are also paradigmatic
concepts. These terms stand for theoretical concepts referring to
processes.
Access has a formal and a factual dimension. The formal dimension
regards general and specific access rules, while the factual dimension
concerns the real use of the formal right to access. This means that
the access approach implies the study of the relation between clients,
between clients and institutions (i.e., the whole, comprised of
officials, programme, aims, procedure, access rules, etc.) and between
the officials of the institution.
Participation includes taking part in decision-making concerning the
functioning of and the results of the decision-making, as well as its
evaluation.
Access and participation have several connotations. The first is
empirical, in which access and participation refer to the level of
access of persons, groups or categories of people to the present or
still-to-be-created goods and services in a society, and to their level
of involvement in the decision-making process in the various sections.
The second connotation is normative-ideological in character. It is
concerned with the idea that development should be aimed at the support
or creation of social justice by means of proportional influence in
decision-making.
The third connotation is related to the economics of development and
suggests the premise that the attainment of economic development is

considered a goal in itself. In this case development is defined mostly in an economic way. The empirical and normative-ideological connotations are in the access and participation approach indispensable conditions for this third connotation.

The fourth connotation stems from developmental sociology, in which besides economic development and the first two connotations, also the element of association is taken into account. On behalf of the development process the process of individualization has to give way to solidarity.

At the base of all these connotations we find an idea about man and society which presumes a democratic order. In this order it is desirable that the individual makes his justified choices himself in such a way that his own interests as well as the interests of his group are equally served. This is especially the case in direct participation, while indirect participation is basically a derivate of this. Because of this starting-point, the strong and the weak sides of the access and participation approach in development sociology in our opinion can be found in the possibility to loosen the existing structures of solidarity, mostly based on primordial bonds, and to replace or regroup them in new ways of social organization, which in time will be incorporated into the structure and culture of the society.

References

Arnstein, S.R.	Een ladder van participatie van de bevol-king. In: Handboek Bouwen en Wonen, dl. 3, 1974.
Blumberg, P.	Industrial democracy. London, 1968.
Buijs, D.	Participation projects: Some conclusions from fieldstudies. Paper: 5th World Congress for Rural Sociology, Mexico, 1980.
Buijs, H.Y.	Access and participation. ICA-publicatie no. 33. Leiden, 1979.
Cohen, J.M. and N.T. Uphoff	Rural development participation: Concepts and measures for project design, implementation and evaluation. Rural Development Monograph no. 2. New York, Cornell University, 1977.
Colebatch, H.	Access and the study of local services: A Kenyan case. In: Development and Change, Vol. 6, no. 2, 1975, pp. 107-118.
Dam, F. van	Honderd jaar ontwikkelingsvraagstuk. In: Konter, J.H. Ideeën en idealen in ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Bloemendaal, 1976, pp. 11-21.
Dusseldorp, D. van	Participation in planned development. Wageningen, 1981.
Fox, A.	Beyond contract. Work, power and trust relations. London, 1974.
French, J.R.P., E. Kay and H.H. Meyer	Participation and the appraisal system. In: Human Relations, Vol. 19, 1966, pp. 3-19.
Galjart, B.	Counterdevelopment: A position paper. Leiden, not dated (1).
Galjart, B.	Participatory rural development projects: Some conclusions from field research. Leiden, not dated (2).

Grijpstra, B.

De 'institutional gap' in het rurale ont-wikkelingsproces.
ICA-festival.
Leiden, 1980.

Lamb, G.

Marxism, access and the state.
In: Development and Change, Vol. 6, no. 2, 1975, pp. 107-118.

Lammers, C.J.

Demokratisering van bedrijf en universiteit.
In: Braam, A. van (ed.)
Aktuele sociologie.
Assen, 1970, pp. 187-210.

Meister, A.

La participation pour le développement.
Paris, 1977.

Palmer, A.

Problems of access: Notes on Indonesian and Malayan cases.
In: Development and Change, Vol. 6, no. 2, 1975, pp. 51-60.

Pateman, C.

Participation and democratic theory.
Cambridge, 1970.

Rew, A.

Without regard for persons: Queueing for access to housing and employment in Port Moresby.
In: Development and Change, Vol. 6, no. 2, 1975, pp. 37-50.

Schaffer, B.

Improving access to public services.
IDS Discussion paper no. 23.
Brighton, 1973.

Schaffer, B.

Editorial.
In: Development and Change, Vol. 6, no. 2, 1975, pp. 3-12.

Schaffer, B. and Huang Wen-hsien

Distribution and the theory of access.
In: Development and Change, Vol. 6, no. 2, 1975, pp. 13-26.

Schwartz, B.

Queueing and waiting.
Chicago/London, 1975.

4

THE PARTICIPATION PROCESS: WHEN IT STARTS

Dieke Buijs

Institute of Cultural and Social Studies
University of Leiden

1. Introduction

In the Third World many organization, governmental or non govern-
mental try to offer the rural poor the possibility of reducing or
even solving their admittance and access problems by means of
participatory projects. Not everyone will accept this "invitation".
Those who respond to these numerous calls to organize themselves, are
referred to as a project-group. In a participatory project a project-
group can exert an increasing influence on the management and
especially on the decision-making of their organization. We call this
process or increasing influence the participation process. This paper
deals with the very beginning of this participation process, namely
the promotion and mobilization phases. [*] As these two phases are
partly overlapping and interwoven, it is difficult to separate them.
That is why they are treated together. Yet we do have to distinguish
these periods. The promotion phase is the period in which the
promoting-agency (I prefer this term to change-agency) prepares it-

[*] The participation process is distinguished in five phases: the
promotion and mobilization phase; the first-action phase, in which
the participants have formed an organization and start to
function; the constructing phase, in which the number of
activities increases and effects a labour division; the consolida-
tion phase, in which the process institutionalizes and the
influence on decision-making by the target-group reaches its
maximum (Galjart et al, 1982).

self; it sets objectives, obtains means, selects a target-category
and a location, and it makes preparations for the mobilization phase
in which the real participation process starts. There are in this
period only a very few contacts with the target-group. This is mainly
restricted to the gathering of information regarding selection of the
location. However, in the mobilization phase the promoting agency, or
rather its promotors, go on the road to mobilize and motivate the
target-group to form an organization for common " self-reliance, access
or admittance problem solving purposes".
In this paper the beginning of the participation process is described
in the form of a model. As is usual in the case of models, only the
main variables which influence the process successfully or otherwise
are given. The model is based on a literature study of participatory
projects and related subjects, and on the field visits made by the
Access and Participation research participants to the Cameroons,
Upper Volta, India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Colombia.

2. The selection of the project location and the target-category

Usually participatory projects are initiated by outsiders, people who
do not belong to the target-category. These can be promoting-agencies,
which approach the population with the objective to start a project,
or persons who live already for some time in the village or in the
region.
When a promoting-agency or individual promotor wants to initiate a
participatory project, it has to select a target-category and to find
a location. Usually promoting-agencies work already in a certain area,
so that selection of a location does not cause many problems. It
even can happen that the inhabitants of villages around certain
projects ask themselves for help and support.
However, when a promoting agency enters a new area, the selection of
a location becomes more problematic. When choosing a village one has
to take into account the social structure of the population. In
Boer's contribution (7) it is indicated which types of villages are
more suited for participatory projects and which are not.
When one has chosen a certain type of community, other factors like
distance play a role in the selection of an area. Which factor or

factors are decisive depends on the promoting-agency in question. It is hardly possible to determine quickly a target-category in a village. The promotor has to take his time and has to do research in the selected village by means of observations, interviews and surveys. In this research he has to pay attention to the possible existence of different categories of poor people with differing interests and positions, as a project meant for one category can result in a relative or absolute decline of the position of the other categories.

3. The legitimization of authority

Most promoting agencies and promotors have built up a certain know-ledge and insight about the way in which such a process should start and proceed in order to give it better chances for success. When a promotor wants to mobilize the target-category members for participation and wishes them to share in his knowledge, his authority has to be accepted and experienced as legitimate by them.

The easiest way to mobilize people seems to be the offer of money or other material benefits. Usually such a generous "Santa Claus" will be most welcome and accepted in this role. But this does not mean that such generosity will legitimize his authority. The only thing he reaches by offering goods or services is that a depending relation is created.
As soon as the flow of gifts stops, participation stops too. This approach has to be avoided as much as possible. But there are situations in which it is almost necessary for a promoting-agency to offer goods. A structure in which essential resources are concentrated in the hands of one single person, family or service evokes patronage by which people become each others' competitors. The owner uses mechanisms which prevent that the group closes its ranks in his face (Galjart, p.c.). Mobilization in such a situation is very difficult for a promoting-agency. It appears to be possible only when the pro-moting-agency is able and prepared to take over the function of patron.
Also in situations in which the target-category is very poor and can-not spend time on the project because the daily food supply would be

risked, the promotor has to make money or food available (besides a
large degree of security).
When people are practically indissolubly indebted to moneylenders, a
promotor can hardly do anything unless he is prepared to offer the
possibilities for clearing the debts. In such cases money or resources
are used to disengage the target-category from the existing structure.
Hereafter a participatory project can be started. The promoting-agency
has to be fully aware of the dependency which can result from such an
approach, and has to find ways to get its authority accepted and
legitimized in order that the participation process may succeed as
well as possible.

There are several courses open to promoting-agencies to legitimize
their authority with the target-category. The most common and success-
ful method is 'lodging'. Many projects appeared to be initiated by
people who lived already for some time in the village or in the
neighbourhood where they fulfilled a certain position, like that of
priest or teacher. Most of the projects visited in Africa were
illustrations.
Through their position their authority is accepted. Also other
institutions, which want to initiate participatory projects in an
area unknown or new to them, use this 'lodging-strategy'. The field-
worker approaches the village where he wants to work and lodges with
someone, or moves into an empty house and starts in most cases a sort
of village-survey. Doing such a research has other advantages besides
the collection of data on the villages. The fieldworker visits each
house and therefore contacts nearly all inhabitants. He can present
himself to each family personally and meanwhile select the potential
future project-group. By discussing extensively the problems one has,
he often sets a process of consciousness-raising in motion. But also
relations with those families which do not belong to the target-
category are built up, so that later, when eventually a conflict of
interest develops as a result of the project, he can act as a kind of
intermediary.
One can also work the other way around: by going to a village or
region for research purposes. This research or stay may result in the

initiation of a project (like the Vicos Project or the Leiden project 'Women and Development').

By this willingness to live in the village and to take part in village life, discussing and advising often till late in the evening, the field-worker builds up a trust relation. Through this trust people are willing to accept his ideas about a project.

It appeared from field studies that the time which the promotor needs for mobilization of the people takes at least three months. Usually the starting period lasts about half a year. The presence of clearly-felt needs or problems can be of great importance for promoting-agencies. The going along with those needs or problems can provide access to a village or can offer an opportunity for the promotor to mobilize people, and can also result in an acceptation and legitimization of his authority (Landau et al, 1976; Morss et al, 1976; United Nations, 1969). Also crises and sudden external problems can play the same role as felt needs (Solomon, 1972; Wade, 1978).

Besides the two mentioned methods to reach a legitimization of authority - the building of trust relations by 'lodging', and taking needs as a starting-point - there is a third, indirect way: one seeks access to a group by way of persons whose authority has already been legitimized and who are held in high respect.

When a promoting-agency wants to initiate participatory projects, its willingness to share any risk which such an enterprise can bring along for the participants can effect a legitimization.

4. Variables concerning the project-group

Not all persons who belong to a target-category will react when a promotor starts to mobilize and organize. Those who respond are called a project-group. Concerning this project-group, two important variables for success can be formulated.

Group size

People only want to cooperate if they cannot solve individually their common problems and if two requirements are fulfilled, namely that a) the individual benefits exceed the individual costs; and b) there

is a strong control on free riders, lazybones and profiteers.
The members want to be sure that they are not the victims of the
idleness or bad work of others. This social control is easiest to
realize in a small group. Here the members know each other and cannot
hide behind the backs of others as is possible in large groups.
Also from the effectiveness point of view a small group can be
recommended (Olson, 1971). Labour division and information exchange
are easier to implement. Another point in favour of small groups is
the necessity of solidarity among the members. Cooperation implies a
certain solidarity, because people have to be prepared to make
personal sacrifices on short notice for the benefit of their common
objective. But the solidarity is socially - and often in rural areas
also geographically - limited. Between different groups or villages
only few feelings of solidarity exist. It appears from literature and
field studies that it is difficult to unite people from different
group origins into a new group. In small groups the chance of
solidarity is greater than in larger groups. And the chance still
grows when it concerns a socio-economic homogeneous group.

Socio-economic homogeneity

The second variable is the socio-economic homogeneity of the members.
Several authors (Morss et al, I, 1976; Cohen & Uphoff, 1976; Schiller,
1969; Landau, 1976) pointed out the desirability of such honogeneity
and the field studies confirmed this opinion. In participatory
development projects the issue is that the members have access to
decision-making. That does not mean that everybody has to be able to
take part in decision-making - delegation of tasks and
responsibilities will be necessary - but it does mean that the
appointed representatives are accountable to the group. In socially
heterogeneous groups it appears that richer people or traditional
leaders often take possession of the leading positions (Uphoff et al,
1979), which creates the situation one wanted to avoid. In socio-
economically homogeneous groups the chances of power-monopolization
are less. Another advantage of homogeneous groups is that the
required contributions of the members can be more or less equal. And
as long as the contributions do not differ, there will be no disagree-

ment about the right return for everybody, which usually is fixed pro rata.

Unfortunately, it is not always possible to exclude the richer people of a community when an organization is founded. If social and strategical reasons require that richer people are admitted to the organization, one can build in mechanisms which either reduce their interest in the organization of enable poor people to maintain their new position.

The mechanisms found in literature and field studies are:

a) the organizing of activities which qua nature or profits are not interesting for big farmers, moneylenders, shopkeepers, etc.;

b) the supply of resources, especially credit, on conditions which are unfavourable for big farmers. This can be done by limiting the amount of credit which is put at someone's disposal. The limit can be based on the situation and needs of a small farmer (Sudarsky, 1976).

   In many projects in Bangladesh one is obliged to save before one gets admission to a credit which is smaller than a big farmer would like to have;

c) mechanisms which help to avoid or prevent power-monopolization by one or a few members, like rotation of functions, frequent group meetings, extension of functions, well-functioning exchange of information, control on management, etc.

d) when the members of the group are collectively liable for the repayment of credits which are given to the group or its individual members, richer people will think twice before joining such a group.

5. Incentives

People do not form organizations spontaneously; they need incentives. Promotors who want to set a process of organization in motion have to give such incentives or stimuli.

Which possibilities do they have at their disposal? One can distinguish three kinds of incentives: force, material and immaterial incentives (Etzioni, 1975; Clark and Wilson, 1960/61). In practice especially the last two incentives are used in participatory projects.

Material incentives are defined as tangible remunerations; and by
immaterial incentives we mean the development of feelings of loyalty,
solidarity and common ideology.
In participatory projects, where besides economic aspects also the
organization and the participatory elements play a role, both types of
incentives are needed. Solidarity, group feelings and ideology are
created by immaterial incentives (Etzioni, 1975). For economic
activities these immaterial stimuli are not sufficient; material
remunerations are also needed.
People are willing to make sacrifices in the form of time, labour or
capital to build an organization and enterprises, but afterwards they
want to see the fruits and reap them.
In the starting-period of a participatory project the material
resources usually are very scarce. And even if the promotor does dis-
pose of plenty of means, it is - as was said earlier - not desirable
that these are used. Therefore, we see that in the initial period of
a project aimed at poor people, the promotor or local leaders use
immaterial incentives to motivate people and to mobilize them.

6. Education

Cooperation makes sense to people when they see that they have common
problems which cannot be solved individually, but can be solved
together. It is not always clear to someone that his problem is the
same or has the same cause as that of his neighbour. But when he does
realize this, there is still a feeling of impotence; too many
difficulties and impediments are seen to do anything about it. When a
promotor gains access to a village or community, he has to start a
process of mentality- or attitude-changing by which the target-
category experiences the community of the problems and overcomes the
feeling of impotence. When he goes round the village, making house-
to-house calls and asking questions to gain the confidence of the
population, he sets this process in motion. By these questions people
are stimulated to thinking and they start discussions among one
another. Then the promotor calls small homogeneous groups and asks
them to think of solutions for their problems.
A second approach is the one where the promotor offers a "programme

d'animation". This method - often based on the ideas of Freire - includes a visual presentation of village situations, with the help of which the people discuss their problems.

A third way to initiate the process of education is by means of a self-survey. The promotor asks the inhabitants to make a social map of their village or neighbourhood. In this manner people get insight in the way in which their village is composed, who has and who does not have 'admittance' to resources, which problems are the most important, etc.

There are also situations in which the population knows exactly where the shoe pinches; but they are not able to stretch it without aid. Insecurity, lack of faith, knowledge and experience to organize themselves, fear of other groups - all these things are to blame. In such cases the promotor can offer his knowledge and experience. And moreover, because of the presence of the promotor, other groups will not easily undertake any actions against the new group.

7. Variables concerning the project

When a promoting-agency - on the basis of the above-mentioned variables - has selected a target-category and a location for a participatory project, the nature and size of the project itself have to take shape.

Small-scaleness
While in the foregoing a 'small-size' project-group was preferred, here the desirability of a 'financial small-scale' approach is indicated. A financial 'small-scale' project means that only a small capital investment is made. Large investments, especially if they are made in the beginning of a project, imply a complicated organization form together with great risks and high demands upon management.
The control of large investments presupposes knowledge of bookkeeping, financial and economic insight, and all kind of abilities and skills which are scarce in developing countries, especially among the poor population groups. Too-great a capital investment goes beyond the 'carrying-power' of the project-group. Therefore the participation of members, the transfer of control and administration of the project to

the project-group, are hindered or even made impossible despite the
intentions of the promoting-agency. Further, it is questionable
whether members of the target-category indeed are keen on large
investments, if they are held (partly) responsible for their control
or repayment. In that case they will run great risks. And it is known
that poor groups especially want to avoid risks. When a promoting-
agency wants a large-scale project, it can diminish the risk by taking
on the control itself. But in that case the essence of a participatory
project is disregarded. Also the money for an investment can be given
to the project-group as a gift, which creates more dependency rather
than it removes. Moreover, as I will indicate in section 10 this dis-
regards one of the factors which determine the successful course of
the participation process, namely the members' own contribution to
the project.

Complexity of the project organization
The second variable has already been mentioned implicitly, namely
that the organization is not too complicated, as management
capacities in the target-category are scarce. This variable mainly
concerns the primary project-group. A second-level organization could
take over to fulfil those functions which are too complicated, time-
consuming or too expensive for one project-group, for the total of
the associated groups.

Technological level
The foregoing links up directly with the requirement that the
technological level in the project may not differ too much from the
one that the members are familiar with (Engelman (1968); Ruthenburg
(1968), O'Kelly (1973)). Cohen and Uphoff stated that as this
difference between the existing technological level and that of the
project-group is smaller, the greater is the potential for
participation. 'And while it is less likely to affect benefits, it
seems true that complex technologies are more difficult to diffuse,
particularly among poorer members of a society' (1976, p. 122).
The complexity and technological level of the type of project and the
risks related to it make demands upon development and the margin of

a project-group. This implies that for a very poor group of the
population, technically and socially simple projects should be
initiated (cf. Chambers, 1978).

Risk

Many studies of adoption of new crops and varieties, new inputs, etc.,
showed that small farmers are afraid to take risks (Dillan, 1977;
Vanneste, 1978; Jedlicka, 1977). "Small farmers learn to estimate
the risks of change with a calculus so sophisticated, its complexity
is seldom suspected by outsiders" (Morss et al, 1976, I, p. 49).
Any new technology proposed to the farmer will be evaluated in terms
of the costs and benefits above what would be required for subsistence
in the traditional way. Therefore, the farmer will compare the
proposed new alternative with his traditional practice and will adopt
the new technology only when costs are low and benefits high, or
reject it when it is the other way around. Still it is not a simple
costs/benefits analysis. Morss et al (I, 1976) found in their
research that small farmers are more interested in security of their
subsistence crop than a much higher yield, even when they have to
take only a slightly greater risk. When a promotor wants to help
farmers to increase production by an introduction of a new technique,
for example, he has to offer it on a more secure basis. Morss et al
(I, 1976) saw three possible ways for approaching this problem: crop
insurance, which did not work well in all cases they evaluated;
subsidies for adoption; and the sharing of inputs and outputs. This
last way shows the characteristics of a share-cropping relation
between the change-agency and groups of farmers. Morss et al
described the functioning of this relation in a number of Latin-
American countries; Haque et al(1977) and Wallman (1976) mentioned
similar mechanisms in South-East Asia and Botswana. Concluding we can
say that small farmers and landless people will take as few risks as
possible. In each project the risk for the project-group has to be
minimized.

8. The first project activities

When the promotor has introduced himself and has stimulated the people

to reflect on and to form a group, the moment arrives when a choice has to be made concerning the first project activities.

A participatory project must comprise three components: organization, education and training, and economic activities (Galjart, 1979). Though in the ideal situation both the development of income-generating activities and the educational process should take place, there are situations where the economic aspect must have priority. Namely when the target-category has seen too many projects failing, it may only be willing to try again in an immediately well-paying enterprise. But also when other institutions nearby try to persuade the population to accept a project by guaranteeing them immediate revenues, the promoting-agency has to adapt (when it decides to go on in this situation). It appears, however, to be difficult in such circumstances to evoke a group-consciousness and moral commitment with the project members. The ideal situation is the one where the approach includes at the same time both the stimulating of consciousness-raising and the education in socio-organizational and technical aspects, as well as the development of economic activities. This combination is desirable, for it appears that the consciousness-raising process progresses faster and the motivation for education is greater when there is a framework in which this knowledge or experience can be applied.

As mentioned earlier, in the starting period of a participatory project, the motivation of members has to take place on the basis of immaterial incentives. Usually such a phase cannot last more than one and a half years.

When choosing the economic activities, several factors are important. In section 6 we pleaded for small-scale investments, a simple organization structure, a simple theory and limited risks. To start with a relatively small economic activity is probably the best and other groups will not feel threatened (De Farcy, 1976).

Moreover, the members get a chance to experience schooling without being compelled to succeed. The first activity will function as a selection mechanism; all over the world there are people who run away with the cash or appear to be otherwise dishonest. It is better to track down these persons while there is still not much at stake. This

is especially important in those situations where the mutual social
control is still small.
A careful but successful beginning will increase the self-confidence
of the members. Finally, when choosing the first activities, one has
to take into account the way in which these can form a basis for
other activities.

9. Foresight is the essence of organization

Of greatest importance for the success of a participatory project is
the securing of continuity. Thereby the success of the first activity
is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Already upon determina-
tion of the first activity attention must be paid to what one wants
to do afterwards. This may seem obvious, but too often action has
broken down and projects have failed because a second step had not
been foreseen and planned. In this way the construction of a building
usually is a relatively brief operation. In the short time which is
necessary to carry out the activity, the group members have not
experienced sufficiently what it means to have their own organization
and to control it. In the beginning phase the promotor plays mainly
a guiding role, and when he has not foreseen a follow-up activity, the
group does not appear able to keep the organization alive and to
extend it in a independent and self-reliant way. Therefore, a follow-
up mechanism has to be built into the first activity in order to
ensure continuation.
Saving in a group can fulfil such a function. One meets regularly to
deposit the contribution. With the money the group can make invest-
ments, like the purchase of an irrigation pump or other agricultural
equipment.
Next these can be exploited on a profitable basis, which makes other
activities possible.

10. The project members' contribution

The contribution by the project members to the project has to be
considered desirable for various reasons. Firstly, their own
contribution can serve as a follow-up mechanism. If people invest

labour, time, capital or land in their project, they want to reap the
fruits. Therefore they are less prepared to withdraw from the project
than if they did not invest. An investment in the project ensures
that people are more committed and are taking more pains to earn at
least their own money back (Lang, 1969; O'Kelly, 1973; Morss et al,
1976).
The importance of the contribution does not only lie in the guarantee
of continuation, but also in the evoking of self-respect and pride,
in showing the ability to build or to buy something by oneself.
A third function of the contribution is that of a sort of check for
the promotor concerning the motivation of the participants. People
are not prepared to invest money or time without being convinced of
its use and sense.
Often it is raised as an objection to contribution, that the small
farmer or landless labourer would not be able to make one. When it
concerns a contribution in labour, this is seldom true. But also
concerning capital, and land for small farmers, one can establish the
fact that these poor groups of the population are willing and able to
make a contribution (Miracle, 1978; Bouman, 1977).

11. Leadership

During the fieldwork and from a great number of researches done
before (Etzioni, 1969), it appeared that in a group or organization
two functions of leadership have to be fulfilled, viz., an
instrumental and an expressive function.
The instrumental function refers to the necessity to acquire and
allocate resources and means, thus to the contribution to reach the
goals. Expressive leadership means that the function integrates the
parts of the social system with one another and with the normative
system.
Sometimes there are leaders who combine these functions quite
effectively, the so-called "great men" (Etzioni, 1969: 156). Mostly
the two functions are fulfilled by different persons. In the exertion
of the two leadership functions different incentives are used. In
that way the instrumental leader will use especially material
stimuli, while the expressive leader will supply immaterial

incentives.

In the marginal situation of the rural poor one can hardly expect that participatory projects will be successful from the very beginning.

It generally takes some time before one can speak of material progress or increase of income. Moreover, this first phase is a learning process, a period of trial and error with problems and disappointments, which can exert a demoralizing influence on the members' feelings of solidarity. To tide over this period success- fully, someone is needed who can mobilize and stimulate the group and can convince it that the stated objectives can be realized; in short, an expressive leader. In many cases the most important leader in the starting-period of a participatory project directed at poor people belongs to the expressive sort.

In this phase instrumentality is subordinate to expressiveness. This does not mean that the former function is unimportant. Because the project group lacks the knowledge and experience to control the project organization, the instrumental function will be fulfilled in the beginning largely by the promotor.

However, this person has to train local staff members as soon as possible if he really wants to dissociate himself in the long run from the project. As said, participatory projects do not come into being spontaneously and are usually initiated by outsiders. People are mobilized and activated to organize themselves and to improve their situation by means of common action. In order to convince people of the necessity to organize and to stay organized, incentives are needed. Especially in the later phases the incentives are given to them by the leaders in that organization.

Leadership is a necessary condition for the functioning of the project organization.

However, there are local situations in which the leadership required for such an organization is nearly absent. Of course there are leading people in the community, but they are rather to be called "primi inter pares". Their sphere is limited to certain areas, like the family, age groups, religion; they do not exceed this level. We see this phenomenon often in tribal communities. These are often

characterized by a "loose structure", in which the main distinction is that they consist of a number of relatively independent units. In general these are nuclear families. A central authority that provides general rules hardly exists (Sahlins, 1968; Grijpstra, 1976, p. 13). There is a sort of leadership vacuum which has to be filled if a project organization wants to have a chance of success. This vacancy is usually filled in the first phases of the organization by an out-sider, often the promotor. As already mentioned, in these phases the expressive function of leadership is required. This function is filled by the promotor.

Promoting-agencies have to take this fact into account when recruiting and selecting fieldworkers for these societies.

Quite a different situation in which the promotor has to fulfil the role of the expressive leader, is the one that is characterized by patronage between the members of the target-category and landlords, shopkeepers, etc. The promotor has to replace, to some extent, the patron. There is no doubt that great risks are attached to the acceptance of such a father role. The promotor has to have a lot of know-how to be able to break down this "father-image" and to make place for new leadership. Many organizations and movements have collapsed as soon as the promotor/leader has left.

When the leadership is fulfilled by local persons, this is not done by the very poorest of the project-group. Even in a socio-economically homogeneous target-category there are always some differences among the members. Because in the starting phase of a participatory project there is usually a lack of material resources, it is impossible to pay the leader for his work or to compensate the income he loses by this leadership. This means that one is committed to those who have some margin and can permit themselves to spend time on leadership and management activities, such as the stimulating of people, the organization of meetings, and the maintenance of external relations. Especially during the foundation and the first activities of the organization the process of motivating and convincing the people takes a lot of time.

This choice of less-poor local persons is unavoidable in a phase
where only few, if any, material means are available. So it is the
promotor's task to prevent the rise of a (new) elite which could
assume power and impede the participation of others.
Therefore, the training by the promoting-agency should not be limited
to the actual leaders, but should also reach potential candidates who
can, as soon as the situation permits it, take over the leading role.
Sometimes leaders from the first phases are characterized by having
experiences in and with the "outside world", like relations with
merchants, regional or national government, or other important
contacts in the city. These people are chosen, among others, because
it is seen that such relations will be favourable to the project
organization. In this way one expects to get better and faster
admittance to markets and access to the institutional sphere.
Contacts with the city or high-placed functionaries can prevent a
local elite from attacking the project. Often members assume, too,
that those people - through their experience or training - get on
familiar terms more easily with the promotor, an outsider. This can
only be the result of an unintended process which the promotor him-
self sets in motion when he approaches the target-category. As a
result of language or culture barriers he tends to select those
people with whom he can build up rapport in the most direct way.

Evaluations of participatory projects show that one of the main
factors of success is the presence of a good leader. However, the
problem is how to find him.
Finding a good leader or a potential candidate can only take place if
the promotor takes his time. By living in the village and holding
informal interviews he has a chance to get some insight in the
situation and to locate the (potential) leaders.
From the participation point of view, common sense can testify that
it would not be right that the promotor assigns someone to be leader.
On the one hand it is questionable if this person would be accepted
by the group as a leader. On the other hand it is not certain that
the promotor has selected a good leader. There are other ways open
for a promotor to "push" those whom he considers to be able persons

and to test them. He can insist on the institutionalization of lower
levels of control or commissions. By working in such a commission a
potential leader can demonstrate his qualities. On this basis the
project-group can consider this person to be a leader.

12. Participation

And what about participation in the promoting and mobilization phase?
Earlier in this paper the participation process was described as a
process of change in which the members of the project-group by common
effort gain an increasing influence in the decision making of their
organization.
The process of participation takes place at two levels. The one level
is the interface between the promoting-agency and project-group. Here
the promotor transfers tasks and responsibilities to the group as a
whole. The other level lies within the group and is caused by
delegation of some functions, tasks and responsibilities to a manage-
ment committee.

1 - external relations
2 - internal relations

Although the participants usually elect a management committee very
soon after the foundation of their organization, the internal
participation process is restrained in the beginning. Regarding
decision making on the objectives, activities, and the competence of
the management, only the group as a whole is important; the joint
members have to agree on the foundation of their organization, because
it is they who must uphold the organization and believe in it.
Thus the process mainly takes place at the first interface between
promotor and project group.
When a participation process is initiated, one cannot expect that the
participation level of the members will be high, for an outsider sets
in motion a process of consciousness-raising and organization with

the target-category. The foundation and control of the organization requires knowledge, information and a number of technical and social skills that are usually not sufficiently at the disposal of the project-group.

In the beginning, therefore, the promotor plays an important role. That does not mean, however, that the participation of the project-group in this phase should be minimal. Several writers (Morss et al, 1976; Uphoff & Cohen, 1977; Buckton, 1975) speak in favour of a relatively high participation. The experience of participation places a growing self reliance on the group members and leads to the taking of initiatives (Bernstein, 1976; Pateman, 1970; Blumberg, 1960). By this a "participatory consciousness" is built, which is a necessary condition for the participation process (Bernstein, 1976; Haque et al, 1977).

During the promotion phase - the phase of preparation by the promotor - he asks information about and from the target-category on the basis of which he decides whether he will initiate a project or not. Here is hardly any question of a participation process. Only in the mobilization phase does such a process get started.

When a promotor has decided to begin a project in a certain community, he will try to stimulate people through an education-process to cooperate. This education-process can develop by questioning people and by letting them formulate answers and solutions in the group, but also by asking the population to make a self-survey. In this last approach the participation of the participants is much higher. Within the target-category the information gathered on its own situation is discussed, and the promotor offers his assistance to help with improvements.

Yet this help is attached to a number of conditions:

a) the assistance is meant only for the target-category [*]

b) it is offered in the form of a participatory project; it does not

[*] An exception can be made when members of the target-category in a community do not want to participate without other people (non-members) from the community, as these others in their opinion belong to the "we-group".

ı

concern a material gift or loan, but one package that includes the
organization of the target-group, income-generating activities,
and training in technical and social skills;
c) the participants have to make their own contributions.
The target-category can take this proposition or leave it.
When the target-group does agree to the proposal for a participatory
project, the framework is established but its filling-in is not yet
done. The further details of the objectives, the organization-
structure, the election of management, the determination of its
responsibilities, the exact amount of the contribution, etc., must
take place in a joint deliberation of both the project-group and the
promotor.
In principle both have a veto-right. The decision on the filling-in
of the frame-work cannot be left to the project-group alone. The
latter does not dispose of sufficient information to oversee the
possibilities and limitations of a participatory project.
When one has experiences with outsiders or other projects, the
project-group often makes demands upon the promotor, which he cannot
or will not fulfil, like provision of loans and access to governmental
services. The framework may be established, but as often is the case
with a new conception, it is not always well understood.
Also the steering of the promotor appears to be necessary when
economic activities are chosen. The project-group often has too-small
an insight in the market situation when it concerns the taking of a
new place in the market. The promotor has to watch the project-group does
not plunge into an economically not-very-feasible project. When the
project-group does not have economically acceptable ideas, the
promotor himself has to make propositions to the project-group, which
are based on his information about the activities of the project-
group and on his insight in the market.
Also regarding the selection of participants, the promotor will some-
times play a steering role. People who do not belong to the same
socio-economic group, and who at the same time are not included in
the "we-group" by the members, are to be kept from participation.
It can be very hard for project members to refuse these candidates,
while it is relatively easy for the promotor to do so.

Although the promotor plays an important role, the project-group
should participate. It must have the possibilities to refuse the
promotor's propositions. He may have information concerning the new
project situation; he may know the market and the factors which
determine the success of a project or of new techniques and skills;
but he lacks a deep insight in the local community, the knowledge on
traditional techniques and skills; and he does not know the members'
experiences with other development activities. The propositions and
ideas of a promotor can conflict with the habits and concepts of the
participants. They should therefore have a say. But it will not
always be easy for a project-group to make use of a veto. Because of
politeness or lack of alternatives one will not refuse directly, but
will want to make known their ideas in a more subtle way. It is not
right to assume (as some promotors do) that both actors will take the
same position in a deliberation. Indeed, in principle both the
promotors and the project-group can decide not to implement the
project, but there is still an important difference. Projects are
scarce goods for the target-category. So when a village or group is
selected for such a project, it would be unwise to decline. The
target-category has certain expectations of a project. Experience has
taught that usually when an outsider offers a project, free goods and
money come along with it. A promotor may deny this, but despite this
denial vague expectations often remain.
The promotor, too, has an interest in the acceptation of the project.
In the end he has invested already time in the selection of the
community, the introduction and the consciousness-raising activities.
This gives the participants a certain power, but they do not feel it
that way. They impute to the promotor a stronger position on the
basis of the scarcity of projects and the lack of alternatives, and
therefore they tend to conform. He must realize which position he
takes with respect to the project-group and should create as much
room as possible for decision-making by the participants.
This can be done through several propositions. By comparing the alter-
natives, the project members are more able to formulate their own
preferences in order to give their opinions.
In a mobilization-phase a promotor can aim at a high degree of

participation, but he has to be conscious of the fact that his
position is seen as more powerful, and that the results of a
discussion will not always reflect on equal contribution.
Acceptance of the offer to initiate a project does not by itself say
much about motivation. The willingness to fulfil the condition of
making a contribution to the project gives more weight to the
decision to participate; when one binds oneself to invest labour,
capital or land, there is a question of a certain belief in the
project.

References

Bernstein, Paul — Workplace democratization: its internal dynamics.
Kent, Kent State University Press, 1976.

Blumberg, P. — Demokratie in het bedrijfsleven.
Utrecht/Antwerpen, Spektrum, 1968.

Bogaert, M. van den — To stand together and to sit together.
India, Ranchi University, Dissertation, 1977.

Bouman, F.J.A. — Indigenous savings and credit societies in the third world. A message?
In: Savings and Development, Quarterly Review, no. 4, 1977-I, pp. 181-218.

Buckton-Jones, D. (ed.) — Analysing poverty policy.
Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto, London, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1975.

Chambers, R. — Project selection for poverty-focused rural development. Simple is optimal.
In: World Development, Vol. 6, no. 2, 1978, pp. 209-218.

Clark, P.D. and J.A. Wilson — Incentive systems: a theory of organizations.
In: Administrative Science Quarterly, 161/62, Vol. VI, 1961/62, pp. 129-166.

Cohen, J.M. and N.T. Uphoff — Rural development participation: concepts for measuring participation for project design, implementation and evaluation. Working paper.
Ithaca, Cornell University, Rural Development Committee, 1976.

Dillon, J.D. and P.L. Scandizzo — Risk attitudes of subsistence farmers in North-East Brazil: A sampling approach.
In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 60, no. 3, 1978, pp. 425-435.

Dobyns, H., P. Doughty and H. Lasswell — Peasants, power and applied social change.
Beverly Hill, Sage, 1971.

Engelman, K. — Building cooperative movements in developing countries.
New York, Praeger, 1968.

Etzioni, A.   Dual leadership in complex organizations.
                               In: Gibb, C.A. (ed.).
                               Leadership.
                               Harmondsworth, Penquin Books, 1969.

Etzioni, A.   A comparative analysis of complex
                               organizations.
                               New York/London, Free Press, (revised
                               edition), 1975.

Farcy, H. de   Creation of a collective will: Some French
                               examples.
                               In: Landau, Y.H., M. Konopnicki,
                               H. Desroche and P. Ramboud (eds)
                               Rural communities, intercooperation and
                               development.
                               New York, Praeger, 1976, pp. 21-28.

Grijpstra, B.G.   Common efforts in the development of rural
                               Sarawak, Malaysia.
                               Assen, Van Gorcum, 1976.

Haque, W., N. Metha,   Micro land development: Design and
A. Rahman and   evolution of rural development projects.
P. Wignaraja   In: Development Dialogue, no. 2, 1977,
                               pp. 71-137.

Jedlicka, Allen D.   Organization for rural development. Risk
                               taking and appropriate technology.
                               New York, Praeger Publishers, 1977.

Landau, Y.H.,   Rural communities, intercooperation and
M. Konopnicki,   development.
H. Desroche and   New York, Praeger, 1976.
P. Ramboud (eds)

Lang, Gottfried,   Sukuma land cooperatives as mechanisms of
O. Warren, J. Roth and   change.
Martha B. Lang   In: Brokenska, D. and M. Pearshall (eds).
                               The Anthropology of Development in
                               Sub-Saharan Africa, pp. 48-63.
                               Lexington, University of Kentucky Press,
                               1969, pp. 48-63.

Miracle, M., D.S. Miracle   Mobilization of savings in the formal
and L. Cohen   sector of African economies.
                               Unpublished paper, July 1978.

Morss, E.R., J.K. Hatch,   Strategies for small farmer development,
D.R. Mickelwait and   Vols I & II.
C.F. Sweet   Washington, West View Press, 1976.

O'Kelly, E.   Aid and self-help.
                               London, Charles Knight & Co. Ltd, 1973.

Olson, M.   The logic of collective action. Public
                             goods and the theory of groups.
                             Cambridge, London, England, Harvard
                             University Press, Revised edition, 1971.

Pateman, C.   Participation and democratic theory.
                             Cambridge, London, Cambridge University
                             Press, 1970.

Ruthenburg, Hans (ed.)   Smallholder farming and smallholder
                             development in Tanzania; ten case studies.
                             London, C. Hurst and Co., 1968.

Sahlins, M.D.   Tribesman.
                             Englewood Cliffs. New Jersey, Prentice
                             Hall, 1968.

Schiller, O.   Cooperation and integration in agricultural
                             production.
                             Bombay, London, Asia Publishing House,
                             1969.

Solomon, D.D.   Characteristics of local organization and
                             service agencies.
                             In: Sociologia Ruralis, Vol. XII, no. 3/4,
                             1972, p. 334-360.

Sudarsky, J.   Rural cooperatives, neopatrimonial regimes
                             and interventions.
                             Not published paper, 1976.

United Nations   Community programmes for low-income popula-
                             tions in urban settlements of developing
                             countries.
                             New York, Dept. of Economic and social
                             affairs of the U.N., 1976.

Uphoff, N.T., J.M. Cohen   Feasibility and application of rural
and A.A. Goldsmith   development participation: A state-of-the-
                             art paper.
                             Ithaca, Cornell University, Rural Develop-
                             ment Committee, 1979.

Vanneste, G.   Introducing a new crop in Zaïre.
                             In: Stamp, E. (ed.)
                             Growing out of poverty.
                             Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 80-85.

Wade, R.   Social response to irrigated agriculture:
                             An Indian case.
                             Paper presented at the annual A.S.A.
                             conference, Cambridge, 1978.

Wallman, S.   The farmech mechanization project,
                                 Basutoland (Lesotho).
                                 In: Brokensha, D. and Pearsall (eds)
                                 The Anthropology of development in
                                 Sub-Saharan Africa.
                                 Lexington, Kentucky, University of
                                 Kentucky Press, 1969, pp. 14-21.

Zimmerman, S.   Economic development; the SWAFCA
                                 cooperative.
                                 In: Cahn, E.S. and B.A. Passett (eds)
                                 Citizen participation effecting community
                                 change.
                                 New York, Praeger, 1971, pp. 145-183.

5

TRADITIONAL AND MODERN ORGANIZATIONS

Dieke Buijs

Institute of Cultural and Social Studies
University of Leiden

In the preceding papers it has already been mentioned that one seldom sees poor people organize themselves spontaneously in order to lessen their admittance and/or access problems. However, they often prove to be loyal members of various traditional organizations. The question of the extent to which traditional organizations (can) play a role when new organizations are founded is regularly being posed in writings and congresses[*] without being settled for everybody.
In the fifties and sixties usually the existence of a positive relation between traditional and modern organizations was denied. One assumed that development only could take place by means of modern organizations. Traditional structures would hamper such development (Seibel, n.d. 1) and should therfore be replaced (Münkner, 1979). In 19th-century Europe the cooperative had been developed among the poorer sections of society, like the labour class and the small farmers. This modern form of organization had proven its usefulness and was exported to the developing countries, taking for granted that it would be applied universally.

[*]Examples of such congresses are: the Sussex Conference, 1969, Sussex, England; the Copac Symposium, Saltsjöbaden, Sweden; the IUAES Intercongres, Amsterdam. Examples of writing (some based on these congresses) are: Worsley (ed.), 1971; Migot - Adholla, 1970; Cliffe, 1970; Jones, 1972; Widstrand, 1972; Seibel and Massing, 1974; O'Brien, 1975, 1977; Coward, 1976; Uphoff, Cohen and Goldsmith, 1979; Coward (ed.), 1980; Gow and Morss, 1981.

Unfortunately, the results did not correspond with the expectations.
In Europe the cooperatives, which originated from the base, had been
able to promote the interests of the poorest groups. In the 20th-
century Third World the cooperative was introduced by the top. In the
late sixties and seventies one realized that modern cooperatives
contributed to the development of the poor only to a very small extent
(cf. the UNRISD publications on cooperatives, 1970).
It appeared that they benefitted only the richer people of the society.
Then the attention was drawn to traditional forms of cooperation, and
one wondered whether these organizations would be a starting-point for
development.
This search for tradition was also based on romantic ideas, which were
cherished by some development workers; in this they were supported by
political leaders, like Nyerere in Tanzania and Kaounda in Zambia.
Both presidents were convinced that traditional forms of cooperation
would be a fertile soil for modern forms of collective organizations.
In Zambia the experiment died a natural death after a few years
(Verhagen, 1981, p. 3). And in Tanzania, too, the Ujamaa movement can
not be considered succesful (van Freyhold, 1979). However, there are
some success-stories. The findings of Seibel and Massing (1974) in
Liberia are illustrations.
This does not yet answer the question whether traditional cooperational
structures form a likely base for modern cooperation.
What exactly is meant by cooperation in modern and traditional
organizations? The definitions are based on Dore's (1971) descriptions.
Cooperation is any sacrifice of the independency of the individual
and the household in favour of a group of other households or their
representatives in order to reach a common goal.
"An organization is modern if it is new; if the sacrifice of their in-
dependency referred to is or was within living memory, a conscious act
of commitment, rather than part of a set of social relations inherited
from time unremembered" (Dore, 1971, p. 45). When it does concern such
an inheritance, we speak of a traditional cooperation. One of the
reasons that this question is still a recurring topic of discussion
might be the fact that it was formulated too vaguely and unclearly.
Galjart (1981) stated that the debate is in fact concerned with four

questions, namely:

1. do traditional rural cooperative organizations continue to function or not;
2. do traditional rural cooperative organizations take on new functions or tasks, or are these taken up by new organizations;
3. do traditional bases of solidarity (like kinship, age) maintain a certain importance for new associations;
4. do traditional elements, like labour division or the distribution of authority, rights and duties, continue to play a role in new organization?

In this paper we shall pursue these four questions.

To be able to answer the first question - do traditional cooperative organizations continue to function - a distinction has to be made between different forms of cooperation. One can cooperate regarding labour, capital and goods[*]. When it concerns the factor labour, one can use Moore's distinction (1975). He distinguishes two categories, namely reciprocal and non-reciprocal cooperation (comparable with Erasmus' (1956) distinction between exchange and festive labour). The essential difference between them lies in the form of remuneration for attendance at work parties (Moore, 1973, p. 273). In non-reciprocal cooperation the rewards are food, drink and entertainment. In the case of reciprocal cooperation the reward is an equal amount of labour. According to Moore, non-reciprocal labour is disappearing. Reciprocal labour can take on four forms, namely:

1. cooperation in cultivation;
2. cooperation for the construction of roads, community houses and other common facilities by representatives of all households of a village or locality;
3. cooperation for the construction and the maintenance of the agri-culturally-related infrastructure, like irrigation systems, by the potential beneficiaries;
4. mutual assistance in a wide variety of household tasks (like building houses and well-digging) (ibid p. 277-278).

[*]In this distinction land and water are not taken separately, but are discussed together with the factor labour.

As for the first form, Moore says it is usually on the decline.
However, these are situations in which this form of reciprocal labour
seems likely to persist for some time. "The main circumstances
conducive to its persistence are the existence of small farmers, a
low incidence of non-agricultural activities, and the cultivation of
crops with high peak labour requirements, such as rice and cotton"
(ibid p. 287).
On the other forms of cooperation in relation to labour Moore does not
comment.
Regarding the second form - cooperation in constructing roads and
communal facilities - Galjart writes that these tend to be on the
decline to a lesser degree (Galjart, 1981, p. 3). This is also true
for the third form (Wade, 1979; Coward, 1980). However, the last form
- mutual aid - is also on the decline (Migdal, 1974).
Cooperative organization in relation to the factor capital, like
rotating credit savings and credit associations (ROSCA's, they are
called by Bouman, 1977) are found all over the world (Miracle a.o.,
1978; Bouman, 1977) and fulfil an important function as traditional
banks.
When the cooperation concerns goods, we have to make a distinction
between the pooling and redistribution of (a part of) the harvest, and
the joint purchase of tools:
Levelling by pooling and redistribution is diminishing rapidly (Boer,
1980). The pooling of agricultural equipment mainly takes place among
households of very different socio-economic status (Moore, 1975, p.
280). Whether this form is on the decline or not is unknown.
Galjart's second question concerned the fulfilment of new functions
by traditional organizations. Here five forms of traditional organiza-
tion seem to continue:
1. reciprocal cooperation under special circumstances;
2. cooperation regarding the construction of communal facilities;
3. cooperation regarding the agricultural infrastructure;
4. ROSCA's; and eventually
5. cooperation regarding agricultural equipment.
Whether the forms 1, 3 and 5 have taken on new functions is unknown.
During one of the field studies for the "Access and Participation"

of type 2 was found. A village in India started to maintain and watch
a nearby forest to prevent its complete felling.

There are many more examples of ROSCA's which take on new functions
(Bouman, 1977; Miracle e.a., 1978). The "mandjon" with the Bamileke
tribe is such a traditional organization which takes up a new function.
This initial "common" organization turned into an "uncommon" enterprise.

> Dans la forme actuelle, non seulement on se trouve devant un
> groupement d'individus qui mettent en commun leurs salaires ou
> une partie de ceux-ci mais la notion de mise en commun des
> ressources de tous au profit d'un membre à tour de rôle est
> dépassé pour faire place à societé de type coopératif de gestion
> du capital ainsi créé.
> On a pu constater que déjà, traditionellement, dans cette région,
> avant même l'introduction de la monnaie, existait une notion de
> biens communs tels que le meeting-house ou la case aux tambours.
> La societé se fixe maintenant un but à atteindre comme par exemple
> l'achat d'un camion. Puis, une fois le montant nécessaire réuni,
> elle décide de confier le camion acheté à un des membres qui en
> deviendra le conducteur et, en même temps, le responsable devant
> elle.
> A l'heure actuelle tous les taxis de Douala et probablement aussi
> ceux de Yaoundé sont la proprieté de telles 'sociétes'. De même
> les transport routiers du Sud et du Sud-Ouest du Cameroun sont
> en passe de devenir le monopole des 'Mandjon'. Aucun domaine de
> l'activité économique ne leur est étranger. Elles possèdent de
> nombreuses plantations de café en région Bamiléké et, paraît-il,
> depuis peu, trois des cinq cinémas de Yaoundé (donc loin de la
> région d'origine) (Ghilain, 1968, pp. 494-495).

So there are incidentally organizations which "spontaneously" take up
new functions. But that does not say anything about the desirability
to convince a traditional organization from the outside to take on
new functions, by which it would gain characteristics of a
participatory project. One has to realize that "most cooperative tasks
are different from traditional collective tasks, which are generally
intermittent in nature and aimed at meeting collective needs rather
than directly raising individual income levels" (UNDP-note, pp. 7-8,
cited by Verhagen, 1980). One would introduce contradictions which
raise conflicts and undermine the organization. The new functions and
objectives usually require different ideas on financial management,
administration, affinity and efficiency from those held in existing
traditional organizations. On the other hand, there do exist new

organizations which have taken on traditional elements, like the saving principle of the ROSCA. We shall return to this point later.

Back to the questions posed by Galjart! The third and fourth questions are now coming up for discussion: "Are traditional bases for solidarity, like kinship, age or origin, of importance for modern organizations?" and "Do traditional elements continue to play a role in new organizations?" The first question has been answered positively by Galjart. Usually people are not prepared to give up existing relations in favour of new unknown forms of cooperation. Also Dore pointed out the sense of group solidarity which still plays its part in the modern cooperative (Dore, 1971, p. 58).

The members themselves have to choose with whom they want to cooperate, whom they consider as belonging to the "we" group. It will not come as a surprise that one chooses for the traditional solidarity-group. The authors of the UNDP-note differ from Galjart's and Dore's opinion. They stress the necessity that modern organizations require other forms of solidarity and discipline (UNDP, 1978, p. 8). The reasoning behind this originates from the idea that a modern cooperative requires a larger number of people than there are in traditional groups. A second argument - which brings us back to the fourth question about the maintenance of traditional elements - says that within traditional solidarity groups the concepts of the distribution of rights and duties and their weight differ from those in modern organizations. In most cases the tradition determines the valuation which members give to the commitment they expect. Therefore, the ideas of the members will differ from those of the promotor. Should these traditional elements be taken up in the new organization, or shouldn't they?

For the target category the valuation and comparison of the costs and benefits of joining the new organization is of decisive importance. When the deliberations turn out negatively, one will not join the organizations.

The promotor may draw up the rules of the new association unilaterally, but when he does not have a clear view of the locally cherished values and ideas, he will tend to underrate the social costs. It would seem

better to allow people to work out their rights and duties by them-
selves. But as it also concerns new functions and tasks, of which the
requirements are not (sufficiently) anticipated, the promotor's voice
must be heard in the decision-making.
The rules which are drawn up in this way will include traditional ideas
about equality, rights and duties.
However, one may not expect that the results of this deliberation will
remain acceptable in the long run. The rules will be changed. The
incorporation in a market economy will take its toll in the form of
adaptation to the terms of modern functionalism.

To sum up, we can say that participatory projects require a modern
organization. However, this organization may and often will be based
on traditional solidarity. Especially in the first phase will traditio-
nal ideas on the weight of rights and duties and labour division have
an important influence. In this context several authors pointed out the
possibility and desirability to incorporate elements of traditional
cooperation in modern organizations (Bouman, 1977; Coward, 1976;
Coward (ed.), 1980; Seibel, n.d. 2).

References

Boer, L.	A first design of a typology of rural local communities. Paper presented at the 5th World Congress for Rural Sociology, Mexico City, August 7-12, 1980.
Bouman, F.J.A.	Indigenous savings and credit societies in the Third World. A message? In: Savings and Development, Quarterly Review, no. 4, 1977-I, pp. 181-218.
Cliffe, L.	Traditional Ujamaa and modern producer cooperatives in Tanzania. In: Widstrand, C.G. (ed.) Cooperatives and rural development in East Africa. Uppsala, the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. New York, African Publishing Corporation, 1970, pp. 38-60.
Coward, E.W. Jr.	Indigenous organisation, bureaucracy and development: The case of irrigation. In: Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 13, no. 1, October 1976, pp. 92-105.
Coward, E.W., Jr. (ed.)	Irrigation and agricultural development in Asia. Perspectives from the social sciences. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1980.
Dore, R.F.	Modern cooperatives in traditional communities. In: Worsley, P. (ed.) Two blades of grass. Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1971, pp. 43-66.
Erasmus, C.J.	Culture, structure and process: The occurrence and disappearance of reciprocal farm labor. In: Southwestern Journal of Anthropology XII, 4, 1956, pp. 444-469.
Freyhold, M. von	Ujamaa villages in Tanzania: An analysis of a social experiment. London, Heinemann, 1979.

Galjart, B.F.   Cooperation as pooling.
                                 Paper presented to the symposium on
                                 'Traditional cooperation and social
                                 organization in relation to modern
                                 cooperative organization and enterprise'.
                                 Amsterdam, IUAES Intercongress 23-24 April
                                 1981.

Ghilain, J.   A propos de la formation du capital autoch-
                                 tone en Afrique noire: Le Likilimba.
                                 In: Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie, no.
                                 3, 1968, pp. 443-466.

Gow, D.D. and E.R. Morss   Local organization, participation and rural
                                 development: Results from a seven country
                                 study.
                                 In: Rural Development Participation Review,
                                 Vol. II, no. 2, Winter 1981, pp. 12-17.

Jones, W.I.   The mise and demise of socialist institu-
                                 tions in rural Mali.
                                 In: Genève-Afrique, Vol. IX, no. 2, 1972,
                                 pp. 23-44.

Migdal, Joel S.   Peasants, politics and revolution. Pressures
                                 toward political and social change in the
                                 Third World.
                                 Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974.

Migot-Adholla, S.E.   Traditional society and cooperatives.
                                 In: Widstrand, C.G. (ed.)
                                 Cooperatives and rural development in East
                                 Africa.
                                 Uppsala, the Scandinavian Institute of
                                 African Studies.
                                 New York, Africana Publishing Corporation,
                                 1970, pp. 17-37.

Miracle, M., D.S. Miracle   Mobilization of savings in the informal
and L. Cohen   sector of African economies.
                                 unpublished paper, July 1978.

Moore, M.P.   Co-operative labour in peasant agriculture.
                                 In: The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 2,
                                 1975, pp. 270-291.

Münkner, H.H.   The legal status of pre-cooperatives.
                                 Bonn, Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, 1979.

O'Brien, D.C.   Saints and politicians: Essays in the
                                 organization of a Senegalese peasant society.
                                 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975.

O'Brien, D.C.

A versatile charisma, the mouride brotherhood 1967-1975.
In: Archives Européennes de Sociologie
XVIII, 1977, pp. 84-106.

Seibel, H.D.

Das Entwicklungspotential autochtoner
Kooperationsformen in Afrika.
Paper, not dated, 1.

Seibel, H.D.

Indigenous self-help organizations and
development. The African case.
Paper, not dated, 2.

Seibel, H.D. and
A. Massing

Traditional organizations and economic
development. Studies of indigenous
cooperatives in Liberia.
New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974.

U.N.D.P.

Technical note no. 1201 on cooperatives and
similar institutions.
New York, 1978.

Uphoff, N.T., J.M. Cohen
and A.A. Goldsmith

Feasibility and application of rural development participation: A State-of-the-art-paper.
Ithaca, Cornell University, Rural Development Committee, 1979.

Verhagen, K.

Cooperatives and rural poverty. Eight
questions answered.
Oxford, The Plunkett Foundation for
Cooperative Studies, 1980.

Wade, R.

The social response to irrigation: An Indian
case study.
In: Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 16,
no. 1, Oct. 1979, pp. 3-26.

Widstrand, C.G.

Problems of efficiency in the performance
of cooperatives.
In: Widstrand, C.G. (ed.)
African cooperatives and efficiency.
Uppsala, the Scandinavian Institute of
African Studies, 1972, pp. 9-31.

Worsley, P. (ed.)

Two blades of grass. Rural cooperatives in
agricultural modernization.
Manchester, University of Manchester Press,
1971.

6

COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND
PLANNING WITH SMALL FARMERS

Koenraad Verhagen

Royal Tropical Institute
Amsterdam

1. Introduction to the project

1.1. Cooperative research and planning to facilitate participatory development

In circles of development agencies, participatory approaches have
become increasingly popular as an alternative for top-down development
approaches of either capitalist or socialist inspiration. However, new
approaches risk to be dismissed as unrealistic when not matched by
practical results. Of paramount importance at this stage is, therefore,
the development of a methodology of intervention adjustable to
specific situations and well suited to set a process of participatory
change in motion. The process, to be truly participative, should
involve those who have so far had little or no voice in directing the
course of societal changes which affect their lives and livehood:
small farmers, the landless, the unemployed, slum dwellers, etc.

This interim paper is mainly concerned with the operational problems
of conducting cooperative research and planning at village level as a
contribution to participatory development. Cooperative research and
planning is conceived as a form of intervention by action-oriented
researchers with the object of identifying suitable avenues for co-

operative action and organization of direct benefit to the target population; its dominant feature is the active involvement of the target population in the analysis of their situation and in the planning of cooperative action.

The 'target group' - in fact, the target category of the population on which the research has concentrated - are Thai and Sri Lanka small farmers (SFs) and their households living in the reputedly poor parts of their respective countries, where adverse soil and climatological conditions constitute the main constraints for their economic development, where SF households form the large majority of the village population, and where landlessness is (still) exceptional. In both countries, SFs (male and female) so far have had little opportunity for shaping their own future by organized cooperative action, and the established cooperative and other development institutions are operating at levels beyond SFs' control and influence - a situation quite common in developing countries.

Participatory development can be defined as the development of institutionalized channels for effective popular participation. Pearse and Stiefel (1979) propose a definition of participation as "the organized efforts to increase control over resources and regulative institutions in given social situations on the parts of groups and movements of those hitherto excluded from such control". If we accept the general thrust of this definition, then cooperative development may or may not contribute to participatory development, depending on the extent to which the resource-weak categories of society are in a position to exercise a directing influence on the allocation and distribution of resources administered by the co-operative groups or enterprises.

It is obvious that the kind of cooperative development which has the effect of strengthening the positions of power of large farmers, autocratic development administrators or self-interested politicians, is contradictory to participatory development. However, when by co-operative organization SFs put themselves in a position to make better

use of the resources they have, or to gain easier access to new production resources, including know-how, then such development may be considered as a positive contribution to participatory development.

Cooperative organization, it should be emphasized, is a form of group or collective activity which pursues economic objectives. It seems to fit well in a strategy of 'counterdevelopment' (Galjart 1981) to the extent that it provides SFs with an effective mechanism to counteract 'the dysfunctions of normal development' (my emphasis). Though it has definite political consequences, cooperative organization is not a very attractive proposition to those who advocate a redistribution of resources by means of political organization and action as the central issue for participatory development. It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the pros and cons of the economic as opposed to the political, more radical, approaches. However, it should be clear that the operational problems this paper will discuss do relate to a form of intervention which seeks to reinforce the resource basis of the weaker sections without directing them towards a frontal attack on the position of the resource-strong categories of society.

To the writer's knowledge, cooperative research and planning has not been used elsewhere in the same meaning as used in this paper. It is markedly different from the usual academic research on cooperatives or the usual type of planning of cooperative development by development administrators. In cooperative research and planning the objects of research and planning become subjects by their actively taking part in analysis and planning of remedial action. As a special form of participatory research and planning, its specific goal is to engender, reinforce, or re-orient cooperative organization and action to the benefit of SFs.
The above can be summarized as follows: cooperative research and planning is the instrument, cooperative organization and action the objective, participatory development the ultimate goal. The way of introducing this instrument from outside in the research milieu is called methodology of intervention.

1.2. The ICA/RTI/CLT/NCC Research Project "Cooperatives for Small Farmers"

An attempt to make a contribution to the development of such a metho-
dology of intervention is the ICA/RTI/CLT/NCC Research Project "Co-
operatives for Small Farmers", the field research component of which
was started in April 1980 in Thailand and Sri Lanka. At the base of
the two research studies, 'action-projects' have been designed which
should have their formal start by the end of 1981. In fact, the tran-
sition from research to action has been gradual: research, in a natural
way, has expanded into planning, and planning into action. From the
start of the project it has been assumed that ' cooperative organi-
zation and action' is the logical outcome of a form of intervention
which seeks to make an underprivileged category of farmers more aware
of their economic situation and unexploited development opportunities.
The assumption is, of course, debatable. It introduces a bias in
research outcome. But, realistically speaking, such bias cannot be
avoided if at the village level the same person combines the functions
of researcher, discussion leader and group organizer.
The field research in Thailand and Sri Lanka has covered in total four
small administrative areas, two in each country, with a focus on the
small farmer situation in one 'representative' village within each
area. The research areas are situated in the relatively poor parts of
their respective countries: in Sri Lanka, both are situated in
Moneragala District, east of the Kandyan Highlands; and in Thailand,
they are in Khon Kaen Province in the northeast. The research has been
carried out by two three-member teams of local researchers which were
coordinated by the Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam[*]. Each area was
covered by one full-time field researcher, who started his/her inves-
tigations in the 'representative village' by enquiring into the si-
tuation of small farmer households through interviews and participant
observation. Following this, the collected information was presented
to small farmer groups for their discussion and reflection. Groups dis-

* For more details on project organization and researchers see the
  Appendix.

cussed how their current economic problems could be solved by organization and joint action. Existing cooperatives and other service institutions, operating at district or sub-district level, were also investigated regarding access of facilities and service utilization by small farmers.

Now, one year after the researchers' introduction to their respective villages, various cooperative 'micro-projects' (in the fields of irrigation, lime marketing, thrift and credit, beekeeping, weaving and dressmaking, mushroom cultivation) are in operation in the four research villages. Other micro-projects are in the planning stage; some are carried out with the assistance of existing cooperatives, others are undertaken as independent group activities. The directly noticeable impact of the project in the Sri Lanka villages seems greater than in the Thai villages. The research has also generated particular interest for small farmer development within tne two national cooperative apex-organizations[*). 'Follow-up Action Projects' are presently in preparation in the two countries. They will make use of local village workers and provide a starting basis for a more comprehensive action-programme. Implementation teams will consist entirely of Sri Lankans and Thais. Members of the current research teams will play a leading role in implementation.

1.3. Objectives of the research

The main questions to be answered by the research were the following:
1. What sort of cooperative organizations and services do SFs require for their security of income and improvement of material living standards ?
2. To what extent are these services covered by the development tasks assigned to the existing organizations (governmental, cooperative or others), and how effective are these organizations at present in reaching the SF households ?

---

* The Cooperative League of Thailand (CLT) and the National Cooperative Council of Sri Lanka (NCC).

3. How could the present system of cooperative promotion at its various
   levels of organization be transformed to accommodate and facilitate
   participatory development ?
4. What should be the basic elements and characteristics of an experi-
   mental action-programme which aisms at achieving the double target
   of greater serviceability of existing cooperative organizations to
   SF interests, and the SFs' increased involvement in self-administered
   cooperative action and organization ?

1.4. Guiding propositions for choice of methodology

Prior to the drafting of a research plan, the researchers had discussed
and agreed on the following guiding propositions:
1. Not only SFs, but also other parties in a position to facilitate SF
   development were to be integrated in the research process and take
   part in the identification of problems, interpretation of findings
   and search for solutions. The various parties concerned are small
   farmers, staff and committee members of existing cooperative
   enterprises, first-line cooperative development officials and
   their superiors, and first-line officials belonging to other sup-
   porting institutions (ministries, banks, etc.)
2. The researchers would start their activities at the village level.
   Research and interventions at highter level were to be undertaken
   at a later stage in the light of findings and experiences gathered
   at the grass roots.
3. A case-study approach concentrating on a few representative groups
   of SFs within selected villages was considered the only possible
   way of ensuring a high level of participation by SFs and relevance
   of findings.
4. The research should eventually produce tangible benefits for the
   participating SFs, and resulting guidelines and recommendations
   should be defined in clear-cut operational terms which give adequate
   concern to details of implementation.
5. To ensure replicability of approach a high degree of sophistication
   of research and planning methods should be avoided.

In short, the research was meant to be:

participatory: small farmers, cooperative staff, board members and officials should not be the passive objects of research, but full use should be made of their accumulated experience in analysing the situation.

diagnostic: the research should not limit itself to analysing causes and effects, but identify how present unsatisfactory situations could be remedied.

action-oriented: the research should prepare and lead to action.

Participatory research, as conceived for this project, has the double purpose of analysis and change. By associating SFs and other parties with the research, not only the research itself is enriched, but a small-farmer sympathetic atmosphere is created at various levels of operation. Perceptions of social reality change in the course of research, and the willingness to change the present situation by appropriate measures at various levels is intentionally stimulated. The theme of the research prompted a multi-level approach for two major reasons:

1. Sf development cannot take place in isolation. Without complementory resource-input from higher levels, the opportunities for effective development action by cooperative effort were expected to be very limited. The research confirmed the validity of this assumption. A series of implementable "micro-projects" were identified at village level, but they all required, to a different extent and in different manners, some sort of assistance (technical, financial, or moral support) from outside the SF milieu.

2. The research project had the explicit purpose of formulating a SF action-programme. Implementation of such a programme, even though on an experimental scale of several villages, would require the collaboration of various agencies. In particular, a new capacity had to be built up within the existing national cooperative apex organizations for the promotion of cooperative development among SFs. To the extent that this could not be achieved in the course of the research, at least a foundation for it should be laid by the organizations' active involvement in the preparations of the action

programme.

The multi-level approach resulted in frequent 'shuttle movements' by researchers up and down the ladders of development administration, especially during the second half year of the researchers' assignment, when research gradually had to cede for programming and planning activities.

2. Participatory research and planning at village level

2.1. Phases

As said earlier this paper will be limited to discussing some of the operational problems of participatory research and planning undertaken at village level. IN the sequence of activities we may distinguish the following phases:

Phases	Activities of the participant researcher:
1. Getting into the village and acceptance by villagers.	Self-introduction to village leaders, supported by a letter of introduction signed by the regional or area government representative. Official presentation at village meeting to village population.
2. Identification of SF households and obtaining insight in SF situation.	Conducting household surveys at various depths. Participant observation. Informal individual and group discussions.
3. Deepening insight in SF situation, reinforcing SFs' socio-economic awareness, motivating them for action, micro-project identification.	Organization and holding of group discussions.
4. Project formulation and planning for action.	Organization of special interest group discussions. Making contacts at higher levels (outside the village). Formation of informal cooperative action-groups, or in a few cases, formal (registered) cooperative societies.

5. Implementation of micro-   Assisting in implementation,
   projects   in an advisory capacity only.

The period which runs from the time of entrance to the village to
the start of the first micro-project could be called the process
initiation period. After this, during the process consolidation
period, the RO continues to visit the village to attend group dis-
cussions and assist in the formation of new action-groups.

In the sections below, activities of the research officers will be
discussed in the sequence in which they have been carried out, high-
lighting only the main points with regard to methodology, problems
encountered, findings and results.

2.2. Introduction to villagers and acceptance

In Sri Lanka researchers introduced themselves to the village leaders
and started their research work without experiencing any particular
problems. In the two Thai villages, the situation was different. There
was a rumour that the researchers were communist agents. Precautions
taken to prevent such a misunderstanding, such as official letters
and official introductions to District level officers, obviously had
not been effective enough. In one village the suspicion dissipated
soon when the Research Officer (RO) was seen by villagers working at
the District administration headquarters (to collect data on the
area). The RO also went to visit and speak to such villagers personally
whom he believed to be suspicious of the real purpose of his mission.
He purposely delayed the start of the preliminary household survey
until he felt accepted. Other factors favouring his position were
the start of unexpected but most welcome rains on his first day of
entry to the village and his good understanding with the Buddhist
monk.
In the other Thai village, the rumour about the RO's communist
sympathies proved more persistent. From the villagers viewpoint, she
had all the attributes of a communist agent: she showed special
interest in the poorer sections of the population, she had come to
the village without having any credit or special facilities to offer,

and unlike the other RO, she was not in a position to display any
visible evidence of her good understanding with government admini-
stration(written credentials clearly were not enough). After the neces-
sary explanations had been given and an official meeting had been held
at the village, which was attended by several District development
officers, the suspicion faded and the RO could carry out her work
normally. However, the suspicion revived when implementation of the
first micro-project (a small-farmer weaving and dressmaking group)
had to be postponed for financial reasons. Once the project had started,
the confidence was restored, and the RO was requested by the SFs to
continue her work in the village.

2.3. Household surveys and informal contacts

Once introduced to the villagers, the ROs had to identify the small
farmer households among the village population, and to get in-
sight into their economic and social situation. For this, and for a
first assessment of SFs' needs, development constraints and opportuni-
ties, the ROs conducted a general village survey and three different
series of household surveys. Moreover, they made widespread use of
informal contacts to familiarize themselves with the village situation
and gain the villagers' confidence. They joined in at informal gather-
ings at places where villagers usually met in the late afternoon or
evening hours (the 'todi bar'), they participated in festivities, and
one researcher regularly assisted in agricultural work (threshing).
ROs stayed overnight in the villages, except for one RO, who was not
able to find suitable accommodation in his village, where housing
standards indeed are very poor. Since this village was composed of
widely scattered homesteads, which prevented the holding of group
discussions during evening hours, overnight stay by the RO at the
village was considered less essential.

The four different surveys which were conducted at village level
successively enquired in greater depth regarding the SF household
situation. They were termed: village survey, preliminary household
(h.h.) survey, elementary h.h. survey, detailed h.h. survey.
The village survey was concerned with gathering general information

on the village situation (communications, key establishments, social organization, occupational structure, etc.).

The preliminary h.h. survey was administered to members of all individual households in the village and comprised basic questions on composition of household, size of landholdings and tenure, and occurrence of off-farm employment. The first aim of the preliminary h.h. survey was to identify the "small farmers" in the village context and to introduce the RO in each household individually. Basic data were collected from all households in the two Thai villages (two hundred households in each village), all the 37 households in one Sri Lankan village and 42 out of the 111 households in the second Sri Lankan village. In this last village a random sample was judged sufficient because from observation and data of the land register it was known that the village was nearly exclusively inhabited by small farmers (with less than 2 acres of rain-fed paddy land allowing only one harvest a year).

The information gathered by the preliminary h.h. survey was complemented by the more elaborate elementary h.h. survey. Through this survey more information was collected on levels and nature of agricultural and livestock production, and off-farm employment income. It covered only a part of the village SF population. In the Thai villages it was limited to SF households living in one particular village quarter ('village block') while in Sri Lanka the survey covered a group of SF households who had their paddy fields in the same yaya (a single tract of paddy land). The number of households varied from 11 to 20 per village.

The detailed h.h. survey had an even more restricted coverage. In each village four to six households were purposely selected on representativity among SF households covered by the elementary survey. The detailed h.h. survey was meant as an in-depth survey based on an elaborate schedule of items seeking information on how access to land, capital goods and water had changed through time, on levels of production and consumption, indebtedness, and cash inflow and outflow over a one-year period. On the basis of the detailed h.h. survey, annual

household income and expenditures could be more precisely calculated. One of the major problems encountered with the preliminary survey was that the information given by SF household members (mostly the men) was not very precise, often incomplete and sometimes incorrect. This was discovered when data from the elementary and detailed h.h. surveys were compared with the original preliminary survey figures. One possible explanation is that the researchers in the course of the research had improved their interview skills and become more able to extract the correct information from the interviewees. Another reason, carrying far more weight according to the ROs, was that the SFs were more willing to provide them with the correct information than two to three months earlier when the household was visited for the first time and the researcher was still less familiar with the villagers. Another handicap experienced by the Sri Lankan researchers was the scattering of homesteads over several miles and their accessability only by foot, making h.h. surveying all the more a time-consuming and sometimes strenuous affair. Once their houses were reached, household members were not always found at home, or had little time for discussions because of other more urgent occupations.

The above-mentioned problems notwithstanding, the various surveys were judged to have served the pruposes for which they were undertaken: they have permitted the identification of SF households in the village, reinforced the position of the researcher as a person of trust, and provided insight in constraints of and opportunities for SF development.

2.4. Summary of preliminary findings - village level research

2.4.1. The situation of SF households in Galboka village (Sri Lanka)

This is the poorest of the four research villages. It comprises 111 households averaging 6 persons each. The SF households' annual income has been calculated at approx. $ 30 per household member[*].

* US $1 = Rs 18

This includes the $ 14 per capita income obtained from government
distributed 'food stamps'. (In Sri Lanka, households earning less
than Rs 300/month ($ 16.60) are entitled to food stamps).
Except for a few, the houses are in poor condition, some on the verge
of collapse. Many under-nourished children can be seen. The food
subsidy system keeps even the poorest alive and prevents starvation
at difficult times. Ninety percent of the farmers are considered small[*]
Most (75%) are owner-farmers. Productivity is low. In years of normal
rainfall paddy production per hectare averages 1.25 tons (25 bushels
per acre). There is no double cropping possible. The average size
of the SF paddy land is less than 0.4 hectares (1 acre). Besides
paddy crops, 'highland' crops are cultivated (maize, limes, bananas,
coconuts and others). Highland holdings, all in ownership, average
0.9 hectares (2.25 acres) per SF household. Highland production is
the major source of SF cash income. The land-capita ratio has been
deteriorating over the past 75 years from 1.84 hectares (4.6 acres)
in 1960 to 0.36 hectares (0.9 acres) in 1981. Further subdivision
of paddy and highland into even smaller plots is expected to continue
in the future. Except for the few medium-sized farmers which sell
part of their paddy crop, the entire paddy harvest is kept for house
consumption and seeds. Fertilizers or pesticides are used by a few
farmers only. The village retail outlet of the Dambagala Multi-Purpose
Cooperarative Society (MPCS) has insufficient storage capacity for
stocking fertilizer. Moreover, most farmers consider use of fertilizer
as too much of a risk. Small farmers use simple agricultural tools;
even these are sometimes hard to obtain. Ploughs, when used, are
mostly borrowed from a private trader or a medium-sized farmer. One
out of three SF households possesses one or two low-breed cows who do
not produce sufficient milk for sale. One out of four has poultry,
usually four to five birds.
Paddy fields are rain-fed with only a few plots benefiting from sup-
plementary irrigation. Lack of water is viewed by SFs as the major

---

[*] 'Small' to local standards, which means less than 0.8 hectares
(2 acres) of rain-fed paddy land in combination with less than
2 hectares (5 acres) of highland.

constraint for increasing production. However, maintenance and management of existing facilities for supplementary irrigation are very poor (three dikes and a small reservoir). It is estimated that by improved water management one-third of the 95 acres of paddy field belonging to the village could benefit from supplementary irrigation. Recent restoration by the Irrigation Department of the reservoir and canal, feeding one yaya and costing $ 2.800 (Rs 50.000), has been a waste of money, according to farmers, because of technical shortcomings and inefficiency. A surprising fact at first notice is that a great part of the available highland is only partly cultivated.

Half of the farming households are loan defaulters with the MPCS. The average debt is $ 16 (Rs 300). Indebtedness with the MPCS seems to be no cause of great concern to any of the farmers. Small amounts are occasionally borrowed from non-institutional sources, mostly friends or relatives.

Following the surveys and observations at village level, the researcher drew up a list of major topics for group discussions.
For Galboka villages these were:
1. Development of highland cultivation
2. Marketing of agricultural produce
3. Subsidiary food crop (vegetable) cultivation during Yala
   (dry season) in paddy fields (situated near small streams)
4. Processing of limes
5. Production of lime cordial
6. Savings and credit needs
7. Poultry development
8. Beekeeping
9. Agricultural extension service.

Each major tropic was divided in sub-items which the RO thought worthy of special attention during group discussion meetings.
By way of example the list of sub-items under "Marketing of agricultural produce" is shown below:
a. Is there a surplus to be marketed ?
b. If not, could a surplus be produced ?

c. How do SFs appreciate the present marketing facilities ?
d. Is there a need to organize it in a different way ?
e. If so, is there a possibility to organize it in a better way
   by some form of group action ?
f. What would be the advantages ?
g. Could the existing MPCS (having a retail outlet in the
   village for sale of consumer goods) be considered as a
   possible buyer of highland produce ?
h. If so, what would be the required facilities at village
   level for storage, packing and grading ?
i. How should the PMCS and cooperative officer be contracted ?

2.4.2. The SF situation in <u>Kuragammana</u> village (Sri Lanka)

There is a great similarity in working and living conditions of the
SF households in the two Sri Lankan villages. The following will
emphasize the differences.
The village is smaller. It comprises 41 households. Living standards
of the SF households is slightly higher ($ 35 per capita). It has
a well-established and accepted leadership which belongs to the
'big farmer' catergory of 6 households. The per capita income of
this last category is estimated at twice as much. Use of fertilizer
in limited quantities for paddy cultivation and supplemetary irriga-
tion are more common than in Galboka village, which explains the
higher paddy yield of over 2 tons per hectare (45 bushels/acre) in
some SF fields. Because of poor water supply not all SFs use fertilizer.
The average yield of the bigger farmers (BFs) is over 3 tons/hectare
(65 bushels/acre). BFs apply fertilizers more systematically and pur-
chase their own stock of fertilizer when it is available on the market.
Their fields are normally better positioned for use of supplementary
irrigation water. SF tenants have to cede 50% of their produce to the
owner after deduction of costs of fertilizer. This goes contrary to
the Paddy Lands Act [*] of 1958, which stipulates that the rent payable

* Replaced by the Agrarian Services Law of 1979

under normal circumstances should not exceed 25 percent of the paddy
yield.
SF households' highland production is concentrated on food crops
for home-consumption. The BFs are more cash-crop production-oriented
(cotton and coconut) and thus are able to benefit from subsidy schemes
designed to promote cash-crop production. The RO assesses the relations
between the bigger and smaller farmers as harmonious. Interdependence
is present in many respects. SFs often receive their seeds from BFs,
and some SFs hire their buffaloes to BFs. Adult members of SF house-
holds work as hired laboures in BFs' fields. The RO noticed a stag-
nation in the development of production potential of SFs and a deterior-
ation of living conditions (like in Galboka village). SF households of
more than six members face particular hardship. Parents look older
than their age. Some of their children do not attend school. Housing,
clothing and sanitary conditions are at a low level. (The RO had there-
fore included family planning as a major theme for discussion).
The RO observed widespread unemployment and underemployment during the
greater part of the year by scarcity of labour during cultivation peak
periods.
Similar to Galboka village, the cooperative shop, which is a branch of
the divisional MPCS, is mainly an outlet for consumer articles. It is
consumer - rather than production - oriented. The MPCS branch has in-
sufficient storage, and probably also management capacity, to increase
the volume of fertilizer supply or develop new activities farmers may
desire. The MPCS lorry carries consumer goods to the cooperative shop,
but it returns empty.

The only authentic people's organization in operation in the village
is the death-aid society. This informal organization has provided the
basis for a cooperative savings and credit society recently formed
and registered as a result of the researchers' intervention.

2.4.3. The SF situation at Paw Daeng village (Thailand)

Paw Daeng consists of 192 households; on the average a household
numbers 6 members. All, except six, are farming households. Landless-
ness, without having any other source of regular income, is exceptional

(only two households).

In the Thai villages, too, the concept of SF has been defined in the
local context using the criteria of the village population as main
determinants: an SF household is a paddy-growing household which pro-
duces less than sufficient or just sufficient paddy for home consump-
tion. Contrary to their Sri Lankan counterparts, the SFs in the two
Thai villages have no access to highland cultivation, where the bigger
and big farmers grow their main cash crop: cassava. Small farmers
derive very little or no cash income from agricultural (paddy) pro-
duction. In years of an above-average harvest, some may sell small
quantities, but normally they will use it to form a buffer stock
until the next season's crop is harvested. In terms of size of land,
the SFs have less than 3.2 hectares (20 Rai) of paddy land. Sixty-
eight percent of the farming households fall in this category. But
even among the category of 3.2 to 6.4 hectares (20 to 40 Rai), re-
presenting 26% of the households, some could be considered as SFs
if the size of the family is taken into account. There are a few tenants
among the SF households (7%). Besides the SF households, the RO
identified 15 "dependent farming households". A dependent farming h.h.
has no land of its own, but h.h. members carry out agricultural acti-
vities on land still belonging to the parents of the farmer or his
wife. Compared to the Sri Lankan villages, the per capita income of
the SF population in the Thai research villages is much higher:
$ 65 for Paw Daeng (and $ 84 for Sokkong). Similar to Sri Lanka the
average SF paddy yield is low, slightly over 1 ton/hectare in normal
years (18 Tang/rai), but the average size of landholding of the Thai
SFs is four to five times as much 1.85 hectare (11.5 Rai). Moreover,
a substantial part of the household income (one third) is earned through
off-farm employment. Typical for the villages in northeast Thailand is
the seasonal migration from the village to urban areas during the dry
season (from January to April). Weekend-commuting between the village
and the towns is also becoming more common. Because SFs have no high-
land for cash crop production, off-farm employment outside the village
is the main source of their cash income. Some off-farm income within
the village is derived form silk-thread spinning and weaving, a wide-
spread cottage industry in the northeast of Thailand.

Figures on lending from institutional sources (cooperatives and BAAC[*])
are still further scrutinized. Borrowers are mostly medium-sized and
large farmers. The in-depth h.h. survey showed that SFs who get loans
do not use them for productive purposes. Expansion of loan schemes,
particularly directed to SF households, would probably lead to increased
indebtedness towards these institutions without generating additional
income.

Differences between the non-SF households and SF households are the
following:

Non-SF households:	SF households:
Average landholding 5.5. hectares (34 Rai)	Average landholding 1.85 hectares (11.5 Rai). Standard deviation in Rai is 4.2.
Grow cassava as cash crop (highland) and rain-fed paddy as cash and food crop	Have no or little highland for cassava cultivation. Are dependent on a single crop (paddy). Have no marketable surplus.
Have paddy land of higher fertility	Lower fertility
Do not participate in job creation projects sponsored by the Thai Government	Receive additional income from job creation projects
Use hired labour	Work as hired labourer in other farmers' fields (wage $ 1 per day, or 20 Baht)
Hold key positions in village committees (Educational Committee, Temple Committee, mostly formed on the headman's initiative)	Low participation in committees
Sell marketable surplus to merchants residing in regional market town	Sell 'marketable surplus' if any to itinerant merchants
Some raise meat cattle	Do not raise any cattle

* Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives.

Non-SF households (cont'd)	SF-households (cont'd)
Have relatively easy access to subsidized fertilizer distributed by the cooperative, and credit facilities granted by the cooperative or BAAC (fertilizer and loans can only be obtained at the district centre)	Have no or little access to subsidized fertilizer and credit. Keep savings at home. Borrow small amounts from relatives with no interest charge or from big farmers or local merchants at a rate of 5% per month for regular borrowers.
A few have their own rice mills (also as a status symbol) and a pick-up motor car for transport	Take their paddy for milling to the local rice mills
Produce silk (as a cottage industry) at home for sale	produce silk cloth mainly for home consumption
Have different durable consumer goods at their houses (a few even have television)	Have no durable consumer goods, except a transistor radio
Head of household does not participate in seasonal migration	Head of household, too, seasonally migrates in search for work
Children are exposed to a relatively high level of education	Children are exposed to a low level of education
Possess a jar for storing drinking water at their houses and a small chart for transport of jars to and from the pumps	Have no jars for storing drinking water

2.4.4. The SF situation in Sokkong (Thailand)

In Sokkong, the SF household population comprises 73% of the 200 households. The RO for this village came also to the conclusion that SF living conditions over the past 10 to 20 years had deteriorated, though this was less obvious than for Paw Daeng village. The nearness of the village to the district centre and a major provincial road had facilitated the search for off-farm employment. SF households earn half of their income from off-farm occupations. The per capita income for household members is also higher ($ 84 as opposed to $ 65 at Paw Daeng). In other respects, the socio-economic situation of the Sokkong SF population did not seem markedly different from their Paw Daeng counterparts.

During the greater part of the year adult SF household members are well
employed by agricultural activities. Their productivity, however, is low
due to water shortage (or floods) and low soil fertility. The untapped
production potential in the two Thai villages is less evident than in
the Sri Lankan situation. Still there is ample scope for raising
levels of production. Construction of dams and pump-wells could alleviate
water shortage and open up opportunities for vegetable cultivation, cat-
tle raising and fertilizer application. Off-farm employment within the
village, especially for women during the dry season, could be further
developed by promoting village cottage industries, for example by in-
tensifying and reorganizing the silk industry.

Causes for particular concern in the Thai situation are the widening
disparities of income within the village, the overall deterioration of
living conditions of the lower strata of the population and the social
disintegration resulting from the migratory movements.

2.5. Small farmer group discussions

2.5.1. Objectives of group discussions and typology of groups.

The reasons for organizing group discussions were multivarious. They
had the object to deepen the RO's insight into the problem structure
hampering SF development. Even more important was the stimulating ef-
fect group discussions were expected to have on the SFs' awareness of
their socio-economic situation and willingness to change present con-
ditions by group action. Group discussions were also aimed at facili-
tating the emergence of SF leadership, and at a later stage, to serve
as a platform for collective deliberations on planning and implemen-
tation of 'cooperative micro-projects'.
The organization of group discussions as a preliminary to group for-
mation was viewed as an essential element of a strategy which seeks to
strengthen both the economic and social position of the SF population.
In the course of research we came to distinguish the following sorts
of SF groups:

1. SF discussion group:
   the group discusses in eight to nine sessions SF problems and how
   group action could possibly solve them. Project ideas which at first
   judgement seem feasible are discussed in greater detail by a
   'special interest planning group'.

2. Special interest planning group:
   SFs with special interest in a particular theme (e.g. poultry,
   irrigation works, etc.) may join the group for more precise project
   formulation and subsequent detailed planning of action. If the
   'micro-project' seems feasible and attractive enough, the next stage
   is to organize a group for action: a 'claim-making group' or a
   'cooperative action group', or a combination of these two depending
   on the nature of the action.

3. The claim-making group:
   SFs have organized themselves in order to press for better service
   and/or their legitimate share of subsidies from governmental of
   existing cooperative service institutions. There is no joint economic
   activity as such conducted by the group. The service or subsidy is
   rendered to individual SFs (e.g., the lime marketing group in Galboka
   village, where members sell individually to the sub-district co-
   operative; the women's family planning group at Kuragammana; or the
   mushroom producers' group at Sokkong, requesting good service from
   the extension officer by insisting on his visiting the SF fields).

4. The cooperative action group:
   the group carries on a joint economic activity (e.g. joint purchase
   of cotton thread for domestic processing in Paw Daeng village).
   The activity may be executed in collaboration with an existing
   service institution, or fully independently. The group may continue
   as a group of, at a later stage, opt for a legal entity and become a
   cooperative.

5. The cooperative society:
   similar to (4) except that the group has been registered as a co-
   operative society and operates as a separate legal entity (e.g. the
   savings and credit societies in the Sri Lankan villages).

The SF discussion group (1) and the special interest planning group (2)
are temporary and of an interim nature. They are preparatory stages for
the more definite claim-making groups (3) or cooperative groups (4 and
5).
By forming claim-making groups SFs get "access to resources ..... that
are introduced ...... from outside their rural environment" (SAREC,
1979), whereas cooperative action emphasizes the mobilization of
available resources. Claim-making and cooperative action are comple-
mentary efforts aimed at improving the resource situation of SFs.
The cooperative action-group (4) may be considered as a pre-cooperative
to the extent that at a later stage it may evolve into a fully-fledged
cooperative society (5).
Cooperative action is nearer to a strategy of 'lower level self-reliance'
(Galtung, 1980), while successful claim-making carries the danger of
"falling in the trap of patron-client relationships" (Hyden, 1980).

2.5.2. Compositions of groups

The first 'core' discussion groups in the villages were composed of SFs
who had been covered by the 'elementary survey' (see 2.3.).
In the Sri Lankan villages this meant that the participating SFs had
their paddy fields in the same yaya and were dependent on the same
source of water supply for supplementary irrigation. In the Thai vil-
lages where the SF paddy fields are more interspersed, SF groups were
composed of household representatives, male and/or female, who were
living in the same village block.

In the two Sri Lankan villages, the groups had initially 9 and 14 members
respectively. In each of the two Thai villages two groups were formed,
each having about 10 members. The large majority were men, though both
men and women were welcome. When women participated, they were mostly
widows.

The group meetings were open in the sense that each farmer who had not
been explicitly invited could walk in and join the meeting.
In the Sri Lankan villages, SF attendance at group discussions rose

slowly but steadily to about 18 persons. When special interest group
discussions were held, the number was mostly larger. In Galboka vil-
lage, participating SFs belonged to different political facitons.
Surprisingly, this did not seem to affect the nature of discussions
and formation of action-groups.

In the Thai villages less interest was shown in the group discussions,
and occasionally, the two original groups had to be merged into one
to form a group of reasonable size (at minimum 6 or 7). In one Thai
village non-SFs who were expected to be more productive in project ideas
were at times invited to the meetings. This did not prove to be a
success, because the big farmers obviously had different priorities
(welfare projects benefiting the entire 'community'). In Sokkong, for
reasons of diplomacy, a special meeting was organized for the non-SFs.

In the Sri Lankan villages, formal participation in discussions by non-
farmers and the few 'big farmers' came in at a later stage, when village-
wide projects were discussed (e.g., the savings and credit society).

In all villages the original plan of setting up several SF discussion
groups in different village blocks (Thailand) or covering different
yayas (Sri Lanka) was abandoned for reasons of shortage of time and
strategy. Instead, it was considered more effective to encourage such
SFs who had had no opportunity to participate in micro-project identi-
fication in discussion groups to join directly in the special interest
planning groups.

2.5.4. Preparation and convening of group meetings

In preparation for the group meetings the ROs had drawn up checklists
of points for discussion. For each major area of concern (e.d. livestock
farming, marketing, etc.) there was a separate list (see the example
given in section 2.4.1.). The group discussions had been preceded by
more informal talks with farmers at conventional meeting plaxes. In
particular in the Thai villages, careful preparation is a precondition
for success (see further under 2.5.7. "How should a group meeting be
conducted").

Convening for the meetings was done by the ROs personally through
house-to-house visits, normally on the same day as the meeting would
be held or the day before. If a meeting had been planned long before,
a reminder that the meeting would actually take place was necessary.
After the first discussion group meetings, the Sri Lankan ROs increasing-
ly made use of local leaders (Buddhist monk, local shopkeeper) or
recently appointed group leaders of action-groups for convening meetings
and spreading news about envisaged micro-projects.

2.5.5. Where to hold the meetings, when and how frequently ?

Where ?
In both Sri Lankan villages the first two meetings were considered a
failure because the venue was not appropriate.
In one village the meeting was held next to the retail shop of the
cooperative society, which was situated on the compound of the village
carpenter. This person enjoys little esteem from the SF population. Sub-
sequent meetings were held at the primary school, a "neutral place".
In the second Sri Lankan village, the first meeting was held at the house
of a recognized village leader. Though the RO was conscious of the fact
that this was not the ideal place, he thought that holding the first
meeting at any other place could have antagonized this influential
person and caused frictions.
Subsequent meetings, however, were held on the threshing floor of one
of the SFs, or at the primary school when a larger attendance was ex-
pected.

In the Thai villages, meetings were held in the open air on the com-
pound of one of the SF households. The venue seemed appropriate (ex-
cept when it rained). People who passed could walk in, and there was no
suggestion of secrecy.

When ?
In one Sri Lankan village, because of the village topography, meetings
could not be held during evening hours. This represented a true handi-
cap during the peak cultivation season, when farmers have no time to
spare during the day to attend group discussions.

Full-moon day ("Poja day", a Buddhist public holiday) proved to be the
most appropriate day for group gatherings.
In all villages, planned meetings had to be frequently postponed because
of rain. The rains were normally followed by days of intensive agricul-
tural work. Moreover, after a day of hard work, SFs felt tired. Those
who still had energy were sometimes more interested in catching fish or
frogs (Thailand).
The Thai researchers concluded that the best period to organize group
discussions is just after harvest (December, January) before many SFs
have left the village in search of work at other places in Thailand.

How frequent ?
In the two Sri Lanka villages 11 and 12 group discussions, respectively,
were held within a 4 months' period. This does not include the special
interest planning group sessions. (It should be admitted that in practice
it is not always possible to draw a sharp line of distinction between
the sorts of meetings.) In these meetings all of the (9 to 10) major
topics of concern were discussed. A higher frequency of meetings was
not judged possible.
The frequency of meetings of special interest planning groups varies
with the nature of action to be discussed, the urgency of the problem,
and the number of persons involved. Once the action has started, a
monthly plenary meeting to review progress and discuss future action
was considered a minimal requirement.
In the Thai villages the high frequency of weekly group sessions
could not be maintained. The Thai SFs are far more occupied than
their Sri Lankan counterparts. Only 8 group discussions could be held
in each village during a period of 3 months. The extremely violent
monsoon rains of September 1980 upset the ROs' work program. Farmers
were fully occupied with protecting their fields from flooding. With
the possible exception of the post-harvest period, a frequency of
group meetings higher than every fortnight does not seem feasible in
the Thai situation.

2.5.6. What to discuss ?

Household surveys and informal contacts had served to identify the
major topics and related problems.
A distinction was made between areas of particular concern to SFs
and other areas of general concern.
Infrastructural works for irrigation and improved water management were
matters of interest to all farmers.
The provision of facilities at village level for purchase of inputs,
sale of produce, savings and credit, and off-farm employment, were
topics of special, but not exclusive, interest to SFs.
In the Thai villages, when non-SFs participated in group discussions
or were informally asked for their views, community projects were
suggested, such as a "medicine bank" (in fact a dispensary), a 'news-
paper centre', and a 'funeral village group'. SFs in all villages
were more interested in discussing income-generating projects as indi-
cated above under 2.4.1.
Handicraft projects commanded special interest among SFs in the Thai
villages. Plaiting, spinning, weaving and dressmaking activities
could be introduced or extended. Discussions centered on the provision
of raw material, the acquisition of more refined skills and tools,
and marketing problems.

In the Sri Lankan villages definite planning of action started already
after the third group meeting. This, the ROs believed, has certainly
contributed to the sustained interest in group discussions, while
in Thai villages, the absence of a clear prospect of follow-up action
caused part of the SFs to lose their interest.

2.5.7. How should group meetings be conducted ?

In the Sri Lankan villages the meetings that were the most productive
in terms of project ideas and formulation, showed in broad lines the
following pattern:
a. A clear statement is made of the problem situation related to the
   topic as viewed by the RO on the basis of his (her) findings.

b. The introduction by the RO is followed by a discussion during
   which the problem is redefined by the group.
c. The RO invites group members to come forward with suggestions to
   remedy the present unsatisfying situation.
d. Suggestions from group members are discussed in a dialogue at-
   mosphere.
e. If ideas seem promising enough, group members and the RO may decide
   to have another meeting on the same topic, to discuss plans in
   greater detail.

Throughout the discussion the RO is particularly conscious not to
raise group members' expectations about possible help from outside
sources.
The above pattern proved effictive in the Sri Lankan villages, not in
the Thai situation.
The Thai SFs have no tradition of collective deliberations. Moreover,
when confronted with some person of a higher status - and the RO is re-
garded to belong to a higher stratum of society - they adopt an attitude
of respectful listening. The RO may gain considerable esteem if he (or
she) comes forward with realistic suggestions on how problems can be solved.
If he (or she) fails to do so, the SFs will still respectfully listen to what-
ever the RO has to say, but will refrain from attending the next meeting.

The meetings in the Thai villages, as became increasingly clear, should
be of a different type and prepared accordingly. Projects shouls be pre-
pared by informal discussions with individual SFs and their potential
or actual leaders. The RO should only convene a SF meeting, when he
(she) has concrete projects to propose. In project terms, this means
that before group discussions start, 'micro-projects' should have been
identified and formulated, and that group sessions should focus on
planning and organization of activities.

2.5.8. The use of local leadership

When traditional leaders do not belong to the SF category - as was the
case in all villages, except in one Sri Lankan village where there

to be a leadership vacuum - and, consequently, do not participate in
group discussions, it is of paramount importance that they be kept
informed about the progress of the "research". Those among them with
genuine interest in SF development were used as a channel for communi-
cation of messages, and as informants; others were just kept informed,
or a special meeting was arranged to provide them with an opportunity
to air their views.

In one Sri Lankan village and one Thai village, the RO had developed
an especially good relationship with the Buddhist monk. In none of the
villages in the two countries could teachers be identified or mobilized
as SF leaders. In the Sri Lankan villages the new generation of village
school teachers were criticized openly by villagers for their lack of
respect for the traditional value system and their individualistic
mentality. In the Thai villages teachers displayed more interest in
setting up private business (pig-raising,rice-mill, etc.) than taking
up leadership functions.

2.5.9. The involvement of officials in micro-project preparation

Officials with technical expertise and belonging to the various line-
departments (agriculture, home industries, cooperatives) were invited
to attend group sessions when the planning stage had been reached.
Their involvement proved useful in many respects:

1. The SFs and RO together did not always possess sufficient technical
   knowledge or experience on the subject matter for correct assessment
   of the projects's feasibility and the planning of action.
2. Not involving the official could have made him (her) feel hurt and
   cause his (her) later obstruction at the implementation stage.
3. The direct confrontation of the line official with SFs in a dis-
   cussion atmosphere proved helpful in changing the officials' atti-
   tudes and orientations.
4. The presence of an official was legally necessary when the group
   wanted registration as a formal cooperative society.

2.5.10. "Micro-projects" as an outcome of group discussions

The outcome of the group discussions in terms of motivating SFs for
group-action and producing feasible project ideas and plans, was
definitely more positive in the Sri Lanka than in the Thai villages.
In Galboka village a lime marketing group comprising about 25 members
started its activities in October 1980. The group is expected to ex-
pand to 150 persons after the first year. The lime fruits are sold
to the Dambagalla Multi-Purpose Cooperative Society. As a result of
the Dambagalla MPCS intervention on the local market, prices paid by
traders also went up.
The village cooperative savings and credit society of about 24 persons
was registered in June 1981. Membership is expected to increase to
60 by the end of the year. It will act as the 'village bank' to fi-
nance income-generating group activities. Projects planned for small
groups of farmers for 1981 are in the fields of beekeeping and poultry-
raising. Projects under consideration are in the fields of intensifi-
cation of coconut and lime cultivation (highland production), proces-
sing of locally available fruits for producing jams and pickle, and
the digging of tube-wells.

In Kuragamana village, a cooperative savings and credit society with
similar functions as the one in Galboka is already in operation since
December 1980. At the time of its formation it had 40 members. A 'Water
Users' group of 17 farmers who have the intention of making their yaya
(paddy tract) into a 'model yaya' started its activities in November
1980. Other such groups are likely to be formed in the course of 1981.
Micro-projects planned for realization in 1981 are vegetable-growing by
a group of six farmers, and a 'family health education' scheme for the
female SFs. Projects under consideration are the increase of SF coconuts
and the introduction of cotton production (already produced by big
farmers); and, further, the encouragement of milk consumption by SF
families and the introduction of hybrid cattle.

In the Thai village of Paw Daeng, a cotton-thread weaving and dress-
making group with 10 members started activities in February 1981.

Under consideration is the introduction of subsidized 'silk houses', which by giving special protection to silk worms and cocoons, have the capacity to double the silkthread yield. The costs would require group investment. Dam and tube-well construction with labour provided by SF household members was often mentioned during group discussions, but requires further study together with technicians. So is the establishment of a small farmer oriented service centre at village level, a promising conception but difficult to realize on a self-management and profitable basis. The 'village service centre' may start by the common purchase of subsidized fertilizer by an SF group and gradually expand and diversify its activities.

In the Thai village of Sokkong, a mushroom cultivation micro-project has been started by a small group of SFs. Besides the above-mentioned projects, the possibility will be studied for extension and commercialization of bamboo and reed products, at present mainly produced for home consumption.

3. Some of the lessons learned

Reflecting on the experiences in the four research areas suggests some lessons about the intervention at village level, which takes cooperative research and planning as a starting point. They relate to the replicability of the applied methodology (3.1.), the organization of group discussions (3.2.), the integration of research, planning and monitoring functions (3.3.), and the interaction between ROs, target group and officials of supporting institutions (3.4.).

3.1. Replicability

The differences in situation between the Sri Lankan and Thai villages have shown that any wholesale transfer of methodology from one country to another is bound to fail. However, the usefulness of a methodology of intervention does not lie in its applicability in an unmodified form, but in its capacity of adjustment. The Thai research villages, compared to the Sri Lankan ones, are characterized by higher degree of social diversity and the emphatic attitude of subservience of SFs towards all

persons considered to have superior status.

For the Thai villages a leadership model has been developed. It implies the active search by ROs for informal leaders, loyal to small-farmer interests and capable of generating project ideas and assisting in project formulation. Group meetings serve to confirm leaders in their positions, and to obtain formal approval and collaboration from participants for the proposed micro-projects and initiatives.

The Sri Lankan method can be referred to as a discussion-model. Though economically more backward, the Sri Lankan SFs appear politically more mature than their Thai counterparts. Group discussions are more productive of ideas, and participating development officials who do not meet the SFs' legitimate expectations may be told the unveiled truth.

'Leadership model' and 'discussion model' are terms which indicate differences in emphasis. In both approaches leadership development and discussion session are predominanly present. There is no standard package of research and planning instruments which would fit all situations, and no villages will have an identical framework of cooperative institutions emerging from a participatory process of institution building. Number, nature, organization and composition of groups will vary accordingly to particular circumstances and change in the course of time, which goes very much against the conventional method of cooperative promotion characterized by the imposition of standarized model patterns of cooperative organization and rules from above.

Though each village will be specific in this range of cooperative instituions, similarities are likely to occur where conditions resemble. In the two Sri Lankan villages, the lead development institutions will be the Savings and Credit Society, which will mobilize local savings and act as a channel for outside financial resources to local SF groups. It will serve as a forum for discussing new project ideas, but its leadership will not be in a position to impose specific development action on groups of fellow-villagers.

In the Thai villages the evolving institutional framework is still much less clear and definite. The Sri Lankan model of a village-based savings and credit cooperative as lead society would not be suitable. It would only add to the position of the village elite and strengthen SFs' dependency on 'respectful' persons, who as a result of 'modernization'

show less and less concern for the weaker sections of society. The process of participatory development in the Thai village will be started by the formation of small purposeful action-groups. The motive force for joining the group is the prospect of immediate material benefit. Nourished by a fundamental feeling of insecurity, the SFs' capacity for self-administration is still limited in the starting phase. There is an understandable tendency to shift off responsibilities to the shoulders of the researcher-cum-group-organizer. The Small Farmer Service Centre is the 'lead institution' planned for the future.

3.2. The organization of group discussion

Group discussions may start approximately 3 months after the ROs' introduction to the village and household surveys have been completed and partly interpreted. Shortening of this period seems possible in the Sri Lankan villages. In the following three months the RO should concentrate on the formation of discussion groups and organization of meetings. The experience in the Sri Lankan and Thai villages has demonstrated that the organization of discussion meetings for SF groups of 10 to 20 persons is so much a time-consuming affair that it is not possible to involve the entire SF village population, male and female, in a systematic reflection on all major aspects of their socio-economic life. A comprehensive discussion should cover 8 to 9 major topics. Each topic requires one full session of about two hours for participatory research (collective reflection and analysis). If promising project ideas are advanced during these sessions, they have to be followed by planning sessions within a short period of time. Furthermore, the size of the SF discussion group should be in the range of 10 to 20 persons. A higher frequency of discussion group meetings that an average of one every week will be difficult to realize. This means that if a single RO is in charge of organizing participatory research at village level, he will not be able to involve more than one or a maximum of two SF groups in the first phase of group discussions, focussing on problem analysis and project identification. This is based on the assumption that the 'process initiation period' should be as good as completed 5 months after the RO's entry in the village. Completion of the process

initiation period means that implementation of the first micro-project has started and that planning of action and implementation should receive the emphasis. The likely implication of this is that the first micro-projects will cover only a part of the SF households in the village. Eventually, by replication (a similar activity undertaken by a different group), new micro-projects, and extension of the existing ones, almost the entire SF population should be covered.

In an environment like the Thai villages, where SFs are not inclined to speak their minds freely in semi-public gatherings, ROs should familiarize themselves with SF views and needs through informal contacts. Groups should deliberate over project ideas which have been carefully prepared by the RO, but which are still susceptible to change as a result of group discussions.

To prevent slackening of SFs' interest in group discussions, the first (easily implementable) micro-project should start not later than five to six months following the ROs' introduction to the villagers, and preferably earlier, while research activities are still continuing. This means that already during the research stage technicians belonging to ministries or other agencies may have to be invited for direct discussions with villagers.

It should be realized that SFs are far more occupied by agricultural work than is mostly assumed. This holds true for the research villages in both countries, but especially for the Thai farmers. The Thai SFs of the northeast are well-occupied by paddy cultivation during the May-December period, and sometimes over-occupied during times of field-preparation, transplanting, floods and harvest. In addition, they are involved in many side-activities, such as fishing. Low agricultural productivity and low payment for work outside the village are the first causes of their poverty, not under- or unemployment.

Participant researchers should have skill in conducting group discussions. Earlier extensive field research or teaching experience is no guarantee of their having the ability to be discussion leader. In the

Thai villages the ROs were short of such ability, which has delayed their progess of work.

3.3. Integration of research with other promotional functions

The ROs performed different functions. They acted not only as re-searchers, but also as group discussion leaders, planners, and to some extent, as administrators. The various functions were combined in a single person. Normally, in conventional project preparation, one sees a differentiation of functions, with the unavoidable misunderstanding, lack of coordination and time-lags between the activities of researchers, the planners and administrators in charge of implementation. In co-operative research and planning aiming at grass-roots level partici-pation, these functions are integrated. In this way fragmentation of knowledge and initiatives are avoided where there is so much need for a coordinated and sustained effort comprising a multiplicity of acti-vities[*]. ROs are of the same opinion that planners, field researchers or departemental specialist who are unable or unwilling to cross the boundaries of their professional specialization and educational back-ground are inept for initiating participatory development at village level.

3.4. Interaction between Research Officers, target groups (Small Farmers), and officials of supporting institutions

One of the bottlenecks of participatory development is the absence of an institutional infrastructure permitting meaningful target-group participation. Building up such infrastructure has to start where the motivation of the people to participate is highest, viz. at the village level and below, where participatory development is directly related to the living and working conditions of the participants. Participation

---

[*] Korten(1981) equally stresses the importance of a "close integration of knowledge-building, decision-making and action-taking" as opposed to a differentiation of functions performed by persons located at different institutions.

flourishes best in the context of "micro-projects" carried out by small groups within the confinement of well-defined objectives. Projects which cover the entire village carry the danger of authoritarian or opportunistic rule by village leaders, who may give little concern to SF interests. However, the Small Farmer Service Centres envisaged for the Thai villages will economically not be viable without big farmer participation. The village Savings and Credit Societies in the Sri Lankan village, too, will not be able to function without the expertise and skill of some villagers who belong to the relatively well-to-do sections of the village population. In many cases there is a need for cooperation between different categories of farmers. This points to the need for outside mediation to ensure that objectives and internal procedures of the cooperative organization are not biased against the interests of the weaker sections of the population.

Cooperative research and planning must be seen as an investment of infrastructural nature which is necessary to build up an institutional framework at village level, permitting small-farmer participation in the development process. Though costly in the short run in terms of manpower (skilled village-level workers), the pay-off in the long run may be considerable, not only in economic terms, but even more in those of social justice.

The strategy chosen for the forthcoming action-programme is one of creation of new institutions at grass-roots level and a simultaneous reorientation of institutions at higher level. During the research project a start has been made with both. Within the national cooperative apex-organization and ministry in charge of cooperatives, SF development has become an issue of special attention and discussion. It is true that research findings and emerging new concepts are far from having penetrated through all the echelons of the cooperative hierarchy, horizontally and vertically, but a definite first step has been made. Through the action-programmes it is hoped to build up a new capacity for effective cooperative promotion at village level within the national cooperative apex organizations. The organizational autonomy of the two organizations, namely the CLT in Thailand and the NCC in Sri Lanka, is

considered sufficient to protect the programme from the encumbering and rigid rules normally prevailing in government bureaucracies. The inter- action between the supporting institutions' research and the village- level research has shown that there are possibilities to make the es- tablished cooperative sector more responsive to SF needs and wishes. However, these hidden possibilities have to be systematically explored together with persons who work within the existing bureaucracies and who are interested or capable to develop an interest in problems of SF survival and development. In both countries it was the experience that, at all levels, the awakening of interest was greatest when discussing concrete situations and concrete solutions ('micro-projects'). The ex- perience in both countries suggests that workshops and work sessions connected with participatory research and planning are a far more ef- fective tool for organizational change than the usual on-the-job training courses. The latter, with their normal emphasis on skill training, seldom develop new insights and attitudes.

Finally, it should be recognized that in participatory development there is a danger of ideology getting the upper hand above pragmatism. SFs are more concerned by practical problems of survival and have no direct interest in the ideological dimensions of participatory development, such as levelling off income disparities and "empowerment" of the poor. SFs do not view or appreciate participation as an end in itself, but as a means to create new development opportunities or bring new facilities within their reach. Participatory development should deliver the goods, otherwise its intrinsic educative or humanistic values also will remain theorectical. This became very clear in the Thai research. The Thai SF dicussion groups were slow in getting started and suffered from in- decision and lack of technical knowledge for planning of action. Though ROs did manage to get group activities started, their effectiveness and efficiency of intervention would have been much greater if technicians with some practical knowledge of vegetable growing and marketing, dig- ging of wells, and silk production and processing had been called in at an earlier stage. The supporting institutions' research, not discussed in this paper, showed that to some extent first-line departemental of- ficers possessed this knowledge which the ROs did not have or had only

insufficiently. This brought out in the open a shortcoming in the research design which had timed the supporting institutions' research only after near-completion of the participatory research at village level. If there had been more overlap of the two research phases, cross-fertilizations of ideas would have been more likely to occur and officials could have been integrated more activily in the search for solutions. Because of the SFs' pragmatic orientation, RO team members hold the view that the first 'micro-project' in the village should start not later than a few months after the researcher-cum-development-worker's introduction to the village. Without this, his (or her) credibility as an 'agent of change' may suffer.

3.5. Conluding remarks

This interim-rapport has attempted to formulate in a tentative way some of the major lessons learned from the field research in Thailand and Sri Lanka. Final conclusions are still to be drawn following completion of the two country research reports and further discussions among RO team members. Conclusions of the field research will be compared and integrated with the findings of another study presently going on in India, where one team member is studying participatory approaches in the Maharashtra and Bihar States.

REFERENCES

Galjart, B.F.   Counterdevelopment: A position paper
                           In: Community Development Journal,Vol.16,
                           No. 2, 1981, pp. 88-96

Galtung, J.   The Politics of self-reliance.
                           In: Galtung Johan, Peter O'Brien and Roy
                           Preiswert (eds)
                           Self-reliance. A strategy for development
                           Geneva,Bogle-L'ouverture Publications,
                           Institute for Development Studies, 1980,
                           pp. 355-386.

Hyden, G.   Cooperatives and the poor: Comparing Euro-
                           pean and Third World experience
                           In: Rural Development Participation Review,
                           Vol.II, No. 1, New York, Cornell University,
                           1980, pp. 9-12.

Korten, D.C.   Rural development programming: The learning
                           process approach
                           In: Rural Development Participation Review,
                           Vol.II,No. 2, New York, Cornell University,
                           1981, pp. 1-8.

Pearse, A. and M. Stiefel Inquiry into participation: a research ap-
                           proach
                           Geneva, 1979, UNRISD/79/C/14

SAREC   Rural development research - the role of
                           power relations
                           (Ed. Bo Bengtson)
                           Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with
                           Developing Countries, SAREC Report R.4, 1979

APPENDIX

SUMMARY OF PROJECT ORGANIZATION

   (Thailand and Sri Lanka)

General Information on the Project

Project: Development of Cooperatives for Small Farmers.

Initiating agency: International Cooperative Alliance (head office
        London) following consultation with her member organizations
        in South and Southeast Asia.

Implementaing agencies: The Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam, in
        Collaboration with the ICA Regional Office and Education
        Centre for Southeast Asia, Delhi.

        Field research in Thailand and Sri Lanka is undertaken with
        administrative support from the ICA member organizations:
        the Cooperative League of Thailand (CLT) and the National
        Cooperative Council (NCC), Sri Lanka.

Financing agencies: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate General
        of International Cooperation of the Netherlands, The Royal
        Tropical Institute and the International Cooperative Alliance.

Countries covered: Field studies are carried out in Thailand and Sri
        Lanka. Country studies in the Bihar and Maharashtra States,
        India.

Orientation of studies: Field studies seek to develop a methodology
        leading to grass-roots cooperative organization by small
        farmers and their increased participation in the established
        cooperative organizations.
        The two Indian studies focus on national policies and speci-
        fic programmes designed to reinforce small-farmer involvement
        in the cooperative sector and their effects on cooperative
        organization at micro-level. (The present paper is only con-
        cerned with the two field studies).

Location of field research:

Thailand The study region is Changwat (province) Khon Kaen. In
        this province two study areas have been selected: Amphoe
        (District) Chonnabot and Amphoe Chum Phae.

Sri Lanka The study region is Moneragala District. In this district
        two study areas have been selected: Dambagalla ASC
        (Agrarian Service Committee) area and Kotagama ASC area.
        Both research regions are situated in the semi-arid parts
        of their respective countries and considered as relatively
        backward in terms of economic and agricultural development.

Start of field research: April 1, 1980.

Duration: One year

Research team:

Thailand - Full-time field researchers:

Miss Chulaporn Choochongniran, Research Officer, Thai Kadi Research Institute
Mr. Chumporn Pahakij, former head of CLT training division.
Part-time leader: Dr. Preeda Prapertchob, lecturer, Agricultural Department, Khon Kaen University.

Sri Lanka - Full-time researchers:

Mr. M. Etampawala, Assistant Commissioner, at present Deputy-Commissioner
Mr. P.A. Kiriwandeniya, former Programme coordinator/Director with Sarvodaya and National Heritage Development Programme(NGOs)

Part-time team leader: Dr. J.M. Gunadasa, Senior lecturer, Dept. of Geography, Peradeniya University.

International

Dr. G. Ojha, Research Officer, ICA, Delhi
Drs. K.C.W. Verhagen, Cooperative Development Officer, RTI/Amsterdam.

Steering Committee: The research team is guided by a Steering Committee, comprising Mr. T. Bottomley, Chief-Education and Development, ICA, London;
Dr. S. Dandapani, Joint Chief-Research, ICA, London;
Mr. R.B. Rajaguru, Regional Director, ICA, Delhi;
Dr. P.J. van Dooren (Research Supervisor), Head of the Department of Social Research, RTI, Amsterdam; and
Drs. K.C.W. Verhagen, RTI, Amsterdam.

7

THE VARIETY OF LOCAL CONTEXTS OF PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: AN ATTEMPT AT SYSTEMATIZATION

Leen Boer

Institute of Cultural and Social Studies
University of Leiden

1. Introduction

The frequent but often loose use of the concept 'target group' in the jargon of developmentalists easily creates and strengthens the impression that a target group is like the very visible bull's-eye. Reality is different. Korten (1979, p. 59) remarked rightly that the poorest are frequently the least visible members of a local community. This is one of the reasons why rural poverty is systematically under-valued and often also misunderstood by 'rural development tourists' (Chambers, 1980, p. 1-3).

Though the use of the concept 'target group' commonly suggests something else, one of the most important characteristics of a target group is generally that it is not a group in the sociological sense of the term. Often it is better to speak of a target category of the poor, or the poorest. Such a target category does not exist in isolation; it is interwoven with a (local) context. Because the local contexts in which the target categories of poor live differ widely from each other, several authors have pleaded in favour of making a classification of villages. Lipton (1978b, p. 132) pointed out that a typology of villages could be useful in actively guiding the local development-process. He stated that a quite small number of variables could form the basis for assigning villages to types.

Such a typology would specify the sort of problem - the sorts of
poverty, maldistribution, etc. - likely to prevail in each type of
village. Lipton also said that such a typology would permit rapid
identification of the sort of village in which particular kinds of
action were required to reduce poverty or to advance development along
particular lines.

Hunter et al. (1978, p. 4 'and 12-13) expressed themselves with more
restraint. They stated that a 'lack of understanding of the real life
of villages, and particularly of its power structure, by planners and
"experts" has led to the creation of institutions (such as local
councils, community projects, co-operatives, credit schemes) which,
however well-intentioned, too often fail to benefit the poor but
rather strengthen inequalities; and after twenty-five years of such
experience, the same policies are constantly revived'.

Though Hunter et al. were of the opinion that - due to the huge
number of possible combinations of variables - any attempt to compile
a complete typology of situations would be bound to fail, they con-
sidered it possible to distinguish broadly local social situations,
but only as a signpost pointing toward a general direction. The
typology presented here has to be understood as such a signpost.
General 'models of local situations' are being distinguished and
described, as well as the implications resulting from these models
for the possibility or impossibility of carrying out a participatory
project.

The typology is meant, among other things, to sensitize the develop-
ment agency as well as the individual field-worker to the factual
diversity of local situations. It is not possible to carry out
the same project everywhere. Sometimes it will be possible to adjust
a project model to a specific local context; in other cases, however
it will be necessary to take the decision not to implement a certain
project model in a specific local context, because the project effects
that would result would be the reverse of the intended effects (cf.
Hunter's institutions which fail to benefit the poor but rather
strengthen inequalities).

The structural and cultural aspects of the different locations in
which the poor live are thus by no means similar. David Korten (1979,

p. 59) remarked very rightly that it takes time to find out exactly who
and where the poor are. Development agencies will not always be able
to carry out the time-consuming preparatory investigations that are
currently deemed necessary before setting up an effective partitipatory
project. A well-grounded typology could shorten the time needed for
such studies.

Due to the input of time and personnel that would be necessary, it
is impossible to design anew in each specific local situation a develop-
ment strategy that is completely adjusted to that specific situation.
With such an approach, in some villages much will be realized, but in
most places, nothing will be accomplished. Having compared some success-
ful programs and projects, Korten (1980, p. 496) concluded that the
foundation of success was the fact that in each project a specific
model which responded to the needs of time and place had been designed,
as well as the fact that in each project a strong organization had
been built up with the capacity to carry out that model. According to
him, not the 'blueprint approach', but the 'learning process approach'
results in successful programs and projects. The essence of the
learning process approach is that villagers and development workers
bring their knowledge, experiences and resources together. They draw
up a program in which a maximal fit is realized between the needs and
capacities of the villages and those of the external development
workers. However sympathetic and - in itself - correct this approach
may be, one cannot expect that it could be applied on a large scale.
When a completely new and adjusted program of action has to be drawn
up in every situation, the amount of time and personnel needed and the
actual lack of means will tend to limit the number of successful cases.
It is not to be forgotten that pilot projects have often been made
into showcases by an enormous input of means. When, however, such
projects had to be replicated on a larger scale in more localities, a
failure usually resulted. This was because, among other things, less
time and less personnel were available per locality than in the
original pilot project (see for example Sussman (1980) regarding the
Etawah Project and the Indian Community Development Programme).

A typology of villages does not only have the function to confront
the field-worker once again with the factual diversity of local

development situations. A classification of villages could also con-
contribute to a better understanding of rural social processes.
A typology could furnish more understanding of the concrete social-
structural contexts in which the people live who 'have to develop
themselves'. In this way it can be made clear how autonomous processes
of development lead to the 'underdevelopment' or marginalization of
certain groups within the village society.
The typology can also be an expedient in identifying and localizing
the poor in local communities. The typology consists, finally, of
a series of profiles of local communities and the place of the poor
therein, on the ground of which the possibility (or impossibility)
of a participatory project can be judged.
A typology of local development situations offers a middle course
between the two extremes of, on the one hand, applying the same
project model everywhere without taking into account the differences
between local communities, and on the other hand designing again
and again a specific, wholly adapted local development strategy.

The typology that is presented here is based on a comparative study
and analysis (by the method of Glaser and Strauss (1979)) of about
fifty village studies carried out by anthropologists, sociologists
and economists, and on earlier classifications of villages in the
sociological literature.
For several reasons the village rather than the region was chosen
as the unit of comparison. First of all, the availability of a
large number of village studies plays an important part. Not less
important was the consideration that, as Lipton and Moore (1972, p.
9-10) stated, the decisions and actions of villagers are being
influenced to a high degree by the system in which they live.
The boundaries of that system are particularly determined by the
boundaries of the village society.
Prior to the description of the typology, the substance of 'develop-
ment' at the level of the village society will be broadly outlined.

2. Local development broadly outlined

A change agent or development worker who starts to work in a village

society does not intervene in a static, but in a dynamic situation.
He (or she) is intervening in an ongoing process of change. The aim
is in fact to correct the course of that process in order to bring it
in line with the desirable direction.
In this section the 'spontaneous' process of local development (and
underdevelopment) is broadly outlined. This process of development is
a process of change, which is the result of a multiple of actions by
individual and institutional actors. Though these actions in them-
selves are directive, the resulting process of development is an
unintended and unguided one. Thus, the concept of development has to
be understood in this paper as 'normal development' (Galjart, 1981, p.
88). The process of development is described here in empirical terms,
and in this context it does not have a normative content. That is,
the concept of development - as it is used here - does not contain
the dimension of a change towards a greater equality of knowledge,
income and power, which has been included in the concept in other
contexts (Galjart, 1978, p. 3-4).

2.1. Incorporation and differentiation

The central characteristics of local development are incorporation
and differentiation.
Incorporation is the process in which the local community is included
in a position of subordination and dependence in more embracing
economic and political systems, and increasingly becomes interwoven
with these more embracing systems. In recent times economic incor-
poration in an economic world-system in process of formation has
been most important. The incorporated societies not only serve as
providers of raw materials, but also and primarily as outlets for
industrial products. This is the essential and qualitative differ-
ence between the present incorporation process and earlier ones.
Former incorporation processes were substantially political in nature
and - in an economic respect - only directed at the extraction of
raw materials and surpluses. The present incorporation process has,
in general, farther-reaching consequences for the local community
than earlier forms of incorporation.

Andrew Pearse (1975, p. 71) made a useful distinction between 'market
incorporation' and 'institutional incorporation'. Market incorporation
is the direct attachment of local production, exchange and consumption
to the national and international market system. Institutional incor-
poration is the establishment, beside local customary institutions and
traditional means, of standardized national institutions.
As a consequence of the incorporation process, the dependence of the
village society on the world surrounding it strongly increases.
The government (national and/or regional) is increasingly present
in the local community and takes over functions that used to be per-
formed internally. Very important in this respect is the taking over
of the function of conflict regulation. In the economic aspects as
well, there is a growing dependence on the outside world.
Local craft products are gradually replaced by industrial products
made outside the village. Technological innovations make the
villagers dependent on means of production from elsewhere.
In most of the local rural societies in the Third World the direction
and the nature of the above-mentioned process of change have been
determined and influenced to a large degree by political and
economic interventions in local and regional structures during the
colonial era. Of course, the pre- and postcolonial processes of
state-formation have also been very important in this respect. Changes
in the context of the local society made farther-reaching processes
of differentiation possible within the village society. The up-to-
then reasonably functioning brakes on differentiation became weaker.
Most village societies have always been characterized by a certain
degree of inequality. Economically, however, that inequality was
mostly limited before the processes of change which are broadly out-
lined here took place. These limits did not only exist because of
the preponderance of the internal levelling mechanisms over the
also present unlevelling powers, but additionally because of the ab-
sence of opportunities outside the village. Inequality was partly
expressed in a different allocation of honour and prestige. In the
course of the local development process the nature of inequality
changes. An institutional separation of social and economic actions
emerges. Both processes of change interact and reinforce each other.

Certain local groups and/or individuals are sooner and better in
seizing the new opportunities for bettering their position. Not un-
frequently they monopolise the channels of communication with the out-
side world and use these locally as means of power. In this way they
play their own role in local development. Though the changing context
is the cause, local development has its own, internal dynamics.
Differentiation, the second central characteristic of local devel-
opment, is a concept with a double content. It is necessary to dis-
tinguish institutional differentiation from economic differentiation.
Institutional differentiation occurs when functions that used to be
performed by one single institution at the same time are going to be
carried out by separate, more specialized institutions, like the
above-mentioned standardized national ones. Economic differentiation
means the coming into being of a greater variety of occupations,
sources of income and ownership positions at the local level.

Behind the two central concepts, incorporation and differentiation,
a range of changes is hidden, that in their totality radically modify
the nature and structure of the village community. Dependent on the
circumstances, the period this process of change takes can be a
very long one, or only lasts one generation.
In the following subsections some of these changes are described.

2.2. Individualization of landed property and population increase

The individualization of the ownership of land is a change that has
occurred extensively in villages. This individualization to a large
degree has stimulated the growth of inequality within villages. Land
that used to be owned by the community or by large kinship groups
increasingly became the property of the nuclear family or of an
individual person. In many cases this process was started from above.
Colonial administrators in particular strongly advocated private
ownership of land. They stimulated it by means of legislation. On
the one side they did this for administrative reasons; by means of
registration of landed property they tried to get a better hold of
the local situation (among other things for taxation purposes). On

the other side there also was an economic reason; by establishing
private ownership of land one tried to further the cause of private
enterprise.

There is an obvious connection between the trend toward individual-
ization and the men:land ratio. When land is plentiful in relation
to the size of the population dependent on it, a strict system of
property rights is not always necessary. But when the population den-
sity increases and land is becoming more and more a closed resource[*],
the necessity of a more precisely circumscribed usufruct- and property
right becomes more prominent. In other words, individualization of
land ownership will occur sooner in a situation of scarcity.

The internal means of existence become scarcer in a relative sense
because of increased pressure on local resources as a consequence
of population growth, and sometimes also in an absolute sense as,
for example, in cases of excessive cultivation resulting in ex-
haustion of the soil. This contributes to the (sometimes fast) decline
of the average amount of land per farm, in particular in villages
where all the children of a father inherit an equal part of the farm's
land. As a consequence, not unfrequently a great part of the village
population is not able to live on agriculture alone. This is one of
the factors that give rise to a complicated spectrum of primary and
sideline occupations in the local community. This picture can be
simplified in a later stage because of specialization, which tends
to occur especially within the elite of the local community.

2.3. Monetization and commercialization

A far-reaching change, too, is the monetization of exchange relations
and the ensuing commercialization of the production (Neale, 1971).
The introduction of money as medium of exchange often originates
from levies outside of the village (mostly in the form of taxation).
Villagers are thus compelled to obtain the required money by selling
their products and/or labour.

The circle round the individual within wich money plays no role in

---

[*] See for the distinction between 'open' and 'closed' resources:
Nieboer, 1971, pp. 385-386.

exchange relations becomes gradually smaller. In the same way the process of commercialization elapses through a contraction of such a circle. Outside the circle the price of goods is determined by the market value and not (anymore) by social norms and values.
Thus, in the course of the processes of monetization and commercialization there is a coexistence of two (or more) different ways of production. The boundary between these ways of production shifts in such a way that the pattern of dominance between them is also modified. The production for the market, which has not yet determined the social relations within the community, gradually spreads into the village and radically changes the relations among the villagers themselves.

In general it is particularly the man who participates first in the market sector - even in those cases where agriculture was formerly women's work. The woman is gradually reduced to domestic affairs, while she sometimes also produces some crops for subsistence purposes. Instead of a more or less independent producer she becomes an unpaid additional worker.

2.4. The loss of functions by kinship groups

As more and more individuals in the village society become economically independent, the large kinship groups lose their functions, while the smaller kinship groups gain in importance. Eventually the nuclear family tends to become the most important kinship group.
It is striking that especially in villages where all children inherit an equal part of their father's property, the larger kinship group within the elite tends to hold out longer than in other strata of the village. This keeping together of the family property can be interpreted as an attempt to prevent the downward social mobility which the separate components of the group would experience if they and their property were to split up (Boer, 1981). Partly because of the increasing occurrence of wagework the corporate nature[*] of larger kin-

---

[*] The term 'corporate' is used to indicate that the large kinship group tends to act as unity vis-à-vis the outside world. In such a situation the kinship group often is the owner of the means of production.

ship groups loses its importance. Kinship-based networks of nuclear
families come into being. This hastens the disappearance of several
forms of co-operative labour and reciprocal labour-exchange relations.
Certain forms of co-operative labour tend to become a method to extract
a labour surplus from the poor, as the economic inequality within
village society increases. They become in fact mechanisms that amplify
inequality. This applies in particular to the form of co-operative
labour that is called 'festive labour' by Erasmus and 'non-reciprocal
co-operative labour' by Moore (1975, p.272-275). It regards the ad hoc
organized, sometimes very extensive labour party, that is paid by
means of a copious meal. As economic inequality increases within a
village society, only the rich will be able to afford such forms of
labour mobilization. They will only do this, however, in a situation
of scarcity of wageworkers. When the supply of wageworkers is ade-
quate, then it is generally easier for the rich to hire wageworkers.

2.5. From labour scarcity to land scarcity

Because of the increasing population density resulting from popu-
lation growth there is a transition from labour as scarce production
factor to land as the scarce factor. As the supply of labour is
going to exceed the demand, vertical mechanisms that served to tie
labour (like patron-client relations and the Indian Jajmani system)
are being eroded and eventually disappear. The poorer dependent
villagers thus lose their last security. Consequently, labour tends
to become a commodity on the market where the price of it is deter-
mined by supply and demand. This applies particularly to villages
in which the demand for labour is seasonal in nature. The vertical
mechanisms will persist longer when there is a more continuous demand
for labour.

2.6. The weakening of levelling mechanisms

The erosion and the disappearance of levelling mechanisms (like
socially enforced generosity, several forms of communal landowner-
ship, patterns of reciprocity, and several forms of co-operative
labour and labour exchange) have above all things contributed to

the growth of economic inequality at the local level. The brakes on
that growth fell out as it were. The disappearance of such mechanisms
is mostly a gradual matter. Either the contents are devalued, or the
group within which the mechanisms are effectively functioning becomes
smaller.
Some levelling mechanisms even appear to get an unlevelling effect in
a changed context. Ostracism or avoidance, for example, become in-
effective as more profitable contacts with the outside world become
available for certain persons in a village. Ostracism is one of the
sanctions that has a potentially levelling effect in a relatively
closed social system, in which the individual is socially and eco-
nomically dependent on the village community. However, in the changed
situation an enterprising villager, placed 'outside of the community',
is also escaping the claims imposed upon him by his fellow villagers.
Levelling mechanisms only function as long as the villagers' com-
pliance to them can be enforced by means of social control.

2.7. Individualization and the weakening of local social control

The effectiveness of local social control decreases, among other
reasons, because of the increase of contacts with the outside world
and because of the use of these contacts for realizing individual
purposes within the local community.
This will happen to a lesser extent as long as local leaders
succeed to monopolize these external contacts and to function as
brokers. Functioning as middlemen between their dependents in the
village and the outside world, these local leaders often are in
their turn dependent on powerful persons in that outside world.
Using their local power, such intermediaries are able to mobilize
political support within the village for national or regional
political leaders or groupings in exchange for favors. Competition
between such local leaders can give rise to factions within a
village society.
Due to the alternatives that become available in the world sur-
rounding the village, the more enterprising and/or locally more
powerful villager becomes to a less extent dependent on the village
community. The individual villager no longer needs to derive his

status and identity wholly from the local community he lives in.
External reference groups are going to function as alternatives and
make changes of behaviour easier or possible. As a consequence of the
incorporation process the boundaries of the village community become
blurred and the village society is decreasingly a social unity.

2.8. Stratification in village society

Instead of aspects of honour and status, economic power becomes the
dominant criterion that determines one's societal position. In the
resulting economic stratification the possibility of class formation
is in principle present. The classes that can be distinguished in a
village society by an outsider mostly remain as yet categories, in
particular as regards the lowest stratum. Group formation among the
poor in such a stratified community is inhibited for a prolonged
period by vertical relations of dependence. Moreover, the village
poor often are necessitated to provide in a very fragmented way for
their livelihood, often also in competition with each other. Even
when the sources of income of the village poor are somewhat more
stable, one has to reckon with opposed interests resulting from the
variety of income sources. A small tenant, for example, has other
interests than a landless labourer.
Generally, it is to be expected that as poverty is greater in an
absolute sense, conflict and competition for income opportunities
will be heavier among the poor. In short, also when in terms of in-
come the category of poor can be characterized as homogeneous in re-
lation to the village community as a whole, the factors that intersect
this homogeneity have to be taken into account.

2.9. Stigmatization

A problem one frequently has to face in a structure of inequality is
stigmatization. Stigmatization is particularly found in rigid local
structures with a great distance between rich and poor. New gene-
rations grow up and are socialized in a sphere of inequality, which
cannot be broken through by upward social mobility. Such circumstances
give rise to notions that imply that the poverty of the poor is their

own fault and their inherent quality. Such conceptions legitimize the existing inequality. The poor, raised and socialized in such a situation, will have adopted - partly at least - these stigmatizing conceptions as a part of their self-image. This means that a change agent working in such a situation is not only confronted with the problem of the structural neglect of the poor and with poverty characteristics like risk-avoidance, but also with feelings of incapability among the poor, that are based on experience and stigmatization. Forms of non-formal- and adult-education which are directed at the stimulation of the trust of the poor in their own capabilities are in such a situation an essential part of the change agent's strategy.
Situations characterized by stigmatization can also exist when, for example, as a consequence of internal colonization two or more ethnically different groups have to live together within the same village. Under these circumstances solidarity will be concerned with one's own ethnic group in spite of internal dividing lines.

2.10. The decrease of local social cohesion

In the course of the process of local development the social and structural unity of the village community becomes weakened. Also because of the commonly growing population size, 'community' and 'society' coincide less and less. The social cohesion of the village society as a whole is reduced to a lower level. The range of local social control is reduced in two ways. On the one hand there is a certain crumbling, whereby more 'communities of social control' (Antoun, 1972) come into existence within the village society. On the other hand opportunities to escape local social control present themselves, by which the effectiveness of local social control regarding certain behaviour patterns decreases. As a consequence the effectiveness of local institutions also decreases.

2.11. The pace of change

The locally available resources as well as the degree to which and the way in which the government intervenes at the local level are the most important factors that can slow down or accelerate local

development.

The carrying capacity of a local community is not only determined by the physical opportunities offered by the location and by the restrictions imposed by the natural environment, but also by the technology that is locally used and by the way the production is organized. Ceteris paribus, the processes of change will accelerate as the population density increases. A certain degree of seasonal migration and certain forms of emigration, however, may slow down the process, because of the resulting reduction of the pressure on the local carrying capacity. Moreover, often exactly those persons emigrate who locally fulfilled the role of 'entrepreneur-innovator' or could have fulfilled that role[*].

The way in which and the extent to which the government intervenes in the local community is also very important. When confronted with the problem of growth or (re)distribution, governments commonly bet on the strongest. Governments usually display an 'urban bias' (Lipton, 1977). Their policy generally is to finance national development by means of a cheap agricultural surplus.

Röling (1980,p.3-5)pointed out that the more common reason for governments to employ extension services is to increase and safeguard the nation's food- and export crop production. From this perspective 'mini-maxing' is a rational extension strategy. Surplus generation is sought by focusing the extension efforts on the smallest possible number of farmers holding the largest number of hectares. Though alternative aims - such as creating income-generating opportunities, contributing to a more equitable distribution of the increments in agricultural incomes, and helping small-scale agrarian producers to organize themselves - are increasingly mentioned as part of governments' policies and extension objectives, these aims, Röling stated, are mostly secondary to the prominent aim of increasing the total national agrarian production.

Beside the specific agrarian policy a government pursues, it is

* Not all migration patterns, however, have this effect.
  E.g.: Boer, 1981.

also important how far a government is centralistic in imposing its
policies. In the remainder of this section some remarks will be made
about the importance of the nature of national political structures for
the possibilities of participation of the poor at the baseline level
in the villages.
Charlick (1980) concluded that 'animation rurale' as a technique, which
is meant to further the participation of the mass of the people in
rural development, has the greatest chance of success in a situation
in which there is political competition at the national as well as at
the local level. He explained this by pointing out that regimes that
are consolidating their power bases are inclined to promote alternative
channels for involvement of the mass of the population. It will be
clear that such regimes are striving to strengthen their legitimacy
and will be open to all possible sources of support in the society.
Such regimes, moreover, would be more interested in fostering rural
development for national as well as local economic reasons, than re-
gimes that do not have to dread oppositional forces.
Charlick stated that where such a situation at the national level
runs parallel with a pluralistic power distribution at the local
level, 'self-help' activities are more probable - like attempts
from inside the local community to create links with higher levels
in the system - than when competition for political positions is
excluded by the domination of one group only at the local level.
On the other hand, Charlick (1974, 425) wrote in his dissertation
about the role of power and participation in the modernization of
Hausa villages in Niger, concerning the Nigerien government:
'Misperceiving the structural obstacles to mass involvement in
economic and political life, it miscalculated the centralized power
required to modify these existing structures.'
Charlick (1974, 426-7) continued:
'Induced participation as a strategy of modernization in the absence
of a high degree of centralized power never provided an adequate
understanding of how power and modernization requirements could be
reconciled. Lacking the power to support and initiate substantial
structural change deemed necessary for mass economic modernization,
the central regime could not hope to generate this power in the

absence of a disciplined mass movement. Even in such nations as China
and North Vietnam where the central instruments of power have been
vastly more potent than those available to Diori Hamani, or to other
African leaders, the formation of a mass-modernizing elite alliance
to overcome structural resistance to economic modernization has not
been without enormous power difficulties. In the absence of such an
advantageous power configuration, induced participation seems to be
a prescription for certain failure.'

On the whole the impression arises that Charlick wanted too much to
stress that political pluralism at the national level is conditional
for participation of the mass of the population in economic moderni-
zation and rural development. It seems more important to create an
optimal mixture of centralization and decentralization, of control and
participation. Stavis (1979, 41-2) pointed to the dangers of decen-
tralization, in particular, but not only, in local situations charac-
terized by a high degree of inequality. Especially in these situations
decentralization can consolidate inequality.

A certain degree of centralization will then be necessary to prevent
the total dominance of a local elite and to see to a certain degree
of redistribution and reallocation of power and means.

Harik (1974, a.o. 64-5), who has carried out research in the Egypt-
ian village community Shubra el-Gedida, described the situation there
in the Nasser period as follows:

'Nasser's single party is highly centralized; delegated authority is
concentrated in the hands of appointed leaders who advocate the
transformation of society by revolutionary means. However, this model
breaks down at subnational levels of Egyptian party organization,
where leaders are representative, power is diffuse among various
groups, concern with ideology is limited, and political mobilization
is carried out with moderation. In effect Egypt's single party regime
reflects the characteristics of the revolutionary-centralized pattern
at subnational levels.'

In her conclusions Harik (1974, 283) formulated the problem thus:

'It has been observed that the Nasser regime intervened in the local
community and introduced institutions through which villagers manage
their own economic and political affairs. But, in so doing, the regime

has succeeded in creating a local system that bears sharp contrasts
with the national system: in Shubra, citizen participation is freer
and more relevant to the ordinary villager, and the structure of
power is pluralistic. Was this the intention of the regime? The
evidence collected in Shubra does not definitively settle this
question, but it strongly suggests that the national regime did seek
to create such a pluralistic and participatory local system.'
A careful conclusion could be that a certain measure of pluralism at
the local level is certainly necessary for the development of partici-
pative structures. At the national level, however, a centralistic
regime, that is founded on an adequate power basis (and in many cases
this does not coincide with a high degree of political competition at
the national level), can be beneficial to the development of partici-
pative structures at the local level. Such a regime is in principle
able - for example by carrying through the needed land reforms, as in
Egypt - to create the room that is needed at the regional and local
level for the development of new structures, in which not only the old
elites participate, but also the other strata of the rural population.
Of course the essential conditions are that such an aim is an integral
part of the policy of this kind of regime, and that at the local level
a certain measure of freedom in adapting the new structures to the
local circumstances is guaranteed.

3. A typology of local development situations

In this section eight types of villages are described. These des-
criptions are ideal-typical in nature.
Substantially, the dimensions of incorporation and differentiation
underlie the typology. There is no question of a linear development
from type 1 via type 2, etc., to type 8. Roughly, however, sequences
can de discerned.
As far as the terms 'poor' and 'poverty' are used in the typology,
they mostly refer to relative poverty. Whyte (1976, 47) stated that
relative poverty means that certain people do not have access to the
kind of life available to their neighbours, and which has come to
be accepted as a decent minimum. Thus, in cases of relative poverty

there is always a reference group against whose standard of living the poverty is compared.

THE TYPOLOGY

---

1. The self-sufficient, more or less egalitarian village
2. The precapitalistic, inegalitarian village
3. The dualistic, more or less egalitarian village
4. The dualistic, inegalitarian village
5. The stratified community
6. The plantation
7. The new settlement
8. The industrializing or suburbanizing village

3.1. Type 1. The self-sufficient, more or less egalitarian village*

The villages belonging to this type are not or are only marginally incorporated in more embracing political and/or economic systems. In other words, the central and/or regional governmental authorities virtually have no say in the customary routine of the village community.
As far as governmental interventions occur in this kind of local community, they mostly remain limited to taxation and - possibly - the deliverance of some services (like medical care).

---

* See for an example of a village community that is to be classi-
fied as belonging to type 1: Basso (1973), who has made a study
of the village Aifa in Central Brazil. See for short descriptions
of the villages that are mentioned in this paper as examples,
Chapter 5 (De lokale kontext) of: Benno Galjart, et al (1982),
Participatie, toegang tot ontwikkeling. Verslag van een onderzoek
naar de mogelijkheden van participatie in ontwikkelingsprojekten,
Leiden.

As of yet the free market has scarcely pervaded the community if at all.
At the most there is some selling or buying of industrial products from
outside the village. The import of such articles in villages belonging
to this category can be detrimental for local handicrafts.
The production within the village is mainly directed at self-subsistence.
Commodity crops are not cultivated, or only in negligible quantities.
The local community belonging to this type is geographically quite
isolated and socially relatively closed. It is, however, possible, and
even probable, for the village to form part of a network of villages.
Between these villages exchange takes place of marriage partners, raw
materials and handicraft products. These relations of exchange with
other, neighbouring communities, notwithstanding, such a village still
is to a high degree a social and economic unity with distinct boun-   .
daries.

Because of the closeness of the village community and the limitedness
of opportunities outside the village, the individual is dependent
on the community. The community prevails over individual aspirations.
As the individual is continuously necessitated to adapt himself, ten-
sions and conflicts will frequently occur. The villages within this
category are autonomous in the settlement of internal conflicts and
tensions.
The local system of norms and values embracing the village as a
whole - in other words the village still is 'one community of social
control' - determines to a great extent the behaviour patterns and
alternatives of the individual villagers. There exist norms, values
and mechanisms that screen the individual villagers from the outside
world. In spite of internal tensions, villages in this category show
a considerable social cohesion. This cohesion is reinforced by level-
ling mechanisms, factual and fictitious kinship systems, and reli-
gious ceremonies and rituals which express and affirm the unity of
the village community. As a consequence of the levelling mechanisms
in particular, there are limits on the upward and downward economic
mobility of the community members. A village chief, functioning as a
pooling centre, can be exempted from this rule. As far as possible
under given circumstances the individual villager is guaranteed a

subsistence minimum by the community.

In communities of this type the land resources are often still 'open'. Mostly there are no serious disturbances in the ratio between the population size and the locally available resources and opportunities which constitute the carrying capacity of the locality. In such a situation land will often be the corporate property of the community as a whole and/or of large kinship groups. Within this category of local communities the villages within which the government raises taxes can be distinguished as belonging to a subtype of this first category. The money needed for the payment of taxes is often earned outside the villagers' own community. This fact can have important consequences for the internal structure of the village. One of the prominent means for earning the money needed is seasonal migration to neighbouring regions that are more pervaded by the free market. Individuals migrate; the migrant's family stays behind in the village. After a relatively short time the migrant returns to the village. To an important degree he is able, therefore, to assert his rights in the community and to fulfill his obligations. Though the external contacts mostly remain limited, they can lead to a certain decrease of the range of levelling mechanisms and other cohesion-reinforcing institutions, or to a weakening of the substance of such institutions. Mostly, however, a village community that is to be classified as belonging to this subtype of type 1 will still be 'one community of social control'. though lines of fissure may start showing themselves.

As the incorporation process proceeds more and more on the global level, the communities remaining in this first category will be mainly situated in the very marginal regions of the earth.

3.2. Type 2. The precapitalistic, inegalitarian village[*]

The land of the villages of this type is wholly or for the greatest part owned by one or a few big landowners. These landed estates are not exploited on a strictly economic basis. The primary aim of the

[*] See for an example: Umehara (1969), who has done field research in the Philippine village Trinidad.

big landlord is not the maximization of profit or the accumulation of
capital, but the security of his status as a landlord.
The landlord withdraws a surplus from his dependents in the form of
labour and/or products. The production in this kind of community gene-
rally is labour-intensive and capital-extensive.

The emphasis can be on production in tenure units or on surplus
extraction in the form of labour on the land of the landlord.
In the last case the dependents get a small lot for cultivation for
self-subsistence. The production of the estate often is destined for
a limited local or regional market, characterized by a continuous and
certain demand for the commodity produced on the estate.
The big landowner and, if present, his agents monopolize the most
important channels of communication with the outside world. Within
the community the landlord enacts his own laws. Such an estate thus
shows a high degree of autonomy.
The landlord can have labour committed to himself in several ways:
physical force, indebtedness and vertical relations are some of the
possibilities. The vertical patron-client relations in particular
intersect potential horizontal solidarities. Individuals from the
stratum of dependents are being favoured at the discretion of the
landlord or his agents. The communities in this category conform
to the picture of an estate-like stratification.

3.3. Type 3. The dualistic, more or less egalitarian village[*]

The most important characteristic of the villages belonging to this
category is the coexistence of two or more separate ways of product-
ion (thus also the relations of production) within one and the
same village. These villages are also characterized by a more or
less equal distribution of the means of production among the pro-
duction-units in the village. The coexistence of the separate ways
and relations of production differentiates this type especially from
the types 1, 5 and 6; the more or less egalitarian distribution of

---

[*] See for an example: Champaud (1970, 1973), who has made a study
of the Bassa village, Mom, in Cameroun.

the means of production distinguishes this type from the types 2 and
4.
In addition to cultivation for self-subsistence, production for the
market also takes place. Often there are two clearly separated spheres,
each with its own crops (or other products), rules and labour patterns.
In the villages that are to be reckoned to this category, production
for self-subsistence is of primary importance. If necessitated by
circumstances the villagers drop the production for the market to
safeguard self-subsistence.

The principal resource, which in most cases is land, is in this type
of village often in a stage of transition from 'open' to 'closed'[*].
Given the techniques that are used locally, the population size of
the community is reaching the optimum with regard to the carrying
capacity of the locality. Land is going to be scarce. Consequently,
as a rule there is in this kind of community individualized owner-
ship of land. Small kinship units grow in importance and take over
some of the functions that used to be performed by larger kinship
groups. The nuclear family becomes the principal component of the
household as unit of production and consumption.

Within the household the assignment of duties to the sexes is often
modified. In general the man occupies himself with production for
the market, though the woman can be called in to help as an unpaid
labourer. The reproductive and domestic task tends to become the
main function of the woman; not unfrequently cultivation for self-
subsistence is an important secondary activity of the woman.
In the sphere of production for the market the labour needed beyond
that of the household itself is usually paid. Products and services
that are new in the village almost always originate from the sur-
rounding world and tend to be kept out of the customary co-operative
relations, levelling mechanisms, and reciprocal relations. In the
sphere of self-subsistence activities, however, these and other
cohesion-furthering mechanisms hold out, but at a lower level of

[*] See for the distinction between 'open' and 'closed' resources:
Nieboer, 1971, pp. 385-386.

functioning.

The first signs of a broader occupational differentiation can be dis-
cerned within villages of this type. Sometimes this will be connected
partly with the increasing grip of the central or regional authorities
on local government. The expanding officialdom creates new occupational
opportunities.

3.4. Type 4. The dualistic, inegalitarian village[*]

Just like the local communities of type 3, the villages in this
category are characterized by the coexistence of different ways of
production within the same village. The distribution of the means
of production among the production-units within the village, how-
ever, is to a high degree unequal. In addition to cultivation for
self-subsistence in this kind of village, production for the market
also takes place. In these villages, too, there are two (or more)
clearly differentiated spheres, each with its own crops (or other
products), rules and labour patterns. Production for self-subsistence
is predominant in this kind of village. Customary co-operative in-
stitutions and levelling mechanisms tend to be limited to the sphere
of self-subsistence, like in the dualistic, inegalitarian villages,
however, there usually is more than one 'community of social control'.
The existence of factions is not uncommon in this type of village.
Often there will also be a high degree of indebtedness, by which
the village poor are committed to local moneylenders. In many
cases its concerns consumptive credit for emergencies.
Regarding the nature of inequality within this kind of village,
two subtypes can be distinguished. In the first subtype socio-economic
inequality practically runs parallel with ethnical (and/or reli-
gious) lines of fissure. Almost always this is a consequence of the
immigration of one of the groups concerned. Either autochthons or
'outsiders' can be the dominant group in such a village. Mostly,
but certainly not always, the one group produces for the market,

[*] See for an example: Visser (1980), who studied the village Baan
Dong in Thailand.

while the other produces mainly for self-subsistence and also supplies
labour to the first group. Generally both groups live spatially separated.

In the second subtype the villagers belong to the same ethnical (and/or
religious) category. Inequality in this subtype is rather wholly based
on incorporation and the scarcity of means of production. As a consequence of incorporation, external contacts and opportunities outside
the village, the mechanisms and institutions that limited the upward and
downward economic mobility within the village community no longer
function in an adequate way. Moreover, the population pressure on the
locally available resources, given the techniques locally used, is
so high that the means of production in the local community are -
whether absolutely or relatively - scarce. Things being as they are,
a part of the villagers is not so much dependent on the community,
but on certain individuals or groups in that community. It is also
possible that a part of the village population is dependent on income
sources outside the village, by way of labour migration, for example.
The labour pattern of such dependent groups is very fragmented.

3.5. Type 5. The stratified community[*]

The greatest part of the total production in villages of the stratified type consists of commodity crops (or other products made for
commercial purposes). Production for self-subsistence can occur, but
is not dominant.

The distribution of land and other means of production in this kind
of village is unequal, and sometimes very unequal. In most cases
the land resource is 'closed'. Consequently, there is a considerable
population pressure on the carrying capacity of the local community
(given the techniques that are locally used). In the villages belonging
to this category a concentration of the means of production has
taken place in a rather small subgroup of farmers. This subgroup
tends to become a sort of 'village-bourgeoisie'. In absolute terms
this concentration is of course dependent on the living standard of

[*] See for an example: Miller (1964), who has made a village study
of Hosseinabad in Iran.

the village as a whole. It is possible that there is in fact an unequal distribution of poverty. Besides the 'village-bourgeoisie' several groups can be distinguished: an intermediary group of farmers, small peasants and tenants or sharecroppers, and the landless villagers. In these circumstances not labour, but land (and capital) is the scarce factor of production. That is the reason why a process of untying of labour is taking place (or has taken place). This means that the decision to engage or to dismiss labourers will be more and more taken on the basis of economically rational motives. In the relations between employer and labourer the economic aspect is going to dominate. Labour tends to become a commodity on the market, where the price of it - the wages - is determined primarily by supply and demand. As the agrarian production in the village is more continuous in nature (and a shortage of labour tends to exist in the village as a whole) the process of untying of labour will progress less rapidly. The general trend, however, is that vertical mechanisms like patron-client relations, which among other things serve to commit labour, gradually become devalued and eventually disappear.

As far as customary co-operative institutions and levelling mechanisms still occur in this kind of local community, they are either restricted to relatively small (kinship) groups or are rather without content. Most households consist of a nuclear family. The nuclear family is the unit of production and consumption. As a rule ownership is individual.
The occupational differentiation in this type of village is considerable. Within the elite (particularly the younger people within this group have a higher educational level) there is more individual specialization than in the lowest stratum of the village society. The poorer villager is necessitated to work in many occupations and to accept diverse jobs to provide for his (or her) livelihood.
If there is migration from this type of village it will often have a twofold pattern. Migrants from the elite will be particularly urban-oriented and will stay away for a longer period of time; migrants from the lowest stratum are rather rural-oriented and will stay away for a shorter period.

The infrastructural provisions in these villages themselves and in the surroundings tend to be relatively good. The central and/or regional authorities are apt to have a considerable influence on local affairs by means of the provisions these authorities control. Within this category two subtypes can be distinguished: the diverging or polarizing village, and the converging community.

In the diverging village a splitting-up of the middle stratum is taking place. In a long term the larger part shows a pattern of downward mobility. On the contrary, in the converging community the middle stratum is getting larger and more important. The principal causes of these opposite movements in the total picture of a community have to be sought in the inheritance system that is in operation in the specific local community and in the scale and complexity of technological innovations.

3.6. Type 6. The plantation[*]

The local community belonging to this category is for the most part inhabited by wageworkers and their families. These workers are permanent or casual labourers on a neighbouring plantation or in an agro-industrial concern. Such an undertaking is modern in nature. Mostly it is highly mechanized, if that is possible with regard to the specific crop cultivated and processed. The management of the plantation is directed at the maximization of profit. Plantations are often owned by foreign business corporations; sometimes, however, a plantation is state-owned. Typically, one single crop is cultivated in a very specialized way. The production is mostly destined for export. As a consequence a plantation is very vulnerable for ups and downs in supply and demand on the world market. A plantation is thus characterized by a low degree of autonomy.

There is commonly a concentration of plantations and agro-businesses in regions with good connections and communications.

Labour is engaged from the free market; not unfrequently there is an oversupply of labour. Mostly, however, there have been also shortages

---

[*] See for an example: Jayawardena (1963), who has done research on the sugar plantation Blairmont in former British Guyana.

of labour in former times. As a consequence thereof immigration or even
direct importation of labour has taken place in these cases. This has
led to the existence of ethnical lines of fissure within the category
of wageworkers. In all probability cultural and ethnical lines of
fissure will exist between the categories of managers, office staff
and overseers on the one side, and land- and factory labourers on the
other side. The first categories generally are for the greatest part
outsiders, and not unfrequently foreigners. Almost always the different
categories live spatially separated.
In principle the individual wageworkers have a comparable position
on the labour market. Their socio-economic position is equal.
This can lead to a kind of egalitarian ideology among the wageworkers,
which is expressed in everyday life in, for example, networks of fic-
titious kinship relations. Very important for the degree of mutual
solidarity is the presence of a union of wageworkers (or of unions of
agricultural labourers and of factory workers). The possibility and
the effectivity of such unions is to a high degree dependent on the
size of the oversupply on the labour market, and on the position that
the management of the plantation, mostly backed by the national and/or
regional authorities, takes with regard to workers' organizations.
Sometimes the management of a plantation considers the union a neces-
sary evil, among other things because of the disciplinary effect a
union can have on the workers[*].
Because usually only a single commodity crop is cultivated on a
plantation, and because labourers are paid in cash, foodstuffs and
articles of all sorts are imported in the local community from outside.
Thus some members of the community are apt to earn their living by
trading. On the whole there is a considerable occupational differen-
tiation within this kind of local community.

3.7. Type 7. The new settlement[**]

The local communities belonging to this category are relatively
recent, new settlements. Mostly they are situated on formerly unused

[*] See: Paige, 1978, p. 22.
[**] An example is the Nubian village Kanuba in Egypt, which has been
   described by Fernea and Kennedy (1966), Kennedy and Fahim (1974)
   and by Fahim (1973, 1979).

land. The process of resettlement has left clear traces in the social
structure of the communities. These traces are the most important
criterion for assigning villages to this category.
New settlements differ in the degree of voluntariness and the extent
to which the government interferes with the resettlement. Moreover,
it is of essential importance whether the new community originates
from the transfer of a whole community from elsewhere, or whether it
consists of a hotchpotch of individuals or groups coming from different
communities.

When resettlement has been more voluntary and a community has been
resettled as a whole, the new local community tends to be socially
rather closed. If, however, resettlement has been of a more or less
forced nature and the new community consists to a higher degree of
individuals and groups with different origins, the new settlement
tends to be atomistic or loosely structured. Especially in the last
case the age distribution of the new community will be unbalanced.
Older people are apt to be underrepresented in that kind of local
community.
If the new settlement is founded under the more or less intensive
guidance of governmental departments, it mostly forms part of a more
embracing settlement scheme. The frequently changing policies that
characterize such projects often have far-reaching consequences for
the new local communities concerned. Resettlement often takes place
on more or less marginal land. Consequently many special provisions,
such as fertilizers and irrigation installations, tend to be needed.
With regard to the organization and/or supply of such provisions
errors are often made, particularly in the beginning phase of such
a project. Also frequent are modifications in project policies.
Sometimes the first new villagers get their land in possession, while
those that come later are given no choice but to rent land from the
project organization or the state. Or, the people that come first
get more land than those that come later. In such cases the project
policy itself creates economic inequality right away in the new local
community.
Too much governmental guidance tends to further an 'attitude of depen-

dence' within communities of this kind, and to strangle initiatives from within the new community itself.

3.8. Type 8. The industrializing or suburbanizing village*

The local community in this category is characterized by a favourable location, for example at important access roads, at deposits of raw materials, or in the neighbourhood of an expanding city. The opportunities in terms of employment and good communications that such locations offer usually attract immigrants. A rapid increase in the population size is not the only consequence; the local population also becomes more pluriform in composition. Sometimes the relations between autochtons and 'outsiders' in such communities take the form of an 'established-outsiders' configuration' (Elias and Scotson, 1976). This kind of community is commonly characterized by a broad occupational differentiation and a far-reaching occupational specialization. On the whole the importance of agriculture is considerably reduced in such communities. Often a great variety of crops is cultivated, destined for the local and urban markets. In general the retail trade has become of greater importance.
The supralocal authorities have a substantial grip on local affairs and in many instances influence or determine the course of things within the community.

4. Implications for participatory projects

The poor - the target-category of development policy - rarely or never form an isolated and solidary unit in the local society. The poor form part of a local field of vertical relations (of dependency) and horizontal relations (of solidarity). Before the change agent can start any substantial action, he needs to know and to understand the extent to which and the ways wherein the local poor are dependent on richer co-villagers by means of vertical relations, and also the extent to which those richer co-villagers form a unity in the local configuration of power relations. He has to know which people have an interest in the maintenance of the status quo and which do not.

* See for an example: Fakhouri (1972), who has done research in the Egyptian village Kafr el-Elow.

One of the most important criterions for the judgement of the possi-
bilities of a participatory project in a certain type of village is
the local distribution of the means of production and of incomes, and
the related field of vertical and horizontal relations. In general it
must be stated that as vertical relations tend to predominate in a
local community, the lack of freedom of the poor to act in their own
interest will be greater, and the possibilities for a participatory
project among them will be slighter.
Whatever the local situation in a specific village looks like, one
has to reckon everywhere with the already broadly outlined, existing
trends toward individualization and toward rationalization of pro-
duction. Naïveté in the form of entertaining illusions about commune-
like utopias is certainly misplaced. Participatory projects have to be
grounded on a matter-of-fact and business-like basis, not on phantasms.
An essential condition for a target-group-oriented participatory
project is also the presence of bottlenecks that are considered im-
portant problems by the members of the target-category, but which are
seen too as individually insoluble[*]. Co-operation has to be necessary
not merely desirable. The problems that poor people experience in the
different village types have to be the starting point of a participa-
tory project. However, it is of course also essential that the possi-
bility exists to do something to solve the problem.
Co-operation will be realized earlier if a certain degree of external
threat reinforces the solidarity within the local target category of
poor. Hyden (1981, p. 19) even stated that the absence of an
'obstructing power' has rather appeared to be a disadvantage than an
advantage in the setting-up of viable rural organizations. He concluded
that the modern co-operative originated from intense social contra-
dictions. When such contradictions are not present, the chance is
great, according to Hyden, that the implanted co-operative organi-
zation gets 'hijacked' by the wealthier members for their own interest,
or that it is torn apart by sectional interests. The setting-up of
organizations within the framework of a participatory project will have
the greatest chance of success in a somewhat polarized context. However,

* See the contribution of Buijs: On admittance, access, cooperation and
  participation.

the 'obstructing power', to use Hyden's term, has to be opposable in
the eyes of the members of the target-category. The assistance of an
outsider will often be needed in such cases, at any rate in the
starting phase of a participatory project.
In certain situations outsiders, rather than internal leaders, will be
more able to get the better of the oppositional forces in the local
community that work against projects for and by the poor. As for
internal leaders, however, it is conceivable that an affected member or
the local elite (they are rare, but they occur) or somebody from the
local middle stratum (that will often be somebody who has seen somewhat
more of the world surrounding the village, by means of migration, for
example) takes up the crucial function of leadership in the beginning
of such projects.
The project groups that are worked with in participatory development
projects have to be socio-economically as homogeneous as possible.
Therefore, the possibility of the formation of such groups within the
target-category of poor is an important criterion in the judgment
concerning whether the setting-up of a participatory project in a cer-
tain village is a possibility or not.
It is important to make a distinction between long-term project acti-
vities, that are rather directed at the enlargement or betterment of
production, and short-term co-operative projects, that are oriented at
one concrete activity, like the building of a road. The short-term
activities tend to be possible in more types of villages than the
long-term activities. Here, however, attention is focused on long-
term activities.

```
THE TYPOLOGY                                           .

1. The self-sufficient, more or less egalitarian village
2. The precapitalistic, inegalitarian village
3. The dualistic, more or less egalitarian village
4. The dualistic, inegalitarian village
5. The stratified community
6. The plantation
7. The new settlement
8. The industrializing or suburbanizing village
```

As a rule type 1, the self-sufficient, more or less egalitarian village,
is not the best-suited context for participatory projects.
Within the community belonging to this category (serious) problems of
inequality are generally absent. There exist mechanisms, the function
of which is to prevent the origin of too-big differences in standard
of living within the community. As fas as inequality within socially
accepted limits occurs among the members of the community, this is
not considered a threat for the life chances of the other, somewhat
less-endowed members of the community. There are bottlenecks and pro-
blems in this type of village, but these are of another nature and
concern rather the village as a whole.
Villages that are to be reckoned to type 1 have become relatively
scarce. As at the global level the incorporation process progresses
more and more, in this category those communities tend to be left,
that are situated in the rather marginal regions and that are poor or
very poor in absolute terms. According to (inter)national standards
the provisions in this kind of villages, like medical care and educ-
ation, are very inadequate. The degree to which this is experienced
as such in the locality itself is an empirical question. It will be
certainly dependent on the degree of contact with the outside world.
Especially in those villages in which external relations occur more
frequently, like in villages where tax is raised and the villagers are
necessitated to earn elsewhere the money they need, production-
oriented participatory projects are to some degree thinkable, but in
a rather adapted form. Such projects can be specifically directed at
the protection of local handicrafts. The essentially cell-type design
of participatory projects, in that the cell consists of a small homo-
geneous group of individuals, whose equivalent participation is
guaranteed as much as possible, meets problems in this kind of commu-
nity. Working with individuals will not be feasible. Mostly household
groups or kinship units will have to be the local project actors.
The way in which consensus formation is organized within these groups
will have to be considered as a given fact. The existing levelling
mechanisms and co-operative institutions will have to be reckoned with
properly. There is a strong impression that it is generally difficult,
if not impossible, to found the project activities to be introduced,

on existing customary co-operative institutions[*].

Care must be taken that the new activities do not conflict with the customary co-operative institutions. Also, in this kind of community there must be assurance that the profits of the activity benefit the participating group as a whole, in accordance with the functioning levelling mechanisms and norms within the community.

Participatory projects will be sooner possible in this type of community when the community as a whole considers itself poor in comparison with surrounding villages. Not a subgroup of the community - for within the community the problem of inequality does not exist - but the community in its entirety is then the target-group to be mobilized. Factual mobilization, however, will often occur in groups smaller than the village community.

Heinen et al (1979, p. 40) pointed out that the presence of at least some villagers who understand the 'rules of the game' and who know how to counter the many tricks of traders coming from outside the village, is required for such undertakings. Commonly they will be the villagers who have gained the experience needed in the surrounding area of the village.

The local communities belonging to type 2, the precapitalistic inegalitarian village, are a somewhat better context for participatory projects than the villages of type 1. The coupling of a participatory project approach and land reforms is to be preferred in this kind of village. Not too unfrequently land reforms only bring about the elimination or curtailing of the upper stratum, while the (beginning) stratification underneath is left unaffected. A land reform that purports to a real redistribution of land among the villagers certainly contains possibilities for a participatory approach. The organizations of peasants that have to be built up in this context can take over the functions that used to be performed by the big landowner(s), such as the sale of products and crops. In the beginning, especially, the guidance of an outsider will be desirable. It is also very well conceivable that a local priest or teacher (if available) takes a

---

* See the contribution of Buijs: On admittance, access, cooperation and participation.

leading role.

Without land reform it is sometimes also possible to start participatory projects in this kind of local community. These projects will have to be directed at activities outside the agrarian sphere, and the need for land will have to be small or non-existent.

Possibilities are the raising of chickens, handicrafts, etc. The range of these possibilities will be to a high degree dependent on the specific landlord. It will be necessary to put out feelers carefully to find out what is experienced as threatening by the landlord and what not.

In villages of type 4, the dualistic inegalitarian village, participatory projects will be sooner possible than in villages of type 3, the dualistic, more or less egalitarian village. Particularly in villages belonging to the subtype of 4, in which socio-economic inequality almost runs parallel with ethnical (and/or religious) lines of fissure, the ethnical or religious identity of the subordinate group can be a suitable basis for mobilization. Here, too, assistance of an outsider will often be necessary in project guidance, especially in the beginning. Assistance from outside the village is necessary to prevent or counteract resistance to the project activities. Moreover, the assistance will have to be guaranteed for a long period to enable the poor in this type of village to run the risk of endangering or even breaking their dependency relations with wealthier co-villagers.

Within the project a solution will have to be found to fulfil the need for (emergency) credit by the poor in such villages, which usually commits them to local moneylenders. Customary co-operative institutions generally do not seem to form a firm basis for participatory projects*; it appears possible, however, to try to link these with the notion of co-operation or acting together, as it is still expressed in institutions that are - be it at a lower level - functioning in the village. Though participatory projects have to be considered possible in this type of village, it is certainly not easy to carry them out in this context. The development agency/promotor has to realize very well that

* See the contribution of Buijs: On admittance, access, cooperation and participation.

there is no way back once a project has been started. The input, especially in terms of time, will be considerable. The process of participation will only slowly get going, among other things because of the fact that especially in the beginning the local poor will be dependent on the development agency/promotor as 'patron' and 'moneylender'. If all this is taken into account inadequately, the damage caused might appear to be greater than the intended good works.

Type 5, the stratified community, is a preeminently suited context for participatory target-category-oriented projects. Within this kind of village there are primarily more or less marginalized groups of poor, that are conscious in broad group terms of their (relative) poverty. From these groups of poor, homogeneous project groups can be formed. This has to be done, however, in a very careful way.

These groups of poor can be characterized roughly as homogeneous with regard to the community as a whole, but within the groups themselves there are still factors which intersect that homogeneity.

Men, for example, will have other interests than women, and small tenants other interests than landless labourers. In forming project groups these differing and sometimes oppositional interests have to be taken into account.

In attempting to organize the poorer inhabitants in this kind of village, resistance has to be expected from richer local persons or groupings. The resistance will be less as labour is more 'untied' and as the mechanization of the farm has proceeded further. A certain degree of distrust with regard to the intentions and purposes of the development agency/promotor has to be expected in every situation. Invariably attempts will be made by the local elite at seizing (a part of) the project's inputs and results. Therefore, it is important that mechanisms are included in the project that make project activities less attractive for wealthier villagers[*].

When, for example, the purpose of the project activity is to enable small peasants to irrigate their plot of land, hand pumps have to

---

[*] Benno Galjart et al, 1982: Participatie, toegang tot ontwikkeling. Verslag van een onderzoek naar de mogelijkheden van participatie in ontwikkelingsprojekten. Leiden, Chapter 2.

be used instead of motorized pumps. Hand pumps are more attractive for
the small peasant because of the low investment involved, but not
attractive for larger farmers, because for them hand pumps are in-
efficient in comparison with motor-driven pumps.

Often, however, the poor will have no land at all, or too-small a plot.
The project then will have to be directed at the creation of so-called
'off-farm employment'. Then, too, it is necessary to start with activi-
ties that do not immediately awake the active interest of the wealthier
villagers. As long as patron-client relations still occur in this type
of village, and if relations of indebtedness are frequent and multiple,
the project organization will have to offer adequate alternatives.

The most important potential leaders for participatory project organi-
zations in this type of village appear to be villagers who have lived
for some time outside their own village; also conceivable are villagers
originating from elsewhere, such as priests or teachers[*]. When local
conflicts occur, the promotor (and in a later phase, the second-level
organization of project groups) has the function to protect the project
group and its activities.

As a rule, type 6, the plantation, is not a suitable context for
participatory projects, at least not for the production-oriented ones.
It is rather necessary in this situation to stimulate the formation
of unions and to support these in their functioning. Educational work
is also one of the possibilities.

Most of the villages that are to be reckoned to type 7, the new settle-
ment, do not form a suitable context for a participatory project as
an attempt of the poor to make up their arrears. Nevertheless, it would
make much sense if a participatory approach would be integrally part
of a resettlement policy. Villagers' organizations would be able to
perform themselves the tasks that are now carried out - often in-
efficiently - by governmental departments.

In the case of resettlement of a community in its entirety from else-
where, the possibility of the setting-up of a participatory project
is of course to a high degree dependent on the internal structure and
the history of that specific community. When groups and individuals

[*] Benno Galjart et al, 1982: Participatie, toegang tot ontwikkeling....
Chapter 3.

originating from different communities are being resettled and placed
together in a new village, there will be possibilities for a partici-
patory approach. Special care will be needed, however. Since a minimal
level of community integration and cohesion has to be realized in the
new community, a harmony model appears more necessary than a conflict
model.
Projects will not always be necessary in villages belonging to type
8, the industrializing or suburbanizing village. However, when they
are needed, for example because of an oversupply of labour, activities
in the sphere of the creation of 'off-farm employment' are very well
possible. In concrete terms this can mean the setting-up of small
business units based on self-management, occupying themselves with
the production of commodities or services.

5. The usefulness of a social map

It is important that the change agent or promotor understands the
local situation in the specific village society and its ramifications
for the surrounding world, whenever a participatory project is to be
started. One of the ways to reach this understanding is the construct-
ion of a kind of local social map. During the progress of the project
this map has to be brought up to date. There are several ways in which
such a social map can be made. The promotor can do it alone or it can
be done by people from the local society itself. Each method has its
own disadvantages. A combination of methods seems most adequate. Then
also those things are included that the promotor as an outsider tends
to overlook, while the biasses inserted by the villagers themselves
can be corrected by the outsider. Such a form of self-research can
function at the same time as a learning process.
Besides the construction of a local social map one of the tasks in
the preparation phase of the project is a study of the carrying
capacity of the local community and of the unused opportunities avail-
able. On the basis of facts it must be considered how far organization
building among the poor will make a contribution to the improvement of
their life chances, given the existing and available resources, the
population size, and the technological level of the village concerned.

6. A concluding remark

Applying one development strategy or one project model in all local situations in a country or region, without taking account of the actually existing structural differences, will certainly lead to large failures.

Working without strategy and without any prior model, and designing a local development policy that is wholly directed at the concrete reality of a specific village, is for reasons of needed input of means and personnel an impossible venture. When this approach is followed, in some villages much will be realized, but in most villages, nothing. A typology of local development situations and the making of a local social map for determining the type to which a specific village belongs, can offer a middle course between the extremes of taking too little or taking too much account of the variety of situations in which the people, and the poor in particular, live in the Third World.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Antoun, R.T.	Conservatism and change in the village community: A Jordanian case study. In: Human Organization, Vol. 24, 1965, pp. 4-10
Antoun, R.T.	Social organization and the life cycle in an Arab village. In: Ethnology, Vol. 6, 1967, pp. 294-308.
Antoun, R.T.	On the significance of names in an Arab village. In: Ethnology, Vol. 7, 1968, pp. 158-170.
Antoun, R.T.	The social significance of Ramadan in an Arab village. In: The Muslim World, Vol. 58, 1968, pp. 36-42 and 95-104.
Antoun, R.T.	Pertinent variables in the environment of Middle Eastern village politics: A comparative analysis. In: Antoun, Richard and Iliya Harik (eds) Rural politics and social change in the Middle East. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1972, pp. 118-162.
Arens, Jenneke and Jos van Beurden	Jhagrapur. Poor peasants and women in a village in Bangladesh. Amsterdam, 1977.
Arensberg, Conrad M.	The community as object and as sample. In: Murphy, Robert F. (ed.) Selected papers from the American Anthropologist 1946-1970. Washington, American Anthropological Association, 1976, pp. 295-318.
Barnard, Rosemary	Deuba: Economic change in a Fijian village. In: Oceania, Vol. 45, 1974, pp. 1-17.
Basso, Ellen B.	The Kalapalo indians of Central Brazil. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973.
Beals, Alan R.	Gopalpur. A South Indian village. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962.
Bell, Colin and Howard Newby	Community studies. An introduction to the sociology of the local community. London, George Allen and Unwin, 1971.
Belshaw, Michael	A village economy: Land and people of Huecorio. New York, Colombia University Press, 1967.

Bertocci, Peter J.   Patterns of social organization in rural East
                            Bengal.
                            In: Lipski, Alexander (ed.)
                            Bengal East and West.
                            East Lansing, Asian Studies Center, Michigan
                            State University, 1970. (South Asia Series
                            Occasional Paper No. 13).

Bertocci, P.J.   Community structure and social rank in two
                            villages in Bangladesh.
                            In: Contributions to Indian Sociology. New
                            Series, No. 6, 1972, pp. 28-52.

Bertocci, Peter J.   Rural communities in Bangladesh: Hājipur and
                            Tinpārā.
                            In: Maloney, Clarence (ed.)
                            South Asia: Seven community profiles.
                            New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974.

Bhatnagar, Gurnam Saran   Monomorphic and polymorphic leadership in
                            some North Indian villages.
                            In: Eastern Anthropologist, Vol. 25, 1972,
                            pp. 235-240.

Boer, Leen   A first design of a typology of rural local
                            communities.
                            Paper presented at the 5th World Congress for
                            Rural Sociology, Mexico City, August 7-12,
                            1980.

Boer, Leen   Migration and social mobility in Bangladesh:
                            The marginalization of peasant migration.
                            In: The Journal of Social Studies (Journal
                            of the Centre for Social Studies, Dacca
                            University), No. 13, 1981, pp. 23-30.

Booth, John A.   Organizational processes in the growing
                            community: Strategies for development.
                            In: Journal of Community Development Society,
                            Vol. 6, 1975, pp. 13-25.

Booth, John A. and   Peasants as activists. A reevalution of
Mitchell A. Seligson   political participation in the countryside.
                            In: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 12,
                            1979, pp. 29-59.

Bose, Swadesh   The Comilla Cooperative Approach and the
                            prospect for food-based Green Revolution in
                            Bangladesh.
                            In: World Development, Vol. 2, 1974,
                            pp. 21-28.

Broekhuyse, J.Th. Subsistentie economie "Samo du Sud". Boven
Volta. Deel 1. Een comprehensieve benadering
van de ontwikkeling van de dorpen.
Amsterdam, Afdeling Sociaal-Wetenschappelijk
Onderzoek, Koninklijk Instituut voor **de**
Tropen, 1976.

Broekhuyse, J.Th. Sociale organisatie en grondrechten. "Samo
du Sud". Boven Volta.
Amsterdam, Afdeling Sociaal-Wetenschappelijk
Onderzoek, Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen,
1976.

Buijs, Dieke Vriend of vijand.
Not published paper, April 1978.

Buijs, Dieke Participation, compliance and commitment.
Paper presented at the 10th European Congress
for Rural Sociology, Cordoba, 4-10 April
1979.

Buijs, H.Y. Access and participation. On the access
problems of poor people and participation as
a solution. An interim report.
Leiden, Instituut voor Culturele Antropologie
en Sociologie der Niet-Westerse Volken,
Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, 1979 (ICA-Publi-
katie No. 33).

Burman, B.K. Roy Villages in the census of India.
In: Dasgupta, Biplab (ed.)
Village studies in the Third World.
Delhi, Hindustan Publishing Corporation,
1978, pp. 46-55.

Byrnes, Kerry J. A social action perspective on small farmer
agricultural development.
Paper submitted for the 5th World Congress for
Rural Sociology, Mexico-City, August 7-12,
1980.

Câmara, Fernando Religious and political organization.
In: Tax, Sol (et al)
Heritage of conquest. The ethnology of Middle
America.
Glencoe (Ill.), The Free Press, 1952, pp. 142-173.

Cernea, Michael M. Measuring project impact: Monitoring and
evaluation in the PIDER rural development
project - Mexico.
Washington, The World Bank, 1979 (World
Bank Staff Working Paper No. 332).

Chambers, Robert and
John Harriss

Comparing twelve South Indian villages: In
search of practical theory.
In: Farmer, B.H. (ed.)
Green revolution? Technology and change in
rice-growing areas of Tamil Nadu and Sri
Lanka.
London, MacMillan, 1980, pp. 301-322.

Chambers, Robert

Rapid rural appraisal: Rationale and reper-
toire.
Brighton, Institute of Development Studies at
the University of Sussex, September 1980.
(IDS Discussion Paper No. 155).

Champaud, Jacques

Mom (Cameroun) ou le refus de l'agriculture
de plantation.
In: Etudes Rurales, Nos. 37-39, 1970, pp.
299-311.

Champaud, Jacques

Mom. Terroir Bassa (Cameroun).
Paris; O.R.S.T.O.M., 1973.

Charlick, Robert Barry

Power and participation in the modernization
of rural Hausa communities.
University of California, Ph.D., 1974;
Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1981.

Charlick, Robert

Animation Rurale: Experience with "partici-
patory" development in four West African
nations.
In: Rural Development Participation Review,
Vol. 1, No. 2, 1980, pp. 1-6.

Chattopadhyay, Gouranga

Ranjana: A village in West Bengal.
Calcutta, Bookland Private, 1964.

Connell, John

Economic change in an Iranian village.
In: Middle East Journal, Vol. 28, 1974,
pp. 309-314.

Connell, John, Biplab
Dasgupta, Roy Laishley
and Michael Lipton

Migration from rural areas. The evidence from
village studies.
Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1976.

Connell, John (compiler)
and C.M. Lambert (ed.)

Labour utilization. An annotated bibliography
of village studies.
Brighton, The Village Studies Programme,
Institute of Development Studies at the
University of Sussex, 1975.

Connell, John and
Michael Lipton

Assessing village labour situations in
developing countries.
Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1977.

Cooley, Frank L.

Allang: A village on Ambon island.
In: Koentjaraningrat (ed.)
Villages in Indonesia.
Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1967,
pp. 129-156.

Dasgupta, Biplab

A typology of village socio-economic systems
from Indian village studies.
In: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 10,
1975, pp. 1395-1414.

Dasgupta, Biplab (ed.)

Village studies in the third world.
Delhi, Hindustan Publishing Corporation,
1978.

Derman, W. (with the
assistance of Louise
Derman)

Serfs, peasants and socialists. A former serf
village in the Republic of Guinea.
Berkely, University of California Press, 1973.

DeWalt, Billie R.

Alternative adaptive strategies in a Mexican
ejido: A new perspective on modernization and
development.
In: Human Organization, Vol. 38, 1979,
pp. 134-143.

Dooren, J. van, P. Engel
en F. van Sluys

Eindrapport van het vooronderzoek "De kleine
boer en de ontwikkelingssamenwerking".
4e annex: Samenwerkingsverbanden.
Wageningen, Internationaal Agrarisch Centrum,
1976.

Dooren, P.J. van

Coöperaties voor ontwikkelingslanden.
Muiderberg, Dick Coutinho, 1978.

Doughty, P.L. (with the
collaboration of Mary
F. Doughty)

Huaylas. An Andean district in search of
progress.
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1968.

Durrenberger, Paul

The regional context of the economy of a
Lisu village in Northern Thailand.
In: Southeast Asia, Vol. 3, 1974,
pp. 569-575.

Durrenberger, Paul

The economy of a Lisu village.
In: American Ethnologist, Vol. 3, 1976,
pp. 633-644.

Elias, N. en
J.L. Scotson

De gevestigden en de buitenstaanders. Een
studie van de spanningen en machtsverhoudin-
gen tussen twee arbeidersbuurten.
Utrecht, Het Spectrum, 1976.

Epstein, T. Scarlett   The dimensions of rural development.
In: Epstein, T. Scarlett and David H. Penny (eds)
Opportunity and response. Case studies in economic development.
London, C. Hurst and Company, 1972, pp. 241-251.

Fahim, H.   Change in religion in a resettled Nubian community, Upper Egypt.
In: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 4, 1973, pp. 163-177.

Fahim, Hussein   Field research in a Nubian village: The experience of an Egyptian anthropologist.
In: Foster, George et al (eds)
Long-term field research in social anthropology.
New York, Academic Press, 1979, pp. 255-273.

Fakhouri, Hani   Kafr el-Elow. An Egyptian village in transition.
New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972.

Fernea, Robert and John Kennedy   Initial adaptation to resettlement. A new life for Egyptian Nubia.
In: Current Anthropology, Vol. 7, 1966, pp. 349-354.

Fischer, Peter und Gerhard Kortum   Kahrizak. Sozialgeographische Dorfmonographie einer Qanat-Oase bei Teheran.
In: Geographische Rundschau, 19, 1967, pp. 201-209.

Foster, George M.   The sociology of pottery: Questions and hypotheses arising from contemporary Mexican work.
In: Matson, Frederich R. (ed.)
Ceramics and man.
New York, Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, 1965, pp. 43-61.
(Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology 41).

Foster, George M.   Tzintzuntzan: Mexican peasants in a changing world.
Boston, Little, Brown, 1967.

Foster, George M.   Godparents and social networks in Tzintzuntzan.
In: Southwestern Journal of Anthropology. Vol. 25, 1969, pp. 261-278.

Foster, George M.	Dreams, character, and cognitive orientation in Tzintzuntzan. In: Ethos, Vol. 1, 1973, pp. 106-121.
Foster, George M.	Fieldwork in Tzintzuntzan: The first thirthy years. In: Foster, George M. et al (eds) Long-term field research in social anthropology. New York, Academic Press, 1979, pp. 165-184.
Franke, Richard W.	Miracle seeds and shattered dreams in Java. In: Natural History, Vol. 83, 1974, pp. 10-18 and 84-88.
Fresco, Louise	Rural women and households in the context of small farmers' projects. In: Approach, No. 8, 1979, pp. 3-22.
Friedmann, John	The active community: Toward a political-territorial framework for rural development in Asia. In: Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 29, 1981, pp. 235-261.
Fuller, Anne H.	Buarij, portrait of a Lebanese Muslim village. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1961.
Galjart, Benno	A model of local systems for understanding rural development processes in the third world. In: Rural Sociology, Vol. 40, 1975, pp. 344-352.
Galjart, B.F.	Ontwikkeling: Processen en structuren. Een analytisch model voor de ontwikkelings-sociologie. Leiden, 1978.
Galjart, Benno	Counterdevelopment: A position paper. In: Community Development Journal, Vol. 16, 1981, pp. 88-96.
Galjart, Benno	Participatory development projects. Some conclusions from research. In: Sociologia Ruralis, Vol. 21, 1981. pp. 142-159.
Geertz, Clifford	Tihingan: A Balinese village. In: Koentjaraningrat (ed.) Villages in Indonesia. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1967, pp. 210-243.

Ghai, Dharam and
Reginald Herbold Green

Ujamaa and villagisation in Tanzania.
In: Ghai, Dharam, Azizur Rahman Khan, Eddy
Lee and Samir Radwan.
Agrarian systems and rural development. A
study prepared for the International Labour
Office within the framework of the World
Employment Programme.
London, The MacMillan Press, 1979,
pp. 232-256.

Glaser, Barney G. and
Anselm L. Strauss

The discovery of grounded theory. Strategies
for qualitative research.
New York, Aldine Publishing Company, 1979.

Gore, Peter H.

Rural development: Assessing rural insti-
tutions and infrastructures.
Paper presented at the 5th World Congress
for Rural Sociology, Mexico City, 7-12
August, 1981.

Gosselin, Gabriel

Traditional collectivism and modern asso-
ciations. The example of Southern Dahomay.
In: Nash, June, Jorge Dandler, Nicholas S.
Hopkins (eds)
Popular participation in social change. Co-
operatives, collectives, and nationalized
industry.
Den Haag, Mouton Publishers, 1976, pp. 55-
70.

Gotsch, Carl H.

Technical change and the distribution of
income in rural areas.
In: American Journal of Agricultural Eco-
nomics, Vol. 54, 1972, pp. 326-341.

Gran, Guy

Some functional constraints to enhancing
participation in project design and imple-
mentation. An exploratory essay.
A report prepared for the Bureau for Program
and Policy Coordination, Office of Policy
Development and Program Review, Civic Parti-
cipation Division of the Agency for Internatio-
nal Development, 1979 (second draft).

Grijpstra, Bouwe

Alternative development strategies and de-
velopment administration. The group approach.
Paper presented at the 10th European Congress
for Rural Sociology, Cordoba, 4-10 April,
1979.

Grijpstra, Bouwe

Some thoughts on the role of local and external elites in improving access for the rural poor.
Paper for the panel on "Reaching the poorest of the poor: The role of local elites in poverty-oriented development programs".
Annual Meeting American Political Science Association, Washington, August 28-31, 1980.

Gudeman, Stephen

Relationships, residence and the individual. A rural Panamaian community.
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976.

Gudeman, Stephen

The compadrazgo as a reflection of the natural and spiritual person.
In: Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland for 1971.
London, 1972, pp. 45-71.

Gudeman, Stephen

Saints, symbols and ceremonies.
In: American Ethnologist, Vol. 3, 1976, pp. 709-728.

Haq, M. Nurul

Village development in Bangladesh. A study of Monagram village.
Comilla, Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, 1978.

Harik, Iliya F.

The political mobilization of peasants. A study of an Egyptian community.
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1974.

Havighurst, Robert J. and Anton J. Jansen

Community Research. A trend report and bibliography.
In: Current Sociology/La Sociologie Contemporaine, Vol. 15, 1967.

Heck, Bernard van

FAO Rural Organizations Action Programme (ROAP). Participation of the poor in rural organizations. A consolidated report on the studies in selected countries of Asia, Near East and Africa.
Rome, Food and Agriculture Organizations of the United Nations, 1979.

Hettige, Siri

Agricultural development and the role of entrepreneurial farmers. A village study in Sri Lanka.
Paper presented at the 5th World Congress for Rural Sociology, Mexico City, August 1980.

Hillery Jr., G.A.

Definitions of Community: Areas of agreement.
In: Rural Sociology, Vol. 20, 1955,
pp. 111-123.

Holdcroft, Lane E.

The rise and fall of community development in
developing countries, 1950-65: A critical
analysis and an annotated bibliography.
East Lansing, Department of Agricultural
Economics, Michigan State University, 1978
(MSU Rural Development Paper No. 2).

Horowitz, Michael M.

Morne-Paysan. Peasant village in Martinique.
New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967.

Horowitz, Michael M.

A typology of rural community forms in the
Caribbean.
In: Horowitz, Michael M. (ed.)
Peoples and cultures of the Caribbean. An
anthropological reader.
Garden City, N.Y., The Natural History Press,
1971, pp. 179-189.

Hudson, A.B. and
J.M. Hudson

Telang: A Ma'anjan village of Central Kali-
mantan.
In: Koentjaraningrat (ed.)
Villages in Indonesia.
Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1967,
pp. 90-114.

Hunter, Guy (ed.)

Agricultural development and the rural poor.
Declaration of policy and guidelines for
action.
London, Overseas Development Institute, 1978.

Huq, M. Ameerul (ed.)

Exploitation and the rural poor. A working
paper on the rural power structure in Bangla-
desh.
Kotbari, Comilla, Bangladesh Academy for
Rural Development, 1978.

Hyden, Goran

Modern cooperatives and the economy of
affection in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Paper presented at the I.U.A.E.S. Symposium
on Traditional Cooperation and Social Or-
ganization in Relation to Modern Cooperative
Organization and Enterprise, Amsterdam,
23-24 April 1981.

Jayawardena, Chandra

Conflict and solidarity in a Guianese
plantation.
London, The Athlone Press, 1963.

Jedlicka, Allen D.   Organization for rural development. Risk
taking and appropriate technology.
New York, Praeger Publishers, 1977.

Jong, L. de en   Nederlandse steun aan arme landen en groepen.
H.J. Tieleman   Goede wil vormt nog geen (goed) beleid.
In: Internationale Spectator, Jrg. 32, 1978,
pp. 525-532.

Kandiyoti, Deniz   Some social-psychological dimensions of
social change in a Turkish village.
In: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol.
25, 1974, pp. 47-62.

Kandiyoti, Deniz   Social change and social stratification in a
Turkish village.
In: The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 2,
1975, pp. 206-219.

Kandiyoti, Deniz   Sex roles and social change: A comparative
appraisal of Turkey's women.
In: Wellesley Editorial Committee.
Women and national development. The
complexities of change.
Chicago, The University of Chicago Press,
1977, pp. 57-73.

Keatinge, Elsie B.   Latin American peasant corporate communities:
Potentials for mobilization and political
integration.
In: Journal of Anthropological Research,
Vol. 29, 1973, pp. 37-58.

Keddie, N.R.   The Iranian village before and after land
reform.
In: The Journal of Contemporary History,
Vol. 3, 1968, pp. 69-91.

Kemper, Robert V.   Tzintzuntzeños in Mexico City: The anthro-
pologist among peasant migrants.
In: Foster, George M. and Robert V. Kemper
(eds)
Anthropologists in cities.
Boston, Little, Brown, 1974, pp. 63-91.

Kemper, Robert V. and   Urbanization in Mexico: The view from
George M. Foster   Tzintzuntzan.
In: Cornelius, Wayne and Felicity Trueblood
(eds)
Latin American urban research 5.
Beverly Hills, Sage, 1975.

Kemper, Robert V.	Migration and adaptation: Tzintzuntzan peasants in Mexico City. Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1977 (Sage Library of Social Research Vol. 43).
Kemper, Robert V.	Fieldwork among Tzintzuntzan migrants in Mexico City: Retrospect and prospect. In: Foster, George M. et al (eds) Long-term field research in social anthropology. New York, Academic Press, 1979, pp. 189-207.
Kennedy, John	Mushahara: A Nubian concept of supernatural danger and the theory of taboo. In: American Anthropologist, Vol. 69, 1967, pp. 685-702.
Kennedy, John and Hussein Fahim	Nubian dhikr rituals and cultural change. In: The Muslim World, Vol. 64, 1974, pp. 205-219.
Khan, Azizur Rahman	The Comilla model and the integrated rural development programme of Bangladesh. An experiment in 'co-operative capitalism'. In: Ghai, Dharam, Azizur Rahman Khan, Eddy Lee, Samir Radwan Agrarian Systems and rural development. A study prepared for the ILO within the framework of the World Employment Programme. London, MacMillan, 1979, pp. 113-158.
Korten, David C.	Community social organization in rural development. Resource paper. Ford Foundation, Asia and Pacific Agricultural and Resource Staff Seminar, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, October 1979.
Kurado, Etsuko	Atomization in the social relations in a peasant community of Rizal Province, The Phillipines - A case study of Sitio Pulong Kumanoy, Lagundi, Morong, Rizal. In: The Developing Economies, Vol. 9, 1971, pp. 290-314.
Lambert, Claire M. (ed.), Mick Moore, John Connell, and Claire M. Lambert (compilers)	Village studies. Data analysis and bibliography. Volume 2: Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Asia (excluding India), Pacific Islands, Latin America, West Indies, and the Caribbean. 1950-1975. London/Brighton, Mansell/Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, 1978.

Landé, Carl H.

Group politics and dyadic politics. Notes for a theory.
In: Schmidt, Steffen W., Laura Guasti, Carl H. Landé, and James C. Scott (eds)
Friends, followers, and factions. A reader in political clientelism.
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977, pp. 506-510.

Lauwagie, Beverly Nagel

The effects of agricultural modernization on migration patterns in Mexico, 1960 - 1970.
Paper presented for presentation at the 5th World Congress for Rural Sociology, Mexico City, August 7-12, 1980.

Lee, Y.L.

Kukup. A Chinese fishing village in South-West Malaya.
In: The Journal of Tropical Geography, Vol. 16, 1962, pp. 131-148.

Levi, Yair

Community development actions in a dynamics of community-cooperatives relationships.
Paper presented at the 5th World Congress for Rural Sociology, Mexico City, August 7-12, 1980.

Lipton, Michael and Mick Moore

The methodology of village studies in less developed countries.
Brighton, Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, 1972.
(IDS Discussion Paper 10).

Lipton, Michael

Why poor people stay poor. Urban bias in world development.
London, Temple Smith, 1977.

Lipton, Michael

Village studies and alternative methods of rural research.
In: Dasgupta, Biplab (ed.)
Village studies in the Third World.
Delhi, Hindustan Publishing Corporation, 1978, pp. 15-26.

Lipton, Michael

'Key variables' in village studies.
In: Dasgupta, Biplab (ed.)
Village studies in the Third World.
Delhi, Hindustan Publishing Corporation, 1978, pp. 132-136.

Long, Norman

An introduction to the sociology of rural development.
London, Tavistock Publications, 1977.

Longest, James W.,
Eugene H. Owen, and
Dan L. Tweed

Structural and cultural effects on rural services delivery systems.
Paper presented at the 5th World Congress for Rural Sociology, Mexico City, August 7-12, 1980.

Loucky, James

Production and the patterning of social relations and values in two Guatemalan villages.
In: American Ethnologist, Vol. 6, 1979, pp. 702-722.

MacAndrews, Colin

The role and potential use of land settlements in development policies: Lessons from past experience.
In: Sociologia Ruralis, Vol. 19, 1979, pp. 116-134.

Majumder, A. Mannan

Village Mohajanpur.
In: Huq, M. Ameerul (ed.)
Exploitation and the rural poor: A working paper on the rural power structure in Bangladesh.
Kotbari, Comilla, Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, 1978.

Mamdani, Mahmood

The myth of population control. Family, caste, and class in an Indian village.
New York, Monthly Review Press, 1973.

Marcus, George E.

Incomplete transformation: Social change in a Guyanese rural community.
In: Caribbean Studies, Vol. 9, 1970, pp. 27-49.

Margolis, Maxine

The ideology of equality on a Brazilian sugar plantation.
In: Ethnology, Vol. 14, 1975, pp. 373-383.

McGoodwin, James R.

Society, economy, and shark-fishing crews in Northwest Mexico.
In: Ethnology, Vol. 15, 1976, pp. 377-391.

McGoodwin, James R.

No matter how we asked them, they convinced us that they suffer.
In: Human Organization, Vol. 37, 1978, pp. 378-383.

Merriam, A.P.

Congo: Background of conflict.
Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1961.

Merriam, A.P.
Social and cultural change in a Zairian village.
In: African Studies Review, Vol. 17, 1974, pp. 345-359.

Migdal, Joel S.
Peasants, politics and revolution. Pressures toward political and social change in the third world.
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974.

Miller, W.G.
Hosseinabad: A Persian village.
In: Middle East Journal, Vol. 18, 1964, pp. 483-498.

Minore, J.B.
Operation Koumbite: Local initiative environmental action groups in Haiti.
Paper presented at the 5th World Congress for Rural Sociology, Mexico City, August 7-12, 1980.

Moerman, Michael
Kinship and commerce in a Thai-Lue village.
In: Ethnology, Vol. 5, 1966, pp. 360-364.

Moerman, Michael
Agricultural change and peasant choice in a Thai village.
Berkely, University of California Press, 1968a.

Moerman, Michael
A Thai village headman as a synaptic leader.
In: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 28, 1968b, pp. 535-549.

Montgomery, John D.
Toward a value theory of modernization.
In: Lasswell, Harold, Daniel Lerner and John D. Montgomery (eds)
Values and development: Appraising Asian experience.
Cambridge (Mass.), The MIT Press, 1976, pp. 1-19.

Moore, M.P.
Co-operative labour in peasant agriculture.
In: The Journal of Peasant Studies. Vol. 2, 1975, pp. 270-291.

Neale, Walter C.
Monetization, commercialization, market orientation, and market dependence.
In: George Dalton (ed.)
Studies in economic anthropology.
Washington, American Anthtopological Association, 1971, pp. 25-29.

Nieboer, H.J.
Slavery as an industrial system. Ethnological Researches. (Second revised edition).
New York, Lenox Hill, 1971.

Okazaki, Shoko — Shirang-Sofla: The economics of a Northeast Iranian village. In: The Developing Economies, Vol. 7, 1969, pp. 261-283.

Paige, Jeffery M. — Agrarian revolution. Social movements and export agriculture in the underdeveloped world. New York, The Free Press, 1978.

Parthasarathy, G. — Indian village studies and the village poor. In: Dasgupta, Biplab (ed.) Village studies in the Third World. Delhi, Hindustan Publishing Corporation, 1978, pp. 149-164.

Pearse, Andrew — The Latin American peasant. London, Frank Cass, 1975.

Pearse, Andrew — Metropolis and peasant: The expansion of the urban-industrial complex and the changing rural structure. In: Shanin, Teodor (ed.) Peasants and peasant societies. Selected readings. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1975, pp. 69-80.

Polsby, Nelson W. — The study of community power. In: Sills, David L. (ed.) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Vol. 3. The MacMillan Company and The Free Press, 1968, pp. 157-163.

Potash, Betty — Some aspects of marital stability in a rural Luo community. In: Africa, Vol. 48, 1978, pp. 380-397.

Rambo, A. Terry — Closed corporate and open peasant communities: Reopening a hastily shut case. In: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 19, 1977, pp. 179-188.

Risseeuw, Carla — The wrong end of the rope. Women coir workers in Sri Lanka. Leiden, Research Project Women and Development, 1980.

Ritzenthaler, Robert and Pat — Cameroons village. An ethnography of the Bafut. Milwaukee (Wis.), Milwaukee Public Museum, 1964. (Milwaukee Public Museum Publications in Anthropology No. 8).

Röling, Niels — Alternative approaches in extension. Wageningen, Research Project 'The small Farmer and Development Co-operation', International Agricultural Center, July/August 1980.

Rollwagen, Jack R. — Mediation and rural-urban migration in Mexico: A proposal and a case study. In: Cornelius,Wayne A. and Felicity M. Trueblood (eds) Latin American Research. Vol. 4. Anthropological perspectives on Latin American urbanization. Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1974, pp. 47-63.

Roth, Warren J. — Traditional social structure and the development of a marketing cooperative in Tanzania. In: Nash, June, Jorge Dandler, Nicholas S. Hopkins (eds) Popular participation in social change. Cooperatives, collectives, and nationalized industry. Den Haag, Mouton, 1976, pp. 45-53.

Ruttan, V.W. — Integrated rural development programs: A skeptical perspective. In: International Development Review, Vol. 4, 1975, pp. 9-16.

Saxena, C. — Profile of a village in semi-arid part of Rajasthan. In: The Eastern Anthropologist, Vol. 17, 1964, pp. 49-61.

Schendel, Hendrik Willem van — The odds of peasant life. Processes of social and economic mobility in rural Bangladesh. Amsterdam, Academisch proefschrift, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1980.

Scott, James S. — The moral economy of the peasant. Rebellion and subsistence in Southeast Asia. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1976.

Sharma, Ursula M. — Migration from an Indian village. An anthropological approach. Sociologia Ruralis, Vol. 17, 1977, pp. 282-304.

Skinner, G. William — Chinese peasants and the closed community: An open and a shut case. In: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 13, 1971, pp. 270-281.

Sosne, Elinor   Colonial peasantization and contemporary underdevelopment: A view from a Kivu village. In: Gran, Guy (ed.) Zaire. The political economy of underdevelopment. New York, Praeger, 1979, pp. 189-210.

Stavenhagen, Rodolfo   Changing functions of the community in underdeveloped countries. In: Sociologia Ruralis, Vol. 4, 1964, pp. 315-331.

Stavis, Benedict   Agricultural extension for small farmers. East Lansing, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, 1979 (MSU Rural Development Series, Working Paper No. 3).

Stinchcombe, Arthur L.   Agricultural enterprise and rural class relations. In: Bendix, Reinhard and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds) Class, status and power. Social stratification in comparative perspective. New York, The Free Press, 1966, pp. 182-190.

Sussman, Gerald E.   The pilot project and the choice of an implementing strategy: Community development. in India. In: Grindle, Marilee S. (ed.) Politics and policy implementation in the third world. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1980. pp. 103-122.

Tadros, Helmi R.   Rural resettlement in Egypt's reclaimed lands. An evaluation of a case study in the Northwestern Nile Delta. Cairo, The American University in Cairo, 1978. (The Cairo Papers in Social Science Vol. 1, Monograph No. 4).

Tilly, Charles   Do communities act? In: Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 43, 1973, pp. 209-240.

Umehara, Hiromitsu   Socio-economic structure of the rural Philippines. A case study of a hacienda barrio in central Luzon. In: The Developing Economies, Vol. 7, 1969, pp. 310-331.

Visser, Rob   Aspects of social and economic change in a
                               village in the central plain of Thailand.
                               Paper presented at the Thai-European Seminar
                               on Social Change in Contemporary Thailand,
                               Anthropological-Sociological Centre,
                               University of Amsterdam, 28-30 May, 1980.

Voelkner, Harold E.   Development sequence and dominant value shifts
                               in communities of Northeast Thailand.
                               In: Laswell, Harold, Daniel Lerner and John
                               Montgomery (eds)
                               Values and development: Appraising Asian ex-
                               perience.
                               Cambridge (Mass.), The MIT Press, 1976,
                               pp. 82-103.

Vroonhoven, L. van   Typen van lokale samenleving. Het armoede-
                               model - het patronage-model - (het onder-
                               drukkingsmodel).
                               Not bublished paper, Leiden, 1977.

Wagley, Charles, and   A typology of Latin American subcultures.
Marvin Harris   In: Heath, Dwight B. and Richard N. Adams
                               (eds)
                               Contemporary cultures and societies of Latin
                               America. A reader in the social anthropology
                               of Middle and South America and the Caribbean.
                               New York, Random House, 1965, pp. 42-69.

Whyte, Robert Orr   The Asian village as a basis for rural moder-
                               nization.
                               Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian
                               Studies, 1976 (Occasional Paper of the In-
                               stitute of Southeast Asian Studies No. 44).

Wolf, Eric R.   Types of Latin American peasantry: A preli-
                               minary discussion.
                               In: American Anthropologist, Vol. 57, 1955,
                               pp. 452-471.

Wolf, Eric R. and   Haciendas and plantations in Middle America
Sidney W. Mintz   and The Antilles.
                               In: Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 6,
                               1957, pp. 380-412.

Wood, G.D.   The political process in Bangladesh. A re-
                               search note.
                               In: Huq, M. Ameerul (ed.)
                               Exploitation of the rural poor. A working
                               paper on the rural power structure in
                               Bangladesh.
                               Kotbari, Comilla, Bangladesh Academy for
                               Rural Development, 1978, pp. 16-58.

Wood, Geoffrey D.

Class differentiation and power in
Bondokgram. The mini-fundist case.
In: Huq, M. Ameerul (ed.)
Exploitation of the rural poor. A working
paper on the rural power structure in
Bangladesh.
Kotbari, Comilla, Bangladesh Academy for
Rural Development, 1978, pp. 59-158.

Young, Frank W. and
Ruth C. Young

Toward a theory of community development.
In: Ward, Richard J. (ed.)
The challenge of development. Theory and
practice.
Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company, 1967,
pp. 455-463.

8

PROJECT GROUPS AND HIGHER-LEVEL
ASSOCIATIONS

Benno Galjart

Institute of Cultural and Social Studies
University of Leiden

1. Introduction

Even if an attempt to raise the level of living and the degree of
organization of a local - and necessarily small - group by means of
a participatory development project succeeds, so what? Does such a
local success mean anything, or is it merely a drop in the ocean?
What one would like to see is a growing movement of project groups
which mutually support each other. Or is such a movement a pipe dream?
Project groups should be small in order to facilitate homogeneity,
participation and mutual social control. But being small; they cannot
make use of advantages of scale. There exist reasons enough, then, to
take a look at the relations which project groups establish with each
other and with second- or third-degree associations with which they
affiliate.

Such higher-level associations can and do fulfil different functions
for project groups. The following can be listed as examples: the provi-
sion - or transfer - of credit; the sale of produce; the purchase of
needed inputs; transport; education and training in specific skills;
management consultancy; assistance with bookkeeping, with contracts, or
in juridical matters; the direction or monitoring of the production
process; and the political promotion of interests, propaganda or proselitism.

All these functions do occur in practice, but any particular second-
or third-degree association usually focuses on only two or three of
these funtions.
Sometimes - especially when a project has begun on the higher,
secondary level, for instance that of a village cooperative - the
project groups are informal, and only the higher level association is
incorporated. In other instances, the project groups are incorporated
as well. I would recommend the latter approach (cf. Hunter, 1981, p.26);
the members of informal project groups most often are affiliated as
individuals with the second order association, and their opportunities
for jointly exerting influence are decidedly smaller than if the group
is joined as a member unit.

Whatever the juridical status of the first- and second-order associa-
tions, their relations can be profitably analyzed as exchange rela-
tionships. The exchanges are either dyadic, when the second order
association provides some commodity or service to the project groups,
or they take the form of pooling.
It is rather astounding that a perusal of the sociological literature
on these relationships shows that they are only exceptionally regarded
in articles dealing with exchange. This is probably due to the fact that
exchange theory is often seen as a bourgeois theoretical product, whereas
the governments or individuals who promote links between first- and
second-order associations are not seldom imbibed with anti-capitalist
ideals. Various governments which take distributive measures in favour
of certain groups - for instance by redistributing land - are of the
opinion that such groups should thereupon support their less fortunate
peers, so as to restrict inequality (cf. Chonchol 1977 for Chile;
Llosa 1979 and Urrutia et al. 1980 for Peru; Ellman 1975 for Tanzania).
It is insufficiently recognized that redistribution is a form of exchange
and should be analyzed as such. This oversight occurs in spite of the fact
that the phenomenon of group egoism is by now a familiar outcome of such
attempts at redistribution. Group egoism, then, is taken as an explana-
tion of the resulting failures, whereas it is nothing more than a way
of describing them.

2. A question of levels

In any existing situation it is not difficult to recognize levels of
organization. The first level at which individuals are associated is
then the first-level association or project group. However, I believe
that very often projects have started at too high a level, and that
what should have been a second-order association becomes a first-level
one simply because smaller groups, although desirable and functional,
have never been envisaged. I recommend as first-level association the
grouping of 5-25 neighbours who are either engaged in one particular
project activity, or are profiting from one particular service of the second-
level organization. Participation is learned in small groups. A general
assembly to which 200 persons can come is necessarily a formal affair
where only the daring open their mouths. Also, feelings of solidarity
often refer to a group level in between the family and the community;
if this is the case, it is an argument to associate people first on
that level.
As a consequence, the establishment of second-level associations may
have to be postponed until the project groups feel a need for them.
But this might be preferable to a situation in which the premature
promotion of community-wide, second-order associations (let alone
regional third-order organizations) creates a great gap between an
executive committee and the members.

3. Direct exchange

Direct exchange is a relation between two parties. Many of the functions
which second- (or third-) order associations fulfill for project groups
give rise to such exchanges. The provision of credit, the sale of
produce, but also education or training can be regarded as contributions
in a dyadic exchange relationship.

I assume, along with many other theorists, that in general a norm of
reciprocity prevails, i.e. a norm which says that sooner or later
gifts and return gifts should balance. There are, however, circumstances
in which the operation of such a norm appears to be suspended.
One is that of benevolence, or charity, when one party accepts

that the other party is not able to reciprocate, but neverthe-
less bestows a benefit on him. However, a beggar is expected to say
"thank you", or "may God be with you", not "drop dead". Some form of
reciprocation is always expected (cf. Gouldner, 1973). The other
circumstance is that of the market, where supply and demand, not the
two partners in question, establish reciprocity. In fact, a powerful
(monopolistic) market position may lead to a bias in favour of one of
the partners.

In the relationship between a project group and a second level associa-
tion, there may be factors which obscure the exchange. For instance,
when the project group pays a yearly contribution and receives a
variety of services, it is impossible to calculate the cost of one
particular service. In other instances, some services may be provided
free of charge - e.g. forms of training - although the expectation
will be that the imparted knowledge will be used and transmitted
further. In still other instances, the directors of a second- or third-
level association take the value of its contributions for granted, and
do not bother themselves much with the question of whether or not the
receivers are of the same opinion. This may lead to estrangement. It can be
observed in particular with training, education, interest promotion and
proselitism. Training courses are offered which are not considered of
the highest importance by the project groups. As a consequence, they
send somebody who can be missed for the week, but who upon his return,
is not influential enough to persuade the group to change its ways and
make use of his newly acquired knowledge. Such courses then are often
given to very heterogeneous gatherings of people with greatly varying
motivations. Although it takes a lot of effort to consult project
groups beforehand about their learning needs, and to focus theme and
methods on the needs of only a few groups, it is the most effective way
to ensure that the new information or skill will be used. Another
effective way to find out whether project groups appreciate the offered
courses is to ask them to contribute financially. Some promoting
agencies - either official or non-governmental - encountered in the
field act according to the adage that no service should be given free
of charge, not even education or training. A financial contribution
commits not only the project groups, but also the trainees whom they

send. If the trainee does not give his utmost, he is wasting the group's resources.

In general, higher level associations are well-advised to regard their services as contributions in an exchange relationship and to wonder whether the project groups think they get a fair deal. When they sell to or buy from project groups, prices should not be far removed from market prices. Especially government marketing boards often pay exceedingly low prices, claiming that they are forming a hedge against future price reductions. Common peasant reactions are either selling products on the sly or halting production of a particular crop altogether.

Perhaps it is a bit farfetched to also consider political relations as forms of exchange. Mostly it is promises which are given and returned. In countries where political parties are active, they go to great lengths to win control over the directors of higher-level associations. This goes for large governing parties, but also for opposition parties, even small splinter groups. How effective these efforts to create a political power base are, is difficult to say. For the associations concerned, there are also disadvantages involved. Firstly, governments may come to see certain associations as political enemies to whom resources should be denied. Secondly, the association may eventually suffer from internal political strife. Poor peasants do not all have exactly the same interests or the same vision of the political future. Moreover, when leaders are allowed a political stand, competition among them may easily become a political struggle. An example of such a higher-level association repeatedly torn by splits is the Colombian peasant association ANUC, supported by Dutch NGO's (cf. Bagley and Botero, 1978; de Haan, 1981). At the same time, one can hardly warn higher-level associations not to get involved in politics. What the literature does show, however, is that peasants do regard such political involvements partly as an exchange relationship. When rewards are not forthcoming, the commitment wanes (cf. Galjart, 1968).

4. Pooling

Another frequent form of exchange between project groups and
higher-level associations is pooling, or redistribution. Schematically,
a pooling system can be represented by a drawing adapted from Sahlins
(1974, p. 188).

In this pool A, B and C are categories of contributors; these can be
individuals, categories of labourers, or project groups. K is wholly
owned capital, K' borrowed capital. T represents taxes, S other funds
to which a part of the proceeds can - or must - be transferred. D is
a decision-centre, consisting of one or more individuals. The arrows
are contributions to and rewards from the pool. Contributions can take
various forms. Not only hours of labour but skills, attention, and care
can be inputs. Likewise, retributions are not only monetary but can
include other valued rewards.
Pooling systems - although mostly dealt with by anthropologists - are
not something of the past. There are many contemporary forms of pooling;
in fact, all forms of cooperation are also pooling systems (Galjart,
1982).
The scheme enables us to ask pointed questions and foresee where
problems may arise. Two comparisons are involved which may give rise to
eventual feelings of inequity and discontent.
Firstly, individuals and groups do have standards of equity, which take
into account both inputs and outcomes. What weights are accorded to
different inputs and outcomes is a matter of local values and norms.
Governments, however, often prescribe weights. In collectivized
agriculture, for instance, the only input officially recognized may be
hours of labour. Care and some skills are not counted, which may lead

to a deterioration of the quality of labour. Cases are known of members of a community who were so keen on a strict equity of input-outcome ratios, that they could not decide to produce or buy an indivisible public commodity, even if they privately agreed that such would be the wisest course of action (cf. Dove, 1981). The comparison may be complicated by the fact that the retributions which do not go directly to the producers (K, K', T and S), nevertheless may be more useful to some than to others.

The second comparison involved is that between $\Sigma[A + B + C]$ and the other retributions K, K', T and S. Poor people prefer a reward at the present time over a reward later, and people generally prefer a reward that can be spent on individual consumption over an item of collective consumption (cf. Llosa, 1979). In principle, then, contributors will not only balk at paying interests (K') or taxes (T), but also at saving.

Governments, however, in their pursuit of capital accumulation or re-distribution, often intervene in pooling systems through legal measures prescribing certain obligatory retributions. In agriculture for instance, this is done through obligatory sales to some marketing board. The state thus controls the conversion of produce into money and keeps too much for itself. Other interventions consist of denying to the participants in a pooling system the right to the proceeds of their capital resources. That way either saving or some form of profit-sharing becomes obligatory. Thirdly, a state can attempt to restrict consumption or wages, thereby promoting savings. The legislation on cooperatives in many developing countries contains the provision that parts of the eventual profits must be put in savings or social security funds. In the fourth place, the state can do to participants in pooling systems what it has done to everybody else since the beginning of time, namely apply taxes.

Even - and perhaps especially - in countries where governments proclaim sympathy for cooperatives, collective enterprises and the like, after a while they attempt to enforce some form of capital accumulation. According to Holdcroft (1978), one of the reasons for the official discontent with community development, which led to a rapid decline of the programme in the early sixties, was the unproductive nature of many

local investments. Abeyasekera et al (1981, p. 63) write that in Sri
Lanka: "Even though to begin with there was a mixture of motives in
establishing public sector enterprises, a demand that they should
create a surplus for reinvestment increasingly began to be felt".
Relatively few authors emphasize the fact that project groups of poor
people are apt to make consumptive claims whenever they can. That is,
they will be in favour of a maximum take-home pay, $\Sigma[A + B + B]$. When
they participate in the decision about the allocation of rewards, or
decide upon this matter themselves, the claims will be stronger. That
means that there is a certain contradiction between participation and
accumulation (Franco, 1979, p. 146). Especially when a local
bourgeoisie is weak or lacking, and accumulation has become by default
the function of other groups, governments may be expected to promote
it. (It is naive, of course, to think that accumulation is only
beneficial to capitalists. Practically everybody in a developing
country has an interest in accumulation.)

This contradiction is very important, because if our hypothesis is
correct, it means that all attempts to create a cooperative, participa-
tory sector of the economy - and that is what is implied by the replica-
tion on a wide scale of a successful pilot project - are doomed if the
government experiences them as too expensive, either directly or in-
directly, because accumulation is insufficient. This again means
that it is important that a cooperative sector confront itself with the
question of how, and under whose direction, it is going to accumulate. If
it is to remain participatory, such a cooperative sector must accept its
responsibility to the society as a whole.

Governmental decisions regarding the retributions of pooling systems
run the risk of contradicting the sense of equity of the project groups
concerned. Such decisions also restrict participation. However legitimate
in one respect, the contributors involved may regard such measures as il-
legitimate. The result is non-compliance and the dragging of feet. The
same phenomenon may be observed whenever at the decision centre D of
our pooling system, redistribution is decided upon by officials without
the participation of the contributors (A, B and C). A higher level

association needs funds to pay for the necessary trips of officials
to the capital, for keeping its administration in order, etc. As a
consequence, the officials of such an association may come to regard
the contributions of the project groups, the members, as a matter of
course, not realizing any longer that the project groups themselves
may wonder whether the service is worth the cost.

Better than direct interventions by decree, or decisions by the top
leaders of a higher-level association, is to allow delegates of
project groups to work out internal rules with regard to the distribu-
tion of rewards, including savings, gifts and taxes. People can be
found willing to make certain sacrifices. This willingness will be
greater when:

1.-the social distance between givers and receivers is smaller. Taxes
   for local improvements or employment creation will find more
   acceptance than for similar investments elsewhere.
2.-savings or taxes are use to promote a value which the contributors
   share. In this respect, it is important that local communities under-
   stand their unfavourable structural position and want to modify it.
3.-the contributors participate in the making of the redistributive
   rules and can be convinced that no funds are appropriated by
   officials.
4.-if possible, withheld profits take the form of savings rather than
   gifts or taxes. The contributors then maintain some form of claim
   on what they consider as their rightful earnings.

Especially points 1 and 2 above raise the question of consciousness of
the contributors to the pooling system, i.e. the project groups. What
values should they try to realize? It is to this question that we now
turn.

5. Consciousness and counterdevelopment

Clearly, the distributive problems outlined in the foregoing paragraph
do arise if the government, or the agency monitoring the project groups,
insists that savings must be created which - at least in part - then
are to be used to improve the lot of other people than the members of

the project groups. Such a course of action demands considerable
solidarity from the contributing project groups. Can this solidarity
be expected?

Although people everywhere dispose of a definition of their situation,
their understanding may be inadequate, both technically and socially.
A monitoring agency, however, is well-advised not to depreciate
too rapidly what people believe to be the case; they have been proven
right many times. However, especially poor people who have been
exploited for a long period of time by another category or class may
have taken over the negative self-image suggested to them by the elite
group; they may not believe in their capacity to organize and redress
the situation. In other instances, poverty may be the general conse-
quence of a low level of labour productivity. Many people then have not
yet experienced that development creates inequality; they must be
warned for something they have not yet seen.

A redefinition of the situation is preferably an "indictment" of the
present situation, but this cannot be a standard formula. Often it
will be in terms of conflict, making it a tricky affair for various
reasons. Firstly, the people involved do remain, at least in
part, dependent on an elite for the new definition (Piven and Cloward,
1977, p. 17). Secondly, the probability exists that the category
or class which is blamed for the present state of affairs will protest
against the new ideas. Thirdly, the redefinition cannot be
restricted to explanations of facts but must include statements about a
probable, or desired future. There is room here for contending
ideologies, for more or less radical views.
The outcome is partly dependent upon the views and political leanings
of the promoting change agent or agency, and in the long run, on the
alignment of political forces in the society, the rate of development,
and the success of the project. There seem to be some indications that
a too-radical redefinition of the situation may become dysfunctional.
In the first place, since people normally change their views gradually and
not overnight, a penchant for radicalism on the part of the promotor may
come into conflict with the exigencies of participation. He must become

either very paternalistic or have recourse to terror to get his views accepted. Second, projects which have an economic activity as a component must perforce conform to some institutions and rules of the game. One author, who clearly sees his promoting work as a means to further revolutionary structural change, concluded that an economically successful project (a cooperative) cannot be combined with political militancy (de la Rosa Medellin, 1979, p. 145). Third, I believe that groups of (poor) people do demonstrate group consciousness rather than class consciousness. Their solidarity weakens as the social distance to the other grows. Social distance is at the same time geographical distance. It is probably more effective to ask for solidarity with others within a geographically limited area, than with all the poor in the society.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, many radical ideologies tragically underestimate the problems - also the distributive problems - which remain to be solved after a radical structural change. As a consequence, they are naive with regard to the possible solutions to such problems. Counterdevelopment (cf. Galjart, 1981) implies not only insight in the dysfunctional consequences of the prevailing rules regulating economic relations but also the gradual, participatory elaboration of new concrete rules. The imposition of new rules from above will not lead to voluntary adoption but to enforcement.

References

Abeyasekera, Charles, Kumari Jayawardena and P.A.R. Perera	Employees' councils in public sector enterprises: The Sri Lankan experience, 1971-1977. Den Haag, Institute of Social Studies, 1981.
Bagley, B.M. and F. Botero	Organizaciones campesinas contemporaneas en Colombia: Un estudio de la Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos (ANUC). In: Estudios Rurales Latinoamericanos 1, 1, 1978.
Chonchol, Jacques	Social and economic organization of the Chilean reformed sector during the Popular Unity Government (1971 - September 1973). In: Dorner, Peter (ed.) 1977, pp. 199-211.
De Haan, Frans	Verslag doktoraal-leeronderzoek in Colombia. Leiden, Subfakulteit Culturele Antropologie, 1981.
De la Rosa Medellin, Martin	Promoción popular y lucha de clases (analisis de un caso). Netzahualcóyotl, Servicios Educativos Populares, A.C., 1979.
Dove, Michael R.	The ideology of peasant labor in West-Kalimantan, Indonesia: The Chimaera of unbalanced reciprocity. Paper presented at the I.U.A.E.S. Symposium on traditional cooperation and modern cooperative enterprise, 23-24 April 1981.
Ellman, Anthony	Development of Ujamaa policy in Tanzania. In: Cliffe, L., P. Lawrence, W. Luttrell et al (eds) Rural cooperation in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1975, pp. 312-345.
Franco, Carlos	Peru: participación popular. Lima, Cdep., 1979.
Galjart, Benno	Itaguaí. Old habits·and new practices in a Brazilian land settlement. Wageningen, Centre for Agricultural Publishing and Documentation, 1968.
Galjart, Benno	Counterdevelopment: A position paper. In: Community Development Journal, Vol. 16, 1981, pp. 88-96.

Galjart, B.F.	Pooling as a contemporary phenomenon. In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Vol. 138, no. 1, 1982, pp. 1-8.
Gouldner, A.W.	For sociology. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1973.
Holdcroft, Lane E.	The rise and fall of community development in developing countries, 1950-65: A critical analysis and an annotated bibliography. East Lansing, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, 1978 (MSU Rural Development Paper no. 2).
Hunter, G.	A hard look at directing benefits to the rural poor and at 'participation'. Discussion paper 6. London, Overseas Development Institute, 1981.
Llosa, Jaime	La empresa agraria de propiedad social. In: Socialismo y participación, no. 6, Marzo 1979, pp. 85-114.
Piven, F.F. and R.A. Cloward	Poor people's movements. New York, Pantheon Books, 1977.
Sahlins, M.	Stone age economics. London, Tavistock, 1974.
Urrutia, Carlos et al	Autogestión en el Peru 1968-1979. Lima, Cidiag, 1980.

9

INITIATING AND SUPERVISING AGENCIES;
GROUP APPROACHES IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT*)

Bouwe Grijpstra

Institute of cultural and social studies
University of Leiden

1. Problems in group cooperation

Agencies in Third World countries charged with rural development often
are of the opinion that the formation of groups by their clients
would facilitate their tasks and thus speed the process of development.
Government agencies who see it as their duty to deliver extension
messages and material resources to the rural population see such
groups as a receiving mechanism, which frees them from the labour-
intensive work of dealing with each individual member of the population.
Non governmental organizations (NGO's), which usually command less
resources, also have high expectations of the creativity and internal
dynamics of groups. By uniting in groups the population can exert
pressure on government officials, landowners, employers, and others on
whom they depend; provide themselves with essential services; and
obtain economies of scale through collective production.
However, despite these advantages, groups are very seldom spontaneous-
ly formed by their members. Functioning in a group has not only bene-
fits, but also economic and social costs. Membership in a group limits
the individual in his actions and the pursuit of his own interests.

*) Thanks are due to Leen Boer, Dieke Buijs, Benno Galjart, Norman
   Uphoff and Laurens van Vroonhoven for their valuable comments.

Especially in the starting phase a group requires investments and
savings, which curtail individual consumption.
At the group level there are certain paradoxes to be resolved.
Usually a common identity and consensus over social and cultural norms
have to serve as a basis for a group with economic goals. In its first
stage, a group needs expressive leadership, which later has to give way
to more utilitarian leaders. In time the involvement of the members
has to change, too. In the starting phase the members have to contri-
bute actively to the group's organization. Later not so much activity
is required, but rather refrainment from acts which would damage the
organization (Galjart, 1973). Bailey (1971) has pointed out the para-
dox which keeps many philosophers occupied. Moral relations are
established between persons who know each other intimately. However,
for the maintenance of these relations a kind of impersonal super-
vision is needed. This requires a development from trust to authority.
These kind of problems are especially encountered in groups which have
to act rather independently or even in opposition to holders of power.
They explain why groups often function so poorly and why so little
success is achieved.
Even in groups which merely serve as receiving and distributing mecha-
nisms, as under the Training and Visit Systems, designed by Benor and
Harrison (1977) and supported by the World Bank, internal dynamics
contradictory to the stated goals account for poor performance.

2. Necessity of outside stimulation

To motivate people to create a group and to keep it functioning through
the first stages is a difficult and heavy task. Major barriers in
group formation are uncertainty about the benefits and the cost of
membership, and lack of mutual trust. Membership includes some imme-
diate economic and social costs, yet usually major benefits can only
be reaped some time after the group has started functioning. Lack of
trust exists with regard to activities which are new to the members.
They do not know each other's qualities and behaviour in performing
the new tasks. There is a fear of 'free riders', people who share in
the products of the cooperation without having contributed to their cre-
ation (see the contribution of Buijs (4)). Lack of a proven control

system in the new group augments the fear. A participative organiza-
tional structure of the group, which allows members to influence the
decision-making process, can help to overcome these problems. Still, the
introduction of new ideas and new norms needs an innovative and moral
authority. He or she will have to embody a guarantee for the success of
the new enterprise, as well as for the fair distribution of duties and
benefits.

According to their social position, three types of persons can be
differentiated who can fit this role: a member of the local elite, an
external promotor, and a marginal member of the target group.

Only seldom are members of a local elite initiators of participative
cooperation by the poorer members of the society. Such a role requires
a reorientation to the dynamics of the local society, and their own
position in it. To play an active new role, they will have to see
development is not a zero-sum game, i.e., to see increasing welfare of
the poor opening new opportunities for all. Local elites can guide new
organizations, which do not aim to fight against the established class
order, but rather provide services which are of greater importance to
the poor than to the rich (Gasson, 1977). Nobility obliges, and besides,
the poor have more trust in a 'real gentleman' than in their next-door
neighbour (Bailey, 1971).

Promotors are persons who are originally outsiders to the local society,
who through a long period of residence obtain an intimate knowledge of
the population and its living conditions. Though they have gained the
trust of the poor, they have not amalgamated with them. Their socio-
economic position is a different one. Two types of promotors can be
differentiated: promotors who work on their own initiative, and
promotors who work for an agency. To the first category may belong
priests, schoolteachers, medical doctors, and others with an economic-
ally independent position. They do not show their concern for poverty
by charity, but rather by attempts to stimulate the poor to self-help.
Essentially their role in this regard is not different from that of the
local elite, of which they are a sub-group.

Among the promotors who are sent by an agency are extension agents,
community development workers, adult education organizers, etc. Charged
by a government or private agency, they try to unite people in groups.
In the present age of consciously stimulated development their number

is rapidly increasing. Compared with the independent promotors their period of familiarization is short, usually not more than six months, which is detrimental to their effectiveness.

Both types of promotors have in common a good education, a good knowledge of the society beyond the village, and a certain immunity from attacks on their person and reputation. This last quality orginates in their economic independence. They are interested in the new organization, but have no economic interest in it.

Sometimes marginal members of the target group are able to stimulate the people of their locality to unite in one or more groups. Through temporary migration for education or employment, they may have developed the ability to look at the local society from a different point of view than the other people. Their external experiences enhance their authority in a number of matters. Quite often the maintenance and improvement of the locality's external relations is trusted to them because of their familiarity with the outside world. Through their absence they have become marginal group members in their home community. Still their moral status is not likely to be as high as that of the promotors, because their background and personal weaknesses are well known. Moreover, the other people are always inclined to think that these marginal members stimulate groups to advance their own interest.

From the three types of initiators and stimulators, the members of the local elite and the independent promotors meet best the criteria of moral authority and economic independence of the new group organization. However, they do not come to the fore in large numbers, and whether or not they take initiative is highly unpredictable. These circumstances make them rather unsuitable to be relied on for conscious attempts at group development. The alternative is to engage promotors working for an agency, and to limit the disadvantages of this approach as much as possible. By careful selection, training, and exemplary supervision a high level of dedication can be reached. When the promotor is not obliged to show results quickly and is allowed to a certain extent to follow his own ideas, he will be able to adjust his actions to the local situation.

From practical experience it can be concluded that a combination of an external promotor and a dedicated local person is very effective in the creation of groups (see, e.g. Shaikh Maqsood Ali, 1981). In this team the promotor takes care of the external contacts. The local person knows the interests of the group members and what is locally possible (Jedlicka, 1977). Besides, the promotor can protect his local partner from rebuffs by the group members. Usually it takes time before they can differentiate between the man and his office (Grijpstra, 1976).

By pointing to the necessity of external initiative and supervision for the creation of cooperative groups with a participative structure, another paradox is demonstrated. 'Top-down' planning and organization may be needed for the poor to participate from the 'bottom-up' (Stiller and Yadav, 1979).

3. Approaches to group formation

Lack of initial trust and uncertain benefits are major barriers to group formation. The development agencies which try to motivate the rural poor to unite in groups do not all follow the same approach. Some emphasize building up mutual trust. Others try to convince their target groups by providing guarantees that there will be a positive benefit/ cost ratio from group action. Both approaches will be discussed.

3.1. Building up mutual trust

Human relations can be characterized by reciprocity, since human beings, except for saints and idiots, seldom to something for free. Providing food, assistance in building a house, moral support, adding to a cosy atmosphere - for these there is usually some kind of a return. The position of the other(s) determines the type of reciprocity expected. Service (1966) differentiated three types of reciprocity. 'Generalized reciprocity' guides behaviour with regard to members of the same household and very close relatives and friends. The size and time of the return are vague. Only in the long run is there some balance between gifts and return gifts. 'Balanced reciprocity' indicates re-

lations where time and size of the payment are clearly specified. For
this type of reciprocity a certain amount of trust in the partner is
needed to give him credit. It can only function between people who know
each other. 'Negative reciprocity' regulates dealings with strangers.
Both parties aim to get more than they give.
With regard to the achievement of new goals people will act from an
attitude of negative reciprocity. Even when the people concerned know
each other and from time to time cooperate on the basis of balanced
reciprocity, they will not automatically be willing to extend the mutu-
al trust to these new, unknown activities. So, having been able to or-
ganize together a harvest festival for many years is not necessarily
a good basis for launching and operating a cooperative shop. Periodic
cooperation in rituals is quite different from the permanent involve-
ment required for a cooperative society. Besides, religion and econo-
mics are different spheres of life.
Cooperation in an income-generating group particularly requires balanced
reciprocity. In the initial stage even some amount of generalized reci-
procity is required, since uncertainty about the time and size of
benefits to be obtained through cooperation will be greatest at the
start. It is however, at that time when people are most likely to act
from a point of view of negative reciprocity, and especially to expect
other members to do so.
The initiating agency can try to change this attitude by building up
mutual trust. The participants have to get to know each other with
regard to the new activity and the new goals. To overcome mutual dis-
trust group members should be fully informed about the functioning of
their organization and have a large amount of influence on decision-
making and implementation.
Only a participative organization structure meets these conditions.
Building up mutual trust and solidarity proceeds best when people
realize a common identity and face the same problems and enemies.

A promotor, who aims to increase the mutual trust between the poor
members of local society, has to have a good knowledge of the local situ-
ation. This knowledge can be reached through intensive daily contacts
for a period of approximately six months. Gradually the people get to

know and trust him, and he can propose the formation of a group. A group
needs a reason to exist. Good starting activities can be adult literacy
classes or a savings society. These activities require regular meetings.
The commitments the members have to make from their scarce resources
remain limited. Adult literacy classes usually follow a 'functional
literacy' method. Learning takes place through dialogues between the par-
participants and the instructor. For reading and writing, words from
daily life are chosen. Some organizations, like the University of
Massachusetts through its Ecuador Project, have developed games by which
numerics and arithmetic can be learned.

Functional literacy can lead to conscientization. The participants start
to realize the conflicts, alienation, and exploitation in their lives.
However, few promotors want to push as far as an open confrontation be-
tween the 'haves' and 'have nots'. This would make them and their or-
ganizations subversive agents and endanger their existence in the commu-
nity. Learning how to keep a new formal organization functioning can
also be done through a savings society. Especially in Asian countries
this starting activity is often used. Members agree to contribute
periodically a certain amount to a common fund. During the meetings the
treasurer records each member's contribution. The total amount is de-
posited in a bank. The savings are intended for a collective purpose,
like buying a sewing machine, a motor pump or a piece of land. During
the savings period members can borrow for emergency purposes like sick-
ness. In this way their dependence on moneylenders is decreased. By
participating in a savings society people learn how to handle money,
get an idea how banks operate, learn to lend with interest, etc.
Most of all they learn which people in their group can be trusted, and
who can be leaders of a future larger enterprise.

The supervision of the above-described approach to group formation by
building up mutual trust and raising the level of consciousness needs
no large bureaucratic agency. It can be loosely structured, because the
amounts of money involved are limited.

Further, flexibility is needed for adjustments to the local situation.
The promotors at the local level do not need a high level of formal
education. Primary education, some additional training and a learning
period with an experienced promotor are sufficient. For every five to

ten promotors a supervisor is needed. The salaries of the promotors are the major costs of the agencies which follow this approach.

Because there are no generous offers of funds behind the promotor's suggestions, there is little danger that people follow him for reasons other than this message. However, a problem for external donors is that this approach has few clear indicators of success. The phases of promotor familiarization, adult literacy class, and/or savings society may take up to two years. During this period only the reports of the promotor and his supervisor about the number of people interested, attendance at meetings, growing ability to overcome crises in the savings society, etc., provide an indication about the results obtained. It appears that few of the supervising agencies which follow the above approach have got beyond this stage. For extensive income-generating activities in agriculture, marketing, home industries, etc., a different kind of expertise is needed, which is usually not available in these agencies.

3.2. Assurance of a positive cost/benefit ratio

The second approach departs from the idea that 'every man has his price' (Bailey, 1971). If only the advantages of cooperation in a group are certain, large and clearly visible, people will forget their doubts and hesitations. A guarantee of positive benefits can be given in the form of technical advice and supervision, guaranteed markets for products, or risk insurance. Subsidized inputs and credit on favourable conditions are other stimulants.

The agencies which follow this approach expect that once organized in a group, people gradually will develop the right attitudes. In order not to lose the benefits, they will continue the group's existence. However, there is a chance that they become permanently dependent on the external agencies. Just because the promotor has so openly stimulated the formation of the group, members will continue to rely on his assistance during all kinds of troubles. The promotor and his agency can be easily tempted to solve problems by providing additional funds to the unsatisfied participants. In this way the 'bribes to cooperation' inflate.

Some well-known examples of this second approach are the dairy coopera-
tives in the Kaira District, Gujarat, India; and the Small Farmers'
Development Project (SFDP), developed by the regional office of the
FAO in Bangkok and implemented in a number of Asian countries. Both
have been fairly successful. The dairy cooperatives have opened a vast
and steady market for the milk produced by a large number of small pro-
ducers. The initial attraction of the SFDP was the availability of cre-
dit and many of its small farmer groups have expanded into other areas
of collective activity.

The provision of credit is a rather risky affair. Group members who
have taken credit to finance one or more of their activities have to
turn these into successes in order to be able to pay interest and
installments. If some people do not repay their debts to the credit-
providing agency, the financial morality of all other members is
affected. If default is accepted, soon no one may be paying the amounts
due. The agency's funds are exhausted, and the project comes to an end.
What started as a credit project thus becomes a one-time gift. There-
fore, the promotor has to take care that only sound proposals are fi-
nanced. Technical advice and support by him, or arranged by him, will
have to prevent activities from becoming failures. Also the promotor
must be sure that the revenues of the activity are not all consumed,
leaving nothing for interest and repayment. In short, the promotor has
to supervise the credit constantly.
Not only with credit, but in all other cases where a group is started
by providing members with direct benefits, heavy supervision is neces-
sary for instruction, control and mediation in conflicts. This super-
vision easily creates dependence.
The promotor can try to have his task taken over by an association of
primary groups operating as a federation or as a wholesale agency at a
higher level. Formally speaking, the difference between an initiating
and supervising agency and a second-level association is that the latter
is controlled by the constituent groups. In reality the difference is
not that clear, especially for primary groups which do not belong to
the original founders. One group by itself has little influence on the
association. The reasons for following the instructions and rules of a

promotor or an association are the benefits to be obtained. If these
are not sufficient, the rationale for a group's existence wanes.

4. Homogeneity of groups

Several initiating and supervising agencies insist that the members of
a project group should be homogeneous in social and economic position.
Other agencies seem to care less about this issue.
The question of homogeneity versus heterogeneity of membership is
directly related to the following three considerations. First, does
the agency intend to direct its aid to the poor members of the society
only. To work exclusively for the poor easily invites negative reactions
from the richer people. Sometimes they show open hostility to the pro-
motor and his group. Otherwise, the rich may try to register as group
members in order to share in the expected benefits. Another problem
with an exclusive strategy is that promotors usually have more affinity
and find easier rapport with the rich members of the society. Training
and motivational efforts are needed to keep them directed to the
poorest strata. For these kinds of reasons it is difficult to work ex-
clusively for and with the poor.
The second consideration regards the kind of activities to be done
by the group. It is possible to select activities that are of little
or no interest to the rich, so there is a limited chance of monopoli-
zation by the latter. Infrastructural amenities like a water supply,
a clinic, or a preschool can benefit both rich and poor, but usually
the latter more than the former, because the poor lack the money to
acquire such services individually. In India a dairy cooperative is
successful because most members, rich and poor, own just one or two
milk cows or buffaloes. However, provision of credit on the basis of
mutual security can only be done in homogeneous groups. Poor people
would refuse to be guarantors for large loans taken by the rich.
The third consideration concerns the structure of the local society.
How large are the internal economic differences, and what is the
opinion of the local inhabitants? Four situations can be differen-
tiated.
a. Differences are large. The poor feel exploited. Among the poor
   there is competition for jobs and favours from the rich, which

capitalize on this situation.

b. Differences are large, but the poor do not feel exploited. The rich have a certain responsibility for the whole of the local society and are subjected to levelling mechanisms.

c. Some differences exist. However, the poor see the richer people as clever guys and intend to follow their example.

d. No (large) differences exist.

In situations c. and d. it will not be possible to convince the poor that only a homogeneous group will be successful. In situations of type b. quite some efforts in consciousness-raising will be necessary. Besides it can be questioned whether or not it is effective for the poor to provoke a benevolent elite.

Outsiders tend to consider the matter of homogeneity in participative groups in ideological terms of harmony and conflict. Initiating and supervising agencies usually take a more pragmatic stand. Depending on the circumstances, they opt for the course that leads to maximum benefits for the poor with little or no counter-productive effects from the side of the rich. This does not mean that the agencies lack a philosophy and do not use ideological arguments when convincing the poor to unite in groups. Functional literacy as practiced by a number of agencies often leads to a world view expressed in terms like conflict oppression, and alienation. But other agencies provide an idealized romantic picture of a traditional self-sufficient village society, where the differences between rich and poor are softened by feelings of responsibility from the side of the rich. In reality the agencies and their promotors have to be masters in day-to-day tactics.

An agency which in the course of years has developed a strategy to avoid clashes at the village level is the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement in Sri Lanka. The first activities in a village are such that no one can oppose them, like sweeping the village square and painting the temple. Gradually more attention is paid to activities which will benefit primarily the poor.

5. Initiating and supervising agencies

The agencies which stimulate the creation of participative groups by

the poor are mainly small private organizations, so-called non govern-
mental organizations or NGO's. In their style of functioning these
organizations reflect the personality of their founders, who often are
still the present directors.
However, the stimulation of participative groups is not exclusively the
realm of private organizations. Also in the large complex bureaucracies
of national governments and international organizations there are
branches which specialize in this work. Dedicated and motivated indi-
viduals are allowed to create a niche from where they can operate in
their particular style. Consequently, their programmes hardly ever get
beyond the stage of experiments and pilot projects. Size and style of
the operations are not different from those of private agencies. These
special branches are tolerated and welcomed by the top level of the
bureaucracies, because they provide handy excuses. Whenever there is
a question about what the bureaucracy does for the poor, they can point
to these programmes.

Quite a number of NGO's in Third World countries have originated from
the charity branches of missionary societies, which provided relief
aid in times of disaster and sometimes financed small infrastructural
amenities, like clinics and schools. Gradually they have started to
look at development problems from a more fundamental point of view
and are engaging in income-generating activities. When donor countries
came to realize that private investments and government-to-government
aid were often not effective for reaching the poor interest developed
in organizations which offered an alternative way. The amount of
funds available to them increased rapidly. In the Netherlands the
NGO's which deal with the agencies in the Third World are called co-
financing organizations, because of the large share of their funds
that is made available by the national government.
In reaction to these developments the number of NGO's in Third World
countries is multiplying. This process started in Latin Amrica and
Asia, and at present extends to Africa.
Besides religious organizations, also urban labour unions, universi-
ties, colleges and private persons take the initiative to found an
NGO. The NGO's provide employment for the intelligentsia of the

developing countries and for expatriates with strong ties to these
societies. First initiatives in the founding of an NGO are often taken
by expatriates, who become the directors. Later they retreat to the
position of advisor. These expatriate advisors can be valuable assets
in the dealings with foreign donors.

The increasing number of NGO's in a country usually leads to task diffe-
rentiation and specialization. Some work primarily at village level.
Others act as counterparts to the donor organizations, coordinating the
activities of the other agencies, and providing an intermediary for
the distribution of funds. They have become experienced petition
writers, who know exactly in what terms to phrase a request to have it
financed by a certain donor agency. Some concentrate on the training
of promotors, often developing and producing aids like instruction books
for literacy classes. A number of NGO's are multipurpose, others are
specialized in fields like health care, education, low-cost housing, etc.
The present aid boom, which has contributed to the creation of many
NGO's and alternative government programmes, implies certain dangers.
Future reduction of foreign funds would bring the agencies in diffi-
culties. Some NGO's are looking for ways to greater financial indepen-
dence by cutting salaries and allowing promotors to work as part time
craftsmen or farmers, for which they are provided with tools and fields.
Another way is to start commercial activities, like a printing com-
pany or fruit and vegetable plantations, for which labourers are em-
ployed. These income-generating activities can lead to conflicts. The
commercial and the promoting branche of the agency compete for attent-
ion from the directors. Also it can create confusion with the target-
groups, because promotors are employers as well.
In countries where the government does not take an unfavourable stand
towards NGO's they can earn funds by providing training programmes for
civil servants, or by obtaining contracts for the implementation of
adult education programmes, low-cost housing, etc. This means a start
to the development of a situation similar to that in the Netherlands,
where much welfare work is done by private organizations almost fully
subsidized by central and regional governments.

6. Founders and directors

The persons who take the initiative to found and to manage an NGO or
similar agency have the character traits of entrepreneurs. Besides
their concern for the poor, they have in common that they are attracted
by new and changing circumstances. They seek personal freedom and inde-
pendence, enjoy travelling, establishing new contacts and making decis-
ions. During a meeting with a director he told that when he graduated
from the university he had applied for a job with an U.N. organization,
but had not been selected. As director of an NGO he drew a salary much
smaller than that of an U.N. official. 'However', he added, 'now I am
my own boss, and still I somehow manage to travel around the world'.

The approach and specialization of a new agency are to a certain ex-
tent determined by circumstances such as the needs of the target
groups and the preferences of donors. However, also the personality of
the founder-director plays a role. Somewhat artificially three cate-
gories can be differentiated: workers, philosophers and diplomats.
The workers are creative people, with a strong urge for self-realiza-
tion. They want to see concrete results of their efforts, and there-
fore direct their attention to small infrastructural amenities,
employment creation, supply of inputs, and marketing of produce. The
internal dynamics of the participative groups tend to be neglected
by them. Their idea is that a group will keep functioning as long as
it provides benefits to its members.
The philosophers have analysed the causes of poverty under the present
social systems, and have developed a guiding image of a better society.
Sometimes their ideology is phrased in terms of conflict; others
think in terms of harmony, but group action usually plays an impor-
tant role in the efforts to build a better society. Their primary
goal is the creation of groups through which the ideology can be
internalized. Concrete activities are of secondary importance. Purist
advocates of alienation theories even oppose activities. Piecemeal
improvements would delay the revolution.
The diplomats tend to think that a prevailing system can be improved
by coordination, communication and adjustments between groups and

services. They have high expectations of the creation of 'recipient
systems' (FAO, 1978), training, and the extension of credit facilities
to enable the poor to engage in productive activities.
Agencies are not necessarily dominated by one person; some have a dual
leadership. A combination of complementary personalities, like a thinker
and a fighter, can be very effective.

7. Internal structure

Initiating and supervising agencies usually have a simple organization-
al structure. Due to their limited size, 10 - 100 staffmembers, only
one organizational level is necessary between director and field staff.
The dependence on externally acquired contracts and funds causes them
to function with flexibility and in a task-oriented way.
Compared with government agencies and industrial firms, relations be-
tween the director(s) and staff are rather informal. The exemplary per-
sonality usually is a strong motivation for the staff to work with the
agency, as is shown by the following statements 'If the director needs
some information from me, he does not summon me to his office, but
comes to my desk'. 'Whenever I see my boss in the office corridors, he
returns my greetings. Other officers of his rank only peep through
their eyelashes to see whether or not they are greeted'. And, 'If Mr.
So-and-so had not been my supervisor, I would have quit this diffi-
cult job a long time ago'. However, when the number of staff increases
beyond 50 to 100 persons, it becomes difficult to maintain the in-
formal, cordial relations. Directors tend to be surrounded by a coterie,
which hinders their charisma. Frustrations may show in accusations of
ineffectiveness and nepotism. Also differences in opinion with regard
to the approach and activities of the agency can emerge. Decentrali-
zation and/or institutionalization of contacts comprizing more than
two levels in the organization are ways to prevent immobilizing-
cleavages. Some larger NGO's have experienced a split. Part of the
staff started a new agency, taking with them some of the contacts
with the target groups and the foreign donors. Such a break-up can
put an agency temporarily in disorder. However, from an external point
of view they should not be regarded as a disastrous. Because of their

highly motivated staff and their flexibility, smaller agencies are
usually more effective in their dealings with the target group.

8. Promotors

Though the promotors play a crucial role in the formation of partici-
pative groups, little is known about these persons. The first promotors
are often spontaneous drop-outs from the oppressor class, according to
Paulo Freire, (Norman, 1977), but few indications are available about
the second generation of promotors. Also the issues of promotor select-
ion and training are rarely discussed in the relevant literature. Some-
times a long list of desirable qualities is presented, which mentions
items like stamina, an open mind, being well-versed in discussion
techniques, and many others. Oakley (1980) remarked that these lists
are of little relevance. It is almost impossible to find candidates
who have all these qualities. What matters is to know which qualities
are needed in which situation. The subject which has received most
attention in this regard is the origin of the promotor. Should he be a
member of the target group, or an educated outsider (Jiggins, 1977)?
Devitt (1977) made a plea for outsiders, like students and young gra-
duates, because they are not part and parcel of the local structure, in-
volved in feuds and factions. Their independence would make it possible
to work with the less priviliged groups. Others, like Barriga et al
(undated), drafted the profile of an education promotor for the moun-
tainous areas of Ecuador as being a young married farmer with a few
hectares of land, who has had some elementary education and has an opti-
mist attitude without having illusions. The question of taking an out-
sider or not can only be answered by considering the initiating and
supervising agency and the intended activities. When the agency in-
tends to follow the approach aimed at building up mutual trust, the
best fit would be a promotor originating in the local society. The
group should play an important role in his selection. If, however,
the agency wants to realize quick successes by providing inputs,
credit, and stimulating other agencies and services, an educated ex-
ternal promotor is necessary. In these cases so many arrangements have
to be make - which all open the possibility of abuse and fraud - that

a capable manager is indispensable. He should have authority, internal-
ly and externally.
The selection and training of promotors is thus closely related to
the type of agency, its leadership, and the approach to initiate a
participative group. Government agencies have less freedom in this
matter than NGO's. Whenever they recruit externally they will have to
follow certain rules as laid down by a public service commission.
Sometimes these can be circumvented by recruiting within the service.
In agencies which are headed by workers, recruitment is a subject which
receives little attention. When they need extra staff they tend to
take in people who at that moment show interest and have the right
qualifications for the vacancy. They expect the agencies' image to
result in self-selection among the potential candidates.
The people who feel that they were mistaken will quickly leave.
The agencies of philosophers recruit mainly within their target group.
The process of selection and training is similar to the way a priest
selects mass servants and students for the seminary. Both sides
inquire about each other. Small requests for and offers of help are
made. Gradually the novice becomes part of the agency and gets a small
salary. Training is mainly provided by working as an understudy of an
experienced promotor.
Diplomats painstakingly try to select the best persons for their
agency from a large number of candidates by advertising, interviewing,
formal training, judging recruits during their probation period, etc.
Still the rate of dropouts among the selected candidates may be as
high as 50%. They either leave the agency or have to be dismissed.
This formal procedure in recruitment attracts many people who are not
suited to improvising and carrying out independent tasks under
difficult circumstances. In short it can be said that the different
types of agencies recruit promotors who are replica's of their founders
and directors. In this way they maintain their identity and an 'esprit
de corps'.

The salary that an agency can and wants to pay to its promotors plays
an important role during recruitment of promotors, and even more in
the continuation of their service. In their enthusiasm for participa-

tory development the leaders of the agencies should not forget the following statement by Luykx (1975), when he reviewed his experiences in Comilla: 'Individuals engaged in rural development work have purposes of their own that are largely of a kind different from those of the program or project'. Government agencies usually are bound by the salary scales for all other staff of similar rank and experience. The level of these salaries, and the lack of differentiation according to actual performance, may not stimulate maximum dedication and efforts (Leonard, 1977). Sometimes emoluments like travel allowances or special training courses can provide for the needed differentiation. NGO's have more freedom in these matters, but government salaries are still an important point of reference. Whenever these are higher than those paid by the NGO, promotors will try to become government servants. Employment with a well-known NGO can even be a good recommendation. Jobless educated youths play an important role in the Sarvodaya Shramadama Movement in Sri Lanka. They hope to gain experience which will help them in their careers. Only the very dedicated people remain with the agency.

Apart from the salarylevel, the security of employment which an agency can offer influences the motivation of the promotors. The dependence of NGO's on external contracts and funds makes them insecure employers. Pension funds are almost always absent. For these reasons promotors will sometimes leave an interesting position with an agency for a dull job with the government. Especially the agencies which do not recruit promotors from the target group itself, but employ well-educated people, face these problems.

9. Implications for donors

As we have noted, people belonging to the poorest strata of the rural population hardly ever spontaneously unite in participatory groups. Participative projects need stimulation and supervision by an external agency and its promotors. Especially in the starting phase, lack of mutual trust and uncertainty about the benefits of the new organization are barriers to cooperation. According to their approach in stimulating people to form groups, external agencies can be differentiated

into two categories. The first concentrate on building up mutual trust among the group members; the second try to motivate people by providing a guarantee for the benefits of their cooperation.
The first approach takes much time and shows little spectacular and clearly visible results. The group members have many meetings among themselves and with the promotor. Some acquire the ability to read and write. Sometimes small amounts are saved for a common purpose.
However, in the first years major changes have to occur in the minds of the people concerned, and these are not immediately reflected in improved incomes.
Under the second approach, group formation and cooperation is rewarding to the individual members from the very beginning, by the provision of subsidized inputs, credit, and advice. This approach is rather costly because of the inputs and close supervision. To create permanent cooperation in a group, it is necessary to present an activity that meets a permanent need, such as cash income at a reasonable cost. Few agencies have ready models or technologies which can produce these results. To entice cooperation implies the danger that people show interest mainly because the benefits immediately made available. The intended results of cooperation become of secondary importance.

For a donor willing to stimulate development by participative cooperation, it is difficult to choose between agencies following the first and the second approach. Should it opt for participation for the sake of participation, or select an agency which follows a more active approach? If a donor feels itself pressed to spend substantial amounts of money in a rather accountable way, it would be best to support the second type of agency under the following two conditions: first, the results of the activity being presented to the group should be of real value to members involved. Second, the agency should have developed a model for succesful implementation, which in itself is appealing and convincing. Only when these conditions are met is there a chance that the projects of such groups become self-financing. It is of no use to spread widely a model which is still suffering from growing pains.
The trial-and-error development of a viable activity, which can

perhaps later be extended to other locations, is an entirely different matter. In those cases the trust of the people involved - towards the agency and its promotor and among themselves - is of utmost import- ance. A participative organization structure applies best to these situations. An agency involved in this type of work only needs small donations to carry on its experiments. Still, not all agencies which start on a small scale in a participative way develop a replicable model of income generation. Some do not aim to do so; they are only interested in conscientization and participation. Other agencies fail in their efforts.

A foreign donor should probably not try by itself to implement participative projects. In the past, missionaries have done many good things in this regard. However, present expatriate experts are so different in background, style of living, etc., that during a short contract period they are unable to bridge sufficiently the cultural gap with the poor population groups. Pressure to show results, and the expectations of the population with regard to rich foreigners, entice them to place too high a premium on quick cooperation, which thwarts the original goals. There is no alternative to working through a local agency with local staff, except possibly for an expatriate director or advisor. In this regard more attention should be paid to the possi- bility of a tripartite approach by national government, donor country and a local NGO. The first two parties can take care of the construc- tion of an infrastructure; the latter has as its task the organization and supervision of the population which will make use of the amenities. This approach corresponds with a long-standing method in agricultural development in the Netherlands. Infrastructural facilities and technical advice are provided by the government. Information on economic and social matters is furnished by extension workers of the farmers' own organizations, based on religion and locality. Naturally this method can only be followed in countries with a government sufficiently democratic and self-assured to allow an NGO to play such a role.

Participative groups coordinated by an association or supervising

agency have more functions than those for which they were established, and they can have effects beyond the original purpose.

One of these outcomes can be a contribution to the level of organization in a country. In a study of sixteen primarily Asian countries, Uphoff and Esman (1974) operationalized this term as 'linkage', the extent and effectiveness of communication and interaction between different levels of organization down to the local level, and 'relevance' to rural development functions. They found that the more organized country cases scored substantially higher on a number of indicators of rural development.

Thus, when a rural population is organized in participative groups and associations of these groups, which allow for information and participation in decision-making, a general process of rural development is likely to be facilitated.

References

Bailey, F.S.
Gifts and poison.
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1971.

Barringa, P. et al
The facilitator.
Technical note 11, Ecuador non-formal
education project.
University of Massachusetts, Center for
International Education, undated.

Benor, D. and
J.Q. Harrison
Agricultural extension, the training and
visit system.
Washington, World Bank, 1977.

Devitt, P.
Notes on poverty oriented rural development.
In: Hunter, G. (ed.)
Extension, planning and the poor.
London, Overseas Development Institute,
1977, pp. 20-41.

F.A.O.
Small Farmers Development Manual. Volume I:
field action for small farmers, small
fishermen, and peasants.
Bangkok, 1978.

Galjart, B.F.
Solidariteit onder boeren, een bijdrage tot
de theorie over politieke mobilisering en
samenwerking gebaseerd op veldonderzoek in
Chili.
Wageningen, Landbouwhogeschool, 1973.

Gasson, R.
Farmers participation in cooperative
activities.
In: Sociologia Ruralis, Vol. 17, no. 1,
1977, pp. 107-123.

Grijpstra, B.G.
Common efforts in the development of rural
Sarawak, Malaysia.
Assen, Van Gorcum, 1976.

Jedlicka, A.D.
Organization for rural development, risk
taking and appropriate technology.
New York, Praeger Publishers, 1977.

Jiggins, J.
Motivation and performances of extension
field staff.
In: Hunter, G. (ed.)
Extension, planning and the poor.
London, Overseas Development Institute,
1977, pp. 1-19.

Leonard, D.K. Reaching the peasant farmer, organization theory and practice in Kenya. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1977.

Luykx, N. Purpose and performances in rural development. In: Webster, R. Lyle (ed.) Integrated communication, bringing people and rural development together. Honolulu, East-West Communication Centre, 1975, pp. 52-61.

Norman, A. Pedagogy of the oppressed, a methodology of adult education or a philosophy of development. Reading Rural Development Communications, Bulletin no. 4, 1978.

Oakley, P. Can Jorge do it? Reading Rural Development Communications, Bulletin no. 9, 1980.

Service, E.R. The hunters. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1966.

Shaikh Maqsood Ali The Batasan-Durgapur format for rural development in Bangladesh. In: Rural Development Participation Review, Vol. 2, no. 3, 1981, pp. 18-21.

Stiller, L. and R.P. Yadav Planning for people, a study of Nepal's planning experience. Kathmandu, Tribhuvan University, Research Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, 1979.

Uphoff, N.T. and M.J. Esman Local organization for rural development, an analysis of Asian experience. Ithaca, Cornell University, Rural Development Committee and Department of Government, 1974.

10

POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS:
COMPARING LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF
PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATIONS AND
GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES

*Mario Padrón**

DESCO, Centro de Estudios y Promoción del
Desarollo, Lima, Peru
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague

1. Introduction

Within the last three decades, the growing presence of Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) has increased the scope of development efforts
made by governments and international cooperation. The NGOs are being
gradually considered as important partners for the elaboration, design
and application of development projects (Scott, 1980, p. 16). Moreover,
in addition to this specific function implementing development projects,
the NGOs - being part of the society - also play a role in the
decision-making structures and processes concerning matters of develop-
ment: namely, by letting the voice of underprivileged sectors of that
population be heard, and by criticizing and/or monitoring Governmental
Development Strategies (Padron, 1980). Therefore, it can be understood
that in the international forums regarding the discussion and

implementation of development alternatives, the NGOs have recently
achieved an outstanding position within the so-called "Third Sector"
(outside the public and private sectors) (Szuszkiewicz, 1979).
In daily practice and common speech, this possibility of influencing
decisions is often understood as a "matter of fact", but these
possibilities and limitations in fostering peoples' participation have
not, however, been clearly identified.
The influence and importance of NGOs promoting popular participation
undoubtedly vary according to the socio-political and economic
characteristics of the national contexts (i.e. political regimes)
within which they operate. The overall impact of such contextual
conditioning cannot be denied, but perhaps neither can it be
operationalized to allow a comparative approach. Thus considering that
there are also governmental agencies which try to implement develop-
ment projects, and which often coexist with NGOs acting within the
same country (region, or even locality), we assume - ceteris paribus -
that in every specific historical context, both types of institutions
have to cope with such contextual conditioning; we must try to compare
their relative pros and cons in promoting popular participation
through development projects.
The comparison between non-governmental organizations devoted to
implement development projects (defined below as Private Development
Associations: PDAs) and the Governmental Development Agencies (GDAs),
usually tends to be polarized, jeopardizing one or the other.
Arguments are thus piled up, either referring to the limits of GDAs
(i.e., the fact that they do not answer the needs of the grass-root
levels; lack of flexibility; bureaucratization; low expenditure
capacities; further distance from grass-roots organizations, etc.) or
on the other extreme, pointing out the possible shortcomings of the
PDAs (their narrow approach; small-scale impact; their political
orientations; their leading to eventual disruption of the public order,
etc.).
This article follows an alternative approach, analyzing in comparative
terms the limits and possibilities of both kinds of institutions.
Thus, their role in promoting people's participation through develop-
ment projects is discussed. Beforehand, however, a short description

of the Private Development Associations is provided (2); and of the
Governmental Development Agencies (3); as well as the operationaliza-
tion of the concept of popular participation (4).

Both types of institutions (PDAs and GDAs) are then compared from
concrete experiences, which have been organized as follows: conceptual
factors (5); organizational factors (6) and their development projects
(7). In a final paragraph (8), the article deals with some important
experiences about the relationship between both types of institutions.
Most of the data and the examples provided have been gathered within
the framework of the international debate: "Non-Governmental develop-
ment centres and popular participation", which is being held among
sixty institutions from Third World countries which are actively
involved in development projects. It includes my personal (and
institutional) experience and relevant literature on these topics.

2. The Private Development Associations (PDA)

The private development associations are part of the broad, varied and
somehow confused universe of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
This term (NGO), however, denotes organizations which, although
different from the state apparatus and voluntarily organized, are also
extremely varied among themselves and aiming at diverse goals. NGOs,
thus include universities, research centres, political parties, craft
and union organizations, churches, or social clubs, together with
private associations which work with grass-root levels of the popula-
tion implementing development projects and programmes (U.N., 1980).
This specific form of NGO, which mainly acts through development
projects, is also referred to by various terms, i.e. Voluntary
Organizations (Barclay, 1979, p. 105), Voluntary Associations (Prisma,
No. 16, 1980, p. 3), Voluntary Agencies (Omvedt, 1980), and Develop-
ment Centres (Centros de Desarrollo: de la Rosa, 1979).

We have chosen the term Private Development Associations (PDA) to avoid
confusion with the general denomination (as NGOs) and the various
specific names mentioned above. This is a working concept, which
defines PDAs as private, non-profit voluntary associations, dedicated
to the design, study and implementation of development projects and

programmes at the grass-roots levels.

The PDAs place particular emphasis on direct action-oriented projects; sometimes they combine these activities with research and studies, seeking feedback between research and action. They define as their "target groups" those sectors of the population known as the "marginalized" (i.e. the "exploited", the "poor", the popular sections, the grass-roots, the basis, etc.) and not attended by governments in their demands of basic needs or with respect to their human rights. PDAs are legally constituted (usually known as private associations, non-profit oriented) and part of their financial resources comes from abroad, from the co-financing agencies.

Their efforts promoting popular participation through development projects, as well as the often-envisaged participation of grass-root organizations in their concrete functioning, put the PDAs in an out-standing position in the areas of self-management, self-reliance, participatory efforts, and alternative development strategies. But their contribution to the participatory efforts also goes beyond these spheres. Many of the so-called "change-agents" - both public and private functionaries, technicians and professionals, as well as the "intelli-gentia" directly involved in development efforts - get together in, or have links with the PDAs. Their influence in the larger society and in processes of policy-making can thus be asserted in a multiple perspective: either directly, by working with the grass-roots organiza-tions (unions, political parties, etc.); or acting (their members or the PDA as an institution) as governmental advisers; and/or by publishing the results of their activities (dissemination of their experiences) influencing the mass media. Therefore, it can be said that PDAs are constantly involved, either in institutional terms or through personal commitments of their staff, in the design, implementation and testing of development strategies. Sometimes their contributions refer to one specific aspect of development, but they do also deal with wider and more ambitious development programmes.

PDAs in this respect often channeled the "local" initiatives (i.e. national, regional or local) towards development. In response to challenges coming from their own realities, they look for feasible and historically contextualized strategies, working out specific contribu-

tions which can be understood as native attempts to cope with some of the development's problems.

In their declared goals and specific activities, they usually try (or contribute) to change the social system, (i.e. the "establishment" or the "status quo"), although because of their institutional character, they are also part of that social system. Moreover, they receive financial support from other entities and institutions (usually from abroad). Such a contradictory position in the society gives rise to a permanent and restless effort (by themselves) in identifying their own limits and possibilities in supporting popular participation.

But popular participation, grass-roots movements and organizations, as well as economic and political mobilization of the poor, have received support from PDAs' activities. The question remains whether such support is of a positive nature, or whether (as other social forces would say) the PDAs mainly harm or hinder the political consciousness of the poor. And to answer such a question is crucial to anyone interested in the liberation of men and participation processes.[*]

3. The Governmental Development Agencies (GDA)

Development strategies in Third World countries are usually implemented by governmental institutions or specific Development Agencies. Although being part of the state apparatus to which they formally belong, these GDAs have specific functions related to the elaboration and implementation of development projects according to Government's development strategies.

Such specificity of the GDAs makes them different from other institutions and departments of the state apparatus, i.e. repressive forces, legal institutions, the different ministries and sectors, etc.

Insofar as they are development agencies, their function is not mainly oriented towards the maintenance of "public order" or "internal security", but towards the implementation of development policies defined by the government.

The GDAs usually have specific sources of financing, which are different

[*]Such an answer goes beyond these pages; therefore we remain comparing the PDAs with the GDAs.

from the traditional sources of the state apparatus (national budget).
An important component of their financial certainty is the technical
and financial support received from foreign governments through
bilateral and multilateral agreements. This support is usually given
under specific conditions referred to in development projects or
programmes, stating their aims, goals and means to achieve envisaged
results during a certain period. These forms of funding are considered
within the Terms of the Official Development Aid (ODA) (OECD, 1979).
Given the specificity of the purposes for which they have been created
and the conditions of financial (foreign) support received, the GDAs
usually have a relatively higher level of autonomy than other
governmental institutions. This relative autonomy goes along with other
characteristics, like the presence of foreign experts (also as counter-
parts of the head of the GDA); the establishing of "ad hoc" criteria
for recruitment of their members; different scales of wages and
salaries; special facilities for budgetary operations; specific
material loans (vehicles, offices, office supplies, etc.) and others,
which contribute to differentiate them from other traditional govern-
mental institutions. It might be said, nevertheless, that despite such
relative autonomy the GDAs remain under the direct control and super-
vision of the state apparatus as a whole, which is, however, in terms
of supervision and fiscalization, rather than in their direct opera-
tions and "day-to-day" decision-making and functioning.
The concrete evidences gathered show that GDAs can be found in Third
World countries adopting different forms, i.e.
a. as part of one of the existing public sectors (e.g. within the
   ministry of agriculture, ministry of education, central planning
   institutions, etc.);
b. as specific entities which result from functional decentralization
   and regionalization schemes (e.g. regional development entities, or
   sectorial bodies specialized in health, transport, agriculture or
   some other sector);
c. as "special projects", the name being used to label multi-
   disciplinary teams, operating with higher autonomy from the public
   sector as a whole, and with their own specific budget (usually they
   also have their own headquarters and offices);

d. as parastate institutions, i.e. when they have juridical recogni-
   tion, although they remain linked and formally part of the public
   sector (also known as "decentralised institutions").

A general overview of GDAs' link with the state apparatus leads to the
acceptance that they are part of the state as a whole. They contribute
to the performing of the different functions that the government
carries on in a Third World country.

From the historical materialistic perspective the state is understood
as representing the interests of one social class (in power), and in
this sense the different roles performed by the state and its various
institutions answer to the interests of such class(es), helping to
maintain and reproduce the social system (social formation).

The further elaboration of concepts like the relative autonomy of the
state and the power block (with internal differences) controlling it
(Poulantzas in Roxborough, 1979, pp. 121-124) has enlarged the under-
standing of the (almost mechanical) relationship between the state
apparatus and the social class(es). It provides room to understand the
conflicts and differences that reality provides in the functioning of
different state institutions. This is especially the case for Third
World countries where various governmental institutions compete among
themselves and implement different development strategies. These
Governmental Development strategies can conflict among themselves,
although usually in non-fundamental terms (Kesselman, 1973). Moreover,
this conceptualization also makes it possible to understand the several
reforms and modernization processes carried out by state institutions
(under progressive governments). Without altering the basic features
and social relationships in the society, they have contributed to
change some of their characteristics and institutions, fostering the
dynamics of the social classes.

Pressures arising form the popular sector (by definition, those who
are not in power and who do not reach forms of representation in it)
are usually answered by the state apparatus, not only through its
traditional institutions (i.e. different ministries and sectors) or
through its repressive apparatuses, but also through the implementa-
tion of development projects. These projects attempt to alleviate the
living conditions, contribute to the satisfaction of basic needs, or

to achieve so-called "integral development schemes", including - in some cases as a goal - the participation of popular sectors in the implementation of these projects.

It must be added, however, that also structural approaches (and not necessarily Marxist ones), in analysing the role of the state in development, have pointed out the limits (margins) of state intervention in the development process (ISS, 1979, p. 14). They also assume such a relative autonomy of the state apparatus (from the ruling classes) and therefore the existence and operation of different GDAs in development projects and programmes (Voorhoeve, 1979, pp. 268-270). Recent analyses on these issues already show that a. the line of decision-making within the state apparatus is quite long, complicated, and thus can hardly be opportune (ISS, 1979, pp. 29-35); b. the efficiency and efficacity of the state apparatus in the elaboration and implementation of development projects and programmes is far from the expected results (OECD, 1979).

These shortcomings and difficulties of governments and GDAs implementing development projects (OECD, 1979, pp. 109-115) reach levels of serious concern when contrasted with the enormous volumes (quantitative) of money channeled through them to enhance development efforts. In 1978, for instance, the total flow of economic resources from DAC countries (Development Assistance Committee countries, which include the 17 highly industrialized countries (OECD, 1979, p. 64)) to developing countries was 71.3 billion (U.S.) Dollars. From this figure, only 2% was channeled through non-governmental co-financing agencies, while 28% was done through the Official Development Assistance (OECD, 1979, p. 74).[*] Although some comparisons can be derived from the above-stated definitions of PDAs and GDAs, they are to be contrasted in their limits and possibilities of promoting popular participation through their projects; therefore, an operational concept of popular participation is needed.

[*]The largest amount (70%) represents direct private investments (i.e. private commercial banks and transnational companies), which - it is worth mentioning - have increased their direct investments by 5 times between 1970 and 1978, and were oriented for purely profitable reasons towards the better-off developing countries (OECD, 1979, p. 74).

4. Popular Participation

There is a continuing and extensive discussion on the different ways to
conceptualize participation and the different levels of analysis
attached to them.[*] However, we have chosen an inductive approach (which
also reflects the basic emphasis in these pages), relating participa-
tion to the development projects; and, discussing how participation is
understood by PDAs and GDAs, according to the evidences gathered in
direct interviews and our former experiences.

An operational concept of participation can be built up in terms of a
'continuum', within which four main complementary dimensions can be
arranged. These dimensions are not exclusive, but each of them includes
the former. They are valid to analyse participation a. internally (in
the new organization); b. at the interface between change agency and
organization (the project itself) and also c. at the interfaces with
the local, regional or even national political systems (Galjart, 1981,
p. 145).

The four complementary dimensions are:

a. Passive participation

   This is the initial step in the 'continuum'; participation is under-
   stood as accepting or gaining access to certain concrete benefits
   and/or the immediate amelioration of living conditions (material
   aspects) for those involved in the development project. It can refer
   to specific services or facilities which did not previously exist,
   as well as to the improvement or introduction of new (economic)
   productive forms.

b. Passive/reflective participation

   This type adds to the former one, certain educational activities
   which, transcending mere training, enable the population to under-

[*]For Pateman (1970, p. 68), participation is "the totality of such forms
of upward exertions of power by subordinates in organizations as are
perceived to be legitimate by themselves and their superiors" (Galjart,
1981, p. 145). Roca and Retour (1981), analyzing definitions of 30
theorists, proposed 6 levels (dimensions) to analyse participation: i.e.
a. who participates and over whom do they exert their influence; b.
level of the organizational structure; c. the objectives of participa-
tion; d. the right to participate; e. the subject matter of participa-
tion; and f. forms of participation (pp. 3-12).

stand the causes of both the situation of underdevelopment and the problems that are to be solved by the project. This form of education means acquiring (non-material) knowledge and is usually labelled as "conscientization" or integral education, because its main goal is to make the people conscious and aware of the structural and historical dimensions of the problems they are facing in their daily efforts to survive.

c. Active participation

Being the third step in the 'continuum', this type includes actions towards the organization of the grass-root beneficiaries of the project: to promote (or consolidate) their organization for implementing, conducting and/or following up the project; and to stimulate the participation of people in wider and generalized terms in different spheres of society, which transcends the limit of the beneficiary group itself. This dimension of participation usually includes the presence of a regional (union and/or political) organization, the scope of which extends further than the narrow limits of the development project itself.

d. Active/reflective participation

This is the fourth and most comprehensive form on the "continuum". This step adds to the "active" component, the reflection (evaluation) about the limits and the meaning of the project, within the national context and the historical conditions in which it is casted. It usually includes the design, formulation or testing (evaluation) of alternative development strategies which, starting from the specific topics dealt with in the project, are projected towards society as a whole.

Having so far the main characteristics of the PDAs and the GDAs and these four dimensions of participation, we can proceed to compare the limits and possibilities of both type of institutions in promoting popular participation.

5. Conceptual elements affecting the development projects

Evidence gathered provides a first set of elements which can be under-stood within the realms of conceptual dimensions. They exert a certain

influence, conditioning the development projects themselves, thus being important in their effects, but also in the concrete forms of functioning of both institutions (and their results), not only in their theoretical dimensions.

5.1. The Concept of development

The development projects carried out by GDAs represent one of the various functions of the state. Either implementing or experimenting governmental development policies, answering demands which arose from popular sectors, or calming down their expectations, the GDA's concept of development has to comply with a different instance. The PDAs do not have to bear this situation, considering that their "raison d'être" (razon de ser) is precisely the attention to the popular sector throughtout these development projects.

The legitimacy of the development concepts which underline the projects of GDAs and PDAs is different.
For the case of GDAs, it has to be consistent with the overall governmental development policy. Changes in these policies at governmental level will affect the functioning of the concrete development project as it was originally launched. We can find examples in the cases of Colombia and Peru of this shifting in the national development policies: from redistributive approaches (i.e. reducing the difference between poor and rich), which have been implemented by prior governments, to a second movement in which the emphasis has shifted towards the increasing of production and productivity. This change in the emphasis of the national development policies at the global level also affected various specific development projects which were being carried on by GDAs. Main changes were noticed at least in three aspects:
a. in their financial dimensions and the negotiations with the governmental development aid;
b. new ideas were to be followed (and set up as priority). Human resources already trained were shifted to other governmental institutions;
c. at the level of the project orientations, the methodologies to

promote self-managerial enterprises (Colombian case) and to
consolidate their organizational dimensions (Peruvian case) shifted
towards developing new methodologies for productive schemes and
bookkeeping (in Colombia), and towards increasing production and
credit facilities rather than consolidating their organizational
dimensions (in Peru).

These changes appear as adjusting the policy and priorities of GDAs'
development projects to "catch the wind" (avoiding conflictive argu-
ments) rather than their being derived from specific or openly-stated
directions coming from above. In this respect, the member of the GDA
and its policy-making organizations, perform a process of self-control,
trying to avoid difficulties with higher echelons within the state
bureaucracy to which they belong.

PDAs' legitimacy of development policies, instead, does not derive from
higher decision-making organizations, but at most from the target
groups with which the PDAs are working (or would become the
beneficiaries of the project). Considering that the development policy
of the PDA was initially approved by the co-financing agency supporting
the implementation of the project, and given the fact that PDAs can
introduce any further modification in the course of implementing the
project (eventually only informing the co-financing agency), any
further change introduced during the implementation of the project will
directly answer to the needs of the project itself, rather than to
third parties or other (higher) decision-making bodies.

The development strategies implemented by the GDAs are to be accepted
by the society as a whole as being good for everybody, and thus
satisfying one of the specific functions of the government. No matter
how progressive the regime looks, no matter what the nature is of
innovative or modernization processes to be carried out by governmental
institutions, they will always be seen as representing the establishment
and the status quo, or (at most) changing it in favour of those sectors
of the population which are benefitting most from the government. More-
over, the government itself is commonly perceived as one of the (main)
reasons for the numerous problems within Third World countries.

In this respect the PDAs do not have to bear such a burden. They are
private associations and not necessarily perceived as representing

those social sectors in power (through the government), neither defending the status quo nor the establishment. Moreover, they are able to formulate development strategies, which - contrary to governmental ones - will advance the points of view of the poor, the popular sectors toward whom they orient their activities.

PDAs establish the goals of their development projects with the popular sectors, or at least with those potential beneficiaries of their activities. GDAs, instead, do carry on development projects for the popular sectors, or "on behalf of them". The voluntary nature of the PDAs, in this respect, plays an important role and distinguishes them from the compulsory nature of the development activities carried on by the GDAs.

5.2. Horizontal relationships

This also implies that horizontal relationships with the potential beneficiaries are usually developed with the PDAs (especially when the former approach them on their request) rather than with GDAs, which to a certain extent represent the authority of the government and thus come "from above". Most of the initiatives for implementing development projects at the level of PDAs arose from their (previous) relationship with the potential beneficiaries of those projects. In some cases those preliminary activities are also pre-financed by co-financing agencies from abroad. GDAs' projects, instead, originally sprang from unilateral decisions of governmental institutions, although they can also answer to specific requirements from the local population like in areas of social unrest or extreme poverty conditions, for instance.

5.3. Scope and levels of activity

Evidence shows that GDAs' scope and levels of activity in their projects usually comply with universally accepted criteria within society, and try to reach wider sectors or regions in the country. This sharply contrasts with the local parochial or particular scope of development projects carried on by PDAs ("micro level interventions, primarily outside the governmental framework", Sethi, 1979, p. 112).

5.4. Understanding of "popular participation"

Comparing the understanding of "popular participation" of both institu-
tions, further terms of differentiation can be found. GDAs' develop-
ment projects usually correspond to the first three levels of
participation above mentioned (i.e., Par.4. a. objective results and
access to services, b. conscientization and c. supporting grass-roots
organizations), but they seldom answer to the elaboration or testing of
alternative development strategies (the fourth dimension). Such an
approach seems extremely difficult to be found in GDAs, as far as it
would imply that they are "threatening their own existence, and more-
over, denying the development policies as established by the govern-
ment".

> We found such explicit formulations in GDAs in Peru, which were
> supposed to be promoting self-management schemes (Padron and
> Pease, 1974). But this can also explain certain cases where GDAs
> have promoted (from above) grass-root organizations, which in a
> rather short time became autonomous ones, and openly stated their
> differences with governmental bodies. That would be the example
> of the CNA (National Peasant Confederation) in Peru, which was
> promoted by a GDA (National System to Support Social Mobilization),
> and after an initial period of complete dependence on governmental
> organizations, rapidly developed its own identity and expressed
> (and fought for) its own options, which were not identical to
> those of the military government in Peru.
> The same would be valid for the ANUC (National Association of
> Peasants) in Colombia and the various attempts of the government
> to control its functioning.

5.5. The contents of the message

Throughout the literature and concrete cases analysed, it can be seen
that the contents of the message which is being carried out by the
development projects also play an important role in this respect. This
content refers mainly to the various forms of understanding participa-
tion. Whenever the fourth dimension (alternative strategies, evaluative
aspects, awareness of the limits of the project, etc.) is present, it
will lead to further autonomy of the grass-roots organization, even
when it has been promoted from above. The alternative vision of society
enhancing self-reliance aspects of development is also stressed by

Constantino-David, 1981, p. 17. Whenever self-management or self-determination concepts form part of the content of the message, these will lead to higher degrees of autonomy of the target groups (or at least lead to looking for them).

5.6. Autonomy versus control

There are several examples of supportive structures (e.g. INCORA, the National Institute for Cooperatives and Agrarian Reform in Colombia) which cannot fulfil the functions for which they were created. This is because the basis-organizations tried to avoid a relationship with the government to whom those supportive structures belong and whom they also represent to a certain extent. Grass-roots organizations try to become (or remain) independent from such supportive organizations, which can utterly threaten their autonomy and their searching for alternative development strategies.

Insofar as the PDAs do not represent the government, (neither would they threaten the autonomy of the grass-roots organization or its supportive structure), they tend to be better accepted by the grass-roots organizations to fulfill their functions.

5.7. To whom do they orient their action?

Universal criteria widely accepted in the society are used to identify the potential target groups of GDAs' projects. Whether the beneficiaries are specific constituencies of the dominant political party in power, ethnic groups, or areas which have shown signs of social unrest, the selection of these beneficiaries has to answer to criteria accepted as legitimate by other members in the society. This situation does not necessarily occur for the PDAs' activities, whose members are able to choose and identify the popular sectors with which they work, using rather particularistic criteria (which would coincide, at most, with the co-financing agency which supports its activities).

Insofar as the development strategies implemented by the government constitute an ideology which has to be accepted by the society as a whole (Kesselman, 1973), the GDAs' development projects and the

target-groups to whom they are oriented, have to have a wider
acceptance in society and be understood as being "good for everybody",
a condition which is not required for the activities of the PDAs.
In addition, PDAs' selection of potential beneficiaries of the project
can include grass-roots organizations which: a. are not necessarily
legally recognized; b. can be considered even as alternative to those
sectors which are in power (being usually understood as "the opposition"
to the regimes); c. are able to maintain their self-image as not
collaborating with the status quo.
The GDAs, on the other hand, can seldom work with these types of
grass-roots organizations.
This difference implies a certain advantage and flexibility of action
for the PDAs vis-à-vis the GDAs; however, it also introduces
difficulties in the relationship between both types of institutions.
Political suspicion (often understood as jealousy between public
functionaries and PDAs' technicians), and severe forms of control over
the activities of the PDAs, or even physical intervention, can be
identified in concrete evidences as the results of these differences
between both institutions (see also below in 8).

6. Comparative terms derived from their organizational characteristics

Interviews, our own experiences and reviewed literature provide a
second set of elements mainly derived from organizational
characteristics of both types of institutions. They influence the
functioning of the institutions and the results of the latter's develop-
ment projects, trying to promote people's participation.

6.1. Relative autonomy

From the point of view of the decision-making structure, which
determines priorities to establish a project's policies, the relative
autonomy of the institution (whether GDA or PDA) becomes a crucial
issue. The relative autonomy varies both from country to country, and
within the same country, from period to period in historical terms
according to the type of government and strategies of dominant sectors

which hold the control of the state. In spite of the possibility of
GDAs having a certain level of autonomy vis-à-vis the central govern-
ment and its development policies, and the theoretical considerations
which can allow such a space to formulate their own priorities, the
civil servants have to deal with several forces to whom they are
accountable in their actions. It frequently happens that one can find
several factions (or segments) within the dominant group controlling
the state, rather than one monolithic body. Such internal differences
in the "power bloc" are often also expressed throughout the different
governmental administrative units, ministries, and institutions.*
On the other hand, the civil servants (in the GDAs) have to answer to
the expectations of popular sectors and their organized possibilities
of exerting pressure; and also to the various ideologies of development
within the society and to other social pressures (i.e. mass media,
intellectuals, churches or other non-governmental organizations).
The PDAs can be more independent in this respect and thus gain a higher
level of relative autonomy vis-à-vis those other social forces. They
answer to less factors which can control them or force them to introduce
changes in their policies and in their criteria for the selection of
development projects. This could explain (as one possible factor) why
several cases of grass-roots organization or supportive structures,
initially supported by governmental agencies, tend to shift to
non-governmental bodies.

> Several cases of institutions which, after being initially
> promoted by governmental agencies, became private can illustrate
> this point (i.e. the Fund to support self-managerial enterprises
> in Colombia lately organized as a private institution).

6.2. Time investment in internal clashes and differences with other institutions

Insofar as the GDAs are part of the state bureaucracy, they spend a
good deal of their efforts and daily activities in internal clashes and

*Petras and Laporte (1971) found a peculiar form of such a
"political arena" within different governmental institutions and
ministries during the Peruvian Military Regime (1969-1971), when other
political spaces (i.e. parliament, or political parties) could not exist.

differences with other levels and institutions of the state apparatus.

   Examples analysed in Colombia, Peru and the Philippines showed
   that more than 35% of their time and efforts were devoted to these
   issues, being thus distracted from those activities originally
   envisaged in the development projects.

The PDAs do not have to deal with this kind of problem, for they are
independent in themselves. However, there are at least three main
reasons which motivate a certain deviation of their energies and which
also create internal problems hindering the results of their develop-
ment projects.
Within the same PDA one can often find differences in points of
view and attitudes of the members, between the "intellectuals" and the
"promotors"; or between those members of the PDA who are mainly
oriented towards research and intellectual activities, and those who
are mainly dealing with technical aspects and working at the fieldwork
level.
Moreover, there are differences within the PDAs members which
indicate various ideological and political orientations; the
differences also introduce points of conflict within the institution.
However, providing the (predominantly) "horizontal" terms of relation-
ship between their members, and the possibilities to discuss these
issues on democratic grounds, the PDAs usually manage to solve these
problems, and moreover, obtain the benefits of the different points of
view expressed by their own members.
Finally, (and also at the institutional level) there are differences
arising from difficulties in coordinating and integrating the
different lines of activities within the PDAs (either action and
research, or several development projects being implemented at the same
time). This particular combination of activities, although enriching
the scope and action possibilities of the PDA insofar as the institution
does not settle the terms of relationship and coordination within itself,
can also introduce difficulties and divert main efforts from the
implementation of development projects.

6.3. The organizational flexibility

The organizational flexibility to define (or redefine) new goals of the
institution constitutes another important difference. PDAs tend to be
more flexible for this kind of decision, given their relative indepen-
dence and their not having to answer to so many different levels and
forces, as is the case of GDAs.
The PDAs, however, face the danger of an extreme "goal diffusion",
which threatens the efficiency and efficacity of their results (De
Nitish, 1979).

6.4. The size

The size of both institutions introduces another comparative dimension.
PDAs are often small (between 4 to 10 members) or medium-sized (up to
25 members) and very seldom one finds cases of large institutions
(above 30 members).

> These figures are provided from cases analysed in Colombia, Peru
> and the Philippines, Indonesia, India, Kenya and Tanzania.
> However, there are also examples of large PDAs in those countries,
> i.e. one case in Peru (46 members) or one case in Bangladesh
> (more than 400 members).

The GDAs usually are larger, and being part of the state-apparatus,
they have to cope with a larger bureaucracy. This has an immediate
effect on the decision-making structures which are much more complicated
and time-consuming, and for their higher overhead costs, which derive
precisely from their larger sizes (OECD, 1979, p. 113). Once more, these
aspects place the PDAs in better comparative terms than the GDAs
insofar as PDAs are able to operate with lower budgets and financial
requirements, and with more agile and flexible procedures for decision-
making.

6.5. Financial support

PDAs usually have many more difficulties finding financial support to
initiate their development projects than the GDAs, which usually start

to operate only when they have assured their financial requirements (often via bilateral or multilateral agreements). However, the situation is reversed once they are settled and their budgets approved. PDAs will then have a certain guarantee of operating with the financial support already conceded (at least while the project lasts). This is not the case for the GDAs, which usually have to deal every year with national priorities in terms of budget composition, thus having to compete with other governmental institutions to assure their financial requirements. This situation of uncertainty affects the functioning of the GDAs in that respect; and moreover, they are being forced to show immediate and concrete, measurable (quantitative) results which can be used as parameters to guarantee further financial support from the national budget (OECD, 1979, p. 113-115).

6.6. Recruitment

As far as the recruitment of the members is concerned, the PDA usually tries to combine two criteria: attitude and aptitude. They tend to recruit their members considering not only their professional capabilities (aptitudes) but also (and often more importantly) their commitment (attitude) towards the popular sector with whom they will work while implementing the project. GDAs usually recruit civil servants already working within the state-apparatus, in other institutions or departments. When they recruit new members, the professional qualifications, curriculum vitae, and other technical considerations tend to be more important than their attitudes or commitment to the popular sectors. In this respect they have to answer once more to the universalistic criteria rather than to particularistic ones, as in the case of PDAs.

5.7. Initiatives

Initiatives to improve the work, to modify its functioning, or to introduce new (experimental) approaches are usually welcomed within the rather democratic internal structure of the PDAs. Rigidity and verticality, which often characterize GDAs' organizational structure, impede these possibilities of promoting and accepting the initiative of

its own members. To a certain extent they are being forced to fulfill
the targets already settled at the beginning of the year, being less
concerned with the quality of the work rather than with quantitative
dimensions of it, which are required to justify their existence and to
show positive results.

6.8. Job satisfaction

The job satisfaction criterion for PDAs' members is not often a
question of wages, but it includes a strong component of personal
satisfaction and the feeling of performing certain tasks to aid popular
sectors. This is obviously linked with the "attitude/aptitude" criteria
chosen for their recruitment. It also conditions an attitude of close-
ness to the popular sectors, where symbols of prestige or professional
status are not needed (as in the case of GDAs' members) to find either
job-satisfaction or the criterium of high wages.

> In five different regions in Peru (between 1973 and 1975), when-
> ever I posed the question of "why are you doing this work", 8 out
> of every 10 members of GDAs produced as the first answer, "because
> I am paid for doing it"; while in PDAs, the majority of the cases
> (6 to 8 out of every 10) answered, "because we have committed our-
> selves with the grass-roots organizations to do it so".

7. Comparison at the project level

Although most of the above-mentioned elements of comparison become
concretized at the project level there are also specific aspects that
are referred to the development project itself (under its different
aspects, i.e. elaboration, implementation, and evaluation), which also
provide a framework for the comparison.

7.1. Potential beneficiaries

With respect to the potential beneficiaries of the project, it has been
mentioned above that the PDAs select their target groups using their
particular and own criteria, rather than universalistic ones and those
accepted by the different sectors in society, as appears to be the case
for the GDAs. In this respect, PDAs usually have the support of the

popular sector with whom they will work, before initiating their
activities in that particular area. This situation is completely
different from most of the GDAs' projects, which rather have to look
for the acceptance (and in this sense the "participation") of those
popular sectors. To a certain extent, the project comes from outside
to be brought to the popular sector (or grass-roots organization),
whose participation is something to be gained by the GDA. Special
emphasis is therefore placed on different techniques and methods to
make such a "participation" possible, a kind of concern which does not
affect the PDAs that much, because it has gained such acceptance
beforehand.

7.2. Autonomy of the grass-roots organization

The problem of the autonomy of the grass-roots organization (either
promoted, or already existent) to decide about the project and its
implementation, is seldom faced by the PDAs; this is because very often
one of the goals of the projects is precisely the transference of the
main activities to the promoted organization itself and its
self-reliant further functioning. This situation does not appear so
often in the case of GDAs' projects.

> As we have seen in different examples, housing schemes exist where
> the dwellers must fight to express their own opinion vis-à-vis the
> governmental structures (in India, ASAG, 1981); or there are
> agrarian reform and rural settlement schemes where the peasants
> themselves have to accept certain models imposed from above, rather
> than expressing their own opinions about how to organize themselves
> and cultivate the land (case of the Peruvian agrarian reform;
> Padron and Pease, 1974).

7.3. Formulation of the development project

The formulation of the development project in the case of GDAs tends to
be more sophisticated and elaborated, having to cope with - universally
approved - technical criteria, and allowing therefore fewer
possibilities for participation of the grass-roots level. This is also
reflected in feasibility studies, technical qualifications, and the
universally approved development policies of the government. This is

not the case of PDAs' projects, although in certain cases (i.e. when referred to economy-oriented and reproductive projects) they also have to elaborate feasibility studies. In any case, the major observed difference between PDAs and GDAs remains in the possibility and room which they leave to the popular sectors in order that they may participate directly in the elaboration of the project before its final approval by the financial agency.

7.4. Design of the development project

The design of the project, in the case of the PDAs, usually sets a definite life span of the project, and smaller amounts of money are implied when compared with those of the GDAs.
Relatively smaller amounts of money are needed for development projects to be implemented by PDAs, which constitutes in itself an advantage (OECD, 1979, p. 114-115). Additionally, the design of the project usually considers a particular period and a concrete form to transfer such a project to the promoted organization, criteria which are used by co-financing agencies to define their priorities. This is not necessarily seen in most of GDAs' cases, which would tend to continue themselves, acting as supportive structures, rather than to concede a total autonomy to the promoted organization.

7.5. Scope of the development project

The scope of the development projects promoting participation is wider and much more ample in the case of GDAs than in the case of PDAs. Therefore, GDAs' projects can reach wider sectors of the population (or at least aim at such), and in this sense it can be said that they are nationally oriented more often than the PDAs, which are mainly locally oriented. This does not exclude, however, certain PDAs' projects which try to reach either regional dimensions or sectorial aspects within society (i.e. health, agriculture, urban settlements, etc.). Therefore, one can observe that the impact in terms of dimensions and scope of the project itself is wider in the case of GDAs. In those cases where GDAs have implemented projects to promote basis participation at a national scale, they have reached wider sectors of the population, although

most of the participation finally promoted meant a direct opposition
to the GDAs and the governmental schemes which they represented.

> As it happened in Peru between 1972 and 1978, where a GDA
> (SINAMOS), acting under the military regime, was meant to support
> the organization of the population; and whenever the latter
> became organized, these organized sectors of the population began
> to oppose the SINAMOS itself, trying to defend their own
> initiatives and points of view, rather than those of the govern-
> ment to which the GDA belonged.

7.6. Financial support for development projects

In terms of the financial support for development projects, one of the
criteria used by the co-financing agencies to decide their support to
PDAs, consists precisely in asking whether the basis population has
participated in the elaboration of the project, and whether it would
participate in the project's implementation and evaluation. Most of the
"questionnaires" of co-financing agencies include such a question. This
is not necessary the case of the GDAs' projects' sources of financing,
which will rather look for the acceptance of those projects by the
population which will be the beneficiary of the project.

7.7. People's participation in financing

From the point of view of the people's participation in financing the
various activities included in development projects, no differences can
be found. Both types of institutions usually require certain forms of
"own contribution" from the grass-roots as concrete means to stimulate
their commitment to the project. In both cases it could be argued that
the impoverished sectors of the population have to pay for (either by
contributing with their labour or in kind) the benefits and living
facilities which other sectors in the society have acquired without
charge (i.e. housing schemes, electricity, water supply, transport,
services, etc.).

7.8. Implementation of the development project

The implementation of the development project in the case of GDAs

usually requires the acceptance of the local power structures, which should be convinced of the importance and usefulness of the project. Moreover, they control the behaviour and activities of the "local promotors" (GDAs' change agents) and can easily get in touch with higher instances in the decision-making structure within the bureaucracy.

> This was the case of several projects which, during the implementation of a national agrarian reform scheme in Peru (1969 to 1979), failed or were doomed to benefit only the well-off people in the rural areas, who constantly threatened the local promotors (from GDAs) to denounce them to their superiors as subversive and acting against the latter's interests.

This is not the case of the PDAs, which do not have to gain such an acceptance from the well-off sectors of the local or regional power groups. However, it implies at the same time potential conflict situations with the power groups, which in the long term can threaten the PDAs' presence in the region.

7.9. Methodology for the implementation

In terms of the methodology for the implementation of the project, the GDA usually has to consider the possibilities of replicability of the project, as well as its further generalization at national level; these things will give the projects a 'pilot' character. The PDA's methodology, on the other hand, stresses the possibilities of transferring the project to the promoted organization, rather than generalization or replicability criteria. In this respect the PDA's project remains valid more in terms of its final results, rather than for its acceptance and further possibilities of generalization (as in the case of GDAs).

7.10. Innovativeness

Most of the evidences gathered also show that PDAs projects are far more innovative than GDAs for introducing new forms and new experiences. The higher levels of institutional flexibility, freedom

for experimentation, and its own position within society, answering to those popular sectors with whom they are committed rather than to other social forces in society, allowed the PDAs to develop such innovative approaches (OECD, 1979, p. 113).

7.11. Self-evaluation

The increasing tendency of PDAs to include direct action together with research (or study) dimensions, allows them to maintain a permanent level of self-evaluation of their functioning and of the results which are being reached. This is not the case with GDAs' projects, which seldom include such a research component; nor are GDAs able to concede certain levels of participation of the target groups themselves in the continuous evaluation of the activities being carried on. But the ongoing evaluation is not only important in itself (i.e. promoting and enabling additional forms of participation) but especially in terms of the often-required modifications to be introduced in the project. The PDAs are usually in a better position to modify the project or to introduce required shiftings in its functioning than the GDAs, who have to answer to wider criteria and a far more complicated decision-making structure.

7.12. Evaluation of the project

The evaluation of the project, in the case of the PDAs, stresses the emphasis on the project itself, and how does the latter answer the expectations of the target groups involved. Most evaluations of GDAs have to answer to general orientations and governmental development policies rather than the target groups themselves. Although both types of institutions need to be evaluated with respect to (a) their efficiency (in their own functioning), (b) efficacity (in reaching the target groups and implementing the originally envisaged measures) and (c) legitimacy (impact in wider society which transcends the project itself) (Starodubb, 1981); the role played by forces which are outside of the relationship between change agency and beneficiary population are much lower in the case of PDAs than in the case of GDAs. In this

respect GDAs' local development projects are to be considered as part
of a whole (i.e. government development policies), while PDAs' projects
are themselves analysed (and at most on the three above-mentioned
dimensions).

Comparing the roles of governmental development agencies (GDAs) and
private development associations (PDAs), the experiences and concrete
evidences gathered show that insofar as quantitative dimensions are
concerned (width and scope of popular participation at the national
level), the GDAs have better chances to promote such participation.
PDAs, in their turn, have apparently greater chances in qualitative
terms, reaching through their projects' deeper and more comprehensive
forms of popular participation. Participation of popular sectors means,
therefore, not only dimensions of a. immediate and concrete results,
b. education and knowledge, and c. organization to pursue their own
initiatives, but also a fourth dimension, namely d. the evaluation of
the project (and its limits), and the possibility of formulating
alternative development strategies which would express their own points
of view and priorities.

8. Relationships between PDAs and GDAs

From the various concrete experiences of relationships between PDAs and
GDAs, three main forms of relationships can be identified.
a. The PDAs cooperate with GDAs, either to implement specific schemes,
or to experiment with new forms and experiences of promoting peoples'
participation. In this case the relationship depends mainly upon the
formal agreements between both types of institutions, and upon concrete
mechanisms to solve differences and any possible matter of controversy.
However, at the fieldwork level, it does not avoid concrete clashes
between lower echelons of their members (i.e. local social promotors),
who easily develop forms of competition and/or "loyalties" to their own
respective institutions. This situation is successfully avoided in
those cases where both teams have merged under a single line of
decision-making at the local level.
b. The PDAs act by themselves, although they may have had an initial

approval of each development project by some governmental body. This
implies a situation of tolerance from the GDAs and governmental levels
for the PDAs' activities, and does not require commitments to cooperate
in the implementation of governmental development policies. Besides the
formal approval of their projects by some governmental institution, a
certain level of interrelationship with GDAs cannot be denied, insofar
as they act within the same society and orient themselves towards the
same potential beneficiaries. PDAs have to take governmental bodies
(and GDAs) into account in order to design and implement their own
institutional policies. Whether it is intended or not, the results of
the PDAs' development projects are often used by governmental
institutions to push forward their own development schemes. For
instance, they try to generalize the results achieved by the PDAs'
development projects to wider areas in the society. Several of these
efforts to borrow the results of the PDAs' activities have shown
serious difficulties, if not complete failure.

> An example is the case of Indonesia (BIMAS Agricultural Develop-
> ment Project), where in trying to cover wider sectors in society,
> governmental institutions had to cope with very many different
> variables and problems which were not present at the level of
> PDA activity. (In addition, problems regarding their extended
> decision-making structure, as well as their lesser flexibility and
> distance from grass-roots sectors, appear when the GDAs tried to
> implement similar schemes as those of the PDAs.) Another example
> of difficulties in this respect is provided by the Peruvian
> attempts by GDAs trying to replicate the methodology of
> implementing rural settlements during the Agrarian Reform period.
> One PDA, with direct participation of the peasantry and during a
> period of 7 months, successfully managed to design and implement
> one Rural Development Programme (PIAR) which included one central
> cooperative and nine integrated basic production units. The GDA
> passed instructions to all governmental departments to repeat such
> a final scheme. As a result, in less than three months, more than
> 34 other PIARS were organized in reformed lands regardless of
> their sizes, quality of lands, the former organizations, the
> interests and expectations of the people already working there;
> and even new enterprises were created where they did not exist
> before.

But this situation of 'borrowing' the results of the PDAs' activities
can be also applied to their criticisms on governmental development
policies. Governmental institutions can use them to improve (provided

they are interested), following the suggestions mentioned in those
criticisms. This can be done regardless of the intention (of coopera-
tion or not) of the PDA which stated such criticism. Such has been the
case of relatively progressive and/or populistic governments, which
tried to gain wider constituencies or legitimate themselves through
progressive and modernizing reforms.

At local levels the competition problems appeared to be more frequent
between PDAs and GDAs. They arise usually from professional jealousy
or because of competition for the interests and support of the same
target groups (to be gained as their constituencies). Political
suspicion of being against the establishment or specifically against
the development policies stated by governmental institutions is also a
common fact in their relationship. Insofar as the origin of the
clashes is not located at the very roots of the existing power
structure (and thus impossible to be solved in the following ways, the
conflicts have been successfully overcome by permanent dialogue,
periodical discussions, and establishing formal agencies to coordinate
their actions in the same region. However, there is the risk of the
PDA being identified with the GDAs by the local population, (a situation
which must be clearly understood, because it tends to appear rather
rapidly).

The evidence provided from the analysed cases has shown that the
relationships of competition tend to diminish whenever the PDAs are
involved in development programmes which are restricted to productive or
material types of activities. This is not the case for PDAs' projects
oriented to bridge gaps of access to public services (housing, urban
facilities, or health, etc.); or oriented to promote educational
dimensions (conscientization); neither for those which support
organizational schemes of the popular sectors, or - moreover - when
their projects also include alternative development strategies to be
tested. Technically oriented PDAs tend to be more easily trusted by
GDAs than those that are redistributively or socially and politically
oriented, insofar as they do not challenge the status quo. In this
latter case their relationships are very difficult and the 'tolerating'
terms of understanding can easily disappear, giving way to a frontal
opposition, accusations and the threatening of the PDAs' team members,

and even of their physical safety.

c. Relationships in terms of opposition can be found only with
already-existing PDAs. This opposition is usually expressed by rumours
(spread by governmental institutions within the target groups, about
the PDAs being distrusted by government); or by using mass media and
similar means to discredit them. It can also be done through indirect
pressures (i.e. extremely accurate fiscalization and controlling their
activities or their bookkeeping systems, etc.) and through banning the
PDAs from the legal associations' registers, and finally (but un-
fortunately not infrequently), through physical violence and repression
against their members. Whenever conflicts have arisen on these levels,
we have found and experienced successful terms of solution (successful
for the PDAs) in the openly-expressed support of the grass-roots organ-
izations with which the PDA was working. Although it usually demands a
great deal of energy and monetary resources (e.g. to finance mass media
campaigns), they can successfully match actions launched against the
PDAs acting in the same region. This openly-expressed support of the
popular sectors has proved to be more effective than the PDA trying to
defend itself. International solidarity links with NGOs and other
similar agencies have also been relatively effective as in the recent
case of the coup d'état in Bolivia, and the support which several PDAs
received from European organizations, avoiding thus further repressive
measures from the state apparatus. The evidence provided in this
article was mainly centered around the idea of identifying and pointing
out the relative advantages and limits of both types of institutions
(PDAs and GDAs) in promoting popular participation, and the different
aspects which can be shown as conditioning these limits and
possibilities. Such a perspective does not compare both institutions to
justify a certain (moralistic) option of 'one being better than the
other'. Attempts at showing 'how good PDAs are' (and 'how bad GDAs are')
have been indirectly fostered by co-financing agencies, which apparently
had to justify themselves and their function within their own societies
to strengthen their own role of channelling development aid funds,
which otherwise would go through the bilateral (or other forms of
governmental) or international development aid. In our experience such
an approach is often unrealistic, insofar as a comparison can only be

established considering specific and comparable parameters. Therefore, we have chosen those terms of reference to compare them, namely, the goals at which they aim (and they both have different basic assumptions regarding their development concepts and approaches, as we have said above); and/or their nature and functions in the society as a whole. Their understanding of participation also has a definite role in this comparison and in the establishing of their limits and possibilities in promoting people's participation. Additional aspects were discussed, knowing that they differ from each other in their organizational features, and also in the concrete forms of elaborating, implementing and evaluating their development projects.

Results thus obtained (from concrete experiences and specific comparable parameters) can be used for policy-oriented conclusions, and for a better service to the popular sectors. However, the final test of both GDAs and PDAs lies in the grass-roots organizations them-selves, and in their own practice, rather than in ideological, technical or allegedly 'scientific' considerations.

References

ASAG and SELAVIP   Summary of a seminar on sheltering the poor.
            Ahmedabad, India, ASAG, May 1981, (mimeo
            37 pp.).

Barclay, A.H. Jr.   The development impact of private voluntary
            organizations.
            In: Development Digest, Vol. XVII, no. 3,
            July 1979, pp. 105-124.

Constantino-David, K.   Issues in community organization.
            In: IFDA Dossier 23, May/June 1981, pp.
            5-20.

De la Rosa Medellin,   Promoción popular y lucha de clases
Martin   servicios educativos populares.
            Mexico, SEPAC, 1979.

De Nitish, R.   Organising and mobilising: some building
            blocks of rural work organizations.
            Delhi, paper (unpublished?), 1979.

Galjart, Benno   Participatory development projects: Some
            conclusions from research.
            In: Sociologia Ruralis, Vol. XXI, no. 2,
            1981, pp. 144-157.

Institute of Social Studies Research Programme.
            The Hague, 1977.

Kesselman, R.   Las estrategias de desarrollo como ideolo-
            gias.
            Mexico, Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1973.

O.E.C.D.   Development co-operation: 1979 review
            (Efforts and policies of the members of the
            Development Assistance Committee).
            Paris, Organization for Economic Co-opera-
            tion and Development, 1979.

Omvedt, Gail   New strategies of the bourgeoisie.
            In: Frontier, Journal.
            Delhi, January 5th, 1980.

Padron, M. and H. Pease Planificación rural, reforma agraria y
            organización campesina.
            Peru, DESCO, 1974.

Padron, M.   Organizaciones no-gubernamentales desarrollo
            y participación popular.
            Costa Rica, Conferencia Latinoamericana de
            Autogestion, Junio 1980.

Petras, J. and J. Laporte   Peru, transformación revolucionaria o modernización?
Buenos Aires, Ed. Amorrurtu, 1971.

Voluntary Associations and People's Participation in Development.
In: PRISMA, The Indonesian Indicator, no. 16, Jakarta, March 1980, pp. 3-10.

Roca, Santiago and Didier Participation in enterprise management:
Retour   Bogged down concepts.
In: Economic and Industrial Democracy, Sage, London and Beverly Hills, Vol. 2, 1981, pp. 1-26.

Roxborough, I.   Theories of underdevelopment.
London, Macmillan, 1979.

Scott, Bob, Chip Lyons   NGO Briefer.
and Beth Heisey   11th Special Session of the General Assembly, Aug.-Sept. 1980.
New York, NGO Liaison Service, 1980.

Sethi, Harsh   Rural development: Alternative strategies.
In: Das, A. and V. Nilakant (eds) Agrarian relations in India Manohar.
New Delhi, 1979, pp. 95-112.

Starodub, Linda   Evaluation and non-governmental organizations.
In: ICVA News (International Council of Voluntary Agencies), no. 88, January 1981, pp. 33-37.

Szuszkiewicz, J.S.   Can they do it: Participation of NGOs of Third World countries in NIEO-oriented projects.
In: IFDA Dossier, no. 10, Aug. 1979.

United Nations   Non-governmental organizations associated with the department of public information.
NGO/DPI list, doc. no. 80-45803, May 1980.

Voorhoeve, J.J.C.   Peace, profits and principles; a study of Dutch foreign policy.
The Hague, Nijhoff, 1979.

11

DISSECTION OF AN ALTERNATIVE
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Benno Galjart

Institute of Cultural and Social Studies
University of Leiden

1. Introduction

In the spring of 1975 the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation
- DGIS hereafter - received two project proposals from Sena in Colombia.
Sena was - and is - the government organization which provides all kinds
of professional training, to farmers as well as secretaries, to indus-
trial labourers as well as hotel personnel. Training was mostly given
in permanent schools and centres throughout the country. There were,
however, also mobile training programmes, one for rural areas (and
skills) and one for urban areas. Both programmes had put in project
proposals, but they were different.

One asked for assistance in the field of sociology or social work to
help in an effort to be undertaken by Sena for improving the internal
organization and, hence, the economic results of various existing col-
lective farms. The other asked for assistance in the planning and es-
tablishment of small urban self-managed enterprises, which would alle-
viate unemployment. After a good deal of consultation the two projects
were amalgamated. DGIS would sent out a team of experts who, together
with Sena-counterparts, were to do three things: actually set up a num-
ber of small, self-managed enterprises in both urban and rural areas;
carry out an investigation of already-existing cooperative enterprises,

agricultural as well as industrial; and identify the variables crucial
for success. This combination of practice and research would enable
the team to write a manual on how to establish self-managed enterprises.

The project started in the autumn of 1976 and ended, after a second
phase, in July 1981. As a member of a fitfully-functioning steering
committee on the Dutch side, I was able to follow the project more or
less closely.

There are so many questions that can be asked of an ambitious develop-
ment effort like the PMUR-project, as it came to be called, that it
is necessary to choose rather carefully which ones to ask.
What can be learned from it ? I shall deal with three aspects in par-
ticular, namely the dysfunction in the performance of the bureaucracies
involved on the Dutch and Colombian sides, the final results, and an
assessment of the development potential of the promotion of small, self-
managed enterprises.

2. The implementation: first phase

For DGIS the reformulation of the Colombian proposals made PMUR into
one of the few projects specifically oriented towards its target-groups,
the categories of urban and rural poor. The promotion of self-managed,
cooperative activities even could be taken to imply laying the founda-
tions for a future structural change of Colombian society. The aims of
the project were to enhance employment, income and social participation
of the target-groups. This fitted the new policy lines laid down by
the Minister of Development Cooperation like a glove.

Probably because of this, DGIS decided not to turn the project over to
a consultancy firm - although this had been done with one of the iden-
tification missions - but to form a team of its own. Behind this de-
cision other considerations may or may not have played a role. The con-
sultant involved acted as if the project meant the promotion of small
industries and nothing more, downplaying the element of self-management.
The two outside social scientists involved in the elaboration of the

project held that this aspect complicated matters very much, and that
not only the consultancy firm but also the Netherlands lacked experts
in this field. My own point of view was that if this particular approach
to employment creation proved feasible, DGIS would start receiving pro-
ject proposals of a similar nature from many countries and would urgent-
ly need people with such expertise.

Anyway, DGIS started to assemble a team of its own. Altogether, eleven
persons were selected, most of them rather young and enthusiastic.
All had previous experience in developing countries, but few had worked
in participatory projects. As circumstances would have it, the team
leader was the last one to be selected. As the team was already large,
my request to include someone with experience in the field of ap-
propriate technology was refused.
In spite of a special training programme of a fortnight to which the
team was subjected - and which primarily dealt with problems regarding
self-management - once in Colombia the team began to have discussions
about its task. What had appeared to be clear on paper gave rise to
endless talk. Soon afterward the first conflict broke out, as a result
of which one member was transferred to another project.

The discussions centered around two topics: the best methods to carry
out the reconnaissance survey of existing collective enterprises, and
the relative importance of social participation versus the other two
goals of the project. With regard to the investigation, an elaborate
questionnaire was produced; but the diversity of the enterprises en-
countered proved it to be too rigid, so that it was not used consistently
in the forty-odd enterprises that were investigated. As for social par-
ticipation, did this mean, for instance, that the team would only promote
self-managed enterprises and not cooperatives which might employ a driver
or a salesgirl as a simple wage-labourer ? Did it mean that all decisions
were to be left to the groups that showed an interest in the collective
production of some article ?

These discussions were not only due to the complexity of the work but
also to a lack of leadership. Toward the end of January 1977 the

Colombian counterparts began to take part in the discussions. They
were bewildered by the participatory atmosphere that differed so much
from the hierarchy they were accustomed to. After the initial investi-
gation in which all members had participated, the team had been split:
the largest part was stationed in Medellin and had as its taks the
actual promotion of self-managed enterprises; four members, who were
to work at the national level with regard to finance, marketing and
further research, lived in Bogotá, as did the team leader. Neither he
nor his Colombian counterpart visited Medellin more frequently than
once a month, as a result of which the Medellin team went more or less
its own way. Undoubtedly, the fact that Sena's cumbersome administrative
prodedures led to delays before permission was granted to make trips
aggravated matters. But instead of shrugging this off, the team leader
started to complain about Sena's cooperation.

With the benefit of hindsight, my conclusion is that the entire team
was suffering, not only from its own relative inexperience, but also
from mistakes made by those who had formulated the project.
One of the ideas incoporated in the project - originating with the
consultancy firm - was that the field team would set up an enterprise
every four months, as if these came from a conveyor belt. This image
of men in shirt-sleeves was behind the constitution of a large team
of specialists.
In Medellin, for instance, there was both an agricultural and an urban-
industrial sub-team, each consisting of a management expert, an econo-
mist and a sociologist. One training officer was to serve both sub-
teams. In reality, the activities which eventually were to lead to
the establishment of an enterprise, did not conform to the neat time-
schedule and the division of work into specialized tasks.
For instance, it was necessary to select, one way or another, the areas
which were to be approached. In both phases of the project this exer-
cise took a lot of time, because it had to be based on a perusal, how-
ever rapidly made, of available information on resources, resource use
and population characteristics. It had to be done as a team effort, as
the next step could not be taken before an area was selected. The next
step, obviously, was finding or forming groups which wanted to begin a

self-managed enterprise. Only gradually it turned out that one of the
implicit early assumptions - namely that the groups of people who
received training under Sena's mobile programmes would suit our pur-
pose - was wrong. These groups, first of all, were formed for the
occasion of the training, and could hardly be called groups.
Their enthusiasm could be easily raised by the instructor, but their
mood was not a firm basis of cohesion. Moreover, the instruction did not
bring them up to the minimal standards required for the production of
an article. Yet Sena regulations required instruction to be given to a
class of a least twelve persons; and to give a second course to the
same people was considered wasteful. That left two possibilities. Forming
new groups, or finding ones that already existed. These alternatives
were discussed heatedly in the Medellin team, since the latter had the
impression that existing groups were, at least in some cases, political-
ly more motivated and conscious than the population at large. Also,
such conscious groups could be formed by approaching the peasant move-
ment at the regional level. Most of the groups with which the team
started working, however, were new ones.
The third step, that of finding a suitable product, included a pre-
feasibility and a feasibility study. As it turned out, this step had to
be taken at the local or sub-regional level. The earlier idea that it
would be possible to construct a list of viable products on the basis
of national statistics proved to be erroneous (although such a list
was produced). If a group was planning to produce leather belts, it
was better that it made some of these during the training course and
then tried to sell them in Medellin shops. Reality, in short, not
only did not conform to plans, but it also clashed with the specialized
expertise and the supposed division of work of the team members. At
the lowest level, that of change agent, one had to have an understanding
of the sociological, economic and technical problems involved. The
Medellin team adapted to this exigency by working in teams of two or
three people with a certain degree of de-specialization. In theory, how-
ever, the work was directed from Bogotá, so this independence created
problems. (Not surprisingly, these problems, which I now impute to
the groping, implicit efforts to understand a very complex process, ap-

peared at the time to be based on personality clashes. The entire team even participated in a three-day sensitivity training to overcome them). In a way, my foregoing description of the first four steps involved falsifies matters in itself, since conclusions which were drawn in the course of a year's work are presented as if they became rapidly visible.

In April 1977 an evaluation mission of DGIS found leadership wanting, but did not probe deep enough or remain long enough to get to the roots of the problem. I also took part in this mission, which lasted almost three weeks. We talked about the project and its problems during office hours, lunch, dinner and often deep into the night. Yet the programme was so full that there was only one morning that I could participate in an effort to order the various steps of the entire process. The mission - and I include myself - was unable to have an overview of the promotion, establishment and monitoring phases, and the way the various specialized tasks then had to gear into each other. By a stroke of luck, a Dutch sociologist with experience in Peru's social property sector was found willing to take over as team leader. He arrived in August, when the project had only another ten months to go. However, the Medellin team by then had found a working procedure which indeed did work, and which the new team leader, understandably anxious to establish his authority, interrupted by calling the members back from the field to write.

The consecutive steps in the process of group formation and the establishment of a cooperative business were identified, and corresponding first drafts of the manual were written. Also, a basic document describing the entire process was produced.
The analysis of the forty enterprises studied was completely rewritten. Stretching the available data to the limits, a much bolder interpretation of the differences between successful and less successful enterprises was given.
The statutes of a specialized credit organization were drawn up. In the final months some 15 enterprises began to produce. The team leader also began to look around for Colombian nationals with some experience in this line of work, whom he offered short-term contracts.

A second evaluation in May 1978 indicated that Sena's interest in the
project, which had waned very much in the intervening period, had picked
up again. Some of the results carried a sting; for instance, it was found
that Sena's mobile training courses in certain crafts were woefully
inadequate if the pupil had to produce the article concerned after com-
pletion of the course. Other results were news for both parties:
for example, that group formation had to be a drawn-out process or a
split would occur at the slightest difficulty; or that suitable pro-
ducts could not be found on the level of the national economy, but only
on the regional or local level.
It was decided to have a second phase, which was to start in January
1979 after a period of preparation. In spite of dire warnings from
members of the Medellin team, the problem of transferring the new enter-
prises to Sena was underestimated. (These warnings were taken as partial-
ly inspired by the wish to continue being employed for another six
months) As a result, only four enterprises survived the intervening
period.

As an illustration of how complicated matters could become and of how
the hurry created dysfunctions, I am including the description of one
case. During the first phase of the project, members of the Medellin
team working in a rural area came into contact with an already existing
association, Isoagro, which had as its aim the promotion of small-farmer
agriculture. It had been founded a few years earlier by other associ-
ations, among them 3 cooperatives (2 savings, 1 agricultural), one com-
mittee for peasant integration, and one small cooperative farm. On this
farm, Los Labriegos, three or four people participated who were also
directors of the founding organizations in Insoagro. Just before contact
was made with P.M.U.R., Insoagro had bought a medium-sized tract of
farmland in an outlying district, San Luis, with credit from a bank and
from some of its founding associations.
The intention was to cultivate it; when in a few years' time the new
Medellin-Bogotá road would be finished, the land was to be sold with a
substantial profit, since this road would improve its accessibility
greatly.

During the first contacts the idea of a land bank was born. Insoagro would receive credit to buy land, would hire it in usufruct to landless groups, and from the proceeds would buy still more land.

During the first half of 1978 - i.e. during the last months of the first phase - there was a good deal of contact. Insoagro - or at least the five representatives of its founding associations - could be considered as a fledgeling second-order association. A number of trips were made to other districts to see if groups of rural labourers could be found who were interested in starting a collective farm. Some of such groups were found, but none wanted to go to the distant area of San Luis. A first feasibility study for a land bank that would give out farms in usufruct was rejected by the leadership of the project, who wanted to receive detailed plans for each farm. This refusal acerbated relations within the team, and as time was pressing, the Medellin team found the Dutch Embassy willing to donate a certain amount of money to Insoagro. With this sum a small (25 ha) farm, La Castellana, was bought, and a group of six landless peasants agreed to take it in usufruct and start a collective farm. All this occurred in the last month of the first phase.

When the second phase began six months later, the situation had changed in various respects. The members of Los Labriegos had agreed to break up their enterprise and sell the land, which in the meantime had become about 40 times more expensive. The bank and the savings cooperatives were clamoring for the repayment of the credit with which Insoagro had bought the farm in San Luis. Since Insoagro had been unable to find a group willing to cultivate this farm, and the mayordomo whom they had installed also only cost money, they had been trying to sell the farm again, but as yet without success. There was a possibility that, in order to placate its creditors, Insoagro would be forced to sell its other property, La Castellana - the more so since it had not yet paid the full price to the former owner.
In the end, the Fondo provided the La Castellana group with credit to buy this farm from Insoagro. With Dutch money, land was bought which had earlier been donated by the Dutch Embassy. The team thereafter

continued to work with La Castellana, but gave up on Insoagro. In 1981
it became necessary to organize a special twoday training session for
La Castellana, in order to make the group more cohesive and disciplined;
this session did appear to help.

(Of course a single case cannot be used to draw firm conclusions. Yet,
in the rather complicated web of relationships, it was remarkable how
often individuals compared the outcomes of alternative courses of
action and then chose the course that promised more immediate material
benefits.)

3. The steering committee

During the first two years the Dutch advisory committee met rather
frequently. My hope was that this committee would be called upon to
advise on other, similar projects elsewhere, and in the course of time
would build up a body of knowledge that could really be useful in the
preparation and monitoring of participatory projects in the field of
employment creation. This hope was not realized. We met frequently, but
were used for solving administrative problems, rather than problems of
content. DGIS never organized a study meeting. There are many reasons
why my hope was somewhat naïve. In the first place, DGIS was organized
in national desks. There was no reason whatsoever why the Zambia or
Nicaragua desk would call upon a committee linked to a Colombian
project. Each bureau had contacts with different outside experts and
consulted those if the need arose.

Secondly, DGIS seemed to consider outside experts as people who already
had all the answers. This might be true with regard to run-of-the-mill
technical problems, but it is a grave error as far as new, target-group
oriented approaches are concerned. It was not realized that we had an
urgent need to study in a comparative manner (aspects of) the process
which our field team was setting in motion in Colombia. This need was
so urgent that some of us decided to set up a study group, completely
independent of DGIS (but comprising several officials). That way we
convened whenever we wanted and dedicated the day to the discussion of

some aspect or other. The drawback was that as researchers, working in
universities and institutes, we were not forced to have an overview of
the entire process; we could and did remain specialists. Behind our
discontent, then, was the problematic relation between Dutch develop-
ment administration and science. Quite apart from the normative aspects
involved, one of the major difficulties of this relation is that
reality is cut up differently, and that a scientist is under pressure
to stick to his own discipline.
DGIS, however, is at present not equipped to slice real life problems
into tidbits appetizing to scientists. There is also no incentive for
a group of scientists to do this. The result is a rancorous stalemate.
(At about the same time that we decided to carry on independently from
DGIS, the minister stated in public speeches that scientists were hard-
ly of any use to his department.)
A final aspect to be mentioned is that, in my experience, even exten-
sive reports about a project usually do not provide enough information
for a scientific analysis of the problems encountered. And the reports
we received were voluminous; most of the memos the members of the field
team had written in the intervening period were attached; the whole
package amounted to several hundred pages every three months. Yet it
was insufficient, because there was no possibility of asking for the
meaning of concepts and for the reasons why something had been written.
Members of a consultative committee should spend a month each year in
the field simply to catch up. If that is considered too costly, my
suggestion is to save more money and to scrap consultative committees
entirely.

4. The second phase

Between July and December 1978 a plan of operations for the second
phase was written. Some lessons learned from the first phase had al-
ready been incorporated into an administrative agreement.
The first was that the Dutch side insisted with Sena that the one staff
member who had shown from the beginning that he understood the implica-
tions of the work be nominated as Colombian chief of the project.
(In the first phase, this had not happened for reasons of institutional

politics. We were unpleasantly surprised but did not protest at the
time. Instead, we had three different Colombian project leaders who,
because they were not exempted from other duties, neither had the time
nor the ability to really understand what process they were supposed
to lead.)
Second, we insisted on office space outside the Sena department to
which the project was linked administratively. Third, we demanded
easier access to the highest authorities within Sena, so as to be able
to speed up certain decisions if necessary.
Also, the division and coordination of tasks were better planned. The
project would still be carried out in several locations - in and
around Medellin, Cali and Bogotá - but all change agents at the field
level charged with the establishment of self-managed enterprises would
be Sena staff. In each city they would form a team of about eight
members. A central team located in Bogotá, would train the change
agents, monitor their work, but also would be continuously discussing
with them the usefulness and truth-value of the methods employed and
would revise the methodology accordingly.
A separate central team would repeat the investigation of existing
self-managed enterprises; their results were to be fitted into the
final version of the manual. A few persons, finally, would take care
of the dissemination of project results into Sena. Although the major-
ity of the central project-staff were on the Dutch payroll, only a
minority - about one-third - were Dutch nationals. The others were
locally hired experts. Between regional and central teams 40 to 60
people were engaged in the project.

Administratively as well as methodologically, the second phase was
much more orderly than the first. The project was a rather autonomous
organization within Sena, which footed its part of the bill without
demur. Enthusiasm at the Sena top waxed and waned. When it was sudden-
ly realized that Sena had not drawn any methodological conclusions
from a possible difference between formal and informal sectors of the
economy, that is, had acted as if this distinction did not make
sense, the project's central team was asked to design a methodology
for training in the informal sector. A complicated document was indeed

produced with which the Sena directorate was very happy. Otherwise, it
was the political moods within the government which appeared to dictate
Sena's interest in the project. During an evaluation in August 1980
interest was very low; in April 1981 it had picked up again consider-
ably.

However, Sena's opinions were no longer due to doubts about the quality
of the work. It had become clear that the project teams, both in their
fieldwork and in the documents produced, knew what they were doing and
talking about. However, they had found out that the creation of employ-
ment through the establishment of self-managed enterprises was much
more difficult and time-consuming than originally had been hoped. The
earlier optimism based on ignorance could not be maintained. For some
Sena officials this appeared to be a motive to recommend - and pin
their hopes on - other strategies, about which they were still
ignorant. Yet their hope appeared to be a better guarantee that the
project results would be incorporated in Sena than there was after the
first phase. In two of the three regional Sena centres involved, the
decision was taken to maintain the project teams as teams, and charge
them, among other things, with continuing assistance to the new enter-
prises. In Sena's central office two project participants were appoint-
ed to monitor the dissemination through the Sena apparatus of the know-
ledge produced by PMUR.
However, it remains to be seen whether Sena will really start to
establish collective enterprises. When the project stopped, a programme
had been worked out to this effect, but its goal of one hundred enter-
prises in the first year was rather ambitious. Then again, I do not
know if this figure was meant to be taken literally. The only thing
that seems certain is that Sena's field promotors from time to time
will meet with groups which will want to form an enterprise and will
request assistance. One can only hope that the PMUR manual will become
available to them.

In Holland, meanwhile, DGIS lost interest and wanted the project to
end. Various factors may have played a role. There had been a change
of personnel at the Colombian desk; and there seemed to be a certain

degree of discouragement now that it became clear that the PMUR project
did not show an easy way out of poverty and unemployment. But perhaps
most important, at least to the mind of an occasional outside observer,
was a lingering doubt about the value of a project which is not
enthusiastically taken over by the recipient country. It is true that
there is not much sense in creating a little Holland in a small region
and for a limited period by doing the dirty work and footing the bill.
All former little Hollands have subsequently disappeared from the map.
Yet, an approach oriented towards the poor will perhaps be welcomed
orally by the recipient government but will not be enthusiastically
adopted. One of the reasons that the poor are there is that they are
not taken into account. This indifference will not change just because
we tell governments that it is morally wrong. The consequences, then,
of an approach oriented to the poor should be thought out. It implies
not only that Dutch inputs into development projects should be main-
tained for a longer time; this has been pointed out often enough. It
also implies that the Dutch effort risks becoming a substitute for a
recipient country's own effort, at least until the time the target
population has acquired some countervailing power.
Whatever the case may be, the considerable expertise built up - and
let me state categorically that there has hardly been any other
development project which so constantly monitored and learned from its
own results - has been allowed to disintegrate. A memo, written already
in February 1980 by two members of the study group about the
possibilities of making further use of the PMUR experiences, dis-
appeared in the apparatus without a trace.
Only outside pressure led to the decision to provide the small finan-
cial fund, which had been set up by the project but was independent
juridically with a minimal staff of three people, so that interests and
repayments from the enterprises could continue to be received.

5. The results

Physically, during the second phase the project created 25 new enter-
prises and worked altogether in 38. It left an independent, small
financial institution. The final version of the "manual" was being

published by Sena in the form of 25 booklets. Apart from that, three
studies were to be published on the informal sector and on the existing
self-managed enterprises.

What was learned? I shall not summarize the 25 booklets but shall focus
instead on the aspects I myself find important.

The project tried out several methods to see whether the choice of an
area in which to work could be based on certain criteria. To my mind
this work, which consisted of collating information from census data,
official sources and field visits, was not very useful.
One of the reasons is that it was found necessary that at least some
of the people who want to start a collective enterprise have experience
in the line of work involved. The suitability of a product did not
depend so much on the area as on the people. In cities the distribution
of skills does not correlate with areas; the only thing that can be
said is that there will be a concentration of cobblers in a city with
shoe factories.
Another reason is that informal groups already existed and got into
contact with the project when they heard of its existence and purpose.
In the rural areas collective economic activities were concerned either
with kinds of "off-farm" employment or with service cooperatives
related to the individual farm production. It is not worthwhile to try
to induce peasants to collectivize their farms. Collective agricultural
production is interesting to peasants only as a sideline, as something
they do in addition to working on their own, individual farms. Of the
enterprises with which PMUR worked, 7 out of 17 in rural areas, and 13
out of 21 in urban areas had come into existence without a previous
diagnosis of the area concerned having been carried out.
A reconnaissance then can be brief, at least for the kind of projects
on which PMUR focused. The only thing it would be interesting to know,
namely the frequency and extent of earlier attempts at association
among the target population, is difficult to measure.

Group formation turned out to be a slow and difficult process that took
three months or longer. The initial optimism of members who think that

they are now going to make it, that they will receive lots of help from the Project and the Fondo, has to be replaced by a realistic assessment of the hard work, the small financial margins, the discipline and the problems that lie ahead. Some potential members leave. Even the phase of group formation - of which a pre-feasibility study was part and parcel - had its casualties; more than 40% of the groups which were approached or formed never became an enterprise of one kind or another. As for internal participation, care was taken to combat the dominance of one or two members. In the course of time, however, the earlier illusions about the possibility of a rapid rotation of roles were dropped.

A certain degree of homogeneity - in age, socio-economic status and earlier job experience - was found necessary and in a later phase was made into a condition. The unfortunate implication was that the project after a while did not work any longer with the poorest people. The field agent sketched "entry profiles" of potential members to measure homogeneity. They also had to report on changes or problems in various areas: composition, leadership, relationships, and in a later phase production, sales, finances. Although the measurement involved could be called primitive, the attempt was important. It enabled the monitoring central team to take early note of changes. It also forced the field agent to be an observer as well as a guide or leader.

The pre-feasibility study was followed by a full-blown feasibility study carried out by the field agents themselves. This helped to make earlier plans more realistic, yet a careful scrutiny by the central team always led to adjustments in the direction of still greater realism.
Field agents turned out to be pivotal people. They needed to have commitment enough to be willing to sacrifice evenings and weekends, which were suitable times for the target-group to have meetings. They also needed to have an understanding of the social, economic and technical aspects involved in the establishment of a self-managed enterprise. Whereas on higher levels coordinated work by specialists is possible, on the field level at most two change agents can work with any

particular group. Since they can, up to a point, shield their group
from the probing eyes of specialist outsiders, it is necessary that
they do not underestimate the importance of some aspect. Otherwise, the
lame are leading the blind, and the group is to suffer the consequences
later. Field agents had to be as honest and realistic as possible in
their assessment of the group and its potential. This proved to be very
difficult, for a certain identification with groups did occur. During
the last two years of the project they learned very much and began to
consider themselves as much better promotors than their former peers, a
judgement often corroborated by Sena officials. As a result they began
to ask for salary raises, which Sena refused to give.

The products chosen were very diverse, although less so in the rural
areas than in the cities. Among the rural enterprises several focused
on transporting and selling members' produce (milk, grapes, horti-
cultural products). One workshop produced bags of aromatic leaves; an-
other kept bees. There were several rural consumer cooperatives and
some primitive sugar refineries (trapiches). Relatively few enterprises
were collective farms proper.
In the urban areas (including villages) the branches of production in-
cluded shoes, women's fashion, men's trousers, steel window frames,
furniture, rope baskets, bricks; the services involved were a laundry,
television and automobile repair shops, a small printing shop, and a
cooperative of property guards. The diversity is due to the fact that
groups which already were playing with an idea asked the Project for
assistance rather than using the entrepreneurial imagination of the
team members. There is no doubt in my mind that it is very important to
have some prior experience in production and knowledge of market
exigencies in the envisaged branch of activity. One, or even a number
of economists, do not have this prior experience.
Some possibilities which appeared promising, such as a hotel, were not
considered because they implied a rather heavy capital outlay. Although
during the four years of the project, estimates of the necessary
minimal sum per worker increased from 5 to 70 or 100 thousand pesos,
the idea was and remained that a labour place should be viable but as
cheap as possible. Without this partly self-imposed limitation the

range of feasible products and services would have been larger. In the
first phase a number of enterprises failed because too many workers
were combined with capital goods of some sort. In the second phase
there were a few - non-fatal - cases of groups which bought certain
pieces of machinery that did not quite fit the technical specifications;
the purchases were made because the machinery was offered cheaply.
During the process of establishment of the enterprises the attention of
the field agents and the monitoring central team shifted from socio-
logical to economic and technical problems.

As experience had shown that normal bookkeeping procedure often turned
out to remain an unsurmountable barrier in spite of courses, a simpler
method was devised. Groups participated in the elaboration of the
feasibility study; the choice of machines and their physical outlay
were discussed with them. Although groups were guided and, if necessary,
corrected, no decision - apart from the actual granting of credit - was
taken without their knowledge beforehand and consent. Altogether, in
most cases it took from six months to a year after the first contact
before production was started.
Although it is still too early to say anything definite, all enter-
prises had been producing for half a year and some for a year when the
project was ended. Some were in arrears in paying interest, but no
enterprise was really in a desperate situation by July 1981. The least
one can say is that the enterprises generated during the second phase
of the project were more stable than the earlier ones.

Assistance did not stop when production started. During weekly meetings
productivity, quality, purchases and sales were controlled and dis-
cussed. A technician of the central team visited enterprises to see
whether a possibility existed to raise productivity or lower costs by
making small technical improvements. If he thought this to be possible,
he farmed the problem out to a network of technical experts working in
universities. Unfortunately, he had only been with the project during
its final year and a half, and his work was far from finished when the
project ended. But he has been given the chance to continue, now in the
employment of the Fondo.

Before I turn to the development potential of this kind of project, a
word is in order about the Fondo, the small, independent fund set up
by the project.
Its purpose is to grant part of the necessary credit to self-managed
enterprises, the part that could be compared to a private entre-
preneur's own capital. It is given in the form of a loan, of which the
amortization is postponed until other loans have been paid off. The
Fondo does charge an interest. The Fondo invites other financial
institutions - the Caja Agraria, the Banco Popular de Ahorro - to come
to an agreement according to which they provide the other part of the
credit, the part that is spent on capital goods, Although such an
agreement has been signed with the Caja, the Fondo is still negotiating
with other Columbian development banks. As I said earlier, the Fondo is
the one part of the PMUR project that continued to receive support from
DGIS after July 1981.

6. Development potential

As the PMUR project combined practice and research, I believe it was
one of few development projects in which every action was evaluated
again and again.
In theory it was interesting, because it tackled the enormous problem
of employment creation in a way that made it independent from private
or state managerial talent.
The method employed has not been compared with either the promotion of
small private industries or of state industries. Until it is known,
through similar projects, how expensive these other methods of employ-
ment creation are, statements about the PMUR-method are not really
comparable.
However, it is true that the method was more time-consuming and
expensive than was expected, especially in terms of manpower. This we
find to be the case with all kinds of participatory development
projects. The less skilled and educated the group, the more costly the
establishment of an enterprise. Groups were relatively small (3 - 10
people mostly); the argument can be defended that PMUR did not create
so much employment but rather stabilized it in the informal sector,

where jobs are generally very unstable.

In the course of the project it was found that the groups needed previous experience and skills. It is much more difficult to create self-managed enterprises with the poorest and most unskilled. Such people might be better reached in other ways, although that too remains to be seen. The fact of the matter is that PMUR did not do what was hoped of it - at least on the Dutch side - i.e. to discover an effective way to bring development to the poorest of the poor.

A qualifying impression I shared with some team members, but one that could not be tested, is that there was a difference in this respect between men and women. Some experiences with groups of very poor people led me to the hypothesis that women are more inclined than men to endure the discipline, the hard work, the problems that go with a beginning enterprise. In one case, even a failure did not discourage a group of women: they looked for another product; in another, they endured in spite of very frequent breakdowns of their (second-hand) machinery. But there was no opportunity to explore this hypothesis further.

At the very last moment the decision was taken by DGIS to enable the Fondo to keep functioning with a small staff. A feasibility study will be carried out to see whether it is worthwhile to put more money in this fund. The promotion of self-managed enterprises would be done entirely by Colombian government - or private - organizations, but part of the necessary credit could be provided by the Fondo if the activity promised to be viable. As it holds the purse-strings, the Fondo can insist on thorough promotion and the application of tested methods, thus fostering that the PMUR methodology becomes widely known and is developed futher.

In the end, then, it may come about that some of the recommendations of the 1980 memo referred to earlier are actually carried out. It was recommended to further develop the methodology by varying either functions of the supporting agency or the organizational structure of the small industry to be promoted, or both. The political impatience of donors to get results is at times detrimental to the necessary

long-term learning process which an efficient development policy
implies. There are fashions for doing things, good and bad countries, a
lot of commitment, and an even greater amount of rhetoric and super-
ficial thinking. Fresh beginnings are continuously made, but little is
learned. One cannot change these things, but one can expose them to
ridicule.

12

DEVELOPMENT AND PARTICIPATION
EXPERIENCES IN TANZANIA

Laurens van Vroonhoven

Institute of Cultural and Social Studies
University of Leiden

1. Introduction

Self-reliance, participation and increase of access are key concepts
in the model of development that President Nyerere presented in 1962
at a conference on Pan-African socialism under the title "Ujumaa -
the Basis of African Socialism". Since then Tanzania has experimented
with that model, but the results are not promising. The economic si-
tuation of the country is alarming, and Tanzania is balancing on the
verge of bankruptcy.
To explain this crisis reference is frequently made to the disastrous
consequences of the increase of energy prices and to the enormous
costs of the war with Uganda. These "external" factors are indeed im-
portant, but the question can also be raised as to whether or not the
development model of Nyerere has been shown to work. After twenty
years the country is still one of the five poorest all over the world
and apparently without resistance against threats from outside. The
choice in favour of agrarian development and the improvement of life-
conditions for the marginal peasant population has met great sympathy,
not only in Tanzania but also abroad. Nevertheless, criticism is heard:
the country is a bottomless pit and the helm must be turned.

In the present paper attention will be focused more closely on the
road that Nyerere has chosen for the development of his country and
to the problems occurring along the way. Particular attention will be
paid to findings which are relevant for problems of access and parti-
cipation. Tanzania has experimented with "counter-development" at
national level and is now paying a high price for errors that have
been made and for inconsistencies which not have been solved. There-
fore, the experiences in Tanzania offer a demonstration school in
development, which has many lessons to teach.

In the first section a brief outline is given of social development in
Tanzania with emphasis on the agrarian sector. Then the development
model of Nyerere will be introduced by discussing the basic principles
and the development philosophy, as well as the proposals for execution
and concretization. In the third section the relation between model
and reality will be treated by analysing if and how far principles and
proposals for execution are adapted to the reality of present-day Tan-
zania. Finally, conclusions will be drawn and several statements for-
mulated, which are closely related to problems of access and partici-
pation.

2. From poverty to unequal development

Pre-colonial Tanzania can be typified as an area with predominantly
small-scale societies, oriented towards self-reliance and subsistence.
People produce what they need for their own survival and life together
in units of several families, which form their own "moral community"
and operate relatively independently (Bailey, 1971, p. 302-303).

Here lies the origin of the notion of Ujamaa, namely in two forms of
cooperation: neighbour-aid and communal work.
The neighbour-aid, called Ujima (Mushi, 1974, p. 12-13), is found only
incidentally and beside normal economic activities realized within the
family. Families, and mostly its younger members, help each other if
there is additional work, for example in road-building, in the construc-
tion of houses or irrigation canals, and during sowing, planting and

harvesting. Payment is made in food and drink (Konter, 1978, p. 39-
40).
In addition labour services are given on lands which normally belong
to the clan-eldest or chief. The yield of that labour serves as a re-
serve, managed by the leader or chief and only used in cases of emer-
gency.

Both forms of cooperation are functional for this type of society. In
critical situations and times of urgent need the community should
function as a social insurance for the members, who therefore will be
disposed to pay their premium in the form of labour.

In the colonial period the export-oriented production of surpluses
gained momentum, disturbing the balance of the subsistence-oriented
economy. Namely, the second form of cooperation was then imposed as
an obligation and extended to guarantee the yield for taxes. It can
thereby be seen more and more as an instrument of exploitation, and
it loses its traditional legitimacy. When independence is attained,
efforts to reestablish this tradition of collaboration in cooperative
production are hardly successful. Incidental cooperation in specific
cases and when additional work must be done occurs more frequently
(Freyhold, 1979, p. 70-71).

At independence modernization continues, and the agrarian sector is
further incorporated in national society. The dualism which originated
in colonial times - modern sectors with capital-intensive pro-
duction and orientation to export on the one hand, and more traditio-
nal sectors on the other - is fortified and extended. Estates and
private firms, cultivating cash crops like cotton, sisal, tabacco,
pyrethrum, cashew nuts, coffee and tea, are growing and expanding,
while more traditional sectors are neglected and staying behind.
This dualistic economic structure is also recently maintained under
the Nyerere administration. A progressive development policy has been
introduced, and a programme of nationalization has been executed,
partially replacing foreign managers by Tanzanians and assigning the
state a dominant role in the modern sector. The contrast between

modern and traditional nevertheless persists, and development efforts
are oriented primarily toward the modern sector (comp. Pratt, 1979,
p. 194-205). Several authors point out that this policy of nationali-
zation within the modern sector has facilitated the development of
state capitalism, with the consequence that state enterprises and
private firms narrowly related to foreign capital groups, play a do-
minant role in modern Tanzanian economy. For these authors the cause
of the crisis is not socialism, but the lack of socialism in the mo-
dern sector, that slows down or prevents socialist-oriented develop-
ments elsewhere (Arrighi and Saul, 1973, p. 272 sq; comp. Shivji,
1976; Shivji, 1976a; Cliffe and Saul, 1972, 1973).

Development in the modern sector also influences directly the more
traditional sectors. The market economy penetrates there, creating
new opportunities and disturbing the balance of the subsistence-
oriented economy. Contacts are made with the outside world by in-
crease in commerce, but also because the modern sector offers labour
opportunities which make migration attractive. Levelling mechanisms
and norms of reciprocity, which kept the members of the traditional
community together and guaranteed equality among them, lose their
strength. Whoever changes over to market products can create his own
reserves and is no longer dependent on the community. Thus inequality
also increases within the more traditional sectors, which are incor-
porated further and obtain a still more differentiated composition of
their population.

Among the peasants different categories arise, like greater, middle
and small peasants, with clearly distinct positions and frequently
conflicting interests. The greater peasants, "kulaks", are still
peasants. They dispose of 3 - 10 HA land and use hired labour on
privately farmed plots, which they supervise directly. In addition,
they frequently are active beyond agriculture as middlemen, transpor-
ters, millowners or shopkeepers. So they are neither landlords nor
agrarian managers oriented to mechanization and maximization of pro-
fits. They can better be typified as sly foxes, who - given the low
productivity of labour in agriculture and their meagre starting

capital - have had more success than the others.

The differentiation between those categories of peasants is thus re-
latively low. There has been no strong polarization between them, and
so they do not see each other as enemies. Kulaks also function regu-
larly as small patrons, who favour their limited clientele and make
use of the latter's services. The other peasants see them more as
examples of clever and successful people who merit respect, than as
enemies who must be rivaled (Freyhold, 1979, p. 63-69).

These socio-economic changes, initiated in colonial times, have gone
together with political changes, which can also partly be seen as an
inheritance from the colonial past. An overdeveloped colonial admini-
stration system was adopted, that remained strongly under control of
those who had been in colonial service. Government bureaucracy has
been adapted to the new circumstances, but remains a system of admi-
nistration and control, that according to a characterization of von
Freyhold, does not plan but merely regulates (Freyhold, 1979, p. 119).
This state bureaucracy - by the nationalization of foreign enter-
prises - has also acquired a strong economic base. The officials form,
together with the managers and technicians of the modern sector,
technocratically-oriented elite groups, which have also absorbed ele-
ments of the agrarian elites, who as such are limited. Thus they
form a strong power group, which in fact finds little opposition in
the country.
Middle-groups are limited in Tanzania and internally divided while
many immigrants, mainly from India, form part of them. The lower
groups are poorly organized and frequently integrated in vertically-
structured connections, and thus internally disintegrated. In this
situation the technocratic elites are almost autonomous, while they
can reckon also on strong support of foreign interest-groups (Parker,
1979, p. 62-63).

In this constellation of power relations Nyerere has tried to intro-
duce changes by the foundation of a new national party, TANU (now CCM),
which - as the only political party - was supposed to win over the
different strata of society and evolve into the political power centre

of the country. This party initially was composed of various local groupings, which had been active in the struggle for liberation and had found each other in a nationalistic euphoria. When independence was accomplished and TANU had to function as the motor for develop- ment, unity rapidly appeared to be a fiction. The views about what development means and how to accomplish it, differed immensely, which gave rise to varied oppositions within the Party. The charisma of Nyerere succeeded in maintaining unity, partly because his plans and his development ideology received great support by the population. TANU consequently evolved into a mass party with members, who - at least verbally - subscribe the ideas and ideals of Nyerere. Practical- ly and with respect to concrete policy, two power blocks can be dis- tinguished within the party, each having a clearly different strate- gic disposition. On the one side is found the top and the base of society, which pursue a proper form of African socialism in the sense of Nyerere's ideas; on the other, officials, technicians, managers and bureaucrats, who pursue a more capitalistic development, oriented to modernization, and who virtually resist against the Nyerere policy.

It looks as though the technocratically oriented managers and bureau- crats will gain from the African socialists, and so the Tanzanian experiment will come to an end. This result is partly caused by exter- nal factors, as mentioned before, so it says as such little about the potency and relevance of the Tanzanian model. Whether this model can work and whether the construction of a self-reliant society can be a real goal or not, is - taking in account the result in Tanzania - not (yet) demonstrated. Nevertheless, many experiences have been acquired, which can give a deeper understanding of the problems related with such an approach. It is therefore worthwhile to analyse more closely those experiences. Before moving on to that, the basic principles of Nyerere's development philosophy and some of his proposals related to the agrarian policy will be discussed.

3. Self-reliance, a path to development?

That many development efforts and aid programmes have only partial
effects, and the opposition between poor and rich is increased rather
than reduced, is evident. Such is also frequently the case when efforts
explicitely are directed toward the poor. Impulses to development do
not bring about the expected trickle-down effects, and innovations
appear to be accepted and applied only by a limited upper-stratum.
The raising of productivity is strived for in a way that the developer
deems desirable. As a consequence, a mini-maxing method is used, which
gives all attention to a few people who dispose of many resources
(Röling, 1981, p. 6).

Starting form these experiences Nyerere has drawn the conclusion that
aid is fundamentally wrong. Aid not only fosters unequal development
but also induces passivity and apathy. Additional given aid provokes
the reaction that still more aid is expected; the capacity to take
initiative is not only unchallenged but neglected. The adage "gifts
are poison" is according to Nyerere also valid for aid and assistance,
which lead to feelings of indebtedness and to the dependence-syndrome.
Men and women essentially are able to solve their own problems with-
out assistance from outside. Critical situations are useful, because
they help people to develop the capacity to overcome obstacles and to
increase their crisis-tolerance (Kilima Bavu, 1975, p. 114). Assistan-
ce, therefore, should be limited to cases of emergency and disasters,
or it should be completely subservient to the development of self-
reliance.

This opinion of Nyerere has had great consequences. At national level
it has led to the phasing-out strategy, by which Tanzania has tried
to disconnect herself from the framework of international relations,
to centralize efforts on national development and to adapt the pro-
duction to the needs of the country's own population. Relations with
foreign countries should be subordinate and subservient to national
needs and wishes.
The same strategy should also be used at meso- and micro-level. There,

too, the outside world should be subservient to the needs and wishes
of the inner world. Each village should be self-reliant and self-
sufficient.

Not the increase of the national product or the national income, nor
industrialization or economic development as such are then the cen-
tral goals of the development process, but self-reliance for each
unit of the society and a high degree of independence, which makes
it possible that they cooperate with each other as independent units.

3.1. Self-reliance as alternative

Self-reliance means for Nyerere independence and freedom. Indepen-
dence has a structural element, which implies that people do not
depend on others and thus are able to solve their own problems with
the available resources. Independence also has a cultural element,
which implies the conviction that everyone can and must manage
his or her own life, that aid is unnecessary and can better be denied,
and that parasitism must be avoided.
Freedom means self-determination and self-responsability, so that
everyone can decide autonomously about matters related to his or her
own life and can take responsability for these decisions. Freedom
also means that everyone is responsible for fulfilling his or her own
basic needs.

These notions of independence and freedom are socially conditioned
and must be realized in a social setting. Independence does not mean
isolation or segregation. Independent units are related to each other,
but not dependent on each other, just as individual freedom is related
to the freedom of others and thereby limited.

Independence and freedom, defined in this way, are for Nyerere the
ideal. He does not deny that different forms of dependence exist and
that power is a reality. He also states that dependence must evolve
into independence as far as possible, and that power must be respon-
ded to by countervailing power.

This ideal of self-reliance can only be realized if three values con-
stitute the core of the national culture and are internalized by the
members of society. Those values are:

a) Modesty and frugality

Modesty is "bounded rationality", which leads to rational choices
of alternatives; the latter are in fact possible and well conside-
red with respect to consequences. Thus, what one wishes is not the
basic issue, but rather what is really possible. These possibili-
ties are not only determinated by available resources, but also by
the individual's motives, his or her limitations with regard to
knowledge, and the capacity to learn (Kilima Bavu, 1975, p. 92).
Frugality relates to the endeavour to limit consumption and to
employ available means as productively as possible.

b) Relevance

Relevance concerns the aspiration that only those means and goals
will be selected which correspond to available resources and basic
needs, and which are appropriate to real situations. Goals and
means imported from outside in general do not comply with this cri-
terium of relevance. The choice in favour of private cars is not
relevant in a developing country; but the decision in favour of
public transportation is. The option for safe and clean water is
more relevant that that for an extended and expensive surgery sys-
tem.

c) Equality and participation

The ideal of independence also presupposes equality, which can be
safeguarded by paying "equal income for labour of equal intensity
and quality" (Kilima Bavu, 1975, p. 94).
Participation is the concrete way by which freedom comes to expres-
sion and everyone can determine which decisions he or she will take
in his or her own matters.

3.2. The self-reliant local community

The local community disposes of a labour force and local resources.
While human efforts are the engine for progress, labour is the most
important factor for its development. Labour, and not money, is also

decisive for the construction of an humanitarian society. Mobiliza-
tion of labour forces is therefore the most important weapon in the
struggle against poverty and for the fulfilling of basic needs. This
labour force must be employed in a maximal way by choosing the best
combination of labour and the available means, like capital goods,
technology and labour organization.
Here the values of modesty and relevance come into play. The members
of the local community are themselves by their experiences the best
informed about the possibilities offered by their surroundings. So
they are the best equipped to choose the technology most suited to
their possibilities. Therefore, they have to decide themselves how
they will work and how they will reach a good balance between availa-
ble labour and resources.

To take up their own development, people need organization. To this
end, cells must be set up: groups of 10 to 15 families, who live close
together and join forces.
These cells are limited in size and surveyable for the members. They
offer a framework within which personal relations can develop and
people can help and eventually correct each other. Within the cell,
forms of neighbourhoods can come alive, and traditional African values
such as services to friends and the exchange of labour for food and
drink can be reestablished. Cells can also evolve into cooperation
units, where the members deliberate with each other, make decisions,
and eventually start cooperative production or marketing.

On the initiative of Nyerere TANU decided to choose this ten-houses-
cell system as the principle for the organization of the Party. Thus
cells are in the first place Party-organs. They also should evolve in-
to the basic units of the local society, which through the Party is
related to the national society.

As primary organs of the Party and basic units of the local society
cells have to fulfil different functions. The first duty of the cell
is to persuade residents, who are not members of the Party, to join it.

Cell-leaders must maintain accurate records of Party membership, collect dues and keep the Party leadership informed. Cells are also communication channels, by which information goes from TANU or the government to the population, and members can express their views and wishes and forward them to higher organs. As Party-organs, cells must also function as basic units of control by seeing to it that applicable laws and regulations are obeyed, that taxes are paid and security maintained, and that the members are protected against intruders, parasites or shirkers. Conflicts and quarrels must be treated in the first instance within the cell, and if possible dealt with. Only through the cell-leadership can matters be referred to the police or to the court. Finally, the cell is the most obvious instrument to explain policies of TANU and the government to the people, to educate them in national development thinking, to encourage them to participate in projects and programmes, and to involve them actively in running the affairs of the nation (Mshangama, 1975, p. 20-26; Njohole, 1975, p. 2-5). The cell is thus a central element serving to link the residents with the major institutions of Party and state; it also should be an effective grass-roots institution, by which access of the population to services will be improved and opportunities given to participate fully and effectively in decision making.

The division in cells can also evolve into a principle of labour organization. The cell will then function as a working group within which several families collaborate, possibly on a communal basis. This will be quite possible if these families are homogeneous with respect to the access they have to land, water, labour and credit. While those cells are internally homogeneous, they can be different among themselves, so that division of labour at local level will be possible. Some cells can dedicate themselves to agriculture or raising livestock, others to handicrafts, industrial processing or marketing (Kilima Bavu, 1975, p. 209-215).

The cells themselves elect their leaders, who naturally must be TANU members. These leaders are responsible for the internal coordination, and they also attend to the relations with the outer world. As basic

units cells are elements of the local society, their activities,
therefore, must be mutually coordinated.

At the level of the local society this coordination is provided for
by three organizations: the Village Development Committee (VDC), the
local TANU Office and the Executive Service. The VDC is the village
council, the main administrative body at village level in which elec-
ted villagers hold office. In the name of their cells the cell-leaders
maintain contacts with the council, eventually being members themsel-
ves. The TANU Office is charged with political instruction and forma-
tion. It also functions as local point of contact with the TANU branch
and district offices. Cell-leaders participate at annual conferences
organized by the TANU branch at regional level, where they can present
and defend the interests of their own groups. The Executive Service is
manned by officials employed by the District Council, who are on duty
in the village for the purpose of services such as instruction and
technical assistance (Mashauri, 1975, p. 55-60; comp. Konter, 1978,
p. 82-88).

So four kinds of leadership are found in every village. At the basic
level are the cell-leaders elected by the cell-members. At village
level on the one hand are "spontaneous leaders' elected by the popu-
lation, like the members of the village council who are elected by the
villagers and the members of TANU Office who are elected by the TANU
members of the village; and on the other hand, more "bureaucratic
leaders" or experts, coming from outside.

4. Self-reliance in practice

The practical application of the principles of Nyerere's thinking about
development has provoked many problems and did not result in the expec-
ted success. An explanation for this lack of success can be found at
the national level by analyzing the interrelation between development
theory and the corresponding policy on the one side, and concrete pro-
blems of Tanzanian reality on the other. The central question then is
whether or not self-reliance can be a resource for development. Ex-
ternal factors are also of great importance, but they will be taken

less in consideration here.

First the principles of Nyerere's development philosophy will be ex-
amined more in detail. Then attention will be focussed on the develop-
ment policy as realized in the agricultural sector; general reforms of
the latter will be discussed and more specific problems treated, which
have been found at local level. Finally, several conclusions will be
drawn, and the main points related to problems of access and partici-
pation will be summarized.

4.1. Development philosophy and practice

In the philosophy on development presented by Nyerere, all emphasis is
put on the values of independence and freedom.
To secure independence at national level an extended program of natio-
nalizations has been realized, as said before. So at least in the for-
mal sense greater independence was reached. Several authors, neverthe-
less, point out that the influence of foreign-capital groups and mul-
tinational firms remains very strong and has even grown in recent
years. Particularly in the sector of state enterprises the number of
foreign experts, who occupy positions as adviser or manager and dis-
pose of power and influence, also increased (Parker, 1979, p. 60-62;
comp. Shivji, 1976, p. 164, 174-178).
Within the national society independence should be additionally rea-
lized at different levels and for each of the self-sufficient units,
upon which the new society has to be constructed. Those basic units of
society not only must be independent and self-reliant; they also must
interrelate with each other at the base of equality, for only in this
way guarantees can be given that they really will be free.
This conception of society reflects a clearly egalitarian ideal,
slightly tinged with anarchism. That ideal is brought forward in a
country where development is still limited and differentiation between
social groups is not yet crystallized to any great extent. In these
circumstances Nyerere apparently sees possibilities to restrain grow-
ing inequality and to combine forces for the realization of a gradual
and equalitarian development of all the different parts of society.

How such a development must be realized has not been made very clear, and practice demonstrates that the development process in Tanzania is strongly directed from above. The state bureaucracy has a great decisional power and exercises a strong controlling influence. TANU is, as political party, designated to offer countervailing power and to defend the interests of the population. However, it appears to collaborate strongly with the state bureaucracy. Other political parties or syndicates of peasants and workers are prohibited, so that there are very few possibilities for the population to make a successful stand against.

The ideas of Nyerere about development in independence and freedom are inspired by the precolonial society. The social order of that society, composed by small-scale and self-reliant units, also presents the ideal for the future. Only some elements of this order must be modified and others modernized, or as Nyerere states himself: "Our task is to modernize the traditional structure so as to make it meet our new aspirations for a higher standard of living" (Nyerere, 1978, p. 167).

Also the culture and the predominant values of the new society fit more in an economy oriented towards subsistence and in a situation of poverty, rather than in an economy oriented towards surplus production and in a situation of change and progress.

Where little is available, modesty and frugality are necessary. Modesty will not permit trying experiments and taking risks. A culture which carries the banner of modesty will also demonstrate low esteem for marked achievements and give them little reward.

Relevance means the tendency to select goals and means in accordance to felt basic needs and available resources. Innovations which come from outside will not be very welcome then.

Where little is available, equality is also frequently found. Nobody can take the liberty to disassociate himself from the others, to whom he must be able to appeal in critical situations and cases of emergency. So equality must be maintained. That equality is at the same time a hamper for progress; it guards against the rise of a vanguard,

which normally is needed to introduce innovations and which only
will succeed in convincing the others in the course of time and when
success is proved.

The social order of small-scale independent units and the culture
presented by Nyerere as the ideal for the future are both grafted
upon traditional and lowly developed social formations. They there-
fore cannot offer an adequate solution to problems of development
and progress. Development is accompanied by incorporation in large-
scaled economic and political systems. It also brings inequality and
gives rise to new values, which facilitate change and innovation.
This tension between ideal and reality can be illustrated by explo-
ring some of the difficulties which have been surged in the agrarian
practice of Tanzania.

4.2. Development policy and agrarian practice

In general it must be said that the possibilities for agrarian deve-
lopment in Tanzania are limited. First there is the unpredictable
weather, which by rainfall or drought frequently leads to disasters.
Secondly, the agrarian technology is - outside of the modern sector
- low developed: hoe and pick are frequently used (Konter, 1979, p.
151 sq.). Not only is the level of illiteracy high, but also the
knowledge and skills with respect to agriculture and animal husbandry
are lacking.
Be that as it may, Nyerere decided on agricultural development to
start modernization. In a predominantly agrarian Tanzania and taking
account of his option for independence and development based on one's
own efforts, he had no other choice. This development should not be
realized primarily by mechanization; not only is capital lacking to
do so, but also such an option would be contrary to the basic prin-
ciples of his development philosophy. The development of Tanzania must
be based mainly on peasant labour, which must be employed more and
more intensively. Nyerere also starts from the supposition that
communal forms of production with workers, who collectively own land,
livestock and means of production are more likely to generate dedica-

tion to work and consequently agricultural development. Therefore
he launched in his famous "Socialism and Rural Development" the idea
of Ujamaa as basic principle of life in the villages, "where people
lived and worked together for the good of all" (Nyerere, 1979, p.
131).

4.2.1. The programme of villagization

Initially many initiatives were taken or supported to start communal
cultivation and production. Villages were transformed into collective
firms or newly established as such. They were to serve as examples
or "magnets" for the peasants in the area, who also were supposed to
decide to move into villages and start communal production. When this
radiation-effect failed to appear, it was decided that preference
should be given to the process of villagization. First the majority
of the peasants, who lived scattered on individual plots of land out-
side villages, had to be moved together; after that people had to be
convinced that they should farm communally.
So in 1971 extended operations were initiated, starting in Dodoma,
which brought the peasants together in villages with a minimum of 250
and a maximum of 600 families. This process of compulsory villagiza-
tion evolved massively when Nyerere ordered that within a period of
three years all peasants should live in villages. Persuaded by argu-
ments, lured by substantial subsidies, but frequently also forced and
sometimes under threat of violence, peasants moved to new settlements,
which were assigned to them by the government and not always appeared
to be prudently chosen. Normally those new villages were located not
very far from the original dwelling places, but the peasants were
obliged to adapt to a new environment and to accommodate to new forms
of social life. That provoked tensions and sometimes also resistance.
The moving-together process as such was implemented successfully. At
the end of 1977 has been informed by official communiqué, that the
whole agrarian population, 13.3 millions of Tanzanians, lives in vil-
lages and that 7373 villages are counted (Ergas, 1979, p. 180; comp.
Mascarenhas, 1979, p. 151-154).

4.2.2. Communal production

What Ujamaa exactly means and how Ujamaa villages must be organized was not very clear in the beginning. The concept as such is hazy and refers to solidarity, cooperation and mutual help. For Nyerere the most important elements are: that there will be no exploitation of one by the other; and that everyone must play a fair part (Nyerere, 1979, p. 126; Nyerere, 1978, p. 168-169). Furthermore, it is also clear that Ujamaa is related to communal activities and collectively owned means of production.

At the first efforts to introduce the Ujamaa principle and communal activities the problem arose that many peasants were not disposed to give up their own plots and livestock to the collectivity. Moreover, it was not very clear under which conditions they could have been willing to do so. An agreement was reached that also in Ujamaa villages specific forms of private property could be allowed. In order to be recognized as an Ujamaa village, it is necessary that "an important part of the economic activities are undertaken and executed at communal base" [*]. In addition, it is only the Prime Minister, who by certificate can designate a village as an Ujamaa village.

Communal activities initially were conceived as the core of the Ujamaa community. The introduction of those activities, however, has not been very successful. Research findings have made clear that there are several influencing factors here, like regional and social differences, village characteristics, personal attributes of those who are committed to communal activities, and working conditions. The main results can be summarized as follows:

a. Regional differences
In general it can be said that the Ujamaa principle is rarely accepted in areas where land is fertile and suited to the cultivation of cash crops. Normally in those areas, available land is also completely

[*] Villages and Ujamaa Villages (registration, designation and administration) Act, july 1975, art. 16.1.

distributed and privately owned. Ujamaa has been more successfully
introduced in regions which Cliffe calls "marginal subsistence areas"
with uncultivated land yet available, and where the Ujamaa programme
was offering several services, thus making it attractive for the pea-
sants to start cultivation and communal production (Cliffe, 1973, p.
203-207; comp. Konter, 1979, p. 158).

b. Social differences

Differences in social stratification at village level also appear to
influence participation in communal activities. In this connection two
basic types can be distinguished; these also form the extremes of a
continuum, upon which several mixed forms and variations can be found.
They are called here the variants of patronage and poverty.

In the case of the patronage-variant the degree of social differen-
tiation is relatively high, and inequality is found in the positions
of different catagories of villagers. Some peasants are successful and
relatively rich; others are marginal and poor; while still others are
located between them. If these groupings decide to combine forces, the
richer peasants mostly appear to be the active ones and to work hard
(Freyhold, 1979, p. 68; Barker, 1979, p. 104). They frequently succeed
in consolidating their own power position by appropriating a dispro-
portionally high share of the collective product and reserving for them-
selves aid funds from government. Moreover, their collaboration also
reinforces the image of the good patron which those "kulaks" have fre-
quently built up about themselves among the villagers. After an eventual
initial enthousiasm the majority of middle-peasants soon lose interest
when they realize that they are being cheated out of the benefits. Con-
sequently, they either try to reduce their activities, do not appear
at all or too late for work, loiter around to save strength, or hurried-
ly work to save time for their private farming later on the day. So
they demonstrate, generally speaking, escapist behaviour, which rein-
forces the prejudice that they really are lazy, apathetic and incapable.
The poor have little to lose and only to gain by cooperation. They nor-
mally are more dedicated to communal activities than the middle-pea-
sants.

In the case of the poverty-variant great homogeneity is found among
the villagers, but at a low level of development and in circumstan-
ces of poverty. They will be disposed to collaborate, because there
are very few alternatives and because conformity to government pro-
posals gives the best chance for aid and assistance from outside.
Great dedication to communal work cannot be expected, and it is quite
probable that the less-committed members set the standards of commu-
nal labour to be followed by the rest of the community (Dumont, 1969,
 p. 34-36).

c. Characteristics of the village

According to von Freyhold communal activities are more frequently
found in small villages. She notes a negative correlation between size
of the village and extension of communal land (Freyhold, 1979, p.86).
The optimum size for an Ujamaa village apparently lies between 60 -
150 households, while in the process of villagization a minimum of
250 households is taken as point of departure. Bigger villages are ob-
viously less appropriate for communal activities. The members do not
know each other and have no reasons to trust each other enough in
order to throw themselves into the risky adventure of communal pro-
duction. On the other hand, findings are not very consistent. In a
study, based on data collected in sixty Ujamaa villages in the re-
gions of Dodoma, Iringa, Kigoma and Kilimanjaro, McHenry concludes
that size of the village does not matter. His hypothesis, that the
level of peasants participation in communal production is higher when
the size of the village is smaller, has not been confirmed (McHenry,
1977, p. 53).

Communal production appears to be more frequent in villages founded
earlier than in those founded later. Emphasis on this form of produc-
tion was indeed stronger at the beginning of the Ujamaa movement.
Villages where people are committed to communal production are fre-
quently also villages where cooperation is found in other areas, like
house-building, road construction, water supply and the building of
schools and health facilities. In general communal activities are li-
mited in scope; people also appear to invest relatively little time
in those activities.

d. Personal attributes

Men in general participate more in communal production than women; the same is true with the better-educated and wealthier peasants. McHenry explains this situation with reference to the gambling element that is related to communal activities. Men and people who possess more resources can better afford the risk involved than women and people with few resources. TANU-members also appear to be more active in this type of activities than non-members.

Those who participate in communal production are, generally speaking, more optimistic about their own future. They also think that they themselves can improve their situation, and they expect more material rewards from communal activities than those who do not participate. It is also interesting, that research findings do not substantiate the notion that the use of coercion to join villages is detrimental to the active participation of peasants in communal production (Mc-Henry, 1977, p. 51).

e. Working conditions

McHenry also found that participation in communal production is more intensive if the leadership participates actively; if a close relation has been established between work-input and individual remuneration, which is more the case with piece-rate work than with time-rate work; and if the rate of return from communal work is relatively high. The average rate of pay per day indeed appears to be higher for villages with more active participants than for those with fewer active ones.

Villagers who participate in communal production think that participation will be improved if working conditions improve, and if it can be avoided that some participants cut corners. Further the more active participants appear to feel that more government assistance would encourage them, while the less active ones appear to think that greater material rewards for work on the communal farm would encourage them. Village leaders and district and regional officers accentuate the importance of changing working conditions, and they call for the

introduction of technical improvements, the organization of small work teams, and the adoption of a piece-rate system of wages. Village leaders also stress the need for more information and extension programmes. They think that lack of participation must be punished, and they accentuate in general the need to impose sanctions or fines as villagers participate less (McHenry, 1977, p. 54-59).

Those findings, indicating the conditions under which communal production can be successful, all point in the same direction: only when the process of development has advanced and people have room to gamble; when private property will not be in danger; when working conditions are favorable and relatively large personal advantages can be expected from cooperation - then only do initiatives towards communal production have any chance to succeed. Moreover, such activities must be organized at a low scale to facilitate that the participants can trust each other and that internal control can be exercised. This leads to the conclusion that communal work cannot be used as an instrument to initiate development, and it only will succeed if development has already been advanced.
This general impression also will be confirmed when we retrace some problems that manifested themselves at the time that the principles of Ujamaa were introduced in the villages.

4.3. Development policy and problems at local level

In the foregoing paragraph 3.2. it was outlined how the local community should function according to the basic notions of Nyerere's development philosophy. This elaboration was formulated in global terms, more indicating general principles than concrete rules and directives. It is precisely these global terms, however, which present the first problem. The vagueness has given rise to a great variety of different interpretations. The translation of the principles into concrete norms and codes of behaviour not only fails, but also is judged to be undesirable, while the basic units of society are varied and everyone has to make independently his own interpretation. As a consequence, many obscurities remain with respect to rights and duties of the members,

related to communally owned land and tools and to services destined
for the community. Neither has the following been elaborated: regu-
lations with respect to entrance and retirement of members; rules
regarding compensations for property used, and regulations for re-
munerations and investments. The village council has to make arran-
gements in those matters, but appear frequently not to be able to
do so, which leads to manipulations and corruption (Barker, 1979, p.
p. 117-118).

In a general sense it can be said that the Ujamaa policy overesti-
mates the possibilities of the villagers to manage their own devel-
opment, and that too little account has been taken of the concrete
dynamics and contradictions, which in fact determine life in many
Tanzanian villages.
That can be illustrated in a cultural way by analyzing more the men-
tality of peasants, which has consequences for their inclinations
with respect to initiatives for cooperation. That can also be made
clear by studying important structural measures at local level, like
the cell-system and its functioning.

4.3.1. The mentality of peasants

Peasants at a low level of development are in general especially
oriented towards their family, which is a unit of production and con-
sumption at the same time. Their main problem is the survival of
themselves and their families. To solve that continual problem ade-
quately they employ a specific rationality, one which is determined
partly by personal experiences and also partly by traditions. It is
that rationality which Nyerere appeals to when he states that the
members of the local community themselves are the best equipped to
solve their own problems. However, he then supposes that this ratio-
nality, oriented to family-survival, can also be applied to solve
problems at the village level and to stimulate village development.
But family and village are different systems, each with its own needs
and interests, which are sometimes conflicting. A family-oriented pea-
sant seeks in the first place personal advantages from communal work

and more remuneration; a village-oriented person will place more empha-
sis on accumulation and saving instead of consumption. In the view of
family-orientation, private ownership of land and means of production
are seen as the most safe guarantee for survival; while in the view
of village-orientation or according to national interest, which accents
the importance of agrarian production increase to national development,
a plea will be made for collective ownership and communal production.

a. Cooperation
Family-oriented peasants in general will be little interested in coope-
ration, for cooperation means additional labour. They also frequently
have the experience that additional labour gives very little additional
profit. Thus success for them does not depend on their own achievements,
but on climate, fate or supernatural forces (Konter, 1979, p. 54-56).
Cooperation will even be less attractive if peasants possess their own
land and livestock. Working together with others then competes with
labour for one's own family. Laziness, apathy, escapist behaviour and
possibly sabotage are reactions, that can then be expected in coopera-
tion. Those reactions will be more pronounced as cooperation provides
less personal profit. Then a vicious circle begins: cooperation yields
little profit, so people will cooperate less and yields consequently
fall down further.

b. Leadership
The relation between peasants at a low level of development and their
leaders generally is characterized by a combination of trust and dis-
trust at the same time. Leaders must be followed and merit trust until
there is evidence of incapacity or dishonesty, after which they must be
replaced. People with an orientation toward family survival do not over-
look the interests of the group as such, and they trust their leaders
to be watchful of those interests and to make the correct decisions. Be-
sides, they will not make a clear distinction between functional and
personal aspects or general and private interests. Deliberations be-
tween leaders and their following thus also have personal accents, and
those who watch over the general interests are also expected to benefit
themselves. A leader, however, cannot be watched and controlled by his

following, for that is against the trust he merits, at least until his project fails or he disappoints his following.

c. Democratic deliberation and planning

Democratic deliberation and discussion between leaders and their followers are difficult to realize in this situation. Such deliberation presupposes that the participants have a critical attitude towards the leadership, that they have a sufficient overview of the issues for discussion to form their own opinions, and that they are capable to depersonalize discussions and focus on arguments and objective considerations. Those conditions frequently are not fulfilled.

Planning presupposes that those who participate examine the elements that play a part, and that they see interrelations and coherences. Planners also are supposed to be capable to formulate alternative solutions, to consider advantages and disadvantages of different solutions and to make coherent decisions. Family oriented peasants will feel themselves unable to participate actively in those processes. They will expect others to make the suggestions, and they will normally agree without asking for particular reasons.

Nyerere appears to be quite optimistic in his thinking about development. Many problems that have arisen in the villages are more understandable when the basic characteristics of the peasant mentality are taken into account. Reactions like lazyness and apathy in cooperation, accepting free advice and plans, offered by technicians and officials, corruption and the refusal to accept additional work, can all be expected, like an aid-mentality, within which aid is waited for and expected to solve every problem. Some authors see this aid-mentality as one of the basic causes for the failure of self-reliance (Freyhold, 1979, p. 38).

4.3.2. The cell-system

The introduction of the ten-houses-cell-system, an important structural measure to relate the population more closely to their own development, has been successful in the sense that this initiative is accepted

massively and has reached the Tanzanian citizenry thoughout the country. Only in residential zones of urban areas, where a highly educated and well-informed upper group of the population.lives, the cell-system appears not to work. When problems or disputes occur in these areas, the people do not resort to the cell-system, and solve their problems or settle their disputes privately (Njohole, 1975, p. 8-9).

However, the functions which were assigned to the cells in the original conception appear not to be adequately fulfilled. Research findings give evidence that internal dispute settlement is the most important fuction of the cell. Problems and conflicts between cell-members in fact are dealt with first at cell-level and usually are solved. Cell-leadership also functions well as a referring-agent to the police and the judicial institutions.
Secondly, the cell appears to be a good communication channel for information going from above to below. People are kept informed by their cells about what is going on and what is expected from them. Namely, for illiterates and people who do not have a radio at their disposal, their cell is really important. In this respect the cell-system has fostered cultural integration and encouraged the population to identify with their country and the development philosophy of their leaders.

On the other hand, this system has functioned far less as an instrument to communicate village problems to higher authorities, to represent and advocate the interests of their constituents, and to create real possibilities for the cell-members to influence the decision-making processes at higher levels. The cell-system also has proved to be rather unsuccessful on other points: as recruiting-mechanism for the Party; as instrument to guarantee the transference of taxes and fees; and as mechanism for ideological education and mobilization for the population for plans and programmes which are handed down from above and mostly imposed on them (Kokwebanjira, 1975, p. 44-48; Quorro, 1975, p. 54-56; Kawago, 1975, p. 58-64).

For an explanation of those results the position of the cell-leader
is of central importance. First it is evident that cell-leaders nor-
mally are not recruited from local elites. They are very much like
the neighbours who elected them, and mostly they are men. Exceptional-
ly, and only in urban areas, some women are found. The function of
cell-leader is unpaid. Energy and time invested in this job are only
honoured by a symbolic reward: a cell-leader may fly the TANU flag
over his house. Through good functioning he can also win respect and
prestige. Traditional leaders frequently refuse to take positions as
cell-leaders, because material compensation is lacking. On the other
hand, they assist cell-leaders by giving councel or advice on various
occasions (Quorro, 1975, p. 53-54; Njohole, 1975, p. 10).
The role of the cell-leader is not clearly defined. He must perform
different tasks, which partially are contradictory. That leads to
conflicts, because the Party does not provide clear directives on how
to operate in such cases. A cell-leader must be a reconciler, but
also a mobilizer and spearhead of rural development; he must explain
politics and persuade people and is also expected to articulate the
people's views and communicate them to TANU and the government. For
lack of definition and directions, cell-leaders see themselves obliged
to define their own position. This results in several types of leaders
and different images existing among cell-members about their leaders
and the cell-system.
Samoff offers as a result of his study three alternative images of
cell-systems and cell-leaders, which he defines as follows:

1. Agent of change   : cell and cell-leader offer an institu-
                                  tion, that in general is responsive to
                                  the needs of the members and at the
                                  same time sufficiently linked with the
                                  larger political system to pass on lo-
                                  cal demands and complaints

2. Agent of control   : cell and cell-leader offer an institu-
                                  tion, which is oriented primarily to
                                  maintain security, keeping discontent
                                  localized and implementing directives
                                  and thus more preserving order than

                              facilitating change.
3. Agent of local power   : cell and cell-leader are primarily
                               responsive to their local constituents
                               and advocate for their interests.
                               In this case they also can develop into
                               focal points of local resistance (Sa-
                               moff, 1972, p. 72-74).

These differences in functions and task definitions and the correspon-
ding images among cell-members make clear that communication and con-
flict settlements are the most important tasks of cell-leaders. That
they fight to stimulate cooperation and communal production appears
to be exceptional.

This variation in task interpretation illustrates, moreover, that
the role of cell-leader is not clearly defined and that little atten-
tion has been given to instruction and training of those leaders.
They operate in a certain isolation. Neither the government nor the
Party take the institutions of cell and cell-leader very seriously.
Concerning the provision of resources to the villages as well as de-
liberations and discussions to define policies at village level, no
consideration is made for the participation of cell-leaders. While
cell-leaders in general have good contacts with their members and
the cells fulfil important functions of communication and mediation,
there is very little direction to and support for the cell-system.

Cells could be developed into key institutions in the process of par-
ticipation, and cell-leaders could be able to fulfil their task as
mediator between the common people and the supporting institutions.
Possibly they could also be equipped for the neglected task of moti-
vation and mobilization of the people for development purposes.

Then it will be absolutely necessary to prepare the cell-leaders and
train them intensively. They are common people, as said before, so
that a predominantly family-orientation and reactions typical for
peasants can be expected from them. Moreover, structural conditions
must be created, which facilitate cell-leaders to take responsabili-
ty for their tasks. Then the relation between cell-leaders and the

supporting institutions at village- and higher levels must be cleared up; then, too, the access of cell-leaders to those institutions must be markedly increased. That is valid for their relation to the village council, which is not clearly defined. Cell-leaders can form part of this council or inform the latter, but they do not necessarily do so. That is even more true for their relation to the officials of the Executive Office and the Party, which is not only unclearly defined but also frequently characterized by lack of collaboration and by conflict. Party and government officials demonstrate reluctance to rely on cell-leaders and to involve them. That can be explained not only by the great social distance between these leaders and the officials, who frequently have been drawn from the more educated and higher strata of the population, but also by the lack of definition and direction, which should indicate more precisely how cell-leaders actively can be involved in Party activities and local decision-making.

This lack of responsiveness to and collaboration with cell-leaders has caused many failures and conflicts and has also led to a growing tension between officials and technicians on the one side, and the population on the other. The people are not yet capable to come up to the high requirements of self-reliant functioning. Neither the Party nor the government provided effective direction and facilities needed to make self-reliance possible at the basic level.
While successes must be obtained and the chosen strategy must be proved to be just, agrarian policy has been developed more and more in an authoritarian direction with plans formulated without participation of the population and imposed from above, and with coercion as instrument to guarantee conformity. That also has led to growing opposition and resistance by the population (comp. Pratt, 1979, p. 203).
Moreover, the new policy and particularly the effective work of cell-leaders as informants have generated new expectations among the people for a better future. Those expectations have not been verified and frustrations are the consequence. If people are dedicated to an ideal but do not dispose of the structural possibilities to realize their ideal, then - after repeated tries and failures - reactions of apathy, escapism or resistance are probable (Mizruchi, 1964; comp. Merton,

1962, p. 121-194).

Taking in account the limitations of their situation and their expe-
riences, peasants are not in a position to develop themselves by own
initiative and resources. If then the cultural and structural facili-
ties are lacking to make such development possible, and authoritarian-
ism and coercion are recurrent, then the poor results obtained until
now in Tanzania can also be expected.
Participation in deliberations about policies and in decision-making
processes is a very difficult and complex road to development, which
also is costly in terms of time, energy and assistance. If participa-
tion in this proper sense has been realized at the local level in Tan-
zania, it has not been proved by the consulted literature. Whatever
the case may be, systematic research about those processes of parti-
cipation has not been found (Barker, 1979, p. 113).

4.4. Supporting services

To stimulate development at village-level and active local participa-
tion, a set of facilities has been created, partly by the government,
partly also by TANU. But many complaints can be found, which refer to
lack of coordination between those services, exaggerated aid to some
and neglect of others, bureaucratic delays in the supply of services,
and favouritism in the allocation of aid (Pratt, 1979, p. 227-228).
Furthermore it is obvious that Tanzania has a great shortage of trained
executives. Frequently it is stated with respect to functionaries and
Party officials that even they do not know exactly what Ujamaa means
and how the basic principles of the development philosophy can be trans-
lated into concrete policies and strategies; that they are also unin-
formed about the political and economic reality in the villages and do
not bother to investigate this; and that they are not able to guide
processes of conscientization and to start and conduct real participa-
tion of the population.

At national level five-year plans have been developed, starting in 1967.
In those plans until 1977 all emphasis is given to agrarian development.

The plans, however, remained circulating mostly within the bureaucracies at national and district levels, and concrete decisions and policies at local or regional levels frequently were not coordinated with those plans (Ingle, 1972, p. 257-258; comp. Pratt, 1979, p. 228-229; Saul, 1972, p. 1-29).

The most unsatisfactory situation, however, appears to be the market system. Initially the peasant was the final link in an hierarchical system of middlemen, in which Arabs and Azians played important roles; after independence marketing cooperations gradually appeared, frequently controlled by richer peasants. From 1976 onwards the marketing of products has been an exclusive monopoly of the state. But complaints are increasing: the system appears to be inefficient, unreliable, more limited than before, unprofitable and expensive (Makoye, 1977, p. 20-30). Namely, the fact that the peasants must pay for loses in weight or quality, caused by errors in marketing, has given rise to great discord and much criticism (Verhagen, 1979, p. 57).

Recently and in the last five-year plan of 1977-1982 emphasis has shifted to the development of basic industries, which will hopefully help the country out of problems. This also means that more pressure will be exerted on agriculture to produce the resources needed to facilitate this new policy. A state monopoly in the marketing of agricultural products will be an important instrument to this end and an efficient mechanism to guarantee the transference of surpluses out of agriculture. But in reaction the black market is growing now in Tanzania in a way that hardly can be controlled.

5. Conclusions and statements

The experiences recently obtained in Tanzania are of great importance for the study of access and participation problems. That country has experimented at national level with improving the access of the population to services, as well as its active participation. In the thinking of president Nyerere those elements are important instruments to induce development, increase production and ameliorate the life conditions of the rural population.

Still the conclusion must be drawn that the desired increase of
agrarian production has not been reached. Since 1969 food production
has stagnated or declined, and also the production of cash crops has
not obviously increased in the last ten years (Barker, 1979, p. 100).
In the foregoing it was said that this lack of success can partly be
attributed to external factors. On the other hand internal factors
also count; these must be sought in the ideas about development and
related strategies as found in Tanzania, and in the degree to which
they correspond to the Tanzanian situation.

The official development thinking as formulated by Nyerere, clearly
demonstrates elements of idealism and optimism, so that a one-sided
emphasis is given to some aspects of the reality while others are
neglected.
Nyerere starts from the idea of equality between people and presuppo-
ses that this equality also is found. He has the conviction that
people in freedom are disposed to help each other and to reflect so-
lidarity. Therefore, he accentuates the necessity of cooperation and
communal work as the best guarantees for maximal dedication and high
productivity of labour. Existing inequalities, competition between
people and the need of the individual to profile himself against
others and eventually at the cost of others, are of little importance
in his thinking. He also assumes that people will come to complete
agreement by mutual deliberation, and that persuasion is the main and
the only proper instrument to reach a consensus. Taking in account
these opinions, he defines development as a process in which all must
share on an equalitarian basis; he places great emphasis on questions
of distribution and has little regard for problems of accumulation and
investment.
Moreover, Nyerere accentuates the necessity of participation and edu-
cation for the masses, paying little attention to issues like the
development of technical and scientific knowledge and the creation of
expertise in different areas.

This strong emphasis on equality and equalitarian development in the
thinking of Nyerere does not correspond to the real situation in Tan-

zania, where inequalities of many kinds are found. Through processes
of modernization and incorporation the balances - determined by tra-
ditions - are frequently disturbed, and forms of unequal development
have arisen in different sectors.
In the development strategy elaborated by Nyerere, too little account
is taken of this factual situation and too few structural measures
are taken to foster desired equality. Important changes have been in-
troduced by the programme of nationalization, by villagization and by
the introduction of the cell-system. Property relations in the agra-
rian sector, however, have hardly changed. There has been no agrarian
reform; private land is not expropriated and allocated to collectivi-
ties of peasants. Existing inequalities are not only maintained, but
frequently reinforced and extended by development policy.

The optimistic view of Nyerere also emerges in his conviction that the
population itself can conduct its own development. He appeals then to
the traditional African society, where the community also could manage
its own matters. That society, however, was oriented to maintaining
subsistence and not to the production of surpluses. Moreover, mutual
equality was a given in that situation and was upheld by levelling
mechanisms, which prevented change, innovation and progress. He also
appeals to the ability of the people to arrive at the correct decisions
with respect to their development by active participation and democra-
tic deliberation. That is a rather optimistic image of the peasant
who, considering his family-orientation, will only be able to parti-
cipate and deliberate if his development is already advanced.

The one-sidedness in the points of departure of Nyerere and his opti-
mism about the possibilities of self-reliance in situations of low
development have provoked reactions and resistance even in his own
country. Consequently, two power-blocks have arisen in Tanzania which
actually pursue opposing policies. Nyerere and his followers take the
line that the country can be developed independently and without assis-
tance from outside, and that this development can be realized on an
equalitarian base. Many officials, technicians and managers employed
by the state bureaucracy, the TANU party or foreign interest-groups,

on the other hand, accentuate just what has been neglected in the
thinking of Nyerere. They carry out a policy that indeed appeals to
foreign assistance, accepts dependence and fosters a development that
creates inequality and augments the internal oppositions within the
country. TANU which as unity-party should have been the stimulating
force behind the official development policy, is blamed that it de-
nies the ideals of equality and independence, offers insufficient
countervailing power against the state bureaucracy, and too rapidly
appears to be disposed to legitimize decisions of bureaucrats politic-
ally. Many cadres of the Party also demonstrate that they are poorly
equipped or unable to help the poor and middle peasants, so that a
policy oriented to mobilization, persuasion and education of the po-
pulation cannot be expected to succeed (Freyhold, 1979, p. 117).

In this opposition between a policy tinged with idealism and oriented
to self-development and independence on one side, and on the other a
technocratic policy, oriented to development in dependence and growing
inequality, lies an important nucleus of the Tanzanian problems and
an internal explanation for the poor results obtained until now. Here
also is demonstrated that improving the access to services and parti-
cipation does not automatically mean a guarantee for development; that
development can only be fostered under certain strict conditions.
Therefore, some lessons can be learned from these Tanzanian experien-
ces - lessons which are relevant for "access and participation" and
which can be formulated in the following statements:
1. The participation-method is as such little appropriate to initiate
   processes of development, because participation presupposes a cer-
   tain degree of development already to exist.
2. Participative projects oriented to groups at a low level of devel-
   opment can therefore only be successful under very intensive and
   specific assistance.
3. The participation-method cannot be applied at national level. Coun-
   terdevelopment by means of participation is only possible in spe-
   cific projects and on a small scale.
4. Participation is expensive in terms of time, energy and knowledge.
   A snowballeffect, which automatically results from participative

projects, cannot be expected.

5. Participation based on moral incentives only functions in relative isolation and with little aid from outside. In other cases material incentives are also needed; piece-rate wages create then more motivation than time-rate wages.

6. A bureaucratic apparatus is in general not very appropriate to initiate and conduct participative projects.

7. Cooperation oriented to the production of surpluses cannot be based on norms and values derived from traditional societies, the latter being oriented to subsistence maintenance.

8. Rural socialism is not a modernized variant of traditional social formations.

9. Development strategies, which are above all directed towards problems of distribution and pursue equality in development, neglect the accumulation-interest with its inherent inequality. Low productivity and stagnation in development are the consequences.

REFERENCES

Arrighi, G. and J.S. Saul
(eds)
Essays on the political economy of Africa
New York, Monthly Review, 1973.

Bailey, F.G.
The peasant view of the bad live.
In: Shanin, T. (ed.)
Peasants and peasant societies
Harmondsworth, 1971, pp. 299-321.

Barker, J.
The debate on rural socialism in Tanzania.
In: Mwansasu, B.U. and C. Pratt (eds),
1979, pp. 95-124.

Cliffe, L.
The policy of Ujamaa Vijijini and the
class struggle in Tanzania.
In: Cliffe, L. and J.S. Saul (eds)
Socialism in Tanzania, vol. 2, Policies:
Dar es Salaam, 1973, pp. 195-211.

Dumont, R.
Tanzanian agriculture after the Arusha
Declaration;
Dar es Salaam, 1969.

Ergas, Z.
La politique des villages Ujamaa en Tan-
zanie: la fin d'un mythe.
In: Revue Tiers Monde, jan./mrt., 1979,
pp. 169-186.

Freyhold, M. von
Ujamaa villages in Tanzania, analysis of
a social experiment,
London, 1979.

Huizer, G.
The Ujamaa village programme in Tanzania,
new forms of rural development.
Paper, The Hague, 1971.

Ingle, Cl.R.
From village to state in Tanzania.
Ithaca and London, 1972.

Kawago, K.S.
The operation of TANU cells in Iringa.
In: Proctor, J.H. (ed.), 1975, pp. 57-66.

Kilima Bavu, I.
Tanzanian experience of self reliance: a
possibility for the development of the
poor societies.
Diss. Univ. of Southern California, 1974.

Kokwebangira, R.M.
Cells in Dar es Salaam and Bukoba.
In: Proctor, J.H., (ed.), 1975, pp. 42-49.

Konter, J.H.
Ujamaa, de ontwikkeling van een Afrikaans
socialisme.
Assen/Amsterdam, 1978.

Konter, J.H.	Traditie en armoede, een casestudy van de Nyakyusa. Tanzania. Leiden, 1979.
Makoye, J.E.	Problems of state trading companies in Tanzania. In: Taamuli, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 20-30.
Mascarenhas, A.	After villagization - what? In: Mwansasu, B.U. and C. Pratt (eds), 1979, pp. 145-165.
Mashauri, R.K.	Leadership structure and function in an Ujamaa Village: a case study of Gallu. In: Proctor, J.H. (ed.) Building Ujamaa villages in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam, 1975, pp. 55-62.
McHenry, D.E.	Peasant participation in communal farming: the Tanzanian experience. In: The African Studies Review, Vol. XX, no. 3, 1977, pp. 43-59.
Merton, R.K.	Social theory and social structure. New York, 1962.
Mizruchi, E.H.	Success and opportunity, a study of anomie. Glencoe, 1964.
Mshangama, A.H.	TANU cells: organs of one party democratic socialism. In: Proctor, J.H. (ed.), 1975, pp. 20-31.
Mushi, S.	Ujamaa: modernization by traditionalization. In: Taamuli, Vol. 1, No. 2, Dar es Salaam, 1971.
Mwansasu, B.U. and C. Pratt (eds)	Towards socialism in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1979.
Njohole, B.	Building Party cells in Tanzania. In: Proctor, J.H., (ed.), 1975, pp. 1-19.
Nyerere, J.K.	Freedom and unity. Dar es Salaam, 1978.
Nyerere, J.K.	Ujamaa, essays on socialism. Dar es Salaam, 1979.

Parker, I.	Contradictions in the transition to socialism: the case of the National Development Corporation. In: Mwansasu, B.U. and C. Pratt (eds), 1979, pp. 46-71.
Pratt, C.	Tanzania's transition to socialism: reflections of a democratic socialist. In: Mwansasu, B.U. and C. Pratt (eds), 1979, pp. 193-236.
Proctor, J.H. (ed.)	The cell system of the Tanganijika African National Union. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1975.
Quorro, J.S.	Cell leaders in Mbulumbulu and the problems of effectiveness. In: Proctor, J.H., (ed.), 1975, pp. 50-56.
Röling, N.	Alternative extension approaches. In: Approach, No. 11, 1981, pp. 3-25.
Samoff, J.	Cell leaders in Tanzania: a review of recent research. In: Taamuli, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1973-74, pp. 63-75.
Saul, J.S.	Planning for socialism in Tanzania: the sociopolitical context. In: Rweyemamu, J.F., (ed.) Towards socialist planning. Dar es Salaam, 1972, pp. 1-29.
Shivji, I.G.	Class struggles in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam, 1976.
Shivji, I.G.	The silent class struggle. Dar es Salaam, 1976a.
Verhagen,K.C.W.	Tanzania, een nieuwe politiek voor dorpsontwikkeling. In: Intermediair, Jrg. 15, 1979, no. 7, pp. 53-57.

13

PROBLEMATICS OF PARTICIPATION
A POST FACTO CONTRIBUTION

D. Flud van Giffen

Institute of Applied Sociology
University of Amsterdam

1. Introduction

On November 19th and 20th, 1981, a seminar on ACCESS and PARTICIPATION, organized by a team of sociologists of the Department of Development Sociology at Leiden University, took place.
One of the objects of the seminar was to present some of the findings of a research project titled 'ACCESS and PARTICIPATION' on which the team has been working for the last two years.
This research project consists, basically, of a comparative analysis of participatory development projects, studied through both literature and fieldvisits. The focus of this research has been on participation processes within the so-called target groups of these development projects, and on external relations within the local context, with special attention to the role and functioning of the change-agency responsible for the execution of the development project.
The overall purpose of the meeting, for which a limited number of Dutch and foreign colleagues had been invited, concerned the discussion of current views and approaches, including possible future lines of research in the field, and of course critical feedback on the 'Access and Participation' project itself.
I had the privilege of being invited to the seminar and being able to participate in the meetings and discussions, which turned out to be a

worthwhile and thought provoking experience.
Reflection and evaluation of this experience, during and after the
seminar, gave rise to the idea of this post facto contribution.
Of course, an elaborate evaluation of the seminar is beyond the scope
and the cometence of this contribution.
Instead, I want to touch upon three related issues that came up during
the meetings. It is hoped that an elaboration of these issues may be
useful to both the theory and the praxis components of participatory
development projects, while at the same time providing a modest
explanation of some of the confusion that at certain times was
prevalent at the seminar.

2. Participation - process and product

At the closing of the seminar, chairman Norman Uphoff related the
contents of the discussions and papers to five 'tension areas'.
He distinguished between the following issues/areas:
- research versus action,
- micro level actions versus macro level tendencies,
- top down versus bottom up development strategy,
- short term efforts versus long term change,
- the well known tension between theory and practice.
He also suggested that in concrete development efforts a 'solution'
to these problems or tension-areas was often found by way of the
adoption of a process perspective, instead of a project approach.
In the 'Access and Participation' research a similar perspective is
adopted: "Participation is not a static concept (see the contribu-
tion of Buijs (2); see also the contributions of Galjart (11) and
Shadid, Prins, Nas (3), all emphasize participation as a process).
However, by adopting the process-perspective one runs the risk of
throwing out the child with the bathwater. A short excursion into the
uses of the term 'participation' may make this clear.
More often than not, both in the ordinary discourse and in the more
technical discourse of scientific undertakings, the term 'participa-
tion' occurs with systematic ambiguity, which frequently is wholly
innocuous. But sometimes and indeed on all those occasions when

discussions center on the nature of participation itself or when the terms used in a rigorous argument make equivocation perilous, the conflation of two of the meanings may result in serious confusion. The two meanings of 'participation' most pertinent at this moment are easily enough distinguished and the damage that may be consequent on their confusion can be avoided simply by making them explicit. The term 'participation' belongs to a rather numerous class of terms, all exhibiting a simular ambiguity and remarkable enough to have been singled out by philosophers of language (Black, 1952) and given a special name: the process-product ambiguity. All the terms that exhibit this ambiguity (and these include such otherwise disparate terms as 'science', 'harvest', 'education', 'swim', 'organization', etc.) are ones that refer to a certain activity or process on the one hand and on the other hand are also used to refer to an outcome or product of that process.

In the case of 'participation' the distinction in reference is straightforward enough: on the one hand (as process term) it is used to refer to the activities or workings of the members of the social system concerned [*], i.e. talking, observing, reasoning, cooperating, deciding, etc.
On the other hand, the same term is employed to refer to the results of these activities or processes, i.e. to products in terms of rules, statutes, norms, procedures, organization structure, etc., in short characteristics which distinguish it from other types of organization. In both theory and practice it would seem to be worthwhile to specify the relationship between participation as process and participation as product. Taking the five-phase model of the participation process as developed by the 'Access and Participation' team (see Buijs (4),

[*] Concerning the meaning of the term participation, I adopt the concept as used by the "Access and Participation Research Project" (see the contribution of Buijs (4)), although the distinction made is not necessarily limited to this particular meaning of the term. In the same way neither the activities nor the products are limited to the ones mentioned.

note on page 50), it seems possible to relate different 'products'
to the various phases.
Thus, in the first phases of promotion and mobilization the
participation in terms of product will be relatively little and of
short duration. In the constructing phase the participation in terms
of product will be relatively high, while in the consolidation phase
one would guess that the characters of the 'product' are likely to
change, that is, participation in terms of product is likely to
become more formal and stable, time-enduring [*].

Empirical testing of the phase-model including hypotheses about the
relationship between the various phases and participation in terms of
product, could provide systematic information as to the need for
specific inputs on the part of the promoting agency, at specific
times in the development process.

3. Participation - the paradigmatic issue

"Problems may arise during discussions about international
comparative research because researchers either share the same
sociological perspective, but have in mind different goals for
research, or have the same primary research goal but do not share the
same perspective or differ in both." (Berting, 1979, p. 165).
Although this statement was put forward by Berting in a different
context, it seems equally suited to explain some of the confusion that
arose during the seminar [**]. A confusion that is not unusual at this
kind of gathering that does not last long enough either to enable the

[*] The distinction between participation as process and Participation
as product is likely related in one way or another to the
distinction between a diachronic and a synchronic approach. It is,
however, beyond the scope of this contribution to elaborate this
relationship.

[**]In addition to the factors mentioned by Berting, the lack of
conceptual clarity added to the confusion.

development of a common language, or to establish clearly the
differences between the participants and the subsequent formation of
different sub-groups with a common language. To overcome these
problems would most likely require a quite different set up, a rigorous
preparation by the participants, (initially) a strict chairing of the
meetings, more time for both formal meetings and informal gatherings,
etc. (As is not unusual, the bottleneck to such an undertaking, will
most likely be found in the financial consequences.)
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile even in retrospect to get a clearer
understanding of some of the factors involved in this confusion, so an
elaboration of Berting's statement is in order.

Idealtypically, Berting distinguishes the following five primary goals
in sociological research:
"We may engage in sociological research in order to
1. develop theory;
2. explain specific social phenomena that catch our attention for some
   reason;
3. describe social phenomena;
4. select from a larger number of variables those variables that may be
   affected by policy;
5. evaluate processes of change". (Berting, 1979, pp. 159-160)
The first two goals are related to 'discipline research', while the last
two goals are primarily connected with research designed as a guide to
action, and are thus called 'policy research'.
The third type of research goal is intermediate in this respect, as it
may generate data that may be useful for both the development of the
discipline and for policy. It is the last three research goals that
are most commonly stressed in research commissioned by both governmental
and non-governmental organizations.
The contribution of the last two types of research to the development
of the discipline is rather problematic:
"More often than not it is very difficult, not to say, impossible, to
generalize from the results of those studies (research types 4 and 5)
because they are mostly not grounded in general theory." (Berting, 1979,
p. 175.)

On the other hand, the contribution of the first two types of research
to the solution of social problems is also highly problematic.
The main goal of this kind of research is to explain social phenomena.
However, an explanation does not necessarily directly provide concrete
guidelines for action. In many cases it is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for direct intervention.
The other issue of Berting's statement is concerned with the existence
of different sociological perspectives or paradigms as he also calls
them (Berting, 1979, pp. 137-157).
Berting presents a typology of sociological perspectives that ideal-
typically represents the present state of paradigmatic pluralism in
sociological theory [*).

Fig. 1. Types of sociological perspectives or 'paradigms'.
        (source: Berting, 1979, p. 144)

*) The concept of paradigm as developed by G. Ritzer is used by
   Berting: a paradigm is ".....a fundamental image of the subject
   matter within a science. It serves to define what should be studied,
   what questions should be asked, and what rules should be followed
   in interpreting the answer obtained. The paradigm is the broadest
   unit of consensus within a science and serves to differentiate one
   scientific community (or subcommunity) from another.
   It subsumes, defines and interrelates the exemplars, theories,
   methods and instruments that exist within it." (Berting, 1979,
   p.143) For the (much discussed and disputed) idea of paradigms, see
   also Lakatos and Musgrave (eds.), 1970. For present purposes it
   suffices to reproduce Berting's typology and his main arguments.

This typology is based on the existence of two major oppositions and three secondary oppositions.

The first major opposition differentiates between sociological holism and sociological individualism. In the first approach social phenomena are to be treated as parts of a whole that are determined by this whole. The whole (society, social system, class, etc.) is logically preceding the parts and cannot be reduced to the characteristics of the parts. It has to be treated sui generis. This approach accords the realm of social phenomena an ontological status of its own, implying that social phenomena can only be explained in terms of other social phenomena and cannot be reduced to psychological phenomena like individual actions, motives, etc.

The holistic approach is catascopic: we look down from the whole to the parts and we understand the parts from the working of the whole. (This does not imply that the parts can be explained completely from the working of the dominating whole.) The holistic and catascopic approach is found in functionalistic approaches, both Durkheimian and the more recent systems-theory, but also in the conflict theory of Dahrendorf, the works of Marx and the neo-marxian approaches of e.g. Althusser and Poulantzas, the critical sociology of the Frankfurt School and Lévi-Strauss' structuralism.

In contradistinction, the approach of sociological individualism does not accept a dominating whole with a separate ontological status. On the contrary, wholes are seen as determined by the attributes of the parts they consist of. The more complex level can thus be reduced to the characteristics of its elements. Within this general approach are placed sociologists like Weber, Schütz, symbolic interactionists (Blumer, Cicourel, Goffman), ethno-methodologists, Pareto, Homans, Blau, etc.

Anascopic and catascopic sociologists differ not only in their basic assumptions regarding the nature of human beings, they also differ with regard to their approach to reality. Thus while they often use the same terms, holists, when referring to 'society', 'class',

continued *)
    A critical evaluation of his position is beyond the intent and
    scope of this paper.

'system', etc. have in mind real social phenomena, while individualists have a nominalistic approach to reality (e.g. a social system is a model of reality, a pure construction of the mind).
The second major opposition, demarcated by the horizontal axis concerns the opposition between approaches to social life.
On the one hand, social life is approached as an objective reality that is based on certain regularities.
This reality is, in principle, understandable to 'objective' observers without taking into account the subjective interpretations of the participants. In this approach the general components and structural aspects of social life are accentuated.
On the other side of the axis, the (inter-)subjective approach declares social life to be comprehensible to the observer only when she/he takes into account the participants' definition of the situation and the processes of reciprocal interpretation between interacting individuals. The 'subjectivists' stress the unique characteristics of a culture pattern or interaction situation. Attention is directed not at the ways social life is reproduced nor at structural adjustments to change but at the production of new forms of social life and cultural innovation. In contrast with the 'objectivists' search for the 'unchangeable laws' of the social world in order to master this world, or to reflect upon it, the subjectivists want to highlight the "uniqueness of man, who is not only capable of discovering the world, in their view, but also and above all is to be conceived of as a being that can create new meanings and values, that can in this way change himself and can give the world a new appearance" (Berting, 1979, p. 146). *)

In addition to the two major oppositions, Berting introduces three secondary oppositions. They are secondary oppositions because they either do not play a role within all of the paradigms described above or they do not differentiate between sociological approaches.

*) In an earlier version of his classification schema Berting attached the labels 'positivistic sociology' and 'interpretative sociology' to these opposite approaches.

These oppositions are:

- The conflict-consensus (or harmony) opposition, concerning the question of common interest versus mutually exclusive interests. This opposition is of importance within the context of the paradigms I, II, III, but not IV.
- The opposition between synchronistic and diachronistic approaches. "In synchronistic approaches attention is primarily paid to relationships between a number of variables and to changes in this system of relationships resulting from changes in one or more of the variables. Diachronistic approaches are oriented to changes in social entities (societies, cultures, social institutions) through time and explaining different types of change" (Berting, 1979, p. 147). The approaches in cell II and IV are primarily synchronistic, cell III-approaches are predominantly diachronistic, while cell I includes both approaches.
- The last opposition between continuous and discontinuous changes, refers to a distinction concerning the nature of social change and may be regarded as a specification of diachronic approaches.

Now, to systematize the debates, or better in this case, to see where the discussions went afoul, it is possible to combine the types of research goals with the types of sociological perspectives. (see fig. 2 on the next page)
The seven paradigms have been derived from the combination of the two major oppositions, holism (H) versus individualism (I), objectivism (O) versus (inter-)subjectivism (S), and the secondary opposition that differentiates between paradigms with a basic assumption of consensus or harmony (Ha) and those which stress conflict (C) as a basic category of social life.
It is in this context impossible nor necessary to elaborate all the combinations of this scheme. Instead, I will illustrate the explanatory potential of this scheme when applied to concrete phenomena like the seminar in a few observations.

	Types of Empirical Research				
Perspectives	(1) Development of Theory	(2) Explanation of Social Phenomena	(3) Description 3a 3b Ideo- of grafic Variables	(4) Contribu- tion to Change	(5) Evalua- tion
HOC HOHa					
IOC IOHa					
HSC HSHa					
IS					

Fig. 2. Classification of empirical research according to primary goals
and sociological perspectives (paradigms). (source: Berting,
1979 p. 164)

1. The first observation regards the able-willing schemes put forward
by Norman Uphoff on the first day *).
From the foregoing it may be clear that these schemes provide a useful,
though limited, heuristic device. In research concerned with e.g.
theory development within holistic paradigms, that is, in discipline
oriented research, the schemes seem hardly relevant. On the other hand,
in descriptive and policy oriented research within individualistic
perspectives the schemes may be quite useful even though the
explanatory power is limited.

*) Uphoff put the following schemes on the blackboard:

```
W            Able                      Able
i      _____      _____
l      yes  |    no          yes |     no
l    yes____|_____     yes___|_____
l    no     |              no    |
i      _____|_____            __|_____
n           |                    |
g     Client                  Provider
```

2. Part of the discussion around the contributions of Mario Padron and Bouwe Grijpstra centered around the perceived necessity of establishing trust relationships between agent/promotor and clients and among clients themselves, in development projects concerned with the formation of participatory organizations. From the exposition above it will be clear that this is indeed an important issue within the ISHa perspective. Consequently, in project formulations, planning and implementation, much effort and attention will be devoted to the trust-building process, and problems or successes will most likely be interpreted in these terms. However, within other paradigms the trust issue is of less importance, while within the HOC-perspective the issue is not only irrelevant, it is nonexistent. This, of course, does not necessarily mean that researchers operating within this paradigm flatly deny the empirical existence of trust or distrust relations. The interpretation of the phenomenon will be quite different though, and as a consequence, so will be the possible policy recommendations and concrete development stategies and efforts [*].

3. The third and last observation with regard to the paradigmatic issue refers to the discussion of Leen Boer's contribution.
At a certain moment the discussion turned into a heated argument concerning the the village-typology proposed by Boer. Although indeed the paper leaves room for serious questioning, some of the comments were unjustly put precisely because they were based on presumptions pertaining to different paradigms and with different research goals in mind. (This may also be a partial explanation for the heat and commotion generated by this issue.)
An example of this is the comment by one of the participants that the construction of typologies (and especially Boer's typology) is a useless intellectual exercise. Clearly, apart from negating the rather widespread and accepted activity of type- and typology-construction in

[*] For a good example of the difference in interpretation and explanation of phenomena like trust and distrust, and the concommittant 'resistance to change' that developers run into, see G. Huizer, 1973

scientific (and other) endeavors [*], such a comment can only be based on adherence to a different perspective and/or researchgoal then the one chosen by Boer. Thus, the criticism boils down to saying that an apple is no good because it is not a pear, or to use another analogy, criticizing a woman for not being a man (and vica versa).

4. Participation - the conceptual issue

Closely related to the issues put forward in the paragraphs above is the conceptual issue, that is, the issue of confusion and non-dialogue generated by the lack of conceptual clarity and/or the existence and use of the same term for different phenomena, within different contexts, within different paradigms.
To a certain degree this obscurity is inherent to scientific knowledge and is especially true for basic concepts such as 'change', 'cause' etc. These terms refer to "...intellectual constructs derived from very deep aspects of human experience of coping with the external world. Our practical command of them has developed through millenia of experience; and no single formalization can capture that body of completely tacit inherited knowledge." (Ravetz, 1972, p. 21)
One consequence of this fundamental obscurity is the conclusion that the assumption of the existence of a unique, perfect and true version or definition of concepts, is a false one.
Thus, words like 'democracy' and 'participation' and even words like 'boat'. do not have 'true' meanings, they just have different applications depending on the purpose of their use and the context in which they are used. Likewise, the question about the essence of a phenomenon becomes irrelevant, moreover unanswerable, since the use of a certain version of a concept is (among others) dependent on the adopted perspective and the formulated goals of the resaerch. It is important then, to clearly specify these aspects of the research, while at the same time also specifying the intended use of the concepts

[*] "...a major task in any science is the development of systems of classification, a structure of concepts and an increasingly precise set of definitions for these terms" (Goode and Hatt, 1952, p. 9).

concerned. If these specifications are not made explicit
misunderstanding results and an adequate discussion is made difficult.

At this point it may be good to realize that conceptualization is
influenced by both internal and external factors. The internal aspect
refers to the existence (and development) of different positions in
the realms of metaphysics, ontology, enistomology, methodology etc.
that influence choices on the theoretical and conceptual level, which
have consequences for both research and development strategies [*].
The external factors refer to influence by the socio-political context
in which the research originates and is implemented. Especially in
policy oriented research (but not only there) the external influences
are more easily noticed in both the researchgoal and the adoption of
a certain perspective.
Benno Galjart's account of the PMUR-project provides examples both
of the consequences of external influences and of the consequences of
not being clear enough on the specification of the internal aspects of
conceptualization (see the contribution of Galjart (11)).

A last observation regarding the conceptual issue concerns the question
of meaning of the concept, as divorced from questions of values (or
moral judgements) and questions of fact. That is to say, a distinction
can be made between three aspects of concepts. First of all, questions
of fact refer to the empirical facts that are covered by the concept
which may be true or not; e.g. participation may or may not exist in a
concrete project like the PMUR.
Secondly, concepts carry with them a value, that is, a moral notion of
being desirable or not. Robert Stern refered to this aspect of
concepts when, in his comments on the first day of the seminar, he
observed that the word 'development' carries, almost by definition, a
positive notion of desirability. The third question refers to the

[*] Thus, a participatory project where the concept of participation is
used in terms of 'partaking in' (e.g. in the school system, labor
market, etc.), without the connotation of effective influence in
decision-taking, will have a different setup, and a different
strategy than a project in which participation is interpreted in
the sense of 'full democracy'.

meaning of the concept, that is to say, concerns the actual and
possible uses of words.
"They (words) just have different applications: and our job is to
analyse the concepts and map their uses and applications" (Wilson,
1966, p. 10).
Without an answer to this last question, the first two questions
become unanswerable.

In the discussions at the seminar these three aspects have not always
been sufficiently distinguished. Neither have the different meanings
and uses of the concept of 'participation' always been sufficiently
'mapped' and made explicit. Thus, where dialogues are intended,
monologues may result as a consequence of different uses and
applications of the main concepts.

5. Concluding remarks

In the foregoing paragraphs I have touched upon some very complex and
problematic topics related to research and fieldwork concerned with
participatory development projects.

The issues of ontology, epistemology, paradigms, theories and concepts
are often considered to be worthwhile only for armchair scholars
working at highly abstract levels. It is my contention and experience
that this is a misconception, these abstract, theoretical issues on
the contrary carry with them very concrete and practical consequences.

In some of the papers and discussions, 'participation' has correctly
been linked with 'conscientization' (that is, becoming conscious and
aware). Dealing with questions of concept similarly asks us to become
aware of the significance of our words. As such it plays an important
role and may be considered as a necessary, albeit not sufficient,
condition for active/reflective participation, to borrow
Mario Padron's terms. After all, "A great many issues that concern
human beings are intrinsically philosophical and very often a
particular difficulty requires to be solved not so much with research

as with conceptual clarification.." (Bonsel, 1981, p. 12)

In a heterogenous group with different backgrounds, experiences, interests, goals and perspectives, conseptual confusion is unavoidable. Realizing this, it may be wise to be much more specific, precise and strict in the question and answer games involved in international and interdisciplinary discourse like the seminar on "Access and Participation" [*].

[*] "Language is a little like eyeglasses. If yours are dirty they will interfere and obscure your view, but if you clean them you will be able to see much better" (J. Feibleman, 1975, p. 205).

References

Berting, J.	What is the use of international comparative research? In: Berting, J. et al (eds) Problems in international comparative research in the social sciences. Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1979.
Berting, J.	A framework for the discussion of theoretical and methodological problems in the field of international comparative research in the social sciences. In: Berting, J. et al (eds) Problems in international comparative research in the social sciences. Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1979, pp. 137-157.
Black, M.	Critical thinking. Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, second edition 1952.
Bonsel, Eduard	Why is methodology problematic. In: Vassalo, Mario (ed.) Youth in perspective, methodological problems and alternatives in the study of youth. Euro-Arab Social Research Group, Malta, 1981.
Feibleman, J.	Understanding philosophy. London, Souvenir Press Ltd., 1975.
Huizer, G.	Peasant Rebellion in Latin America. Harmondsworth, Penquin Books Ltd., 1973.
Goode, William J. and Paul K. Hatt	Methods in social research. New York, Toronto, London, McGraw-Hill, 1952.
Lakatos, J. and A. Musgrave (eds)	Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970.
Ravetz, J.R.	Scientific knowledge and its social problems. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972.
Wilson, John	Thinking with concepts. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1966.